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on  several  occasions  in  recent  years  ) 
Professor  T.  S.  Willan 
had  drawn  attention  to  the  importance  of  the  inland  carrying 
trade,  especially  in  the  eighteenth  century)and  its  neglect  by 
historians.  In  his  latest  study,  of  Abraham  Dent  of  Kirkby 
Stepheng  he  stresses  the  contribution  to  the  network  of  trade  of 
the  carrierg  11  a  strangely  neglected  figure.  "  Until  the  advent 
of  railways  the  internal  distribution  of  goods  depended  heavily 
on  the  services  of  the  common  carriers.  Carrying  concerns  varied 
in  size  from  the  small,  one-man  business  of  local  interests  to 
large  national  concerns  which  operated  over  long  distances  and 
employed  large  numbers  of  road  vehiclesq  canal  boatsl  horses  and 
men.  The  greatest  of  the  national  concerns  was  the  firm  of 
Pickford  &  Co.  Founded  in  the  mid-eighteenth  centuryt  it  alone 
of  its  contemporaries  on  the  roads  and  later  competitors  on  the 
canalst  has  survived  to  the  present  day. 
A  full  study  of  the  carrying  trade  in  the  eighteenth  and  early 
nineteenth  century  still  awaits  an  author.  Such  a  study  would 
be  extremely  valuable  but  as  the  relevant  material  is  likely  to 
be  very  diffuse  it  would  probably  demand  several  years  of  pain- 
staking  work.  In  the  meantime  the  following  study  of  the  premier 
carrying  firm  serves  to  illustrate  some  of  the  major  lines  of 
development  of  the  inland  carrying  trade,  For  although  this 
study  is  based  on  the  activities  and  records  of  an  individual 
business  its  main  concern  is  with  the  development  of  transportation. 
There  are  two  main  reasons  for  this, 
In  the  first  place,  Pickfordst  surviving  records  are  too 
sparse  to  sustain  a  'business  history'  properly  so  called.  Only 
i. for  the  twenty  years  from  1900  is  it  possible  to  say  much  about 
Pickfordst  development  as  a  business  unit,  The  main  core  of 
Pickfords'  business  records  is  a  run  of  Directorst  board  and 
committee  minutes  from  1901  to  1919:  earlier  survivals  are 
essentially  haphazard 
)  although  some  pieces  have  been  of  consider- 
able  value.  Pickfords  sustained  two  bad  fires,  at  City  Basin  in 
. 
1825  and  Camden  Town  in  1857,  when  record  books  were  destroyed, 
although  it  is  a  puzzle  why  so  little  has  survived  from  the  later 
nineteenth  century.  Pickfords'  past  solicitors  have  been  traced 
but  no  legal  papers  discovered.  One  collection  of  such  papers, 
including  partnership  agreementst  court  cases  and  leases  of  the 
1820  to  1840  period,  were  destroyed  in  1917.  Other  papers 
relative  to  the  present  century  were  destroyed  just  a  few  years 
before  this  study  was  commenced,  Supplementary  material  has  been 
found  in  family  papers  and  other  business  recordst  canal  and 
railway  company  records,  Blue  Books,  trade  directoriesq  newspapers 
and  trade  journals.  Inevitably  such  records  relate  to  Pickfords, 
transportation  activities  rather  than  the  firmts  development  as 
a  business  unit.  'Where  possible  the  nature  of  Pickfords'  business 
growth  is  sketched  in,  but  only  in  the  last  twenty  years  of  the 
study  can  more  than  a  summary  outline  be  attempted. 
Secondly,  during  the  span  of  Pickfords'  history  examined  herey 
well  over  150  yearsq  a  series  of  radical  changes  occured  in  the 
technology  of  transportation.  Each  phase,  turnpikesq  canalsq 
railways,  has  its  own  literature,  but  little  attention  has  been 
given  to  the  impact  of  new  modes  of  transportation  on  existing 
transport  forms.  With  its  long  historyg  Pickfords'  experience 
provides  a  new  and  unique  view  of  the  familiar  flow  of  transport 
innovations.  What  effect  did  changes  in  the  technology  of 
transportation  have  on  a  leading  carrying  firmt  itself  both  a 
ii. producer  and  consumer  of  transport  services?  How  easily  were  new 
opportunities  absorbed  and  how  often  did  change  result  in  a 
hostile  rather  than  challenging  environment?  What  were  the 
conditions  for  success  in  the  carrying  tradeq  especially  as 
le 
explaining  Pickfords'  unique  survival?  It  is  in  the  answer  to 
questions  such  as  these  that  this.  study  has  a  general  significance, 
beyond  the  confines  of  Pickfords  as  an  individual  business  concern. 
Of  course  it  is  invariably  easier  to  Pose  questions  than  to  answer 
them.  In  this  case,  because  of  the  limits  imposed  by  the  nature 
of  the  survivina  evidence,  many  potentially'interesting  questions 
have  to  remain  unanswered. 
During  the  course  of  my  researchesp  I  have  been  helped  and 
encouraged  by  many  peopleg  to  whom  I  now  offer  my  thanks.  First 
I  would  like  to  thank  the  archivists  of  the  British  Railway  Board 
in  London  and  Edinburgh  for  access  to  the  records  in  their  care. 
Since  the  bulk  of  Pickfords'  records  are  on  public  deposit  with 
the  B.  R.  B.  at  Porchester  Road,  London,  together  with  the  main  core 
of  other  records  used  for  this  study,  my  work  would  have  been 
impossible  without  their  assistance.  Pickfords  itself  retains  few 
records  pertaining  to  the  time  period  of  this  studyy  but  these 
have  been  freely  available  to  meq  together  with  t4e  valued 
assistance  and  hospitality  of  Mr.  II.  Elliot,  until  recently 
managing  director  of  Pickfords,  Mr.  G.  Skelton,  now  managing 
director  of  Pickfords  Removals  Ltd,  and  Mr.  S.  Dunfordp  formerly 
assistant-general  manager.  I  would  also  like  to  thank  the 
librarians  of  the  Guildhall  Library,  London,  the  John  Rylanqs  and 
Chethams  libraries,  Manchesterf  and  the  Archives  department  of  the 
Manchester  Central  Reference  library  for  their  help'. 
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iii. e5pecially  for  the  first  eightyýodd  years  of  Pickfords'  history. 
I  would  like  to  thank  Mr.  C.  H.  Pickfordt  the  late  Hon.  Miss  D. 
Pickford,  Mr.  E.  HalfPennyt  the  late  Captain  Guy  Baxendale  and 
Mr.  T.  Baxendale  for  the  use  of  records  in  their  possession. 
In  particular  I  wish  to  acknowledge  my  debt  to  the  Hon.  Miss  Mary 
Pickford  who  in  the  1930s  undertook  some  research  into  Pickfords, 
early  history.  I  was  fortunate  enough  to  be  able  to  consult  her 
files,  which  contained  the  fruits  of  many  weeks'  work  on  the  two 
main  Manchester  newspapers  in  the  second  half  of  the  nineteenth 
century.  The  sections  of  Chapters  2  and  3  of  this  study  which 
make  substantial  use  of  this  source  owe  a  great  deal  to  her  original 
labours. 
I  was  first  encouraged  in  my  interest  in  Pickfords  by  Mr.  A.  E. 
Musson  of  the  University  of  Manchester,  and  I  w.  ould  like  to  thank 
him  for  his  help  in  the  initial  stages  of  my  research.  Most  of  my 
work  was  done  in  Glasgow  and  I  would  like  to  thank  Professor  S.  G. 
Checkland  and  my  former  colleagues,  Dr.  T.  Gourvish#Dr.  M.  C.  Reed 
and  Dr.  M.  Elvin  for  their  help  and  stimulating  criticism,  I 
have  much  appreciated  their  comments,  even  if  I  have  not  always 
agreed. 
Much  of  the  research  work  for  this  study  was  completed  in 
London  during  long  vacations.  For  several  months  I  was  fortunate 
t 
to  enjoy  the  hospitality  of  my  friends  Philip  and  Marie  Glennong 
whose  housetamporarily  became  a  second  home.  Their  kindness  and 
generosity  was  greatly  appreciated. 
Many  people  have  done  typing  for  me,  and  I  would  like  to  thank 
-them  allq  especially  my  late  father,  who  spent  part  of  his  hard- 
earned  retirement  typing  several  of  the  early  chapters  of  this 
study:  unfortunately  he  died  without  seeing  its  completion,  I 
would  like  to  dedicate  my  work  to  his  memory, 
iv, Finally,  I  owe  a  great  debt  of  thanks  to  my  wife,  Susan. 
She  has  born  the  main  social  costo  especially  during  the  final 
stages  of  completion,  and  has  helped  and  encouraged  me  at  every 
stage. 
V. Tickfords  1750-1920:  A  study  in  the  development  of  transportation 
Summary 
Pickfords  was  founded  in  the  mid-eighteenth  century.  By 
the  early  nineteenth  century  it  had  achieved.  national  prominence, 
a  position  which  it  has  retained  continuously  to  the  present  day. 
As  the  only  national  transport  firm  now  surviving  from  pro-industrial 
days,  its  experience  is  of  particular  interest  in  the  study  of 
transport  history.  This  study  traces  the  development  of  Pickfords 
from  it.  ý  origins  up  to  1920, 
Until  the  twentieth  century  the  direct  records  of  the  business 
are  relatively  few.  Only  from  1901  is  it  possible  to  attempt  a 
sustained  analysis  of  the  firm  as  a  business  unit,  in  addition  to 
its  place  in  the  context  of  the  transport  industry,  and  the  economy 
in  general.  However  Pickfords'  activities  in  the  eighteenth  and 
nineteenth  centuries  left  their  record  in  other  placeso  especially 
in  contemporary  newspapers  and  trade  directories,  and  the  minute 
books  of  canal  and  railway  companies.  On  the  basis  of  these 
records,  together  with  family  papers,  it  has  been  possible  to 
reconstitute  the  main  lines  of  Pickfordst  development  during  these 
years, 
Pickfords'  business  was  that  of  the  common  carrierp  the 
transportation  of  all  manner  of  traffict  including  passengers  in 
the  early  daysp  initially  between  London  and  Lancashire  but 
eventually,  after  the  advent  of  railways,  over  the  whole  country. 
Pickfords  was  thus  both  a  producer  and  consumer  of  transport 
services  and  therefore  inevitably  affected  by  the  major  breaks  in the  technology  of  transportation  whi'ch  followed  from  the  innovation 
zi  of  turnpikes  onwards,  One  of  the  main  themes  of  this  study  is 
an  examination  of  this  series  of  innovations  from  the  viewpoint 
of  Pickfords..  their  implications  for  a  carrying  concern  and  the 
nature  of  Pickfords'  response. 
Pickfords  began  as  a  Manchester  based  firm,  but  by  the 
beginning  of  the  twentieth  century  its  main  interests  were  in  and 
around  the  London  area.  Pickfords  had  also  by  then  passed  out 
of  the  ownership'of  the  Pickford  family  and  had  for  some  years,  been 
in  the  hands  of  the  Baxendale  family.  Indeed  in  1817  the  firm 
had  been  on  the  verge  of  bankruptcy  and  had  largely  been  saved  by 
the  efforts  of  Joseph  Baxendalev  one  of  three  new  partners  then 
taken  into  the  firm  to  meet  the  crisis.  Pickfords  overcame  this 
crisis,  and  that  resulting  from  the  advent.  of  railwaysq  and  thus 
survived  into  the  twentieth  century.  However  more  problems  were 
still  to  come.  Dissension  within  the  firm,  a  major  error  of 
tactics,  growing  financial  difficulties  and  increasing  pressure 
of  competition,  all  lay  behind  Pickfords'  decision  to  amalgamate 
with  its  major  rivals  in  1912.  The  nature  of  Pickfords' 
development  as  a  business  and  the  reason  for  its  unique  survival 
to  the  present  provide  the  second  main  theme  of  the  study* Celia:  You  seem  annoyed. 
Ld.  Mountararat:  Annoyed!  I  should  think  so!  Why  this 
ridiculous  protege  of  yours  is  playing 
the  deuce  with  everything!  To-niGht  is 
the  second  reading  of  his  Bill  to  throw 
the  Peerage  open  to  Competitive  Examination! 
Ld.  Tolloller:  And  he'll  carry  it,  too! 
Ld.  Mountararet:  Carry  it?  Of  course  he  will!  He's  a 
Parliamentary  Pickford  -  he  carries  everything. 
W.  S.  Gilbert  Iolanthe  Act  11 CHAPTER  1. 
THE  SETTING The  precise  origins  of  Pickfords  are  obscure.  There 
is  a  strong  tradition  in  the  firm,  formally  recorded  early 
in  the  present  centuryt'  that  its  roots  reach  back  to  the 
first  half  of  the  sixteenth  century. 
2 
However  the  first 
documentary  evidence  of  Pickfords'  existence  dates  from 
1756.  In  August  that  year  James  Pickford  informed  his 
customers,  "all  Gentlemen,  Tradesmen  and  othersq'I  that  his 
London  waggon  which  had  hitherto  left  for  Manchester  each 
Wednesday  from  the  Blossom's  Inn,  Lawrence  Lane,  would  in 
3 
future  depart  from  the  Bell  Inn,  Wood  Street.  It  is  clear 
from  this  that  James  Pickford  had  already  entered  the  road 
haulage  business;  the  starting  point  was  earlier  but  how 
much  earlier  the  available  evidence  has  so  far  not  revealed. 
Strictly  speaking  James  Pickford  was  acting  as  a  common 
carrierg  conveyine  goods  and  passengers  by  road  between 
London  and  Manchester.  What  sort  of  a  business  was  it  in 
which  he  was  engaged? 
A  carrier  in  the  sense  in  which  the  term  is  used  hereq 
is  defined  by  the  Oxford  English  Dictionary  as  "one  who 
I 
undertakes  for  hire  the  conveyance-of  goods  and  parcels 
04  (usually  on  certain  routes  and  at  fixed  times.  ) 
1'  Minutes,  Directors'  Committee  8  Jan.  1908  Pic  1/14. 
2  For  a  more  detailed  discussion  see  appendix  1. 
3  Manchester  Mercury,  3,  Aug.  1756.  Advertisements  were 
frequently  left  to  run  for  several  weeks:  only  the 
date  of  the  first  insertion  is  noted.  Except  where 
it  has  been  desired  to  retain  the  flavour  of  the 
original,  spelling  and  punctuation  has  been  modernised. 
4  Oxford  English-Dictionary  Vol.  II,  Ct  133. 
1. In  the  seventeenth  century  and  for  most  of  the  eighteenth 
it  would  be  necessary  to  add  passengers  to  the  range  of 
custom  for  which  the  carrier  offered  his  services,  This 
definition  applies  only  to  that  part  of  the  inland  carrying 
trade  undertaken  by  the  public  or  common  carrier,  For 
there  were  several  categories  of  persons  who  performed 
road  transport  servicesq  variously  differentiated  by  their. 
legal  statU5,  whether  part-time  or  full-timev  or  the 
distances  over  which  they  carried, 
5 
In  the  seventeenth  and  eighteenth  centuries  it  was 
fairly  common  for  farmers  and  small  holders  generally  to 
perform  carrying  services.  This  might  be  on  an  ad  hoc  basis, 
a  back  load  to  fill  an  otherwise  empty  waggon  returning 
from  London  or  some  other  market,  or  it  might  be  on  a  more 
regular  basis,  the  requirement  of  a  lease 
6 
or  the  utilisation 
in  slack  periods  of  otherwise  idle  farm  equipment  but  with 
the  income  from  such  activities  allowed  forg  for  rental 
purposes,  in  the  terms  of  the  lease. 
7 
in  aggregate  such 
carrying  activities  probably  represented  a  substantial 
proportion  of  the  total  volume  of  road  transport  servicest 
but  individually  they  were  essentially  part-time  and  small- 
scale.,  Persons  engaged  in  this  line  of  work  would  normally 
carry  over  relatively  short  distances  but  in  particular  they 
acted  in  a  private  capacity:  the  essence  of  this  position 
was  that  they  did  not  offer  a  public  service. 
5  Until  there  is  substantial  further  research  into  the, 
structure  of  the  inland  carrying  trade  in  this  period 
it  is  impossible  to  speak  in  other  than  fairly  general 
terms, 
6  R.  A.  Lewis  'Transport  for  eighteenth  century  iron  works' 
Economical  N.  S.  Vol*  18  1951 
7  T.  S.  Wilian  The  naviaation  of  the  river  Weaver  in  the 
eighteenth  century  kChetham  Society  publications,  3rd 
jis,  Vol.  39  1951)  passim 
I This  applied  especially  to  those  who  did  more  than,  say, 
cart  coal  for  the  local  town  and  industries, 
8 
but  engaged 
in  general  carrying  activities,  again  mainly  on  a  local 
basis.  Legally  theý,  were  classed  as  private  carriers, 
that  is'they  undertook  particular  assignments  on  a  person 
to  person  basis  and  were  not  available  for  common  hire. 
They  were  thus  free  from  the  legal  obligations  which 
applied  to  the  public  or  common  carriers. 
9 
Thisý 
distinction,  if  rather  thin  at  times  in  practicep  was 
important;  it  was  the  device  by  which  probably  a  fairly 
large  group  of  small-men  were  able  to  share  in  the 
provincial  carrying  trade. 
The  common  carriers  were  full-time  specialists  who 
offered  regular  road  haulage  services  for  specified  routes 
and  places,  many  of  them  operating  over  long  distances* 
Because  they  explicitly  sought  public  customt  the  carrierso 
without  being  officially  ranked  as  suchq  were  subject  to 
some  of  the  legal  requirements  dating  from  medieval  times 
which  applied  to  the  public  or  'common'  trades* 
10 
By 
the  eighteenth  century  the  common  carriers  had  to  observe 
a  number  of  recognised,  if  ill-defined,  legal  obligationso 
They  had  to  accept  all  traffic  brought  to  them  for  conveyancep 
at  agreed  and  reasonable  ratesq  for  all  towns  to  which  they 
professed  to  carry.  They  had  to  treat  the  goods  entrusted 
to  them  with  care  and  accept  full  responsibility  in  the  event 
of  loss.  The  carrier  was  entitled  to  charge  a-,  special 
I 
8  J.  U.  Nef  The  rise  of  the  British  coal  industry  (1926) 
eSp'Vol.  10  pt  1,  Chap.  2. 
9  For  the  distinction  between  private  and  common  carriers, 
J.  Crofts  Packhorse,  waggon  and  120st  (1967)  Chaps-  5  and  6 
10  A.  M.  Milne  and  A.  Laing  The  obligation-to  carry,  (Institute 
of  Transport  Monographt  19.56)  p9  ff. 
also  Crofts  Op.  Cit.  Chap-  5. 
3. rate  for  particularly  valuable  items'like  cash  and  jewellery 
and  if  their  value  was  declared  his  liability  was  limited 
to  the  extent  of  that  valuation,  even  if  less  than  the 
actual  value.  However  it  was  not  uncommon  to  hide  such 
items  in  a  bundle  of  goods  to  avoid  the  extra  cost  of  a 
special  rate.  In  this  case,  it  seems,  the  carrier  was 
liable  to  the  extent  of  the  goods'  total  actual  value.  The 
purpose  of  such  onerous  terms  was  to  protect  the  public  from 
the  risk  of  collusive  robberies.  The  only  excepting 
conditions  were  Act  of  God  or  of  the  Kingts  enemies. 
Common  carriers  can  be  categorised,  broadly  speakinal 
according  to  the  distances  over  which  they  operated.  Some 
were  essentially  localq  perhaps  travelling  no  further  than 
within  a  day's  journey  radius  of  their  home  base*  Others 
ventured  further  afield  and  still  others  specialised  in  the 
long-distance  trade,  in  particular  that  to  London*  This 
sort  of  break  down  is  Illustrated  by  the  range  of  carriers 
employed  by  Abraham  Dent  of  Kirkby  Stephen  in  the  later 
eighteenth  century.  Some  of  his  carriers  travelled  the 
sixty  miles  to  Newcastle-upon-Tyne,  whereas  others  travelled 
only  between  Kirkby  Stephen  and  Kendal.  One  of  the  prime 
tasks  of  this  last  group  was,  to  deliver  Dent%  goods  to  the 
carriers  who  operated  stage  waggons  between  Kendal  and 
London.  12 
This  was  one  of  the  longest  hauls  undertaken  by 
common  carriers. 
11  The  precise  legal  status  of  the  common  carriers  was 
not  definea  until  the  Carriers'  Act  of  1830. 
12  T.  S.  Willan  An  eighteenth  century  shop-keeper:  Abraham 
Dent  of  Kirkby  Stephen  (M-U-P-  1970)  P  39  ff. 
1. When  James  Pickford  first  appears  on  the  scene,  the 
trade  of  common  carrier'was  already  getting  on  to  be  some 
four  hundred  years  old.  In  medieval  times  the  demand  for 
road  transport  services  over  relatively  long  distances  and 
on  any  substantial  scale  and  regular  basis  probably  first 
appeared  in  the  woollen  cloth  and  corn  trades  which  supplied 
the  London  market, 
13 
The  carriage  of  general  goodst  initially 
no  doubt  as  a  back  load,  apparently  grew  up  in  association 
with  those  trades. 
14 
Although  the  demand  for  general  carrying 
services  was  not  large  -  however  the  volume  of  goods  on  the 
roads,  both  wheeled  and  horse  trafficp  and  the  ease  of 
communication,  should  not  be  underestimated  -  by  the  end 
15 
of  the  fourteenth  century  the  common  carrier  was  already 
travelling  the  roads. 
16 
The  accelerated  pace  of  industrial 
and  economic  activity  generally  from  the  later  fifteenth  and 
throughout  the  sixteenth  century  stimulated  a  considerable 
expansion  of  inland  trade.  17 
By  the  mid-sixteenth  century 
carri-ers  were  already  travelling  to  London  on  a  regular 
weekly  or  monthly  basis. 
18 
At  the  end  of  the  century  when 
Stow  was  regretting  the  trend  of  contemporary  developmentsp 
"the  world  runs  on  wheels  with  many  whose  parents  were  glad 
to  go  on  foot", 
19 
the  'long-waggont,  the  carrier's  stage-waggon 
13  R.  B.  Westerfield  Middlemen  iri  English  business,  particularly 
between-1660  anh_1760  (Yale  Univ.  Press  1915)  Chaps.  2  and  5. 
N.  S.  B.  Gras  The  evolution  of  the  EnRlish  corn  market 
(Harvard,  London  &  Oxford,  1915) 
14  Westerfield  Op.  cit.  pp  282-4  emphasiserý  the  background 
of  the  cloth  trade 
15  J.  P.  Willard  'The  use  of  carts  in  the  fourteenth  century' 
Histor  ,  N-S.  Vol.  17  Oct-  19321,  p  246  ff.; 
J.  E.  T.  Rogers  A  history  of  agriculture  and  prices  in  England 
(Oxford  1902)  Vol.  IP  959  p  663. 
16  Rogers  OP. 
-c  -P  95,  p  66o. 
17  W.  T.  Jackman  The  development  of  transportation  in  modern 
England  (2nd--ed.  1962)  pp  43-5 
18  Gras  OP.  cit-  P  1539  note  1;  also  O.  E.  D.  Vol.  II  c.  133 
citation  for  1553/4. 
19  j.  Stow  A  survey  of  London  ...  written  in  the  year  1ý98 
(ed.  H.  Morleyq  N.  D,  ?  1908)  p  101. 
5. of  later  yearsp  had  already  been  introduced  and  journeyed 
up  to  London  regularly  from  various  placesl  including 
Canterbury,  Norwichq  Ipswich,  and  Gloucester* 
20 
From  the  seventeenth  century  onwards  the  common  carrier 
appears  as  an  increasingly  familiar  part  of  the  country's 
transport  servicesq  both  for  passengers  and  goods. 
21 
Before 
stage  coaches  came  into  common  use  the  carrier's  waggon 
accommodated  upper  class  patronaget  including  the  diarist 
Evelyn, 
22  It  was  only  in  the  eighteenth  century  that  this 
form  of  conveyance  was  restricted  to,  the  poorer  classes  of 
society,  By  the  1620s  the  Kendal  carriers  were  already 
travelling  to  London. 
23 
Indeed  a  pattern  of  recognisable 
routes  was  soon  laid  down  and  certain  inns  in  the  City  of 
London  came  to  be  recognised  as  the  regular  arrival  and 
departure  points  of  various  groups  of  carriers. 
24 
The  extent 
of  this  development  is  demonstrated  by  the  publication  in 
1637  of  John  Taylorts  survey  of  carriers  and  the  inns  they 
used  in  London.  2.5  The  survey  shows  that  the  essential 
structure  of  the  inland  carrying  trade  had  already  been  formed. 
20  E.  A.  Pratt  A  history  of  inland  transport  and  communication 
in  England  Cl-912) 
P  35 
21  N.  Penne  ed)  The  household  account  book  of  Sarah  Fell 
of  Swarthmore  Eall  (C.  U.  P.  1920); 
J.  H.  Markland  'Some  remarks  on  the'early  use  of  carriages 
in  Englandt  and  on  the  modes  of  travelling  by  our  ancestors' 
Archaeologia,  Vol.  XX,  1824ý  p  443  ff.:  also 
J.  Wake  and  D.  C.  Webster  (eds  'The  letters  of  David  Eaton 
to  the  Third  Earl  of  Cardigan,  1725  -17321  The  Northampton- 
shire  Record  Society  Vol.  XXIV  (1971) 
F,  Tyrer  &J.  J.  Bagley  (eds)  'The  great  diurnal  of  Nicholas 
Blundell  of  Little  Crosbyt  Lancashire.  Vol,  1  1702  -1711; 
Vol.  2,1712-1719.  The  Record  Society  of  Lancashire  and 
Cheshire  Vol.  110  (1968)  Vol.  112  (1970) 
22  As  cited  by  O.  E  D.  (Waggon)  Vol.  13,  W.  p  15.  This  includes 
a  reference  to 
; 
he  daughter  of  a  Sir  W.  Dugdale  travelling 
to  London  by  the  Coventry  Waggon  in  1660. 
23  G.  Ornsby  (ed)  Selections  from  the  household  books  of  Lord 
William  Howard  of  Naworth  Castl2.,  (Surtees  Society,  Vol.  689 
187ST 
24  Jackman  Opocite  p  45t  citing  Harrison's-Discription  of 
England  in  Shakespeare's  youth. 
25  J.  Taylor  The  Carriers  Cosmographie,  (1637).  The  Pages  are 
not  numbered.  but  the  towns  are  listed  alphabetically. 
6. Similar  accounts  of  the  late  seventeenth  and  early  eighteenth 
centuries  reiterate  the  same  structure. 
26 
Many  of  the  inns 
mentioned  remained  associated  with  the  various  groups  of 
carriers  listed  for  many  years  to  come,  The  Manchester 
carriers  were  described  by  Taylor  as  follows:  - 
"The  Carriers  of  Manchester,  doe  lodge  at 
the  Beare  in  Bassingshaw,  they  do  come  on 
Thursdaes  or  Fridaies.  The  Carriers  of 
Manchester,  doe  likewise  lodge  at  the  signe 
of  the  Axe  in  Aldermanbury. 
The  Carriers  of  Manchester.  doe  also  lodge 
at  the  two  neckId  Swan  in  Lad  Lane 
, 
(between 
great  Wood  street,  and  Milk  street  end)  they 
come  every  second  Thursday;  also  there  do 
lodg  Carriers  that  doe  passe  through  divers 
other  parts  of  Lancashire.  " 
Of  the  inns  mentioned  here,  Pickfords  used  twog  the  White 
Bear  and  the  Swan  with  Two  Necks,  at  various  times*  The 
Castle  Inn,  Wood  Streetv  immediately  adjacent  to  the  Swan, 
was  Pickfordst  first  permanent  headquarters  in  London. 
The  growing  importance  of  the  common  carriers  is  attested 
by  the  increasing  attention  paid  to  them  by  King  and  Parliament* 
In  1623  James  I  issued  a  proclamation,  repeated  by  his  son 
six  years  later,  which  regulated  the,  type  of  waggon  and 
number  of  horses  the  carriers  could  use  and  the  maximum  weight 
they  could  carryt  because  of  the  severe  damage  being  caused 
to  the  public  highwayse 
27  '  Between  1670  and  1748  about  a 
dozen  Highway  Acts  were  passed  which  included'provisions  to 
control  carriersp  most  of  them  specifying  the  maximum  weight 
of  loads  or  the  number  of  horses  to  be  used,  The  most 
important  of  these  Acts  was  that  passed  in  1692  (3  William  & 
Mary  C.  12)  whose  purpose  was  to  bring  the  carriers  under 
26  De  Laune  The 
Metropolis  or 
jjr-ýO-n  The  Inte 
from  Y740  the 
useful. 
27  Pratt  OP-cite 
presentstate  of  London_(1681);  Angliae 
The  present  state  of  London  (169o): 
iligencer.  *-or,  Merchants  Assistant-(1738); 
London  directories  becomTincreasingly 
p  43  Citing  Macpherson's  'Annals  of  Commercel 
7o further  form  of-control,  In  response  to  complaints  that  the 
carriers  had  combined  in  order  to  raise  prices,  carriage 
rates  were  brought  under  statutory  control.  At  their 
annual  Easter  meeting  the  Justices  of  the  Peace  in  each 
county  were  required  to  fix  the  maximum  rate  of  carriage 
within  their  area  of  jurisdiction. 
28 
The  carriers  remained  the  target  of  accusations  of 
monopoly 
29 
and  were  also  the  subject  of  continual  parliamentary 
measures  to  preserve  the  condition  of  the  roads,  especially 
by  the  promotion  of  broad  wheel  waggons, 
30  in  the  face  of 
the  rising  volume  of  traffic  passing  over  them,  However 
throughout  the  eighteenth  century  the  i'nland  carrying  trade 
continued  to  flourish3l  and  the  rate  of  expansion  of  the 
trade  accelerated  as  the  century  advanced, 
32 
Taylor  received  little  co-operation  from  the  carriers 
whom  he  approached  for  information  about  their  trade,  but 
instead  met  with  "hard  and  unsavoury  answers.  " 
28  For  a  discussion  of  the  J.  P.  sl  assessments  under  this 
Act  see  T.  S.  Willan  'The  Justices  of  the  Peace  and  the 
rates  of  land  carriage,  1692-1827.  '  Journal  of  Transport 
History  Vol.  V.  (1962)  PP  197-204t  and  W,  Albert  'The 
Justices'  rates  for  land  carriage  1748-1827t  reconsidered' 
Transport  History  Vol.  1  (1968)  PP  105-129. 
In  the  course  of  his  article  Albert  comments  on  the 
nature  and  significance  of  Parliament's  attention  to  the 
carriers  after  1748, 
29  J.  T*Bunce  History  of  the  Corporation  of  Birmingham  Vole  1 
(1878)  p  49; 
Westerfield  Middlemen  in  Enalish  business  p  137 
30  Jackman  Op.  Cit,  P  215  ff, 
31  Westerfield  Op. 
__cit. 
p  284 
D.  Defoe  The  complete  English  tradesman  (4th  ed.  1738) 
Vol.  I  Cha-p-.  -2-61  Vol.  119  Chap.  18. 
32  W.  G.  Rimmer  Marshalls  of  Leeds  Flax  Spinners  1788-1886 
(C.  U.  P.  19607  p  34.  Rimmer  comments  that  the  carriers' 
services  from  Leeds  increased  rapidly  after  1770.  This 
would  seem  to  hold  good  for  the  country  as  a  whole. 
8. "In  some  places  I  was  suspected  for  a 
projector,  or  one  that  had  devised  some 
trick  to  bring  the  Carriers  under  some 
new  form  of  taxation;  and  sometimes  I 
was  held  to  have  been  a  man-takert  a 
Serjeant  or  bailiff  to  arrest  or  attach 
ments  goods  or  beasts;  indeed  I  was 
scarce  taken  for  an  honest  man  amongst  the 
most  of  them:  all  of  which  suppositions  I 
was  enforced  often  times  to  wash  away  with 
two'-or  three  jugs  of  Beer  at  most  of  the 
Inns  I  came  to.  "  33 
De  Laune  also  complained  of  similar  treatment. 
At  least  in  these  early  days  the  carriers  were  a  close 
knit  group,  and  clearly  suspicious  of.  strangers  who  asked 
questions  about  their  business,  and  with  good  reason,  for 
their  trade  was  accompanied  by  the  ever-present  risk  of 
violent  robbery.  EnglandIs  roads  were  far  from  safe  and 
although  the  more  famous  highwaymen  concentrated  on  the 
richer  picking  of  the  stage  coaches,  the  carriers  did  not 
escape  attention,  The  main  danger  was  on  the  approaches 
to  London,  the  carriers  sought  to  reduce  their  individual 
risk  by  travelling  in  convoys. 
34 
Despite  such  measuresq 
attacks  were  common,  even  in  the  mid-eighteenth  century. 
35 
Indeed  as  late  as  1788  the  Manchester  Mercury  reported  an 
attack  on  George  Worthington,  the  Manchester  and  York 
carrier,  who  had  been  robbed  near  Miles  Platting  (about  three 
miles  from  Manchester)  and  "most  inhumanly  murdered  by  being 
33  Taylor  Carrierts  Cosmog-raphie 
34  Crofts  Packhorse  wagpon  and  post  Chaps,  5.7- 
35  O.  E.  D.  Vol.  109  robbery  of  the  Bath  stage  waggon  in 
1761;  for  other  attacks  in  the  Manchester  areap 
Manchester  Mercurl  24  April,  11  Dec.  1753. 
9. shot  dead  with  a  Pistol,  or  some  other  Fire-armsq  loaded 
with  Pewter  slugs  on  the  KingIs  Highway. 
06 
Casual 
thieving  at  inns  of  call  along  the  road  was  also  a  problem. 
37 
The  reason  for  the  carriers'  defensive  measures  and 
hostility  to  enquiries  no  doubt  owed  something  to  the  fact 
that  they  'frequently  carried  money  and  valuables  among  their 
consignments.  It  was  a  regular  practice  for  the  carriers 
to  take  lettersq  bills  and  cash  for  their  customersp  in  part 
38 
because  the  cost  Of  Postage  was  so  high.  Moreover  the 
value  of  individual  consignments  going  by  road  could  be 
considerable,  The  evidence  is  slender  but  there  are  reports 
of  the  later  eighteenth  century  of  the'contents  of  waggons 
being  destroyed  by  fire  in  which  their  value  is  assessed  in  the 
region  of  C19000.39  In  similar  vein,  in  1767  Nathaniel 
Cartwrightv  a  pillow-lace  dealer  of  Newport  Pagnell  set  off 
"on  a  seven  week  circuit  into  the  North  and  by  Glocester  (sic) 
with  above  ýU,  000  of  lace.  " 
40 
Such  commoditiesp  although 
of  substantial  total  valuet  would  not  be  too  easily  converted 
into  ready  casht  but  large  sums  of  money  were  also  carried. 
In  the  17805  Pickfords  regularly  conveyed  up  to  E200  at  a 
time  for  Samuel  Oldknow  from  his  warehouse  agents  in  London* 
41 
36  Manchester  Mercury,  22  Aprilt  1788- 
37  CopýLand  Roads  and  their  traffic  p  82. 
38  Willan  An  eighteenth  century  shop-keeper  pp  46-7: 
on  one  occasion  the  postage  on  two  returned  bills  was 
2/71d;  gonerally,  see  Markland  tSome  remarks  on  the  early  2 
use  of  carriages.  '  Archaeologia  Vol.  XX  (1824),  and 
Peqney  The  household  account  book  of  Sarah  Fell 
39  Copjand7Op.  PP  79-81;  also  Westerfield  Op,  cit,  p  283 
40  C.  Freeman  Pillow  lace  in  the  East  Midlands 
, 
(printed 
privately  by  Luton  Museum  and  Art  Gallery,  1958)  p  16. 
1  must  thank  my  colleague  Mr.  G.  F.  R.  Spenceley  for  this 
reference:  also  D.  Defoe  A  tour  throujýh  the  whole  island 
of  Great  Britain  (7th  edo  7-Vols.  1769)  Vol.  III  p  126. 
41  G.  Unwin  Samuel  Uldknow  and-the  Arkwrights,  (M.  U.  p.  1924) 
Chaps.  4  and  5, 
10. Such  sums  were  not  exceptional  even  earlier  in  the  century. 
The  element  of  risk  also  extended  to  the  passengers  who 
travelled  in  the  carrierts  waggon,  as  evidenced  by 
Roderick  Random's  experiences  on  his  journey  to  London, 
42 
Organisation  among  the  carriers  was  thus  a  prominent 
feature  of  theIr  trade,  It  was  commonly  denounced  as 
monopolistic  and  certainly  the  carriers  tended  to  act  in 
combination  when  announcing  an  increase  in  their  rates. 
43 
Such  actions  would  seem  however,  to  be  more  than  an 
expression  of  narrow  self  interest.  The  whole  climate 
within  which  the  carriers  operated,  at  least  until  the 
later  eighteenth  centuryt  emphasised  co-operation  rather 
than  competition.  This  stemmed  partly  from  the  need  to 
meet  common  dangers  and  partly  also  from  the  custom  of  all 
the  carriers  from  a  particular  town  or  area  frequenting  the 
same  two  or  three  inns  in  London. 
Some  carriers  were  no  doubt  small  men  of  limited 
resources  but  the  group  who  are  important  heret  those 
engaged  in  the  long  distance  trade  to  and  from  London,  were 
evidently  men  of  considerable  means  and  a  certain  scale  of 
business.  This  is  apparent  from  both  direct  and  indirect 
evidence.  Given  the  conditions  of  unlimited  liability 
and  the  known  value  of  consigrunentsp  the  carrier  needed 
substantial  resources  to  meet  possible  claims  for  loss. 
42  T.  Smollet  The  adventures  of  Roderick  Random  (1st  pub. 
1748;  1821  ed,  of  collected  novels  quoted)  Chap.  12t 
also  8-11.  The  novel  is  accepted  as  an  accurate 
description  of  the  contemporary  scenev  as  based  on 
Smollett's  own  journey  from  Scotland  to  London  in 
Novemberg  1739. 
43  Albert  'The  Justices'  ratesees  reconsidered'  Transport 
History  Vol.  1  (1968)  pp  106-7;  also  Chap.  2  below 
11. Conversely,  a  customer  would  need  to  be  satisfied  of  a 
carrier's  ability  to  meet  all  claims  before  entrusting 
valuable  items  to  him. 
44 
An  early  eighteenth  century 
source  in  fact  refers  to  the  commoil  carriers  as  "generally 
men  of  creditp  and  capable  of  giving  security  for  their 
regular  carriage  .  1145  A  possible  off-set  would  be  to 
insure  against  loss  for  goods  in  transit  but  only  a  single 
instance  of  this  has  been  found,  and  then  from  the  last 
decade  of  the  eighteenth  century. 
46 
It  is  likely  that  the 
risk  would  have  been  too  high  much  before  that  date  for  an 
insurance  company  to  be  willing  to  underwrite  itj  except 
47 
at  a  very  high  premiuM. 
In  general,  therefore,  the  carrier  probably  had  to 
rely  on  his  own  resources.  From  odd  bits  of  evidence  it 
would  seem  that  these  could  be  quite  substantial.  The 
advertised  sale,  in  1766,  of  Thomas  Stevens'  businesst  a 
Colchester  to  London  carrier,  claimed  that  he  had  Itgot  a 
very  good  fortuneg  besides  bringing  up  and  educating  a 
large  family  in  a  handsome  mansion:  so,  with  care  and 
industry,  there  is  a  manifest  prospect  for  any  other  persong 
I 
so  qualified,  not  only  to  get  a  maintenancev  but  a  good 
deal  of  money.  "  Robert  Clarke  of  Leicester,  who  advertised 
his  business  for  sale  in  1793,  had  traded  between  Sheffield 
and  London  lliýith  great  success,  "  His  stock  in  trade 
44  Crofts  Op.  cit.  Chap-  5. 
45  Quoted  by  Westerfield  Op.  cit.  p  284 
46  Thomas  Sloath  &  Co.  of  Manchester  insured  with  the 
Phoenix  company  of  London.  Manchester  Mercury 
30  Aug.  1796.  Unfortunately  the  records  of  this 
company  have  not  been  available  for  consultation,  A 
check  with  a  sample  of  the  fire  policy  registrations 
of  the  Royal  Exchange  Assurance  Company,  on  deposit  at 
the  Guildhall  Libraryt  London,  did  not  reveal  any  such 
business  being  transacted. 
47  Crofts  02.  c.  P  33. 
12. included  14  nine  inch  (i.  e.  broad-wheel)  wageons,  2 
narrow  waggonsg  and  136  horses  with  their  equipment. 
Clarke  also  offered  warehouse  and  stabling  accommodation 
at  Sheffield,  Leicester  and  all  other  places  used  by  him 
on  the  road,  and  a  certain  proportion  of  the  purchase 
48 
money.,  James  Pickford  himself  came  of  yeoman  stock  and 
his  soft  Matthew  made  enough  money  to  be  able  to  acquire 
a  coat  of  arms  and  the  title  of  'gentleman.  ' 
49 
It  is  significant  that  James  Pickfordq  as  the  substance 
of  his  advertisement  quoted  above  indicates,  -based  his 
business  on  the  use  of  stage  waggons,  for  there  is  much 
confusion  as  to  when  waggons  came  into  common  use*  A 
recent  writer  states  thrat  "until  at  least  the  middle  of  the 
eighteenth  century  all  goods  sent  from  Derby  or  Nottingham 
to  Manchester  or  London,  all  the  Yorksbire  clothing  productsp 
and-all  the  Manchester  and  Coventry  wares  were  transported 
on  horsebacko"50  This  would  seem  to  be  an  exaggeration,  at 
least  for  traffic  between  Manchester  and  London. 
The  volume  of  wheeled  traffic  even  in  medieval  times 
should  not  be  underestimated,  Royal  officials'had  frequent 
occasion  to  use  carts,  for  the  conve-yance  of  cash  or  legal 
documents,  while  the  transport  requirements  of  the  King's 
armies,  in  years  of  regular  warfare,  provided  substantial 
el  48  Both  of  these  examples  are  from  Copland  Op.  cit.  PP  76-77  A 
Clarke's  business 
-  was  bought  by  the  Pickfords. 
49  See  below  Chaps.  2  and  4. 
50  Crofts  Op.  cit.  p  3.  Substantially  the  same  position 
is  tak  by  Jackman  TransportRtion  in  modern  England 
p  141;  S.  &.  B.  Webb  En  lish  local-aoverriment:  the  story 
of  the  King's  highw  *5  and  appendix 
pp  76-7;  P.  Mantoux  The  Industrial  Revolution  in  the 
eighteenth  century  (1961  ed)  p  111. 
13. additional  demand.  Indeed  it  has  been  argued  that  during 
the  fourteenth  century  more  traffic  went  by  wheeled 
transport  than  by  packhorse. 
51 
The  'long  waggont,  or  stage 
waggon,  a  roomy,  covered  vehicle  capable  of  accommodating  up 
to  twenty  passengers  and  several  hundredweight  of  goods, 
was  introduced  in  the  1560s. 
52 
By  the  early  seventeenth 
century  it  probably  absorbed  a  major  share  of  the  demand 
for  transport  services  in  the  home  countiesq  especially 
for  the  supply  of  the  London  food  market  . 
53 
It  would 
generally  be  accepted  that  by  the  beginning  of  the  eighteenth 
century  the  stage  waggon  was  in  common  use  within  a  hundred 
mile  radius  of  London,  except  for  Sussex  where  the  heavy 
clay  soils  made  for  particularly  difficult  road  conditions. 
How  far  it  was  used  beyond  that  rangeg  if  at  a119  especially 
as  compared  with  packhorses,  is  more  contentious.  Any 
realistic  quantitative  assessment  of  their  relative  importance 
is  quite  impossible. 
The  belief  in  the  primacy  of  the  packhorse  in  this 
outer  region  until  the  later  eighteenth  century  ultimately 
hinges  on  the  further  belief  that  until  then  road-conditions 
were  impossibly  bad  and  could  not  support  much  wheeled  traffic. 
The  condition  of  the  roads  will  be  discussed  more  fully  later; 
it  is  sufficient  to  suýýgest  here  that  their  state  of  disrepair 
has  been  much  exaggerated.  Briefly,  it  has  been  noted  by 
51  J.  F.  Ifillard  'The  use  of  carts  in  the  fourteenth  century' 
History,  N.  S.  Vol.  17  0  ct.  1932  p  246  ff.  ' 
52  Pratt  History-of  inland  transport  P  35P  citing  Stow 
53  Crofts  Op. 
-cit. 
p8  finds  a  close  correspondence  between 
the  area  where  he  believes  heavy  wheeled  traffic  was 
firmly  established  at  this  time  and  the  chief  grain 
area  delineated  by  Gras  for  the  fourteenth  and  fifteenth 
centuries', 
14. several  recent  writers  that  a  basic  network  of  arterial 
highways,  and  many  others  besides,  had  already  been 
turnpiked  by  1760.54  Doubtless  many  roads  had  to  be 
reconstructed  in  later  years,  but  even  modest  improvements 
could  not  fail  to  have  some  effect.  Some  respected 
contemporaries  believed  there  had  been  considerable 
progress  at  least  in  their  own  areas  in  the  thirty  odd 
years  prior  to  1760.  Homer  believed  that  an  "astonishing 
revolution"  had  been  accomplished; 
55 
Malachy  Postlethwayte 
that  costs  had  fallen  by  a  third  because  better  roads 
allowed  heavier  weights  to  be  carried  over  larger  distances 
I> 
with  the  same  number  of  horses. 
56 
The  contemporary  evidence  is  not,  howeverv  free  from 
problems  of  interpretation.  Defoe,  writing  in  the  1720st 
would  imply  that  the  foodstuffs  and  other  goods  brought  to 
London  from  the  home  counties  went  by  waggon  but  that  the 
conveyance  of  manufactures  from  the  north  depended  on 
packhorses  . 
57 
Neither  Taylor  or  Do  Laune  are  sufficiently 
precise  in  their  information  concerning  carriers'  services 
for  it  tobe  determined  what  form  of  conveyance  was  used. 
54  M.  'Flinn  Origins_of  the  Industrial  Revolution  (1966) 
p  96;  W.  .  Albert 
-Op. 
cit.  p  122,  note  27;  H,  Heaton 
The  Yorkshire  woollen  and  worsted  industries  (Oxford 
1920)  P  399;  R.  G.  Wilson  'Transport  dues  as  indices  of 
economic  growth  1775-18201  Economic  History_Review 
2nd  Series,  Vol.  XIX  (1966)  p  111;  A.  Thomas  Geographical 
asj2ects  of  the  development  of-transport  and  communications 
affecting  the  pottery  industry  of  north  Staffordshire 
during  the  eighteenth  century,  (Manchester  University 
M.  A.  thesisq  1933)  p  52. 
55  H.  Homer  An  enquiry  into  the  means  of  preserving  and 
im2roving  the  publick  roads  of  this  kinrdom  (Oxford  1767) 
p  8. 
56  Pratt  0.  it.  pp  86-7,  quoting  Malachy  Postlethwayte's 
Dictionary  1  45)  article  on  Roads 
57  Defoe  Complete  English  tradesman  Vol,  I  Chap,  25, 
Vol,  II  Chap.  18* 
15. It  is  noticeablep  however,  that  all  the  references  to 
packhorse  gangs  in  the  first  edition  (1681)  of  De  Laune 
are  omitted  in  the  second  edition  (1690).  58  More  precise 
information  is  provided  by  The  Intelligencer:  or  Merchants 
Assistant  (1738)-  This  volume  lists  only  one  packhorse 
service;  all  the  others  were  by  waggon,  even  some  by 
'fly-waggon'  were  mentioned.  It  does  notg  of  course, 
follow  that  because  packhorse  services  were  not  mentioned 
they  did  not  exist  -  especially  as  their  continuance  is 
known  from  other  evidence  -  but  it  does  seem  reasonable  to 
suggest  that  they  are  unlikely  to  have  predominated. 
It  is  known  that  packhorse  gangs  travelled  between 
Manchester  and  London  and  Liverpool  and  London  in  the  mid- 
eiGhteenth  century:  indeed  Liverpoollacked  a  road  able  to 
take  wheeled  traffic  until  1760.  Packhorse  gangs  were 
offered  for  sale  in  Manchester  in  1747  and  1757.59  However, 
even  at  the  beginning  of  the  century  waggon5  were  5aid  to 
travel  between  London  and  Wigan* 
6o 
Stage  waggons  operated 
between  Manche5ter  and  London  by  the  end  of  1739P 
61 
and  a 
stage  waggon  business  operating  between  Warrington,  Liverpool 
and  London  was  offered  for  sale  in  Manchester  in  1749.62  - 
58  De  Laune  Present  state  of  London  (1681);  Angliae 
Metropolis  (1690). 
59  Manchester  Magazine  21  April,  1747,  'quoted  by  A.  P. 
Wadsworth  and  J.  De  Lacy  Mann  The  cotton  trade  and 
industrial  Lanc 
- 
ashire, 
_1600-1780 
(M.  U.  P.  reprint  1965) 
p  220,  note  4;  ýLanchester  MercurXt  26  July,  1757. 
60  Pratt  Opý.  cit*  p  3ý-,  Citing  C.  Leigh  The  natural  history 
of  Lancishire,  Cheshire  and  the  Peak  of  DerbZshire  (1700) 
61  Thomas  Op.  cit-.  P  131,  quoting  The  Lancashire  Journal 
1  Oct.,  1739. 
62  Wadsworth  &  Mann  Op.  cit.  p  220  note  4,  quoting  The 
Manchester  Magazine  25  April  1749.  Liverpool  was 
presumably  served  by  packhorso  from  Warrington. 
16. Other  services  to  Manchestert  and  Lancashire  and  Cheshire 
generally,  are  recorded  for  1753.63  So  stage  vaggons 
were  in  use  between  London  and  the  north,  in6luding 
Manchestert  some  years  before  1750  and  from  that  decade 
they  were  seemingly  the  more,  and  packhorses  the  less, 
common,  Off  the  main  routes,  howover,  e.  g.  across  the 
Pennines,  packhorses  retained  their  importance. 
Another  misapprehension  is  that  the  roads  were 
impassable  in  winter.  James  Pickford  would  have  been  a 
strange  animal  indeed  to  have  adopted  a  business  in  which 
the  capital  employedt  which  was  not  unsubstantialt  was 
rendered  idle  for  several  months  in  the  year.  There  is 
nothing  in  the  available  evidence  to  indicate  that  the 
carriers  hibernated  durine  the  winter  months.  An  extra 
day's  travellinG  time  was  evidently  allowed  compared  with 
the  summer  months, 
64 
and  the  J.  P.  s  practice  of  assessing  a 
higher  rate  for  winter  than  for  summer  is  familiar  enough, 
It  would  seem  that  the  differential  between  the  two  rates- 
declined  overtime  by  fifty  percent  or  more, 
65 
No  doubt 
the  condition  of  the  roads  deteriorated  in  winter  and  made 
life  more  difficult,  but  not  so  bad  that  all  traffic  should 
cease.  The  Intelligencer  listed  the  departure  of  carriers' 
63  Mancheste_r  MercuEX  30  Oct.  1753; 
of  the  commer  cc  and  town  of  Liver- 
18.5  25p  IU8 
.  64  Baines  op.  cit.  p  418. 
65  See  WilYan  'Justices  of  the  Peace 
carriage#  Journal  of  Transport  Hi 
P  197  ff;  Albert  'The  Justices 
Transport  HistoEy  Vol.  -I  (1968)  p 
T.  Baines  Histor-Y 
2201  on  &  Liverpool  (Lond' 
and  rates  of  land 
story  Vol.  V.  '(1962) 
rates  ...  reconsidered' 
105  ff. 
17. servicest  at  the  stated  timesp  as  "always".  The 
regularity  of  road  transport  services  from  the  1760s  has 
been  demonstrated  in  the  experience  of  Abraham  Dent  of 
Kirkby  Stephen,  whose  orders  were  dispatched  to  London 
by  the  Kendal  waggons  all  the  year  roundl  many  of  them 
in  the  winter  months.  They  all  seemed  to  arrive,  and  in 
the  time  expected.  As  Professor  Willan  commentsv  "the 
real  problem  of  eighteenth  century  road  transport  was  not 
1166  the  state  of  the  roads  as  the  cost  of  carriage. 
Hard  evidence  as  to  the  cost  of  road  transport  services 
during  this  period  is  conspicuous  chiefly  by  its  absencee 
Assessed.  rates  varied  greatly  in  different  parts  of  the 
.; 
ures  are  so  random  country  at  the  same,  time;  actual  cost  fip 
as  to  be  virtually  useless  as  far  as  meaningful  generalisations 
are  concern  . ed, 
67 
Rates  were  perhaps  cheaper  along  the 
main  routes  and  the  carriers'  charges  seem  to  have  varied 
according  to  weight,  size  and  risk. 
68* 
As  far  as  relative 
costs  are  concerned  it  is  a  comm.  on  observation  that  only' 
commodities  of  high  intrinsic  value  could  absorb  road  chargest 
yet  the  odd  example  suggests  that  these  were  not  always 
especially  high.  The  cost  of  conveying  Newcastle  steel  by 
road  from  London  to  Birmingham  added  some  five  per  cent  to 
the  price. 
69 
The  freight  charge  of  one  of  Dent's  consignments 
66  Willan  An  eighteenth  century  shol!  -kepper  p  80t  99-100,110. 
67  For  the-relationship  between  actual  costs  and  assessed 
rates,  see  the  articles  by  Willan  and  Albert, 
68  Coxf-I  nd  Roads  and  their  traffic  p  69. 
,  -rý  a 
69  Fl3Vn  Origins  of  the  Industrial  Revolution  p  96. 
189 was  less  than  21%  of  its  total  value. 
70 
In  neither  case 
does  the  charge  seem  excessive,  but  both  referred  to 
commodities  of  some  value. 
Since  James  Pickford  operated  between  Manchester  and 
London  what,  finally,  was  the  framework  of  communications 
between  the  two  places?  By  the  mid-eighteenth  century, 
London  was  already  an  important  centre  for  much  of 
Manchesterts  trade  and  commercial  orgaisation. 
71 
Access 
to  the  London  market  was  of  supreme  importanceg  but  as  an 
inland  town  Manchester  necessarily  depended  on  land 
transport  or  road  and  river  links  to  the  nearest  ports  At 
the  time,  Manchester  was  not  particularly  well  endowed  with 
transport  facilities.  The  I-Tersey  &  Irwell  river  improvement 
scheme  of  1721  provided  a  valuable  water  link  with  the  port 
of  Liverpool  but  costs  remained  high  and  traffic  was  subject 
to  all  the  well-known  delays  and  drawbacks  of  river  transport. 
Bad  roads  between  Manchester  and  Liverpool  had  been  the  main 
stimulus  to  the  promotion  of  the  Mersey  &  Irwell  scheme* 
72 
Roads  had  been  poor  in  and  around  Manchester  generally  but 
by  the  1750s  steps  were  being  taken  to  improve  their  conditions 
Many  of  the  roads  emanating  from  Manchester  were-already  under 
the  control  of  turnpike  trustst  although  not  all  the.  trusts 
prosecuted  their  task-of  road  repair  with  equal  energy. 
73 
70  Willan  Op.  cit,  p  109 
71  Wadsworth  &  Mann  Op.  cit.  p,  236. 
72  Ibid  p  219 
73  Harrison  'The  development  of  the  turnpike  system  in 
Lancashire  and  Cheshire'  Lancashire  and  Cheshire 
Antiquarian  Society  Vol.  IV  (1886)  p  8o. 
A.  H.  Arkle  'Early  Liverpool  coaching  Historic  Society 
of  Lancashire  and  Cheshire  Vol.  73 
j1921) 
p 
19. When  James  Pickford  first  appears  on  the  sciene  Manchester 
was  still  largely  land  locked,  dependant  on  a  road  network 
which  had  only  recently  been  improved. 
Traffic  was  conveyed  to  London  from  Manchester  either 
by  land  all  the  way  or  by  water,  that  is,  by  river  and  sea, 
with  varying  reliance  on  connecting  road  links,  Of  the 
rival  modes  of  transportationg  the  latter  would  undoubtedly 
take  the  greater  proportion  of  the  available  traffic. 
There  were  two  chief  routes  by  river  and  sea  to  Londong 
by  way  of  Liverpool  or  Hull.  Liverpool,  being  the  nearerv 
probably  drew  the  greater  volume  of  traffic.  In  1753  the 
launching  of  a  new  boat  in  Manchester  for  the  river  trade 
to  Liverpool  drew  the  comment  that  further  launchings  were 
to  be  expected  "as  the  navigation  is  considerably  increased 
within  these  late  years,,, 
74 
An  advertisement  the  following 
year  announcing  increases  in  freight  rates  between  Liverpool 
and  London  suggests  this  route  was  regularly  adopted.  The 
alternative  was  to  send  goods  by  road  to  Wakefield,  from 
there  by  river  to  Hull  and  thence  to  London.  This  route 
was  promoted  by  the  Airmin  Cqmpanyq  which  was  set  up 
probably  in  the  September  or  October  of  1752.  By  the 
middle  of  1753  sufficient  traffic  had  been  attracted  for  the 
company  to  open  a  packing  plant  in  Manchester  and-introduce 
a  weekly  waggon  service  to  Wakefield,  The  boats  from  Hull 
docked  at  Chamberlaints  wharf  in  Southwark. 
75 
74  Manchester  MercuEy  17  Aprilq  1753. 
75-  Ibid,  217  July  1753;  also  Wadsworth  &  Mann  Opcit,  p  220; 
L,  V.  Moffit  England  on  the  eve  of  the  Industrial  Revolution 
(1925)  p  150. 
20 Although  cheaper,  coastal  shipping  had  its  own 
drawbacks,  including  delays  in  bad  weather  and  even  total 
cessation  in  times  of  war. 
76  However  the  demand  in 
Manchester  for  road  services  was  more  than  for  just  an 
emergency  alternative:  there  was  a  continuous  need  for 
commercial  information  and  also  for  the  carriage  of  goods 
where  speed,  or  security,  or  even  convenience  were 
important  considerations.  Passenger  travel  from  Manchester 
was  restricted  until  March  1760  when  a  coach  service  direct 
to  London  was  introduced. 
77  Previously  it  had  been 
necessary  to  journey  on  horse-back  either  the  whole  distance 
or,  from  June  17579  the  eighteen  miles  to  Warrington  from 
where  a  coach  left  for  London,  78  Rigorous  as  the  normal 
coach  journey  was,  with  long  hours  of  travel,  hasty  meals 
and  little  sleept  it  must  still  have  been  a  welcome  advance* 
Before  1772p  when  the  first  directory  was  publishedg 
it  is  difficult  to  got  any  comprehensive  impression  of  the 
scale  of  the  road  carrying  trade  in  Manchester.  In  the  1750s 
there  were  about  six  carriers  operating  between  London  and 
Manchester;  the  regularity  of  their  service  varied  from  one 
to  four  departures  a  week. 
79 
Although  numbers  no  doubt 
increased  over  time,  the  only  reliable  figure  is  for  176ý, 
when  ton  carriers  signed  a  joint  advertiseffient  giving  notice 
76  J.  D.  Marshall  ed)  The  autobioFraphX  of  William  Stout 
of  Lancaster 
ýM. 
u.  -p-.  ---j-q-r7)  pp  94-5;  T.  S.  Ashton  Economic 
fluctuRtions  in  England  1700-1800  (Oxford  1959)-P  81 
and  the  references  there. 
77  Manchester  Mercury  2  Oct.,  17599  4  March  1860. 
78  T.  Baines  &  11.  Fairbairn  Lancashire  and  Cheshire, 
-past 
and  present  (N.  D.  )  Vol.  TI 
part  III  P  105 
79  London  directories  for  these  years. 
21. of  an  increase  in  stage  waggon  rates  between  London  and 
Manchester. 
80 
Road  communication  was  not  confined  to 
London.  By  the  mid  1760s  Manchester  had  direct  road 
links  with  Bristol,  Nottingham  and  Birmingham  and  certainly 
81 
many  other  places  besides.  In  1772  forty-six  carriers 
were  listed  in  the  trade  directory,  of  whom  six  provided 
regular  sorvices  to  London.  Most  of  the  others  operated 
to  the  adjacent  towns  of  Lancashire,  Cheshireq  Derbyshire 
and  the  West  Riding,  but  some  '%%rent  as  far  as  Shrewsbury 
and  Cambridge. 
82 
By  1756,  when  the  history  of  Pickfords  effectively 
begins,  the  inland  carrying  trade  was  firmly  established 
not  only  in  the  trade  and  commerce  of  Manchester  but  in  the 
British  economy  as  a  whole, 
80  Manchester  Mercury  24  Sept.  1765 
ý81  At  this  time  Birmingham  had  land  communications  with 
168  other  towns.  Bunco  Op.  cit.  Vol.  Ip  49 
82  Manchester  dir6ctorX  (Raf-fa-l-d'-Tl772  P  55  ff. 
22o CHAPTER  2 
JAMES,  MARTHA  AND  MATTHEW  PICKFORD narrop's  ltlancbýfler  Mercury. 
GENERAL  ADVERTISFR. 
-47ft  I  ULSMAT  Ih.  4.  %v  $ý.  ypk 
This-  is  to  acquaint  all  .  Gentlemen,  Tradef- 
men,  and  Others, 
J'HAT 
. 
7AMES  PICKFORD,  the 
Lpidsis  aod  jilwýurj7er  Wagtoact,  has  tmoved  his  Waggoo 
ftan.  the  in  TO  the  fell-Imp,  in  Wood- 
itrer,  PleApfUt,  tiorn  sherce  it  gocs  cvcfy  Wedoisf4y:  Aod'his 
cthet  Waggon  Ceti  evely  $A:  srd*r,,  as  ufulle  f(OM  'he  Wbi!  #84A? 
Each  Witegon,  rot  the  4;  21112ge  Of  Goods  Sind  TAT.  ngefl,  at 
-J"h  the  Towns  undctmcati-  rea(on;  ble  L,  atcs.  goes  by  and  thlb  b 
oncd.  X.  unaflk-undtr-Unt,  Conlittex,  Miccitificid.  Swfporf,  to 
u-mbei2tv  ;  vid  dclims  Goodsz7e.  fog 
-4  -ktoa-undw  Lint,  Otd6cm, 
Itch14'e,  finrý,,  tvatop,  and  othcg  ;  -ditcent  FlAces.  At  *hich  ?  12ca, 
GentlCMI:.  1,  J:;  ýC.  way  depend  ca  hAviez  661  Goods.  et.  Well 
Zy  Vair  ht-mble  Servant. 
JA24ES  ?  ICKFOILD. 
s.  No  2-terey,  Thite,  jewels,  China-Ww,  Gla(s,  of  Wsic- 
ings  aill  be  accounted  (of,  UAICfs  It  I  Sue  AcCoUnt  of  thern  is  deo 
V.  -wead  to  the  Book-kcepet  .  ASid  cofiftant  Artcadsocc  i!  p1cm 
bovelaid  ItinS  im  Lomita.  TO  SgtCC  with  rtf-  every  1).  Iy  at  the  a 
icalcts  to  take 
iA  Golods. 
j0  it  It  10  NES.  804-tIM  it  1wh  WaLts"o 
This  is  to  acquaint  all  Gentlemeng  Tradesmen  and  Othersq 
that  James  Pickford  the  London  and  Manchester  Waggoner, 
has  removed  his  Waggon  from  the  Blossomts  Inng  in  Lawrence 
Lane  to  the  Bell  Inn,  in  Wood  Street,  Cheapside,  from 
whence  it  goes  every  Wednesdayt  and  his  other  Waggon  goes 
every  Saturday,  as  usual,  from  the  White  Bear  in  Basinghall 
Street, 
Each  Waggon,  for  the  Carriage  of  Goods  and  Passengerst  at 
reasonable  Ratest  goes  by  and  through  the  Towns  under- 
mentioned,  viz. 
Newcastle-under-Linet  Congleton,  Macclesfield,  Stockport  to 
Manchester;  and  delivers  Goods,  etc.,  for  Ashton-under-Line, 
Oldhamt  Rochdaleq  Buryq  Boltong  and  other  adjacent  places. 
At  which  places,  Gentlemeng  etc.  may  depend  on  having  their 
Goods,  etc.  safely  delivered 
By  their  humble  Servant, 
James  Pickford 
N.  B.  No  Moneyg  Plateg  Jewelsq  China-ware,  Glass  or  Writings 
will  be  accounted  forg  unless  a  true  account  of  them  is 
delivered  to  the  Book-keeper:  And  constant  attendance  is 
given  every  Day  at  the  above  said  Inn,  in  Londong  to  agree 
with  Passengers  to  take  in  Goods. 
John  Jones.  Book-keeper  to  both  Waggons ;4 
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E-4  a  10 Like  the  evidence  relating  to  the  origins  of  Pickfords, 
that  concerned  with  the  early  years  of  the  firm  is  equally 
sparse*  Little  is  known  of  James  Pickford  himself.  He 
was  59  when  he  died  in  May  1768  and, 
so 
was  born  in  1708  or 
9,  Few  other  personal  details  of  him  are  known.  Even 
the  date  of  his  marriage  to  Martha  Johnson,  of  whom  )  againt 
few  details  survive,  can  only  be  roughly  determined  by  the 
birth  of  his  eldest  son,  Matthew,  in  1740.  There  were 
51X  children  to  their  marriage  of  whom  twoq  Matthew  and 
Thomas,  were  in  time  engaged  in  the  carrying  business.  One 
of  the  daughters,  Elizabeth,  married  a  carrierg  Jonathan 
Higginson,  who  also  operated  between  Manchester  and  London. 
James  originally  lived  at  Adlington  in  the  parish  of 
Prestbury,  Cheshire,  but  at  some  unspecified  time  moved  to 
the  nearby  village  of  Poynton,  the  place  of  his  death* 
1 
It  is  clear  from  James  PickfordIs  advertisement  of 
August  1756,  that  he  was  already  active  in  the  road  carrying 
business,  between  Manchester  and  London  but  there  is  no 
indication  as  to  how  long  he  had  been  so  engaged,  He 
described  himself  simply  as  'the  London  &  Manchester  Waggoner, 
and  did  not  claim  the  status  of  foldt  or  tconstant'  stage- 
waggoner  as  others  did, 
2 
The  most  promising  place  to  look 
1-  James  Pickford's  move  from  Adlington  was  some  time  after 
1747.  A  lease  of  25  March  1788  between  Sir  George  Warren 
of  Poynton  and  Matthew  Pickford  refers  back  to  the 
originalt  dated  19  Jan.  1747,  between  Lady  Elizabeth  Warren 
and  others  and  James  Pickford  of  Adlington.  CHP/5,  The 
land  concerned  was  in  Poynton  and  this  may  well  have  been 
the  occasion  of  Jamest  removal.  James  Pickford's 
gravestone  in  Prestbury  churchyard  names  him  as  of  Poynton 
and  the  family  long  retained  a  close  connection  with  the 
village. 
2  See  Manchester  Mercury  30  Oct-1753,26  June  1759. 
23 for  evidence  of  any  prior  activities  is  the  London  trade 
directories  of  the  period.  However  they  have  failed  to 
yield  any  positive  results.  Directories  which  included 
information  on  the  departure  of  stage  coaches  and  waggons 
were  published  in  1752,1755  and  1758.  In  all  threep 
services  for  Manchester  are  listed  from  the  Bell  Inn  and 
Blossom's  Inn,  two  of  the  inns  mentioned  in  Jamest  noticet 
but  none  of  them  on  a  day  of  departure  which  coincides  with 
that  stated  by  James.  Pickford's  use  of  the  White  Bear 
in  Basinghall  Street  probably  offers  the  best  chance  of 
identifying  his  services.  In  these  years  the  White  Bear 
seems  to  have  been  particularly  associated  with  carriers 
operating  to  the  east  and  north-east  of  Englandq  so  that 
James'  use  of  it  for  one  of  his  Manchester  waggons  would 
have  been  exceptional.  However  the  White  Bear  does  not 
appear-in  any  of  these  directories  as  being  used  by  the 
3 
Manchester  carriers. 
Assuming.,  as  has  been  argued  elsewhere, 
4 
that  James 
Pickford  himself  started  the  family's  interest  in  carryingt 
say  by  the  purchase  of  an  existing  business  as  a  going 
concerng  what'would  have  been  his  capital  needs  and  from 
where  would  he  have  acquired  the  necessary  resources? 
Although  not  stated  in  his  advertisementit  is  most  probable 
that  James  operated  waggons  from  Manchester  twice  a  week9 
the  same  as  from  London,  For  reasons  explained  below5 
3  Indeed  it  is  difficult  to  relate  Pickfords'  known  services 
to  the  entries  in  the  various  directories  until  the  1780s. 
4  Appendix  1* 
5  see  P-3  ? 
24 it  would  have  taken  six  broad  wheel  waggons  with  their 
full  complement  of  nine  horses  each  to  operate  such  a 
service,  and  this  is  exactly  the  number  of  waggons  and 
horses  which  Pickford  is  known  to  have  owned  less  than 
twelve  months  later. 
6 
What  this  meant  in  terms  of 
capital  employed  is  extremely  difficult  to  estimat6;  ---.  ' 
There  is  no  available  data  for  the  carrying  trade  in 
the  mid-eighteenth  centuryt  especially  concerning  the 
cost  of  broad-wheel  waggons  or  waggon  horses.  The  price 
of  carriage  horses  in  Cambridge,  an  unweighted  average  of 
five  observations  from  1751  to  1760  inclusive,  averaged 
7 
approximately  C19-7.  Od  each,  but  it  would  be  pressing 
the  evidence  too  far  to  assume  that  the  price  of  waggon 
horses  in  Manchester  was  of  the  same,  order.  Agricultural 
price  data  is  equally  uninformative.  Price  movements  of 
crops  and  meats  are  readily  available  for  this  periodv  but 
very  little  for  waggonsg  horses  or  implements.  ,  The  only' 
data  even  remotely  usable  is  probably  that  scattered  through 
Arthur  Young1s  observations  In  his  tours  through  various 
parts  of  England. 
8 
According  to  Young  the  average  price 
of  a  farm  waagon  in  the  late  1760s  was  C20,9  On  this  basis 
6  Manchester  MercurY  7  June  1757P 
7  Rogers  HistorZ  of  agriculture  and  prices  Vol  VIII 
part  1,  pp  304-6. 
8  A.  Young  A  six  monthIs  tour  through  the  north  of  England 
(4  Vols,  2nd  ed  1771);  A.  Young  The  farmer's  tour  through 
the  east  of  England  (4  Vois  1771).  The  various  county 
reports  to  the  Board  of  Agriculture  in  the  1790s  are 
disappointing  in  this  respect,  Few  cost  figures  appear 
and  in  any  case  the  French  wars  were  already  pushing 
prices  upwards  by  then. 
9  This  figure  recurs  regularly  in  Young's  two  books.  On  the 
basis  of  the  Schumpeter-Gilboy  producers'  Goods  price 
index,  prices  were  probably  a  little  higher  in  the  later 
1760s  thon  in  the  mid-1750s. 
B.  R.  Mitchel  (ed)  Abstract  of  British  historical  statistics 
(c.  u.  p.  1962)  p  469. 
25. James  Pickfordfs  six  waggons,  which  would  most  likely  have 
been  bigger  and  more  expensive  than  their  agricultural 
equivalentg  would  have  costt  at  now  price,  C120.  Horses 
cost  perhaps  C10,  which  would  value  Pickford's  stock  at 
r.  54o.  So  waggons  and  horses  together  might  be  assessed 
at  C660.  To  this  would  have  to  be  added  the  cost  of 
harness  and  other  tackle,  of  which  no  assessment  can  be 
made.  It  is  not  known,  of  course,  whether  James  Pickford 
acquired  his  stock  at  new  or  knock-down  price. 
There  is  no  way  of  knowing  how  wide  of  the  mark  this 
estimate,  admittedly  little  more  than  a  rough  guessp  might 
be,  but  if  it  is  even  approaching  the  right  order  of 
magnitudep  the  capital  cost  was  quite  substantial  for  that 
time.  In  terms-of  initial  fixed  investment,  James  Pickford's 
requirements  would  seem  to  compare  not  unfavourably  with 
those  of  his  near  contemporaries  in  the  manufacturing-sector. 
For  example  Samuel  Oldknow  in  his  early  days  possessed  total 
assets  of  some  C2,600,  of  which  the  share  of  fixed  capital 
was  quite  small. 
10 
Similarly  the  original  fixed  capital 
of  the  plAgsley-mill  established  by  Henry  Hollinst  Thomas 
Oldknow  and  partners  was  93,789;  total  assets  were  valued 
at  C49195.  Thisq  however,  is  to  be  set  against  a  partnership 
of  five,  the  two  senior  members  of  which,  Hollins  and  Oldknowp 
were  already  successful  businessmen  in  their  own  right, 
11 
It  is  also  noteworthy  that  the  initial  capital  of  Capýion 
company,  unusually  large  at  C12,000  but  explained  by  the 
nature  of  the  concern,  was  contributed  in  units  of  C500,12 
10  Unwin  Samuel  Oldknow  and  the  Arkwriphts  PP  13-17 
11  S.  Pigott  Hollins.  A  study  of  industry  17  4-194_9 
(1949)  p  21  ff. 
12  R.  H.  Campbell  The  Carron  companX  (1961)  p  123 
26. These  examples  come  from  the  bia  or  notably  successful 
manufacturing  concerns:  James  Pickford's  individual 
capital  commitment  was  broadly  comparable. 
James  Pickford's  capital  needs  were  thus  probably 
quite  substantial.  It  is  not  known  how  easily  or  in 
what  ways  they  might  have  been  acquired.  Because  so 
little  is  known  about  himthere  is  no  possibility  of 
deriving  clues  from  friends  Or  associates  ort  that  other 
fertile  source  of  fundsp  from  his  marriage.  What 
likelihood  is  there  that  Pickford  could  have  met  his  needs 
from  his  own  resources?  This  is  not  impossibleg  for  a 
number  of  reasons.  By  implication  from  earlier  discussiony 
James  could  not  have  been  a  poor  man.  As  a  common  carrier 
he  would  need  certain  resources  in  order  to  undertake  the 
risks  of  unlimited  liability  and  provide  the  necessary 
security  to  customers.  Spare  resources  would  also  be 
necessary  to  absorb  the  fluctuations  in  the  cost  of  feed. 
for  the  horses.  The  cost  of  provender  was  determined  chiefly 
by  the  weather.  Costs  could  vary  between  wide  margins  and 
as  freight  rates  were  evidently  fairly  sticky9  the  carriers 
would  need  to  be  able  to  absorb  such  shifts,  at  lea5t_in  the 
short  run.  The  conditions  of  the  carrying  trade  itselfp 
thereforeq  entailed  certain  financial  requirements  of  those 
who  engaged  in  it. 
More  directly,  one  of  the  few  positive  things  known 
about  James  Pickford  is  that  he  belonged  to  the  yeoman  class. 
He  was  so  called  in  the  letter  of  administration  of  his  estate 
27. 13  14 
granted  to  his  wife.  Also  in  a  lease  of  1747  he  was 
entitled  Ofarmertt  which  is  apparently  a  late  alternative 
of  the  same  title, 
15 
The  holder  of  the  title  of  yeoman 
"had  to  be  a  fairly  substantial  owner  (not'renter)  of  land 
which  he  had  to  work  himself.  116  Pickford's  yeoman  status 
would  place  him  in  the  same  social  group  as  Matthew  Pickford 
the  Elder  of  Adlington,  his  likely  father. 
17 
who  seems  from 
'his  will  to  have  had  quite  substantial  business  interests* 
It  would  also  mean  that  when  Jamest  son  Matthew  acquired  the 
title  of  'gentleman'  he  was  taking  a  singleg  albeit  a  major, 
18 
step  up  the  social  ladder. 
Presumably  then  James  Pickford  did  own  some  land  but 
no  evidence  of  it  has  been  found.  There  are  various  signsg 
however,  that  substantial  leasehold  land  was  acquired  by 
James,  and  retained  by  the  family.  In  1747,  he  rented  some 
property  in  Poyntong  under  a  lease  of  three  lives,  from  Sir 
George  Warren.  The  number'of  acres  leased  is  not  recorded 
but  the  details  of  the  property  suggest  a  sizeable  farm, 
19 
It  is  possible  that  James  held  other  land  as  well.  Some 
years  later  the  Manchester  Journal  advertised  for  sale:  - 
13  Transcription  from  the  original  in  Cheshire  Record 
Office  KS/3/1- 
14  CHP/5- 
15  P.  Laslett  The  world  we  have  lost  (1965)  p  43. 
16  Ibid. 
17  See  Appendix  1. 
18  See  the  chart  in  Laslett  Op.  cit.  P  38. 
19  CHP/5. 
28. "A  Messuage  and  Tenement,  with  29  acres 
of  landq  of  large  Cheshire  measurep  in 
the  occupation  of  Widow  Pickfordq  situate 
in  Pointon  aforesaidp  adjoining  to  the 
Turnpike  Road  which  leads  betwixt  the 
Market  Towns  of  Stockport  &  Macclesfield, 
and  held  by  a  Lease  of  three  lives  under 
Sir  George  Warren  ....  Jat  a  yearly  rent 
of  Z1.12.0d.  "  20 
The  rent  stated  here  is  different  from  that  for  the  land 
leased  in  1747,  so  this  would  seem  to  be  an  additional 
sixty  acres  to  that  already  rented. 
There  is  some  evidence,  therefore,  to  indicate  that 
James  Pickford  was  in  possession  of  farmland  on  a  certain 
scale  andl  by  implication  t  perhaps  commanded  more  than 
moderate,  resources  -  enough,  say,  to  extend  into  the  carrying 
trade,  There  is  no  evidence  that  James  abandoned  farming 
and  indeed  his  son  Matthewt  although  already  referred  to 
as  scarriertcontinued  an  interest  in  farming  and  acquired 
additional  farmland  in  the  Poynton  area. 
21 
It  seems  that 
much  of  the  land  leased  by  Jamesq  and  later  Matthewg  was 
pasture  or  general  farmland.  This  might  be  explained  by 
an  interest  in  the  local  staple,  dairy  farming,  but  would 
22 
equally  fit  with  the  obvious  needs  of  a  road-carrying  business* 
20  Manchester  Journal  16  Nov,  1771.  A  Cheshire  acre  was 
equivalent  to  just  over  two  statute  acres. 
21  Indenture  21  Dec.  1771  by  which  Matthew  Pickford  of  Poyntong 
carrier,  took  over  certain  property  then  leased  by  his 
mother  from  Robert  Kenyon  of  Manchester,  CHP/1.  Indenture 
5  Aug.  1774  between  Elizabeth  Brown  of  Hurstfield,  Cheshire 
and  Matthew  Pickford.  CHP/3-  This  agreement  explicitly 
provided  for  Pickford  to  plough  the  landq  and  to  dig  marl 
and  clay  for  use  as  a  dressing. 
22  In  connection  with  the  supply  of  food  to  Londong  Defoe 
Complete  English  tradesman  Vol.  II  pp  258-9  commented 
on  the  "many  farmers,  and  others  who  are  not  farmers, 
who  keep  teams  on  purpose  to  let  them  out"  for  the  carriage 
of  corng  meal  and  malt. 
29. Feed,  stabling,  smithery  and  general  repair  facilities 
would  all  be-available  as  Part  of  the  farm's  stock  in 
trade.  A  case  can  therefore  be  made  that  James  Pickford 
was  well  placed  to  engage  in  the  land  carrying  trade. 
It  is  possible  to  deduce  some  aspects  of  James  Pickford's 
business  and  working  from  the  content  of  his  advertisement, 
His  business  was  the  "carriage  of  goods  &  passengers,  at 
reasonable  rates"  the  hall-marks  of  the  common  carrier. 
In  addition  conveyance  was  clearly  by  stage  waggon:  there 
is  no  evidence  that  he,  ever  used  anything  other  than  waggon 
As  to  the  regularity  of  Pickford's  services  over  the  whole 
year,  it  has  already  been  suggested  that  it  is  unlikely 
the  main  highways  became  6o  bad  that  all  road  traffic  had 
to  ceaset  but-direct  evidence  of  James  Pickford's  experience 
is  minimal.  Even  if  James  remained  primarily  concerned 
with  farming,  he  had  a  substantial  capital  sum  committed  to 
his  road  haulage  businessq  too  much,  it  is  Suggested,  to 
allow  of  several  months'  inactivity.  It  is  not  without 
sienificanceg  however,  that  of  two  joint  advertisements  of 
the  Manchester  carriersq  announcing  an  increase  in  rates, 
to  which  James  Pickford,  was  a  sionatoryt  one  appeared  in 
September  and  the.  other  in  December, 
23 
Presumably  their 
various  waggons  were  on  the  road  at  the  time,  for  the  now 
rates  were  to  apply  immediately*  Similarly  both  Martha 
and  Matthew  Pickford,  in  the  1770s,  placed  advertisements 
giving  notice  of  alterations  in  the  deParture  times  or 
journey  times  of  their  waggons  in  Novemberv  December  and 
JanuarYt  as  at  other  times  of  the  year. 
24 
23  Manchester  Mercury  24  SePE-17659  1  Dec.  1767 
24  !  bid  26  NOV-17769  7  Jan,  1777,  Manchester  Journal  30  Nov, 
1771,  weekly  to  4  Jan,  1772,11  Nov.  1780. 
30. The  approach  roads'from  London  into  Manchester 
with  the  date  of  their  turnpike  Acts. 
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CoVentry  and  Lichfield. 
25 
At  Stone,  where  the  Holyhead 
road  turned  away  westwards  toward  the  Welsh  border,  the 
Lancashire  carriers  continued  north  for  Stoke  and  Newcastle- 
under-Lynp',  PickfordIs  waggons  left  the  main  road  to  the 
north  at  Talk,  in  Staffordshire,  and  approached  Manchester 
by  way  of  Coneletong  Macclesfieldl  Bullock  Smithy  and  Stockport. 
26 
This  was  the  same  route  as  that  taken  by  the  waggons  jointly 
operated  by  Richard  Wood,  Peter  Culshaw  and  Thomas  Norbury, 
carriers  between  Manchester  and  London,  in  1739- 
27  This  had 
long  been  the  regular  route  into  Manchester  from  the  north 
midlands 
28 
but  by  Pickford's  time  an  alternative  route  was 
available  by  way  of  HolmeiChapelt  Cranaget  Knutsford  and 
Altrincham.  Although  this  was  a  less  direct  route  into 
Manchester  than  that  which  was  actually  taken,  it  was  less 
hillyp  had  been  turnpiked  throughout  almost  its  entire  length 
by  17.56  and  had  become  the  customary  route  into  Manchester 
from  London. 
29 
In  addition  to  this  it  is  notable  that  at 
Congleton,  where  a  choice  of  routes  offered,  the  one  which 
pass'ed  through  Macclesfield  was  preferred  to  that  thr,  Pugh,,... 
Wilmslow.  Again  it  is  likely  that  the  latter  was  a  less 
25  Ogilby  (John  Owen  ed)  Brit  , ýnnia  depicta  or  OrilbX  - Improved 
(1720)  p  50  ff. 
26  See  accompanying  map  and  James  Pickfordts  advertisement, 
for  the  towns  listed.  ' 
27  Thomas  Geographical  aspects  of  the  development  of 
transportation  p  131. 
28  W.  B.  Stephens  (ed)  History  of  Congleton  (M.  U.  P.  1970)  p  128. 
29  Harrison  'Development  of  the  turnpike  system'  Lancashire  & 
Cheshire  Antiq`uarian  Society  Vol,  IV_,  (1886)  p-8-Ve 
31. hilly  route.  Does  this  mean  that  greater  importance 
was  being  attached  to  factors  other  than  the  terrain  and  the  ' 
condition  of  the  road? 
Two  possible  explanations  may  be  considered.  The  first 
is  that  both  Congleton  and  Macclesfield  might  have  provided 
sufficient  traffic  for  that  route  to  retain  its  attractions. 
By  the  mid  1750s  the  silk  industry,  both  spinning  and 
weaving,  had  been  established  in  the  two  towns3o  and  both 
the  raw  material  and  the  finished  product  would  require 
transportation.  However  the  claims  of  Congleton  were  not 
so  strong  as  to  prevent  Pickfords'  waggons  being  diverted 
by  way  of  Leek,  another  silk  town,  after  the  road  from 
Macclesfield  had  been  turnpiked. 
31 
The  second  consideration  is  that  the  road  from  Macclesfield 
passed  through  Poynton  and  this  is  where  the  Pickfords  almost 
certainly  had  their  base  in  the  early  years.  James  Pickford 
I 
mo-yed  to  Poynton  some  time  after  1747  and  the  land  offered 
for  sale  by  Martha  Pickford  in  1771  was  precisely  "adjoining 
to  the  turnpike  road"  between  Stockport  and  Macclesfield  in 
32 
Poynton.  The  farmland  leased  by  James  Pickford  could 
well  have  provided,  as  has  been  suggested  already,  many,  of 
the  facilities  necessary  for  a  road  carrying  business  and 
located  at  Poynton  would  be  well  placed  to-do  so.  Similarly 
James  himself  could  combine  supervision  of  his.  waggons  with 
that  of  his  farming  interests. 
30  Stephens  0  it-  PP  138-9-  C.  S.  Davies  A  his_tory  of 
Macclesfielý 
cM. 
U.  P.  1961)'p  122  ff 
31  see  below  p,  40 
32  Manchester  Journal  16  Nov.  1771 
32. There  is  no  reason  why  Poynton  should  not  have  been 
the  effective  headquarters  of  the  business  at  this  time, 
and  not  Manchester.  The  roadýbetween  Manchester  and 
Bullock  Smithy  was  one  of  the  earliest  to  be  turnpiked 
in  the  Manchester  area  and  the  section  of  the  road  between 
Manchester  and  Stockport,  from  which  town  Poynton  was  only 
four  miles  distant,  was  in  particularly  good  condition. 
33 
Manchester  was  easily  accessible  from  Poynton,  even  for 
heavy  waggons,  and  it  is  possible  that  Pickfordst  waggons 
travelled  to  and  from  Manchester  in  the  course  of  a  day  in 
order  to  discharge  and  take  on  goods. 
34 
In  this  way  the 
business  could  have  been  worked  without  premises  in  Manchester 
itself,  and  there  is  indeed  no  sign  that  the  Pickfords  had 
a  permanent  establishment  in  Manchester  until  some  years 
later.  When  the  turnpike  from  Bullock  Smithy  through  Leek 
to  Ashbourne  and  Sandon  was  built  in  the  1760s  and  became 
the  primary  route  between  Manchester  and  London,  the 
advantageous  position  of  Poynton  would  have  been  reinforced. 
Moreover  the  Pickford  family  remained  closely  associated  with 
Poynton  for  many  years  to  come.  The  main  blocks  of  land 
leased  by  Matthew  Pickford  were  in  the  Poynton  areat35  he 
had  a  house  there,  and  at  least  one  notice  relative  to  the 
33  Wadsworth  and  Mann  Cotton  trade  and  industrial  Lancashire 
p  220,  note  4. 
34  On  the  basis  of  later  departure  times  and  reconstructed, 
working  schedulesq  waggons  seem  to  have  left  Manchester 
at  6  p.  m.  having  probably  arrived  there  early  the  same 
morning, 
35  CHP/l;  CHP/5. 
33. t 
carrying  business  was  issued.  by  him  as  from  Poynton. 
36 
To  the  day  of  his  death,  in  fact9he  was  invariably  referred 
to  as  'Mr.  Pickford'  or  'Mat.  Pickford  of  Poyntont. 
37 
Probably  not  until  canal  traffic  became  important  did 
Poynton  lose  its  strategic  value  and  premises  in  Manchester 
become  necessary. 
James  Pickford  mentioned  only  the  departure  days  of 
his  two  London  waggons  in  his  advertisement,  presumably 
because  the  alteration  in  the  place  of  departure  of  one  of 
them  was  the  sole  purpose  of  the  announcement.  But  he 
must  have  had  waggons  operating  from  Manchester  twice  a 
week  also.  There  is  no  direct  evidence  how  long  the  journey 
between  Manchester  and  London  took  by  Pickfordts  waggon  but 
it  is  not  likely  to  have  differed  materially  from  the  time 
taken  by  the  waggons  of  another  firm  of  Manchester  carrierst 
John  Mills  and  John  Birchenough,  as  recorded  three  years 
later.  In  June  1759  38 
Mills  &  Birchenough  operated  two 
waggons  a  week  from  Manchester:  one  waggon  left  on  a 
Vednesday  and  arrived  in  London  a  week  the  following  Fridayp 
the  other  left  on  a  Saturday  and  arrived  in  London  the 
following  Tuesday  week.  When  Sundays  are  omitted  from  the 
calculationt  since  no  travel  was  allowed  that  day,  a  survival 
from  Puritan  times,  a  regular  patterAorking  is  shown.  A 
Journeys  from  Manchester  to  London  took  nine  days  and  the 
return  journey  one  day  less*  It  is  possible  to  reconstruct 
36  Manchester  Journal  3  JulY  -1773.  Matthewis  four  children 
were  all  christe7e-d  'in  the  house  at  Poynton'  KS/2/1(a) 
37  This  was  the  usual  appellation  when  his  name  appeared  in 
the  Manchester  papers  in  connection  with  coaching 
advertisements. 
38  Manchester  Mercury,  26  June  1759- 
34. from  this  simple  data  the  working  schedule  according  to  which 
the  firm's  waggons  were  operated. 
39 
Two  main  results  are 
demonstrated;  firstq  that  each  waggon  took'three  weeks  to 
complete  the  round  trip,  and  secondlyq  that  a  minimum  of  six 
waggons  were  required  to  work  the  schedule,  The  significance 
of  this  result  is  that  six  waggons  were  exactly  James  Pickford's 
working  stock.  By  implicationg  therefore,  he  was  following 
the  same  basic  pattern  of  working  as  were  Mills  &  Birchenough. 
The  schedule  demonstrated  a  simple  pattern  of  working, 
with  regular  days  of  arrival  and  departure  in  both  Manchester 
and  London.  Since  the  six  waggons  required  as  the  minimum 
to  operate  the  schedule  were  also  James  Pickford's  total  stock, 
any  disruptions,  on  account  of  breakdown  or  bad  weather 
conditions,  must  have  thrown  the  whole  time-table  out  of  gear, 
James  Pickford  evidently  kept  no  spare  capacity  and'there'seems 
little  reserve  in  the  schedule  itself.  Waggons  were  turned 
round  at  the  Manchester  end  in  two  days  and  in  one  day  in 
London.  Provision  evenfor  basic  maintenance  seems  slim  here. 
Presumably  waggons  could  'be  hired  in  an  emergency  but  other 
than  that  the  only  means  of  repairing  a  disruption  of  the 
schedule  would  seem  to  have  depended  on  shorter  than  normal 
turn-round  times  until  the  balance  was  restored.  Other 
operational  problems  would  include  the  provision  of  food  and 
rest  along  the  road.  Stage  waggons  were  hauled  by  one  team 
of  horses  the  whole  length  of  the  Journey,  so  there  was  no 
question  of  providing  relays  of  horses  and  stabling  facilities. 
However,  both  man  and  beast  would  need  overnight  accommodation. 
Assuming  an  average 
39  See  Schedule  1  appended  to  this  chapter, 
35o speed  of  about  two  miles  per  hour,  the  186  miles  between 
Manchester  and  London  would  take  93  hours,  or  something 
in  excess  of  ten  hours  a  day  on  the  road  for  the  nine  days 
of'the  journey.  After  their  lengthy  exertions  of  the  day, 
the  horses  would  need  a,  feed  and  a  good  night's  rest  just 
as  much  as  the  waggoner. 
James  Pickford's  interest  in  the  carrying  trade  was, 
however,  nearly  very  short-lived  for  within  less  than 
twelve  months  of  his  advertisement  appearing,  his  business 
was  up  for  sale. 
4o 
Why  he  should  want  to  sell  so  soon  is 
not  known  but  as  others  followed,  his  example 
41 
the  answer 
most  likely  lies  less  in  anything  personal  to  James  Pickford 
than  the  general  economic  climate.  For  the  economy  as  a 
whole,  the  second  half  of  the  1750s  appears  to  have  been 
a  time  of  prosperity.  By  1755  depression  had  given  way  to 
recovery  of  tradep  afýer  which  the  economy  moved  into  boom 
conditions  which  reached  a  peak  in  1761.42  Despite  the 
onset  of  war  in  May  1756,  export  levels  were  sustained  and 
then  rose'sharply  from  1759:  however  imports  and  re-exports 
fell  off. 
43 
These  broad  favourable  trends,  however,  were 
I 
not  incompatible  with  severe  food  shortaGes.  The  summer 
of  1756-was  abnormally  wet  and  bread  riots  broke  out  early 
the  following  year.  Then  a-succession  of  good  summers  led 
to  a  substantial  improvement  for  the  rest  of  the  decade. 
44 
Manchester's  experience  followed  the  general  trand,  in  most 
40  Manchester  MercurY  7  June  1757. 
41  'A  packhorse  gang  7nd  a  broad-wheel  waggon  businessp  both 
operating  between  Manchester  and  London,  were  also 
advertised  for  sale,  Ibid  26  july,  6  Dec.  1757. 
42  T.  S.  Ashton  Economic  fluctuations  PP  172-3 
43  Ibid  P  59 
44 
'Ibid, 
pp  20-21. 
36. respectst  but  the  improvements  recorded  for  the  country  as 
a  whole  were  absent. 
45 
The  years  1756-7  were  one  of'the 
three  periods  of  severe  food  scarcity  in  the  area  in  the 
fifty  years  from  1715.  Trade  in  1756  was  already  bad  and 
when  the  harvest  failed,  things  soon  became  so  critical 
that  the  Justices  of  the  Peace  in  Lancashire  decided  to 
allow  the  importation  of  foreign  corn.  The  position 
deteriorated  further  in  the  first  part  of  1757  and  the 
summer  brought  only  an  indifferent  harvest.  Also,  against 
the  trend,  the  outbreak  of  war  did  result  in  a  fall  off  in 
tradej  at  least  in  the  short  run.  Both  factors  combined 
to  produce  a  depressed  local  economy.  James  Pickford's 
decision  to  sell,  apparently  taken  at  the  height  of  this 
depressiong  was  almost  certainly  a  product  of  it. 
There  is  nothing  on  record  specific  to  the  carrying 
business  after  this  episode  before  James'  deathq  but  he 
does  appear  on  two  further  occasions  acting  jointly  with  his 
fellow  London  carriers.  Two  joint  notices  were  issued  in 
the  1760s 
46 
and  their  content  reflects  certain  features  of 
the  carrying  trade  which  are  worth  noting. 
On  both  occasions  the  purpose  of  the  carrierst  joint 
notice  was  to  announce  an  increase  in  rates  on  account  of 
a  prior  increase  in  operating  costs.  Two  main  causes  were 
brought  forward,  one  of  which  was  the  cost  of  buying  and 
feeding  the  horses.  In  1765  the  stated  reason  was  "the 
scarcity  of  hay  and  the  bad  crop  of  oats  and  beans",  and  in 
1767"the  long  continued  high  price  of  almost  all  the 
45  Wadsworth  and  Mann  Op.  cit.  PP  356-61 
46  Manchester  Mercur  24  Sepf.  1765,1  Dec.  1767 
37. necessaries  of  life.  "  Food  riots  were  common  during  the 
years  1766-8  and  the  economy  was  generally  depressed. 
47 
On  the  latter  occasion  an  "impending  danger  of  loss  in 
our  horses"  and  a  possible  sharp  increase  in  their  cost 
added  further  jirgency  to  the  situation. 
48 
Expenditure  of 
this  kind  necessarily  bulked  large  in  the  total  costs  of 
road  carrying  concerns  which  were  therefore  particularly 
sensitive  to  such  price  increases.  Also  as  food  prices 
tended  to  surge  suddenly  rather  than  rise  smoothlyt  pressure 
built  up  very  quickly  and  could  only  be  off-set,.  except  in 
the  very  short  run,  by  increased  revenue,  At  the  time 
feed  would  certainly  be  the  most  volatile  element  of  a  road 
carrier's  costs. 
The  carriers'  other  reason  for  the  rates  increase  was 
"the  great  advance  of  toll  on  the  broad-wheel  waggons  and 
the  reduction  of  the  weight  they  have  heretofore  been 
allowed  to  carry.  "  In  order  to  promote  the  use  of  broad- 
wheel  wagoons  legislation  passed  in  the  1750s  had  offered 
certain  concessionsg  including  reduced  tolls,  to  those  who 
used  them.  Whether  as  a  direct  result-or  not,  broad- 
wheel  waggons  were.  widely  adopted  by  carriers  and  their  use 
was  felt  to  have  improved  road  conditions.  These  efforts 
were  regarded  as  so  successful  that  attempts  were  made  to 
extend  them.  Under  the  next  scheme  wheels  were  to  be  so 
aligned  thatq  on  each  side  of  the  waggon,  the  fore  and  aft 
wheels  would  together  roll  flat(I'surface  sixteen  inches  wide.  A 
An  Act  passed  in  1765  incorporated  these  measures  and 
restricted  the  exemptions  previously  allowed  to  waggons 
47  Ashton  Op.  Cit.  p  41,  P  153,  pp  172-3 
48  The  nature  of  the  threat  to  the  horses  is  not  stated  - 
possibly  an  outbreak  of  glanders,  a  highly  infectious 
disease  which  could  only  be  combatted  by  a  slaughter 
policy  and  was  endemic  at  the  time.  R.  Wallace  Farm  live- 
stock  of  Great  Britain  (5th  ed  1923)  P  561 
38. which  conformed  to  the  new  specifications.  In  addition 
a  surcharge  of  20/-  per  cent  was  levied  on  ordinary  broad- 
wheel  waggons  carrying  loads  over  six  tons.  Hence  the 
carriers'  action;  they  preferred  to  put  up  their  rates 
go 
rather  than  to  the  trouble  of  adapting  their  waggons  to 
the  new  stipulations, 
49 
A  final  point  of  interest  which  arises  from  these  notices 
is  the  relationship  between  the  carriers'  charges  and  the 
justiceslof  the  peace  assessments  of  carriage  rates  made 
under  the  Act  of  1692.  It  was  common,  for  examplep  for 
carriers  to  approach  the  justices  for  relief  from  rising 
costs,  especially  that  of  provender. 
50 
Perhaps  no  record 
51 
of  the  Lancashire  justices'  assessments  has  survived',  but 
they  were  made  and  the  carriers  were  invited  to  attend  the 
justices'  meeting. 
52 
Yet  on  both  occasions  under  discussion 
the  rates  increasea,  in  the  months  of  September  and  December, 
seem  to  have  been  effected  on  the  carriers'  own  initiative. 
Had  they  the  formal  authorisation  of  the  justicesq  why 
trouble  to  express  the  "hope  no  person  will  take  umbrage" 
at  the  increase,  or  the  belief,  "that  every  candid-  and 
judicious  person  ...  will  most  readily  discover  the  absolute 
necessity  we  are  under  of  making  such  advance.  "  In  both 
49  These  efforts  to  promote  the  16"  rollers  do  not  appear 
to  have  been  successful,  As  late  as  1774  efforts  were 
still  being  made  to  promote  them  by  the  remarkable 
offer  of  complete  exemption  Prom  tolls  for  five  years, 
followed  by  a  further  five  years  of  half-tolls.  Even 
on  these  terms  they  do  not  seem  to  have  been  adopted. 
50  Copland  Roads  and  their  traffic  pp  69-70;  Albert  "The 
justices'  rates  ...  reconsidered  Transport  History  Vol.  j 
P  113  ff.  Albert  finds  a  broad  corre  lation  between 
assessments  and  known  carriers'  charges.  It  would  be 
interesting.  to  discover  which  of  the  two  ied  the  price 
movements. 
51  Lancashire  is  not  included  in  Albert's  list  of  counties 
from  which  returns  were  made  Op.  cit.  p  126  ff 
52  Manchester  Mercury  7  April  1767;  also  21  March  1797 
39.1 cases  the  new  rates  were  to  apply  immediately;  theýcarriers 
apparently  could  not  afford  to  wait  until  the  justices' 
next  meeting,  the  following  Spring. 
James  Pickford  died  in  May  17680  and  the  business  was 
carried  on  for  a  short  time  in  the  name  of  his  widowv  Martha, 
Although  this  might  seem  an  unusual  role  for  a  woman,  there 
are  in  fact  many  instances  in  the  carrying  and  coaching 
trades  of  womeng  especially  widowst  so  acting  in  the 
eighteenth  and  early  nineteenth  centuries. 
53 
However 
Martha  Pickford  did  not  survive  her  husband  for  very  long, 
but  before  her  own  death  few  discernable  changes  had  taken 
, 
place  in  the  running  of  the  business.  An  advertisement  of 
54  November  1771  showed  the  same  twice  weekly  departuresq  but 
a  point  of  interest  is  that  Martha  Pickford  referred  to 
herself  as  I'Londont  Manchesterv  Stockportq  Macclesfield  & 
Leek  Carrier.  "  The  turnpike  road  from  Bullock  Smithy 
through  Macclesfield  and  Leek  was  now  evidently  the  route 
used  by  Pickfords'  waagons,  The  only  change  which  miGht 
rate  as  a  positive  advance  was  a  certain  degree  of  r.  ational- 
isation  in  London.  The  use  of  two  different  inns  in  London 
had  apparently  been  the  cause  of  confusion,  with  customers 
going  to  the  wrong  inn  to  collect  their  goods.  Things  were 
changed  so  that  for  the  future  all  the  waggons  were  worked 
from  the  White  Bear  in  Basinahall  Street. 
53  For  carrying,  see  Register  of  Freedoms,  1742-1797, 
Fellowship  of  Carmen,  Guildhall  Library,  GL,  MS, 
4915/2;  Manchester  Mercuryq  10  Sept.  1765  shows 
Catherine  Mills  taking  ý`ver  from  her  husband  (of 
Mills  and  Birchenough.  For  coaching,  see  S.  Harris 
The  coaching  ap, 
ýv 
P  1569  p  162 
54  Manchester  Journal  30  Nov  1771 
4o. The  death  of  Martha  Pickford  in  May  1772  ended  the 
first  phase  of  Pickfords'  development.  The  business  had 
survived  and  been  consolidated.  After  her  death  control 
passed  to  her  eldest  son,  Matthew.  With  him  came 
expansion  and  diversification. 
Matthew  Pickford  was  thirty-two  years  of  aCe  when 
he  took  control  of  the  family  enterprise.  Matthew  had 
already  been  working  in  the  business  before  his  father 
55  died  and  Martha  Pickford  had  course  to  acknowledge  in 
her  will  "the  aid  and  service  he  has  afforded  in  and  about 
the  said  business.  , 
56 
It  is  likely  that  Matthew  acquired 
practical  experience  on  the  road,  by  travelling  with  the 
waggonso  This  is  suggested  by  his  marriage,  probably  in 
1775  or  61  to  Hannah  Taylor  of  Talk  01  the  Hill.  Talk  was 
the  road  junction  where  the  waggons  had  formerly  turned  off 
the  main  highway  to  the  north  for  Congleton  and  was  no  doubt 
a  suitable  overnight  stopping  place.  Matthewls  wedding 
was  attended  by  Joseph  Hulse  and  Jonathan  Higginsong  both 
carriers  by  waggon  between  Manchester  and  London, 
57 
In  the  first  Manchester  directory(1772)  the  family 
business  was  already  entered  under  Matthew  Pickford's  name.  . 
58 
55  J.  P.  Earwaker  (ed)  The  Constables'  accounts  of  the  manor 
of  Manchesterv  Vol.  111  1743-1776  (1892)  P  176:  16  Feb. 
1768"To  Matthew..  Pickford  carrying  Water  Buckets  from 
London,  El-3.  d. 
56  Transcript  of  Martha  Pickford's  will  KS/3/1;  also  Pic  4/20 
57  Matthew's  first  childv  Jamesp  was  born  14  Dec.  1776.  The 
date  of-his  marriage  is  not  known.  -  A  paper  at  KS/2/1(a) 
which  records  the  marriage  and  the  christening  of  their 
children  includes  the  note  'Mr  and  Mrs  Pickford  and  Miss 
Sarah  Taylor  arrived  at  Poynton  July  28  -  1776.1  Jonathan 
Higginson,  who  was  sponsor  to  Matthew's  elder  surviving 
son  Thomasp  married  Matthew's  sisterv  Elizabeth, 
58  The  Manchester  directory,  1772  (Raffald;  reprinted  1889) 
p  55. 
41. Six  firms  then  operated  between  Manchester  and  London; 
four  had  wageons  departing  twice  a  week,  the  other  two  once 
a  week,  The  four  carrying  firms  with  a  twice  weekly 
service,  Pickfords  and  three  others, 
59 
were  all  presumably 
of  the  same  size,  yet  Pickfords  was  placed  at  the  head  of 
the  list,  and  the  others  in  alphabetical  order.  James 
Pickford  had  earlier  headed  the  list  of  signatories  to  the 
joint  notices  discussed  earlier,  so  perhapd,  the  Pickfords 
had  already  achieved  a  certain  primacy  among  their  colleagues 
in  the  trade.  The  stage  waggonerts  traditional  custom  of 
both  passengers  and  goods  remained;  until  at  least  1781 
Matthew  Pickford  was  concerned  with-this  kind  of  traffic. 
6o 
The  only  change  madeq  and  that  almost  immediately,  was  the 
removal  by  Matthew  of  his  London  base  from  the  White  Bear 
in  Basinghall  Street  to  the  Swan  with  Two  Necks,  in  Lad  Lane, 
61, 
The  Swan  remained  as  Pickfordst  London  headquarters  for  the 
next  twenty  odd  years. 
There  were  two  chief  developments  which  affected  road 
haulage  in  the  course  of  the  next  few  years  -  faster  speeds 
and  the  provision  of  more  frdquent  services.  The  - 
introduction  of  faster  speeds  in  May  1776  was  foreshadowed 
when  a  new  firm  of  carriers,  Swaine  &  Co.  &  Frith  &  Co, 
reduced  the  time  to  London  from  nine  to  eight  days. 
62 
By  -- 
November  the  first  mention  was  made  of  'flying  waggons,  -a 
somewhat  picturesque  description  of  these  lumbering  vehicles 
no  matter  how  much  they  were  speeded  up.  Swaine  &  Co.  now 
59  Cooper  &  Co.,  Hulse  &  Co,,  Wood  &  Co, 
60  Manchester  Journalg  24  Feb.  1781 
61  Ibid  3  July  1773;  Manchester  Mercury  6  July  1773 
62  Manchester  Mercury  21  May  1776 
42. advertised  a  journey  time  of  six  days 
63 
but  had  already 
been  countered  by  Pickfords  and  Cooper  &  Co,  both  of  whom 
claimed  to  cover  the  distance  in  four  and  a  half  dayse 
64 
Within  a  matter  of  monthsq  therefore,  journey  times  had  been 
halved.  Exactly  why  this  sudden  increase  in  speeds  occurred 
is  not  easily  explained.  No  doubt  competition  played  a 
part,  but  it  is  significant  that  this  development  was  not 
confined  to  road  haulage.  -Coach  times  between  Manchester 
and  London  were  reduced  from  three  to  two  days  at  approximately 
the  same  period.  The  explanation  would  probably  lie  in  the 
cumulative  impact  of  prior  road  improvements  whose  potentional 
65 
had  previously  gone  unappreciated  but  was  now  being  exploited. 
The  implications  of  these  faster  speeds  are  shown  when 
a  working  schedule  is  constructed  on  the,  basis  of  the  waggons' 
journey  times.  Swaine  &  Co,  for  example,  was  soon  advertising 
a  five  day  journey  time  to  London. 
66 
The  working  schedule  is 
complex  and  shows  a  relatively  inefficient  use  of-the  waggonso 
At  least  five  waggons  were  required  to  work  this  service  but 
their  turn-round  time  in  Manchester  was  particularly  slow. 
Waggons  were  turned  round  in  thirty  hours  in  London,  but  only 
fifty-six  hours  (excluding  Sundays)  in  Manchester. 
63  Ibid  '19  Nov.  1776. 
64  Cooper  &  Co.  Ibid  19  Nov.  1776;  Pickfords,  Ibid  26  Nov.  1776 
Pickfords'  notice  is  dated  16  Nov.  1776. 
65  A  point  of  interest  is  that  this  speeding  up  occurs  in 
November  and  January,  the  bad  season  for  road  transport. 
66  Manchester  Mercury  7  Jan,  1777.  According  to  this  notice 
Swaine  &  Co.  had  a  new  partner  in  London,  John  Jones  &  Co. 
Possibly  this  was  James  Pickford's  former  book-keeper  in 
London,  having  set  up  in  business  on  his  own  account. 
This  would  be  an  obvious  means  of  entry  to  the  trade  and 
seems  to  have  been  used  by  James  Deykin.  Deykin  was  book- 
keeper  in  London  to  Bass  &  Morris  in  1781  and  was  in  business 
on  his  own  account  in  1799. 
43. By  comparisong  Pickfords  and  Cooper  &  Co.  's  services,,  on 
the  basis  of  a  four  and  a  half  day  journey  time)were  on  a 
much  better  footing  altogether.  Waggons  were  turned  round 
in  thirty  hours  in  both  London  and  Manchestert  and  the 
round  trip  was  completed  in  two  weeks.  Moreover  the 
reconstructed  schedule  demonstrates  that  only  four  waggons 
were  needed  to  operate  it. 
67 
In  terms  of  waggon  requirements 
alone,  Pickfords  and  Cooper  &  Co.  enjoyed  a  certain  advantage 
over  Swaine  &  Co, 
The  changes  in  speeds  and  schedules  which  took  place 
resulted  i  as  a  bye-product,  in  conditions  which'contained 
built-in  opportunities  for  expansion.  Since  four  waggons 
were  now  sufficient  to  provide  a  twice  weekly  service  between 
Manchester  and  Londong  firms  which  owned  six  waggonst  like 
Pickfords  and  probably  also  Cooper  &-Co.  and  Hulse  &  Co. 
came  to  enjoy  a  certain  margin  of  spare  capacity.  There 
was  always  the  possibility  of  sticking  to  the  existing 
twice  weekly  service  and  scrapping  the  extra  two  waggons 
or  keeping  them  as  reserve  stock.  Alternatively  they  could 
be  kept  at  work  by,  increasing  the  number  of  services  to  three 
a  week.  Considerable  gains  were  possible  for  both  carrier 
and  customer.  A  net  increase  of  a  third  in  the  leading 
carriers'  provision  of  transport  facilities  could  not  help 
but  benefit  merchants  and  manufacturers  sending  goods  to  the 
London  market.  As  for  the  carriers,  within-the  space  of  a 
few  weeksq  their  capital  was  rendered  more  productive.  The 
earning  power  of  their  existing  stock  was  increased  by  a 
67  See  Schedules  2  and  3  appended  to  this  chapter. 
44. thirdq  possibly  with  a  less  than  a  proportional  increase 
in  variable  costs.  Provided  the  overall  volume  of  traffic 
rose  sufficiently  to  keep  constant  or  even  reduce  unit  costs 
then  the  potential  net  profitability  of  the  business  would 
be  enhanced.  Given  these  considerations  it  comes  as  no 
surprise  to  find  both  Cooper  &  Co,  and  Hulse  &  Co.  exploiting 
their  position  and  advertising  three  departures  a  week  before 
the  year  was  out. 
68 
There  is  no  direct  evidence,  but  it 
is  unlikely  that  Matthew  Pickford  failed  to  follow  suit. 
During  the  succeeding  years,  services  became  more 
numerous  with  only  limited,  if  any,  further  reductions  in 
journey  times.  The  four-and-a-half  day  journey  was  dropped 
and  replacedt  from  the  early  1780s,  by  a  basic  five  day 
journey,  together  with  more  frequent  services.  However  it 
is  possible  that  by  the  end  of  the  eighteenth  century  the 
time  of  the  journey  between  Manchester  and  London  had  been 
lowered  to  four  days, 
69 
Faster  speeds  awaited  some  form  of 
technical  breakthrough  in  the  design  of  road  vehicles.  The 
frequency  of  the  road  carriers'  services  however,  steadily 
advanced,  involving  regular  increases  in  the  amount  of 
capital  employed.  The  initial  phase  of  expansion  can  be 
explained  in  part  by  changes  on  the  supply  side  of  road 
transport.  The  faster  speeds  whých  were  attained  created 
conditions  favourable  to  growth',  but  for,  these  to  be 
translated  into  practical  results'an  increase  in  demand  for 
68  Manchester  Mercuryq  16  Septp  30  Dec-1777- 
69  !  bid  14  Feb-1797-  A  new  firm  of  carriersq  Thomas 
Sleath  &  Co.  9  advertised  to  this  effect  but  went  out 
of  business  the  following  year, 
45. transport  services  was  also  necessary.  ]Extra  services 
required  extra  traffic  to  support  them.  Additional  sex-Vices 
beyond  those  made  possible  by  improved  use  of  existing  stock 
would  be  regarded  as  a  response  to  a  sustained  increase  in 
demand.  The  years  after  1780  are  customarily  taken  as  the 
spring  board  of  Britain's  industrial  growtht  and  even  if 
there  is  statistical  evidence  for  a  starting  point  in  the 
174os7O  the  strong,  by  and  large  sustained7l  advance  of  the 
economy  during  the  latter  period  is  not  questioned.  For 
Lancashire  and  Manchester  in  particularg  the  years  following 
the  conclusion  of  the  American  war  brought  rapid  industrial 
development.  Aikin  recorded  a  "vast  extension  of  the 
Manchester  manufactures  after  the  peace  of  1783  ,  72 
andl  in 
more  general  termso  all  the  statistical  series  of  the  cotton 
trade  begin  their  sharp  upward  movement. 
73 
Transport 
services  of  all  kinds  were  stimulated  by  the  Growth  of 
Manchester's  trade  -  canals  in  particular,  but  road  haulage 
also. 
London  gave  way  to  Liverpool  as  the  major  port  of  entry 
for  raw  cotton,  but  it  remained  the  most  important  market 
for  the  manufacturers  of  cotton. 
74 
The  Manchester  and 
London  carriers,  thereforeq  were  almost  certainly  finding 
70  P,  Deane  and  W.  A.  Cole  British 
- 
economic  growth  1688-1959 
.  (c.  u.  P.  1964)  pp  40-0 
71  Ashton  Economic  fluctuations  PP  172-39  and  passim  would 
suggest  fewer  depression  years  in  the  latter  part  of  the 
century. 
72  J.  Aikin  A  description  of  the  country,.  round  Manchester 
(1795)  p  129. 
73  Deane  &  Cole  British  economic  growth  p  182  ff 
74  M.  M.  Edwards  The  growth  of  the 
- 
British  cotton  trade  1780- 
67)  Chap.  8.  1815  (M.  U.  P.  --T9 
46. themselves  required  to  transport  increasing  volumes  of 
goods,  In  the  circumstances  it  became  necessaryg  and 
presumably  profitable,  to  expand  services  still  further, 
but  henceforward  by  additions  to  their  capital  stock, 
By  the  end  of  1780  both  Pickfords  and  Cooper  &-.  Co.  were 
sending  out  waggons  four  times  a  week. 
75 
On  the  basis 
of  a  five  day  journey,  and  reconstructing  the  working 
schedule  as  beforep  this  can  be  shown  to  require  a 
minimum  of  eight  waggons.  For  Pickfords  at  least  this 
may  have  represenied  the  first  net  addition  to  the  firmts 
capital  stock  since  the  very  beginnings  of  the  business. 
Once  under  way,  howeverg  expansion  continued  at  a 
Wkt'r- 
steady  rate.  By  1788tAa  new  directory  was  publishedg- 
Pickfords'  services  had  been  further  increased  to  six 
departures  a  week. 
76 
This  was  more  than  any  of  the 
othe3ý  London  road  carriers  offered  and,  in  view  of  the 
continuine  ban  on  Sunday  travelg  was  equivalent  to  a  'daily 
service.  At  the  end  of  the  century  Pickfords'  waggons 
still  set  off  daily  but  it  is  likely  that  they  were  now 
completing  the  journey  in  four  days.  Given  speedy  turn- 
round  times  a  daily  service  on  this  basis  could  have  been 
worked  with  a  minimum  of  ten  waggonst  but  It  is  likely 
twelve  were  used, 
77 
Over  the  years,  Matthew  Pickford 
was  making  steady  progress  in  the  development  of  the 
business* 
75  Manchester  Mercury  14  ,  21  Nov.  1780;  also  Manchester 
directory  1781 
, 
kRaffald)  pp  91-2. 
76  Directory  for  Manchester  &  Salford,  1788  (Lewis)  p  41ff. 
77  The  use  of  ten  waggons  would  have  required  very  tight 
turn-round  times  and  also  staggered  starting  days  for 
each  wageon,  With  twelve  waggons  this  pressure  would 
be  relaxed  and  each  waggon  could  depart  on  the  same  day 
each  week. 
47. Changes  other  than  the  speeds  and  frequency  of 
services  also  took  place.  A  new  route  to  London  was 
adopted.  Martha  Pickford  had  already  transferred  to  the 
new  turnpike  road  through  Macclesfield  to  Leek  but  the 
road  taken  beyond  there  was  not  indicated.  Within  a 
few  years  of  taking  over 
) 
Matthew  Pickford  was  directing 
his  waggons  through  Ashbourne  and  Derbyshire  instead  of 
Sandon  and  Staffordshire;  the  old  established  carriers' 
route  through  Lichfield  and  Coventry  was  abandoned  in 
78 
favour  of  one  taking  in  Derby,  Leicester  and  Northampton, 
There  was  also  a  more  important  break  with  the  Past. 
During  the  1780s  Matthew  Pickford  began  to  severlthe 
carrier1s  traditional  links  with  the  coaching  inns  andq 
by  taking  up  more  specialised  premises,  became  more  heavily 
committed  both  in  Manchester  and  London.  Initially  this 
probably  reflected  a  quanti:  Lative  increase  in  the  volume  of 
traffic  being  handled  but  from  the  late  1780s  and  early  1790s 
and  important  additional  stimulus  would  come  from  the  need 
to  cater  for  a  new  range  of  trafficq  that  going  by  canal* 
79  Since  at  Ieast  17729  Matthew  Pickford  operated  from 
the  Swan  Inn,  Market  Street,,  in  Manchester,  but  whether  he 
rented  any  warehouse  space  in  unknown;  from  the  previous 
discussion  concerning  the  likely  role  of  Poynton,  the  guess 
would  be  that  he  did  not. 
80 
In  1781  he  still  used  the  Swan 
78  Manchester  directory  1781  (Raffald)  p  92. 
79  For  this  and  succeeding  dates  to  17949  see  the 
appropriate  Manchester  trade  directories. 
80 
-  Manchester  MercurY  30  Nov.  1779,  carried  a  warning  from 
the  Borough-reeve  and  Constables  that  the  carriers  must 
stop  loading  and  unloading  their  waggons  in  the  public 
street. 
48. Inng  but  in  1788  reference  is  first  made  to  a  warehouse  in 
Market  Street  but  no  mention  made  of  the  Swan  Inn,  By 
1794  new  warehouse  premises  had  been  taken  at  54  Fountain 
Street,  and  probably  also  a  small  depot  at  Castle  Quay  for 
goods  passing  over  the  Duke  of  Bridgewater's  canal. 
81 
At 
the  same  time  a  move  was  made  in  London  also.  The  Swan 
with  Two  Necks  had  served  for  many  years  as  Pickfords' 
London  terminal  but  in  1794  the  lease  of  the  Castle  Inn  next 
door  to  the  Swan  fell  vacant  and  it  was  promptly  acquired 
by  Matthew  Pickford's  brother  Thomas, 
82 
The  volume  of 
business  handled  by  the  firm  in  London  had  evidently  reached 
the  stage  where  accommodation  shared  jointly  with  other 
carriers  was  no  longer  adequate.  It  is  indeed  likely  that 
Pickfords  had  had  sole  use  of  the  Swan  for  some  years  prior 
83 
to  the  transfer  to  the  Castle,  but  apparently  it  was 
preferable  to  acquire  the  tenancy  of  a  property  in  addition 
to  its  exclusive  use.  As  a  coaching  inn  the  Castle  would 
possess  stablingg  storage  space  and  room  for  offices,  Over 
the  years  the  property  was  rebuilt  to  meet  the  needs  of  a 
carrying  businessý  and  the  lease  retained  until  1918. 
Pickfordst  services  from  London  can  be  identified  for 
the  first  time  only  in  1789 
ý4 
In  that  year  the  Blossoms  Inng 
Lawrence  lanep  and  the  Saracen's  Headp  Snowhill,  were  being 
.1% 
81  V.  I.  Tomlinson  Early  warehouses  on  Manchester  waterways, 
Lancashire  and  Cheshire  Antiquarian  SociejZ  Vol-  71 
(1961)  pp  14576. 
82  E.  Halfpenny  -  'Pickfords':  expansion  and  crisis  in  the 
early  nineteenth  century.  '  Business  History  Vol.  1, 
(1959)  p  117.  Thomas  Pickford  also  acquired  a  Freedom 
of  the  Innholders'  Companyq  3  March  17989London  Guildhall, 
G.  L.  MS.  6651/1,  Innholders'  Companyq  Freedom  admissions 
1673-1820  p  188. 
83  The  universal  British  directory  of  trade  and  commerce 
1790  Vol-  Ip  506,  records  Pickfords'  as  the  only  wag'gon 
services  worked  from  the  Swan.  Pickfords  was  not  included 
with  the  carriers  working  from  the  Castle  p  482, 
84  Lowndes  London  directory,  1789  Guide  to  stage  coaches 
waggons,  etc.  p  99.  - 
49. used  as  well  as  the  Swan.  From  fuller  information  recorded 
the  following  yeart"  two  or  possibly  three  road  services 
were  being  worked  from  London.  Waggons  left  daily  from 
the  Swan  for  Derby  and  Manchesterg  the  regular  service 
already  established  from  the  evidence  of  the  Manchester 
trade  directories  and  newspapers.  A  general  service 
through  Derbyshire  and  Cheshire  to  Manchester  was  also 
listed  in  Pickfords'  name  from  the  Blossoms  Inn,  Lawrence 
lane.  Whether  these  vaegons,  which  left  four  days  a  week, 
were  additional  to  those  from  the  Swan  cannot  be  saido 
Also  waggons  departed  three  times  a  week  from  the  Swan  for 
the  silk  towns  of  Macclesfield,  Leek  and  Stockport.  Ift 
as  seems  the  case,  they  were  additional  to  the  regular 
waggons  to  Manchester  this  would  require  an  upward  revision 
of  Matthew  Pickfordis  estimated  capital  needs  at  this  date. 
During  the  1790s  road  haulage  and  canal  carriage  were 
combined  into  a  joint  service  as  traffic  was  dispatched  part 
I 
way  to  London  by  canal  from  Manchester  and  the  rest  of  the 
way  by  land. 
86 
Howevert  despite  the  advances  made  by  canal 
carriagep  road  haulage  retained  its  place.  Evidence  for 
1799t 
87 
the  year  of  Matthew  Pickford's  death,  would  suggest 
that  traffic  which  could  be  sent  by  canal  was  being  so 
dispatched  and  that  the  fly  waagon  service,  other  than  the 
regular  daily  waagon  to  Manchester,  was  being  directed 
towards  areas  not  yet  served  by  canals.  In  addition  to 
85  The  Universal  Dritish  directory  1790,  Vol  1,  p  4799 
p  . 5o6. 
86  See  Chap.  39  Section  2. 
87  W.  Holden  Holdents  new,  easy  -Ind  complete  referance 
(sic)  to  all  ....  stage  coaches, 
-- 
mails  ....  waggons  ... 
barges  (1799)  p  63  and  p  96. 
50. the  Manchester  serviceq  which  probably  also  catered  for 
places  like  Leek  and  Macclesfield  which  lacked  canal 
transport,  there  was  one  to  AshbourngtEuxton  and  Derby 
with  connections  to  adjacent  towns.  The  opening  of  the 
Derby  canal  in  1796  linked  the  town  to  the  Trent  &  Mersey 
canal  and  thus  the  national  network,  but  even  so  London 
traffic  would  have 
_-Saced'  a  circuitous  journey.  Road 
haulage  still  had  something  to  offer  Derby  and  was 
essential  for  Ashbourne  and  Buxton  and  similar  land-locked 
parts  of  Derbyshire.  By  the  end  of  this  period  long 
distance  waggon  traffic,  other  than  that  worked  in  with 
the  canalst  was  perhaps  a  relatively  declining  proportion 
of  Pickfords'  total  business.  In  absolute  terms,  howeverv 
there  must  have  been  considerable  expansion  in  this  line 
of  business  and  a  significant  increase  in  the  amount  of 
capital  invested  in  road  vehicles,  horses  and  all  their 
related  equipment. 
The  expansion  of  Pickfords'  road  haulage  businesst 
which  has  now  been  outlinedp  has  a  number  of  important 
implications.  Pickfords  alone,  of  several  long  distance 
carrying  firms  in  M  anchester,  more  than  doubled  its 
provision  of  road  haulage  services  between  Manchester  and 
London  and  introduced  additional  ones  to  other  places  in 
the  decade  or  so  from  1776.  The  experience  of  other 
carriers  was  no  doubt  the  same  both  in  Manchester  and 
other  parts  of  the  country.  This  was  at  a  time  when, 
if  the  account  of  the  standard  text-books  is  to  be  accepted, 
road  transport  was  of  relatively  small  economic  significance 
especially  comp  ared  with  water  'transport  and  canal  transport 
in  particular.  Mantouxt  emphasised  the  deficiencies  of 
the  roads,  despite  turnpikings  as  expressed  in  the  high 
51. cost  of  goods  traffic,  and  high  mail  prices. 
88 
Several 
writers  since  have  expressed  more  or  less  the  same  view. 
89 
Jackmang  although  recognising  the  great  growth  of  road 
carrying  which  occurred  in  these  years,  devoted  to  it  less 
than  one-fifteenth  of  his  discussion  concerning  road 
improvements  and  their  effects  during  the  years  1750  to 
1830.  In  contrast  the  development  of  coaching  and  related 
topics  received  almost  four  times  as  much  attention. 
go 
Miss  Deane  also,  of  more  recent  writers,  stresses  the 
limitations  of  even  improved  road  transport.  "If  Britain  had 
had  to  depend  on  her  roads  to  carry  her  heavy  goods  traffic 
the  effective  impact  of  the  industrial  revolution  might  well 
have  been  delayed  until  the  railway  age.  "  The  absence  of 
any  such  lag  was  explained  by  the  emergence  of  canals  and 
river  navigations  to  provide  the  necessary  "reliablep  high- 
capacityv  low-cost,  transport  system.  1191  It  would,  of  course, 
be  totally  unrealistic  to  suggest  that  road  transport  could 
in  any  way  match  the  canals'  abilityin  terms  of  physical 
capacity  and  cost,  to  deal  with  the  bulky  raw  materials  such 
as  coal  and  metal  ores  which  were  so  important  in  the  process 
88  P.  Mantoux.  The  Industrial  Revolution  p  1190  p  123- 
89  C.  Wilson,  England's  apprenticeship  1603-1763  (1965) 
dismisses  roads  briefly-(pp43-4);  even  turnpikes  are 
regarded  as  having  only  "nibbled  at  the  problem  of  road 
conditions",  so  that  "progress  was  fractional"(p  278). 
G.  N.  Clark  The  wealth  of  England  (H.  U.  L.  1959)  while 
believing  that  "by  1760  many  of  the  roads  had  decidedly 
improved"  (P  139)  also  thought  that  because  of  the 
expense  and  difficulties  of  organisation  by  road,  water 
transport  was  the  only  option  open  to  long  distance  heavy 
traffic.  Compare  also  T.  S.  Ashton  The  Industrial  Revolution 
1760-1830  (H.  U.  L.  1961)  p  44t  pp  84-5;  A.  Briggs  The  age 
of  improvement  1783-1867  (1960)  P  30;  A.  Redford  The 
economic  history  of  England  1760-1860  (2nd  ed  19ZO)-T 
pp  12-16. 
go  Jackman  Transportation  in  modern  England  Chap.  4. 
91  P.  Deane  The  first  Industrial  Revolution  (c.  u.  P.  1965) 
PP  73-4., 
52. of  industrialisation.  Nonetheless  road  transport  possessed 
an  importance  throughout  the  eighteenth  century  which  has 
been  underestimated* 
There  would  be  no  dispute  that  "throughout  the  eighteenth 
century  the  chief  highway  of  the  English  was  the  sea,  1,92 
The  coasting  trade  certainly  made  an  extremely  important, 
for  one  author9?  he  crucialp  contribution  to  the  creation  of 
a  national  economy  from  the  seventeenth  century  onwardsq 
but  it  is  noticeable  that  the  historian  of  the  coasting  trade 
94 
is  at  Pains  not  to  overstate  its  individual  significance. 
The  "close  interconnection  between  land  and  water  transport" 
is  emphasised  from  the  beginning;  land,  river  and  sea 
transport  were  used  as  connected  links, 
95 
Moreover  the 
transport  improvements  of  the  late  seventeenth  and  early 
eighteenth  centuriesq  part  productv  part  stimulus  of  the 
changes  taking  place  in  the  production  and  marketing  of 
agricultural  and  manufactured  goods,  were  not  restricted  to 
water  transport:  "A  careful  reading  of  Defoel  for  exampleg 
suggests  that  much  work  was  done  on  the  roads  before  the 
engineers  got  busy  and  before  the  turnpike  system  was  fully 
developed.  "  However  it  remains  true  that  "the  coasting 
trade  remained  throughout  this  period  the  easiest  and 
cheapest  form  of  inland  transport.  , 
96 
N 
Although  land  carriage  was  costly  during  the  eighteenth  , 
century,  yet  it  was  far  from  being  of  negligible  importance. 
92  T.  S.  Ashton  An  economic  history  of  England:  the  18th 
centur  (19-535ý-P  70. 
93  Deanel  OP-cit-P  74 
94  T.  S.  Willan  The  English  coasting  trade  1600-1750  (M-U.  P.  1938) 
95  lbid  p  xi. 
96  Ibid  p  189p  p  xii 
53. At  least  a  minimum  efficiency  of  road  haulage  was  necessary 
to  offset  some  of  the  damage  caused  by  the  frequent  wars 
of  this  notoriously  bellicose  century.  Disruption  in 
the  coasting  trade  was  caused  not  only  by  enemy  privateering 
but  even  more  by  the  activities  of  the  press  gang. 
According  to  one  writer,  in  the  late  seventeenth  century 
impressmentg  even  the  threat  of  it  from  the  moment  war  was 
declaredt"caused  a  far  greater  interruption  to  commerce  than 
all  the  other  hazards  of  war  put  together.,, 
97 
The  declaration 
of  war  immediately  put  a  premium  on  the  supply  of  road 
transport  services.  The  heavy  stream  of  commodities  of 
all  kinds  to  the  London  market  resulted  in  return  freight 
rates  often  falling  very  low,  Accordingly"it  seems  safe 
to  include  the  road  hauliers  in  any  list  of  those  who  benefitted 
from  war.  "  98 
The  road  carrierst  howeverg  and  road  haulage  in  generaly 
had  a  consequence  quite  apart  from  any  windfall  gains  of  war. 
The  contribution  of  road  transport  has  attracted  little 
significant  attention"  but  one  of  the  few,  Defoe.  to  pass 
any  comment  had  no  doubt  of  its  importance. 
"The  carriage  of  goods  in  England...  is  chiefly  managed 
by  horses  and  waggons,  the  number  of  which  is  not  to  be 
guessed  att  and  is  equalt  in  my  opinion,  to  the  whole  trade 
of  some  nations  ....  In  a  wordo  our  river  navigation  is  not 
97  M.  W. Flinn  Men  of  iron.  The  Crowleys  in  the  early  iron 
industry  (Edinburgh  U.  P.  1962)  PP  132-3. 
98  Ashton  Economic  fluctuations  p  81  and  the  references 
there  cited.  See  also  Albert  OP-cit-P  107  for  the 
ý7elation  between  war  years  and  legislation  concerning  co 
road  carriage. 
99  Willan  'Justices  of  the  peace  and  the  rates  of  land 
carriage'Jourrial  of  Transport  History  Vol.  V.  P  197 
54. to  be  named  for  carriage,  with  the  vast  bulk  of  carriage 
by  packhorse,  and  by  waggons...  11100 
The  power  of  Arthur  Youngis  strictures  on  the 
condition  of  several  stretches  of  road  on  which  he  travelled 
is  one  Good  reason  why  the  contribution  of  road  transport 
has  been  overlooked.  Subsequent  writers  have  tended  to 
generalise  from  Young'sworsit  experiences  and  concluded 
that  even  the  turnpike  roads  were  in  no  condition  to  support 
a  significant  volume  of  traffic.  A  closer  analysis  of 
Young's  commentsp  however,  demonstrated  that  his  witness 
was  not  solely  for  the  prosecution.  Indeed  on  his  northern 
tour,  the  best  documented  for  this  purpose,  Young  commented 
unfavourably  on  less  than  two-fifths  of  the  roads  over  which 
he  travelled. 
101 
Youngo  therefore,,  does  not  necessarily 
stand  apart  from  his  near  contemporaries  who  affirmed 
improving  road  conditions  and  an  increasing  volume  of  traffic 
102 
passing  over  them. 
In  the  last  few  years  road  transport  has  begun  to  be 
accorded  a  more  positive  role  in  eighteenth  century  economic 
development.  Professor  Flinn  has  suggested  that  by  mid- 
century  Britain's  roads  were  quite  regularly  carrying  even 
fairly  heavy  loads  of  industrial  traffic,  the  haulage  costs 
100  Defoe  Complete  English  tradesman  Vol,  iq  PP  339-41. 
101  E.  F.  Gaý-'Arthur  Young  on  English  .  roads'.  Quarterly 
Journal  of  Economics  Vol  x1i  (1926/7)  P  545 
102  Dyos  &  Aldcroft  British_transport  p  69  ffj  P.  Mathias 
The  first  industrial  nation  (lqrq)  p  114 
55. of  which  did  not  constitute  an  undue  proportion  of  final 
costs. 
103 
There  is  earlier  evidence  which  would  support 
at  least  the  first  part  of  this  suggestion.  Industrial 
expansion  in  parts  of  the  West  Riding,  for  example,  took 
place  on  a  road  transport  baseq  although  the  roads  cracked 
under  the  strain.  The  repair  of  roads  from  Selby  to  Leeds, 
Bradford  and  Halifaxt  and  from  Elland  to  Leeds  became 
necessary  because  they  had  been  "torn  in  pieces  by  the 
heavy  carriages  passing  to  and  fro  in  the  carrying  on  the 
vast  extended  trade  of  those  parts.  "  lo4 
In  the  case  of 
Congleton  "industrial  development  in  the  form  of  silk  mills 
began  before  roads  were  turnpiked  or  canals  ...  built.  11105 
A  more  telling  point  made  by  Flinn  is  that  a  number 
of  townst  among  them  Manchesterg  Birmingham,  Sheffield  and 
Leedsv  experienced  considerable  industrial  and  urban  growth 
at  a  time  when  water  transport  was  of  relatively  small 
lo6  importance.  The  growth  experienced  might  have  been  only 
very  moderate  compared  with  what  was  to  come  later,  but  for 
that  time  was  substantial.  The  population  of  Manchester 
and  Salford  was  estimatedt  in  round  numbers,  at  8,000  persons 
in  1717  and  20,000  persons  in  1757.  Population  more  than 
doubled  during  the  intervening  four  decades. 
107 
During 
the  same  period  Manchester  experienced  considerable  industrial 
as  well  as  town  growth.  In  a  well  known  passage  describing 
the  growth  of  Manchester's  trade,  Aikin  pointed  precisely 
to  road  improvements  as  the  causal  explanation. 
103  M.  W.  Plinn,  Origins  of  the  Industrial  Revolu 
, 
tion 
,p 
96. 
104  Defoe  Tour  through  the  whole  island  Vol.  iii,  p  154. 
105  Stephens  OP.  Cit.  P'137- 
106  Flinn  Op.  cit.  p  96. 
107  Aikin  Description  of  the  country  ...  round  Manchester 
156. 
. 
56. In  the  early  days  the  functions  of  manufacturep  sales  and 
distribution  were  all  performed  by  the  merchant  himself  as 
he  travelled  the  country  seeking  retail  outletsv  and  orders 
and  raw  materials  for  the  next  cycle  of  production. 
"On  the  improvement  of  turnpike  roads  waggons  were 
set  upt  and  the  packhorses  discontinued;  and  the 
chapmen  only  rode  out  for  orders,  carrying  with 
them  patterns  in  their  bags.  It  was  during  the 
forty  years  from  1730  to  1770  that  trade  was  greatly 
pushed  by  the  practice  of  sending  these  riders  all 
over  the  kingdom,  to  those  towns  which  before  had 
been  supplied  from  the  wholesale  dealers  in  the 
capital  places  before  mentioned.  "  108 
Although  the  Mersey-Irwell  Navigation  had  allowed  river 
communication  between  Manchester  and  Liverpool  since  1720, 
for  Aikin  the  key  to  growth  in  what  were  clearly  regarded 
as  crucial  years  was  found  in  better  roads  and  better  haulage 
facilities. 
So  far  the  argument  has  proceeded  by  way  of  particular 
examples.  However,  it  is  possible  to  advance  on  a  broader 
base  by  reference  to  the  published  work  of  a  Japanese 
scholar  Akio  Akochi. 
log 
This  study  analyses  the  structure 
of  the  internal  market  of  the  English  economy  in  the 
eighteenth  century  from  several  points  of  view,  including 
that  of  road  communications.  Akochils  work  is  based  on  a 
study  of  contemporary  writers  like  Defoeq  detailed  analyses 
of  many  hundreds  of  petitions  for  road  improvements  to  the 
House  of  Commons  during  the  years  1700-17509  reports  of 
select  committees  and  other  official  papers,  The  main 
108  Aikin  Op.  cit.  p  183. 
109  A.  Akochi  -A  study  of  modern  English  economic  history: 
the  internal  market  (Tokyo  19637  1  must  thank  Professor 
Flinn  for  lending  me  a  copy  of  this  book  and  particularly 
my  colleague  Dr.  Mark  Elvin  who  kindly  translated  the 
relevant  section  for  me. 
57. conclusion  drawn  from  this  evidence  is  that  road  transport 
had  an  important  function  in  breaking  down  the  strictures 
of  'localism'  and  the  emergence  of  a  much  widerg  integrated 
home  market-.  The  break-through  was  achievedq  it  is  argued 
during  the  years  1710  to  1730  as  agricultural  produce, 
manufacturos  and  merchandise  of  all  kinds  became  increasinaly 
more  mobile. 
110  Not  only  short-haul  traffic  is  involved; 
the  carriage  of  goods  by  road  over  quite  long  distances,  for 
example  London  to  the  Midlands,  and  including  through  traffic 
to  the  Northo  constitutes  an  important  part  of  the  argument. 
ill 
Under  the  pressure  of  a  growing  volume  of  traffic  the 
road  surfacest  inadequately  maintained  at  the  best  of  timesy 
began  to  break  up.  The  threat  to  incomes  which  ha4  become 
dependent  on  the  new  forms  of  marketing  and  production  was 
the  spur  to  road  improvement.  A  typical  petition,  lodged 
in  1726  asserted  that  "Formerly...  the  people-of  Birminghamp 
who  are  numerous  and  have  flourishing  industries,  enjoyed 
the  convenience  of  swift  roads  to  transport  their  products 
to  London  or  Westminster;  but  because  the  roads-have  become 
badv  they  have  now  lost  this  convenience.  "  112 
The  climax  of  petitions,  coming  in  the  1720s  and  afterv 
coincides  precisely  with  the  years  in  which  the  decisive 
extension  of  market  relationships  is  found  to  have  occurred. 
On  this  analysis  thereforeq  complaints  about  Poor  road 
conditions  in  the  early  eighteenth  century  take  on  a  distinct 
and  positive  economic  significance.  "At  this  time,  the 
decay  of  the  roads  does  not  indicate  the  localised  nature 
110  Ibid  p  38 
111  Tbid 
-  p  47. 
112 
Tb  -id 
p  42  quoting  the  Journal  of  the  House  of  Commons, 
58. of  market  relationshipst  but  precisely  the  reversep  and 
demonstrates  the  development  of  the  markets  for  industry 
which  relied  upon  the  intermediary  services  of  these  roads,,,, 
113 
This  is  a  challenging  conclusion  and  needsto  be  examined 
further.  At  least  a  prima  facie  case  has  been  made  that 
road  transport  was  an  integral  component  of  the  first  phase 
of  industrial  expansion. 
As  far  as  the  creation  of  a  truly  national  economy  is 
concerned  the  overwhelming  dominance  attributed  to  the 
coasting  trade  as  the  critical  formative  element  has  at 
least  been  questioned,  Perhaps  London  depended  on  it  more 
than  the  rest  of  the  country.  However  a  direct  confrontation 
of  rival  claims  need  not  be  at  issue,  Dr.  Willan  emphasised, 
the  degree  of  market  expansion  during  this  period  and  the 
essential  contribution  made  to  it  by  the  coasting  tradepbut 
he  also  insisted  on  the  degree  of  complementarity  which 
pertained  between  roady  river  and  sea. 
114 
Within  that 
framework  the  full  effectiveness  of  improved  coastal  shipping 
and  related  facilities  would  necessarily  depend  on  similar 
advances  in  the  other  links  of  the  chain. 
Perhaps  a  proper  balance  would  place  moreýemphasis  on 
this  notion  of  complementaritY.  It  is  misleading-to 
suggest  that  one  line  of  development,  e.  g.  roads,  was  tried 
and  then  abandoned  as  deficient  in  favour  of  an  alternativev 
more  promising  prospectp  eg.  rivers  or  canals. 
115 
The 
degree  of  competition  between  the  various  fArms  of  transport 
113  Ibid  P  53.  Westerfield  Middlemen  in  English  business 
P  368  sees  transport'as  "the  basal  and  causal  element 
in  the  expansion  of  business  before  1760.11 
114  Willan 
, 
The  English  coasting  trade  p  189;  p  xi. 
115  E,  Lipson  The  growth  of  English  society  (4th  ed.  1959)  p  231 
"The  universal  discontent  with  the  condition  of  the  roads 
inspired  attempts  to  utilise  as  much  as  Possible  an 
alternative  method  of  transportq  namelyq  the  rivers.  " 
59. may  not  have  been  very  great.  Rather  a  sustained  increase 
in  aggregate  demand  from  industrY  and  agriculture  stimulated 
improved  facilities  in  all  modes  of  transport.  'What  is  seen 
in  the  eighteenth  centuryq  therefore,  is  an  advance  on  a 
broad  front,  a  single  process  which  found  different  forms  of 
expression  at  different  timesq  first  in  roads  and  rivers 
together 
116 
and  then  in  canals. 
It  is  impossible  to  assess  the  significance  of  road 
transport  in  the  eighteenth  century  in  anything  more  than 
crude  terms.  A  certain  test,  of  the  land  carriers'  efficiency 
is  provided  by  the  published  studies  of  three  business 
concerns  of  the  period,  of  which  Pickfords  had  dealings  with 
two.  In  no  case  does  the  firms'  experience  suggest  that 
inadequate  or  inefficient  transport  services  hampered  their 
business  dealings.  Samuel  Oldknow  used  Pickfords  quite 
extensively  for  transporting  his  muslins  to  his  London  ware- 
housement  S.  &.  W.  Salte.  The  published  Salte-Oldknow 
correspondencell7  for  the  years  1786-8  show  that  Oldknow's 
consignments  were  delivered  in  London  with  regularity.  There 
were  no  complaints.  The  historian  of  Peter  Stub  I 
/%s 
of 
Warrington  also  testifies,  for  a  slightly  later  datet  to 
the  efficiency  of  the  inland  carriers. 
118 
Pickfords  was  one 
of  several  carriers  employed  by  Stubjs  and  appears  to  have 
been  the  -1-argesto  operating  over  a  wide  area  by  land  and 
water.  Similarly  Abraham  Dent  of-Kirkby  Stephent  although 
116  Akochi  Op.  cit.  P  53;  during  the  years  1700  to  17509 
there  were  some  700  petitions  to  the  Commons  for  road 
improvementsp  and  about  500  for  rivers  (P  56). 
117  Unwin  Samuel  Oldknow  and  the  Arkwrights  Chaps.  iv  and  v. 
118  T.  S.  Aýshton  -  An  eighteenth  century  industrialist.  Peter 
StubVs  of  Warrington  1756-1806  (1939;  reprint  1961, 
M.  U.  Pý.  )  Chap-7. 
6o. relying  heavily  on  road  transportq  was  able  to  operate  in 
a  national  market  without  difficulty. 
119 
A  part  of  Stubbs'  success  was  attributed  to  his 
favourable  location  at  Warrington,  a  junction  of  north- 
south  and  east-west  communications,  an  ideal  position  from 
which  to  exploit  both  land  and  water  transport.  Superior 
transport  facilities  have  been  brought  forward  as  an 
important  factor  which  determined  the  location  of  the  silk 
throwing  industry  in  north-east  Cheshire  in  the  later 
eighteenth  century. 
120 
The  major  markets  for  thrown  silk 
were  in  Coventry  and  Londong  and  those  areas  prospered 
which  were  most  favourably  endowed  with  good  road  connections. 
The  turnpike  from  Manchester  through  Macclesfield,  Leek  and 
Ashbourne  to  Derby,  opened  in  the  late  1760swas  less  hilly 
than  existing  roads  and  soon  attracted  most  traffic.  Because 
of  this,  it  has  been  arguedg  silk-throwing  migrated  to  towns 
on  or  close  to  this  new  line,  especially  to  the  towns  of 
Macclesfieldq  Leek  and  Congleton.  Pickfords'  waggon  services 
are  supposed  to  have  had  a  hand  in  this  development  but  their 
precise  contribution  is  not  made  very  clear. 
Road  transport  undoubtedly  contributed  less  to  Britain's 
economic  development  than  the  canalsq  but  the  latter's 
dominance-  can  be  emphasised  at'too  early  a  date.  This 
119  T.  S.  Willan  An  eighteenth  century  shopkeeper  p  109  ff. 
120  C.  L.  Mellowes  The  geographical  basis  of  the  natural  silk 
industry  of  the  west  Pennines.  TLondon  University  M.  A, 
Thesis,  1933)  p  29  ff.  In  a  notice  in  The  DerbX  Mercury 
4  March  1802,,  Pickfords  explicitly  limited  its  liability 
in  respect  of  silk,  silk  hose  or  lace  over  920  conveyed 
by  road  to  London  from-Derby. 
61. applies  especially  to  the  creation  of  a  national  network 
of  canals.  Many  canalso  e,  g,  the  Loughborough  Navigation, 
were  essentially  local  promotions  and  their  success  in  no 
way  depended  on  their  being  linked  to  a  network  of  routes. 
However  one  of  the  basic  stimuli  to  canal  construction  was 
the  establishment  of  direct  water  links  between  Liverpool, 
Hull,  Bristol  and  London.  Some  Parts  of  this  system, 
notably4Trent  &  Mersey  and  Staffordshire  &  Worcester  canals, 
were  completed  in  the  1770s,  but  others,  especially  the 
Coventry  and  Oxford  canalst  although  authorised  at  the  same 
time,  were  not  finished  for  more  than  another  decade.  Not 
until  1790  was  the  'Cross'  complete  and  long  distance  as 
well  as  local  traffic  begin  to  flow  over  the  southern  half 
of  the  network.  The  gains  to  the  Coventry  canal  company 
in  Particular  were  marked  by  a  substantial  increase  in  the 
level  of  dividends. 
121 
As  far  as  merchandise  traffic  to  London  is  concerned, 
in  which  Pickfords  and  most  other  long  distance  carriers 
specialisedt  the  canals'  contribution  may  have  been  delayed, 
even  later. 
122 
Entry  to  London  was  by  the  circuitous 
Oxford  canal  and  Thames  navigation  route,  both  parts  of 
which  left  much  to  be  desired.  Indeed  within  a  few  months 
of  the  'Cross'  being  completedq  a  more  satisfactory  route 
into  London,  the  Grand  Junction  canalt  was  being  projected. 
Not  until  1800  was  London  directly  linked  to  the  canal 
network:  in  the  meantime  the  need  for  road  transport  remained. 
121  C.  Hadfield  The  canals  of  the  east  midlands(Newton  Abbot 
1966)  p  143. 
122  Canal  transport  is  discussed  more  extensively  in  the 
second  part  of  chapter  3. 
62. This  is  illustrated  by  Pickfords'  experience.  Although 
canal  transport  was  soon  adoptedl  waggons  continued  to 
be  used  for  a  substantial  part  of  the  distance  to  London 
throughout  the  1790s.  Ther6  is  no  reason  why  Pickfords' 
experience  should  have  been  untypical, 
123 
The  close  correlation  between  canal  construction  and 
the  exploitation  of  mineral  resources  is  familiar  enough. 
In  addition  canals  such  as  the  Trent  &-Mersey  and  the 
Staffordshire  &  Worcester  soon  attracted  the  bulk  of  general 
trafficq  including  merchandise,  in  the  areas  which  they 
served.  The  regional  impact  of  canals  was,  from  an  early 
date,  very  great.  But  as  far  as  London-bound  traffic  was 
concerned,  road  transport  retained  a  role  of  some  consequence 
until  the  end  of  the  eighteenth  century. 
123  According  to  the  London  trade  directories  of  the 
period  most  of  the  carriers  to  Manchester  used  only 
road  transport.  , 
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DIVERSIFICATION:  THE  COACHING  AND  CANAL  TRADES The  expansion  of  Pickfords'  road  haulage  interests 
was  accompanied  by  diversification  into  two  other  lines 
of  activityq  the  coaching  and  the  canal  trades.  The 
adoption  of  canal  working  was  of  major  importance  as  it 
had  a  profound  and  permanent  effect  on  the  pattern  of 
Pickfords'  later  growth.  The  stages  by  which  the  new 
opportunities  presented  by  the  construction  of  inland 
waterways  were  exploited  is  examined  in  the  second  part 
of  this  chapter.  Consideration  is  first  given  to  the 
coaching  tradeq  in  which,  by  contrast  with  the  canal 
trade,  involvement  Was  transitory,  of  real  importance 
probably  only  for  a  few  years  in  the  early  1780sq  and 
left  no  lasting  mark. 
1.  Coaching- 
There  has  yet  to  be  a  systemmatic  study  of  the 
coaching  trade  in  the  later  eighteenth  and  early  nineteenth 
centuries  from  the  points  of  view  of  business  enterprise 
and  of  the  creation  of  an  integrated  passenger  transport 
service. 
1  Similarly  there  is  no  analysis  of  the  growth 
of  coaching  in  Manchester  against  which  Matthew  Pickford's 
Jackman's  work  Transportation  in  modern  England  P  30  fft 
remains  the  most  important  discussion  of  the  question, 
to  which  little  of  substance  has  since  been  added.  Dyos 
&  Aldcroft  British  transport  PP  74-76  summarises  the 
present  state  of  knowledge,  The  more  useful  books  and 
articles  on  the  coaching  trade  include  C,  G.  Harper,  Stage 
coach  and  mail;  S.  Harris,  Old  coaching  days  (1882); 
S,  Harrisq  The  coaching  aga  (1885),  a  ook  used  extensively 
by  Jackman;  A.  H.  Arkle,  'Early  Liverpool  coaching' 
Transactions  of  the  Historic  Society  of  Lancashire  and 
Cheshire  Vol.  73,  (1921);  H.  W.  Hart  'Some  notes  on  coach 
travel  1750-18481  Journal  of  Transport  History  Vol.  IV 
(1959-6o);  H.  W.  Hart  ISherman  of  the  Bull  and  Mouth'  Ibid 
Vol.  V  (1961-2).  The  more  nostalgic  books  include 
W.  O.  Tristram  Coaching  days  and  coach  ng  a  (1888); 
E.  Corbett  An  old  coachman's  chatter  18907--,  T.  Cross, 
The  autobiographX  of  a  stage  coachman 
ý1861,3 
Vols.  ) 
64. activities  might  be  examined.  It  is  impossible  to  remedy 
this  deficiency  here  yet  some  assessment  should  be  attempted 
of  this  aspect  of  Pickfords'  history.  The  following 
discussion  looks  first  at  Matthew  Pickford's  possible 
motives  for  moving  in  this  direction,  and  then  examines 
some  of  Jackman's  conclusions  and  generalisations  in  respect 
of  coachine. 
The  first  indication  that  Matthew  Pickford's  interests 
had  widened  to  include  the  coaching  trade  is  an  advertisement 
in  the  Manchester  Mercur  .  17  October,  1775.  His  name 
appears  as  one  of  a  group  of  proprietors  operating  a  coach 
service  between  Manchester  and  London.  This  partnership 
was  the  descendant  of  the  original  group  of  promoters  who 
had  started  the  first  regular  coach  service  between  Manchester 
and  London  in  1760.2  For  some  years  the  Manchester  end 
had  been  represented  by  Samuel  Tennant,  whose  place  Matthew 
Pickford  now  took.  Of  the  original  promoters  only  John 
Hanforth,  in  Londonp  still  survived  fifteen  years  later. 
It  was  possibly  he  who  introduced  Matthew  Pickford  to  the 
partnership.  -  Since  the  early  months  of  1759 
3 
Hanforth 
had  been  the  proprietor  of  the  Swan  With  Two  Necks  in  Lad 
Lane,  Londont  the  inn  which  Matthew  Pickford  used  as  his 
London  base  from  the  middle  of  1773- 
Because  the  name  of  Pickfords  has  been  associated  so 
heavily  with  the  carriage  of  goods,  an  interest  in  passenger 
2  Manchester  Mercury  2  Oct. 
3  !  bid  22  May  175T.  - 
6.5. traffic  comes  almost  as  a  surprise.  But  the  traditional 
stage-waggoner  had  always  been  concerned  with  both 
passengers  and  goods,  and  Matthew  Pickford  still  advertised 
in  these  same  terms  in  the  early  17805.4  Passenger  traffic 
was  nott  of  itself,  therefore,  a  novelty.  What  was  new 
was  his  participation  in  a  form  of  transport  in  which 
passenger  traffic  was  so  predominant. 
In  addition  to  normal  working  costst  stage-coach 
proprietors  had  to  meet  a  large  number  of  charges,  duty 
payments  for  each  coachq  driver  and  guard  on  the  roadq  a 
mileage  duty  on  passengers,  as  well  as  turnpike  tolls  and 
possibly  also  a  mileage  charge  for  the  hire  of  the  coaches 
in  use.  -5  Even  though  fares  were  high,  the  profits  made  on 
passenger  traffic  alone  were  apparently  not  very  great. 
Total  revenue  was  augmented  by  the  carriage  of  small  or 
'coach'  parcelst  high  valueg  small-volume  items  which  could 
support  the  high  charges  levied.  Additional  income  was 
found  by  charging  baggage  at  so  much  per  pound  beyond  a 
limited,  fYee  allowance  and  by  charging  for  the  carriage  of 
game.  -This  general  point  is  illustrated  by  the  following 
rates  advertised  for  the  coach  service  between  Manchester 
and  London  which  Matthew  Pickford  Jointly  promoted.  Parcels 
under  10  lbs  were  charged  2/6,  and  then  at  21d  per  pound; 
4  Manche  s  ter  Journal  -  24  y6b  -  `-1781.  A  late  survival 
is  found  in  Gore's  Liverpool  directozy,  18059  Appendix 
P  30P  where  Edward  Troughton,  carrier  between  Liverpool 
and  Blackburnq  is  stated  to  take  goods  and  passengers. 
5  Harris  The  coaching  age,  p  188  ff;  Hart  tSome  notes 
on  coach  travel'  Journal  of  Transport  HistoEyt  Vol.  IV, 
P  156  ff. 
66. the  luggage  allowance  was  l4lbs  for  inside  and  7lbs  for 
outside  Passengers  who  both  paid  3d  per  pound  on  any 
excess*  Turkeys  and  geese  were  carried  for  2/6d  each, 
hares  for  1/6dq  partridge  and  woodcock  for  6d  each. 
6 
Of 
these  additions  to  total  income,  the  parcels  traffic  was 
by  far  the  most  important  and  a  major  source  of  revenue. 
In  later  years  many  a  railway  promotion  had  as  one  of  its 
objects  the  capture  of  this  valuable  traffic.  The 
railway  companies  took  pains  to  secure  to  themselves  all 
parcels  going  by  the  passenger  trains  and  the  early  loss 
of  parcels  to  the  railways  accelerated  the  collapse  of  the 
-coaching  system, 
The  importance  of  parcels  may  explain  Matthew  Pickford's 
interest  in  the  coaching  trade,  In  his  primary  function 
as  a  carriert  parcels  traffic  would  be  of  interest  to  him* 
It  is  possible  to  see  at  least  his  initial  involvement  in 
coaching  as  an  extension  of  this  function.  Although 
manufacturers  sent  the  bulk  of  their  output  by  the  carriersl 
waggonsq  small  quantities  were  often  sent  by  coach  to  meet 
urgently  neede  Id  orders. 
7  The  carrier  who  could  also  provide 
this  facility  would  no  doubt  enhance  his  position  in  the 
carrying  trade.  Even  though  Matthew  PickfordIs  actual 
6  Manchester  MercurX  17  Oct.  1775. 
7  A.  H.  John  The  Walker  family,  iron  founders  and  lead 
manufacturers,  1741-1893  (1951)  P  75.  Unwin  Samuel 
Oldknow  and  the  Arkwrights  pp  63-8;  there  are  several 
letters  to  Oldknow  e.  g.  23  April,  10  Oct.  1787, 
10  Jan.  1788  asking  him  to  dispatch  4n  or4er  fby  first 
coach'  or  Part  by  coach  the  rest  to  follow  by  waggon 
Letters  to  Samuel  Oldknow  1783-1812,  John  Rylands  Library, 
English  MS  751.  One  customer,  J.  Robinson  of  Manchester 
(Ibid  undated  letter)p  complained  to  Oldknow  about  the 
delays  and  neglect  of  the  Stockport  carrier,  "I  shall  be 
obliged  to  send  them  [ie.  his  goods]  by  the  coach  which 
(being  heavy  goods)  will  cost  me  more  than  I  can  got  for 
them.  " 
67. motives  are  uncertain  some  rationalisation  of  the  possible 
gains  to  him  as  a  carrier  can  be  offered.  On  the  other 
hand,  of  course,  he  might  simply  have  been  attracted  by 
an  additional  opportunity  of  profit.  In  any  case,  it  is 
noticeable  that  following  Matthew  Pickford's  admission  to 
the  Partnership  stricter  conditions  were  introduced  on 
which  claims  for  loss  or  damage  to  Parcels  would  be  met, 
perhaps  reflecting  his  experience  of  such  matters. 
Later  on,  in  the  early  1780s,  Matthew  Pickford  became 
more  deeply  involved  in  the  coaching  trade,  and  engaged  in 
various  promotional  activities.  For  a  time  at  least  his 
interests  extended  to  all  aspects  of  coaching.  This  phase 
did  not  last  for,  more  than  two  or  three  years,  but  while 
it  continuedq  the  indications  are  that  he  intended  to  enter 
the  trade  fully.  During  these  years,  coaching  appears 
to  have  had  all  the  characteristics  of  a  rapid  growth 
industry,  and  no  doubt  promised  good  profits.  Perhaps 
Matthew  Pickford  saw  its  potential  and  hoped  to  add  a 
valuable  complement  to  his  already  growing  road  haulage 
business.  In  his  primary  capacity  as  a  carrier  he  already 
catered  for  the  lower  class  of  traffict  general  merchandise 
and  any  persons  unable  (or  unwilling)  to  afford  a  more  speedyq 
although  perhaps  not  necessarily  more  comfortable,  form  of 
travel.  The  higher  class  of  traffic,  more  wealthy  passengers 
and  more  valuable  merchandiseq  was  normally  controlled  by 
a  separate  group  of  operatorsq  but  there  was  no  intrinsic 
reason  why  any  individual  carrier  should  not  seek  both  classes 
of  traffic. 
68. Although  both  coach-owners  and  carriers  regularly  made 
use  of  the  same  innsg  it  was  rare  for  a  carrier  to  be  active 
in  the  coaching  trade.  By  and  largeq  coaching  was  dominated 
by  innkeepers  who  derived  their  profit  from  shares  in 
coaching  ventures  andq  perhaps  more  importantlyq  from  the 
food  and  lodging  required  by  their  passengers  en  route. 
The  typical  coaching  Partnership  was  composed  of  inn-keepers 
at  each  of  the  terminal  townsv  plus  the  proprietors  of  those 
inns  at  which  the  coach  stopped  alone  the  road  for  refresh- 
ment  or  overnight  accommodation.  Jackman  found  that  the 
occasional  agriculturalist  also  took  a  hand  in  the  trade. 
Matthew  Pickford,  therefore,  not  being  an  inn-keeper,  stands 
as  an  exception  to  the  rule.  Another  to  combine  the  two 
functions  of  coach-owner  and  carrier  was  John  Swaine  of  the 
Spread  Eagleq  Salford.  Although  he  was  an  innkeeper  his 
major  outside  interest  seems  to  have  been  in  the  carrying 
rather  than  the  coaching  trade.  Swaine  was  engaged  in  the 
London  carrying  trade  from  Manchester  as  early  as  17659  and 
was  still  in  business  in  1777  and  possibly  later, 
9 
As  for 
coachingo  he  had  preceded  Matthew  Pickford  in  the  same 
partnershipq  joining  it  in  1772,  but  had  apparently  withdrawn 
again  by  1774.10  For  a'time,  tooo  Swaine  was  a  partner 
in  a  coach  operating  between  Manchester  and  Liverpool, 
11 
8  Jackman  Op.  cit.  p  315 
9  John  Swaine  was  one  of  the  signatories  of  the  joint  advert 
of  the  London  Carriers  in  1765  and  was  one  of  the  promoters 
of  faster  waggon  speeds  in  1777.  Possibly  this  is  the 
same  Swaine  to  whom  there  is  reference  in  A.  H.  John  Op.  cit. 
P  73,  and  in  W.  B.  Crump  The  Leeds  woollen  industr  1780-1820  7cr 
(Thoresby  Society  Publiýationsv  Vol,  XXXII,  192-91  p  215, 
This  last  reference  is  in  a  letter  of  1794. 
10  Manchester  Mercury  14  Aprilq  17729  29  March  1774 
11  Manchester  directoryq  1772 
- 
69. Early  coaching  partnerships  seem  to  have  been  very 
unstable.  Individuals  frequently  dropped  outj  some  to 
reappear  again  a  little  later  on.  Members  of  a  partnership 
could  quickly  find  themselves  in  conflict.  For  example 
in  June  1783,  Matthew  Pickford  was  running  a  coach  to 
Blackpool  in  conjunction  with  Thomas  Cooper  of  Preston;  a 
year  later  they  were  in  opposition  over  the  same  route. 
12 
As  the  trade  settled  downt  however,  the  tendency  was  for  a 
few  people  to  dominate  a  Particular  area.  In  the  first 
two  or  three  years  of,  the  1780s  Matthew  Pickford  himself 
would  appear  to  have  been  one  of  the  leaders  in  Manchestert 
to  be  replaced  later  by  Richard  Dixon  and  Alexander  Paterson. 
In  Liverpoolt  Thomas  Cooper  &  Co,  and  the  Bretherton  family 
seem  to  have  attained  a  similar  position  by  the  end  of  the 
eighteenth  century. 
13 
The  degree  of  dominance  achieved  by 
people  like  Chapling  Horne  and  Sherman  in  London  in  the  1820s 
and  1830s  was  still  a  long  way  off. 
Coaching  was  as  competitive  as  any  other  business,  but 
this  did  not  take  the  fOrmp  as  might  be  anticipatedl  of  price 
competition.  Despite  the  introduction  of  several  other 
coach  services  between  Manchester  and  London  in  the  forty 
years  after  1760,  fares-between  the  two  places  remained 
notably  stable  throughout  the  period.  From  1760  to  17859 
fares  by  the  different-types  of  conveyances  ranged  from  Z1.11.6d 
to  93-3.  Od  but  centred  ch 
. iefly  between  C2,2,  Od  and  L2.5.0d 
14 
. 
12  Manchester  MercurY  3  June,  1783,29,  june  1784 
13  Arkle  OP.  cit  p  20 
14  These  fares  refer  to  inside  passengers;  fares  for  outside 
passengers  were  lower,  but  as  not  all  coaches,  even 
excluding  the  mailst  carried  outside  passengerst  these 
have  been  ignored  for  the  sake  of  comparison. 
70. In  terms  of  price  at  leastp  the  introduction  of  the  faster 
mail  coaches  from  1785  was  uncompetitiveg  since  the  fare 
charged  was  0.10.0d.  The  same  range  of  fares  continued 
to  apply  unchanged  at  the  end  of  the  century.  The  same 
principle  applied  on  other  routes  too.  When,  in  March 
17819  Matthew  Pickford  and  others  promoted  an  additional 
service  between  Manchester  and  Liverpool,  the  times  of 
departuresq  speed  and  fares  adopted  were  exactly  the  same 
as  those  of  existing  coaches.  Evidence  drawn  from  Manchester 
bears  out  Jackmants  conclusion  that  on  the  whole,  competition 
had  little  effect  on  the  General  level  of  coach  fares. 
15 
The  promotion  of  new  services  seems  to  have  rested  on  the 
expectation  of  additional  traffic  rather  than  on  a  policy 
of  gaining  traffic  by  rate  competition. 
Competition  took  the  form  not  of  price  reductionsq  but 
rather  the  offer  of  a  more  comfortable,  even  a  safer  journey. 
A  now  coach  which  was  introduced  in  March  1765  advertised 
Its  particular  advantage  as  being  "on  Steel  Springs  and  Safe 
BracesqCalculated  for  Pleasure  and  Safetyq  on  the  Gentlest 
Constructiong  and  most  elegant  Taste.  " 
16 
Similarly  a  few 
years  laterl  the  proprietors  of  another  new  service  rested 
their  claims  on  guaranteeing  passengers  against  the  cruder 
forms  of  exploitation  which  were  then  of  fairly  common  practice. 
"The  proprietors  beg  leave  to  inform  their  Friends  that 
they  will  be  particularly  careful  in  hiring  Steady  Driversq 
who  will  not  be  allowed  to  ask  any  Passengers  for  Money,  nor 
will  any  Passenger  be  desired  to  pay  extravagently  for 
Entertainment  on  the  road.  " 
17 
15  Jackman  Op.  cit.  P  343 
16  Manchester  Mercury  26  March  176,5 
17  Ibid  20  Aug.  1776. 
- 
71. Safety  was  ensured  by  the  presence  of  an  armed  guard  in 
and  out  of  London. 
Travellers  could  thus  choose  between  varying  degrees 
of  comfort,  depending  on  what  price  they  were  willing  6r 
able  to  pay.  In  assessing  the  total  cost  of  a  Journey, 
howevert  it  is  important  to  remember  that  the  coach  fare 
was  only  one  of  several  charges)which  might  include  tips 
and  especially  payments  for  food  and  lodging.  Consequently 
as  the  speed  of  coach  travel  was  increased  and  the  time 
taken  for  journeys  proportionally  reduced,  the  net  gain  to 
the  traveller  of  a  shorter  Journey  must  have  been  considerable. 
In  terms  of  total  costs9  thereforeq  static  coach  fares  do 
not  tell  the  whole  story. 
Although  rivalry  seems  to,  have,  been  keeng  especially 
in  the  early  1780s,,  there  is  no  evidence  of  the  cut-throat 
competition  which  characterised  the  later  years  of  the 
coaching  era*  As  roads  improved  a  soundly  based  network 
of  coaches  was  built  upt  linking  Manchester  first  with  Londong 
I 
and  then  with  Liverpoolq  Nottingham,  Sheffield,  Birminehamg 
Bristol  and  the  west  of  Englandq  Leeds  and  north  east  Englandp 
and  Scotland  by  way  of  Prestong  Kendal  and  Carlisle.  The 
general  purpose  was  apparently  to  bring  into  connection 
existing  centres  of  Population.  Individual  routes  were 
no  doubt  over-subscribed'at  times,,  but  the  overall  impression 
gained  from  a  fairly  brief  survey  of  coaching  intelligence 
contained  in  the  newspapers  and  trade  directories  is  that 
supply  followed  rather  than  anticipated  demand.  one 
explicitly  speculative  projection  was  a  coach  service  advertised 
72. in  May  1787  which  also  included  connections  in  London  for 
France  "on  a  Speculation  of  an  increased  commerce  with  France, 
from  the  Treaty  established.  , 
18 
Potential  demand  was 
sometimes  realised  by  the  building  of  a  new  road.  The 
development  of  Blackpool  was  a  case  in  point.  Its  growth 
was  considerably  influenced  by  the  building  of  a  new  road 
from  Ashton-on-Ribble  to  Cliftong  near  Kirkham 
I 
in  1781. 
The  opening  of  the  road  was  almost  immediately  followed  by 
the  establishment  of  a  coach  service  from  Manchester 
promoted  by  Pickford,  Dawson  &  Co.  By  means  of  connections 
at  Prestong  Blackpool  thus  gained  access  to  the  national 
coaching  network. 
19 
Two  years  earlier  the  opening  of  a  new 
road  between  Halifax  and  Sheffield  had  been  followed  by  the 
establishment  of  a  new  coach  service  from  Manchester  to 
London,  going  by  way  of  Halifax,  Huddersfield,  Sheffield 
and  the  east  Midlands. 
20 
Between  1775  and  1780  Matthew  Pickford's  coaching 
interests  appear  to-have  been  limited  to  the  Manchester  and 
London  route.  A  change  occurred  at  the  beginning  of  1781 
and  until  early  in  1785  he  was  engaged  in  promoting  both 
short  and  long  distance,  coaches,  sometimes  in  his  own  name, 
more  usually  in  association  with  one  or  several  partners. 
At  different  times  during  these  years,  Matthew  PickfordIts 
18  Manchester  Mercury  22  May  1787-  A  Parallel  on  the 
goods  side  was  the  introduction  of  a  waggon  service 
from  Birmingham  to  London,  "for  the  better  accomodation 
of  the  trade  of  France,  by  land  to  Dover.  "  The  waggons 
would  connect  in  London  with  those  for  Dover.  Arls' 
Birmingham  Gazette  4  July  1791 
19  i.  J.  Smith  'Blackpool;  a  sketch  of  its  growth,  1740-18511 
Lancashire  and  Cheshire  Antiquarian  Society  Vol.  69- 
t1959)  P  76 
20  Manchester  Mercury 
.5  Oc't.  '- 
-1779- 
73* name  appeared  in  connection  with  coaches  running  to 
Liverpool,  Leedsp  Prestong  Blackpoolq  Bathq  Birmingham, 
Glasgow  and  Edinburgh.  It  is  impossible  to  estimate  how 
far  he  was  personally  active  in  this  work,  but  the  impression 
Gained  is  thatq  for  a  short  time  at  least,  he  was  an  important 
force  behind  the  creation  of  Manchester's  coaching  services. 
From  May  1785  until  May  1792  Matthew  Pickford's  name 
is  absent  from  the  coaching  advertisements.  It  is  concluded 
from  this  that  he  had  withdrawn  from  the  trade  during  that 
time,  Although  he  then  re-entered  the  trade,  in  connection 
with  the  London  to  Carlisle  Royal  Mail, 
21 
coaching  was  now 
probably  no  more  than  a  minor  interest.  For  the  mail 
coaches,  parcels  traffic  was  even  more  important  in  order 
to  show  a  reasonable  profit 
22 
but  it  is  difficult  to  imagine 
that  this  was  sufficient  to  bring  him  back.  Possibly  a 
Royal  Mail  contract  carried  a  certain  prestige  which  was 
good  for  business  generally,  in  much  the  same  way  as  the 
possession  of  a  royal  warrant  nowadays.  Matthew  Pickford's 
role  in  1795f  and  probably  three  years  earlier,  was  to  supply 
the  horses  for  the  twenty  mile  stage  from  Macclesfield  to 
Manchester. 
23  But  he  was  doing  this  so  inefficiently  that 
in  that  yeart  Thomas  Haskerv  the  Superintendent  of  Mails# 
suggested  to  the  Post-Master  General  that  he  should  be  one 
of  several  to  lose  his  contract.  However,  Matthew  still 
24 
held  it  two  years  later,  and  probably  retained  it  until  his 
death. 
25 
Haskerfs  comPlaint  that  'he  has  lost  much  time 
21  Ibid  22  May  1792 
22  E.  Vale  The  mail-coach  men  of  the  late  eighteenth  century 
(196o)  p  54 
23  Ibid  p  119 
24  Ibid  p  24o 
25  Tn  interest  in  coaching  was  maintained  for  a  short 
while  after  Matthew  Pickford's  death. 
74o and  having  other  great  occupations  does  not  attend  to  the 
coach  duty" 
26 
suggests  that  by  this  time,  Matthew  pickford"s 
major  interests  lay  elsewhere.  Indeed  within  a  few  months 
of  leaving  the  coaching  trade,  Matthew  Pickford  was  already 
exploring  the  possibilities  presented  by  the  construction 
of  long  lines  of  canals.  Matthew  Pickford's  withdrawal 
from  the  one  trade  was  almost  contemporary  with  his  entry 
to  the  other. 
Canals 
Matthew  Pickford's  interest  in  canals  was  aroused  in 
the  mid  1780s.  Until  that  time  canals  had  little  to  offer 
a  business  which  was  Primarily  concerned  with  the  conveyance 
of  freight  traffic  between  Manchester  and  London.  The 
impetus  behind  the  first  generation,  of  canalsq  (those 
sanctioned  in  the  late  1760s  and  early  1770s  following  the 
success  of  the  Bridgewater)  had  been  to  secure  an  effective 
linkage  of  the  three  rivers  the  Trent,  Mersey  and  Severn 
together  with  a  connection',  to  London  by  way  of  the  river 
Thames. 
27 
The  first  object  was  achieved  much  the  more 
easily.  Both  the  Oxford  and  Coventry  companies,  which  were 
responsible  for  the  line  to  London,  experienced  severe 
financial  difficulties  during  the  war  years  of  the  1770S 
and  early  1780sq  and  construction  was  at  a  standstill  for  a 
lengthy  period.  It  was  not  until  about  1785  that  these 
two  companies  showed  renewed  signs  of  vigourv  and  the  lone 
26  Vale  OP-cit.  P  119o 
27  For  a  General  account  of  canal  developmentq  Jackman 
Transportation  in  modern_England  P  35  ff;  Dyos  &  Aldcroft 
British  transl2ort  Chap.  3.  C.  Hadfield  British  canals 
F2nd  ed.  1959);  C.  Hadfield  The  canal  aga  (Newton  Abbot 
1968)  together  with  the  various  volumeso  written  by  him, 
Individually  or  jointly,  in  the  David  &  Charles  Canals 
of  the  British  Isles  series. 
75. Tho  early  canal  link's,  176os-1770s, 
botwoon  Lancashire  and  the  midlands. 
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0 awaited  through-route  from  London  to  Lancashire  was  finally 
completed.  The  aim  here  is  to  look  primarily  at  the 
commercial  use  of  the  canals;  to  illustrate  the  early 
growth  of  the  canal  carrying  trade  from  Manchester,  and  to 
assess  the  significance  of  canal  development  from  the 
viewpoint  of  a  Manchester  based  firm  of  London  carriers. 
Before  the  completion  of  the  Bridgewater  canal, 
Manchester's  water  communications  were  limited  to  the  Mersey 
&  Irwell  navigation,  which  by  the  early  1730s  had  been 
rendered  fully  navigable  to  Liverpool.  The  importance  of 
the  Bridgewater,  open  throughout  from  Worsley  to  Manchester 
in  1764  28 
was  that  it  convincingly  demonstrated  the  viability 
of  the  canal  principle  and  removed  dependency  on  river 
navigations.  In  the  years  following,  access  by  inland 
waterways  to  other  parts  of  the  country  was  steadily  extended. 
The  Trent  &,  Mersey  canal  was  begun  in  July  1766  and 
progressively  opened  for  traffic  from  June  1770,  From  a 
junction  with  the  Trent  &  Mersey  canal  at  Great  Haywardq  the 
Staffordshire'&  Worcestershire  canal,  fully  open  for  traffic 
from  Mayý1772,  'connected  with  the  river  Severn  at  Stourport 
and  so  opened  up  the  route  to  Bristol.  The  same  year, 
Birmingham  was  al50,  brought  into  the  growine-network  when 
the  Birmingham  canalt  which,  had-a  junction  with  the 
Staffordshire  &  Worcestershire  canal  at  Aldersle  Y)  commenced 
operations.  Within  a  few  years,  thereforeq  a  rudimentary  - 
28  W.  H.  Chaloner  'Manchester  in  the  latter  half  of  the 
eighteenth  century.  '  Bulletin  of  the  John  Rj:  lands 
Library  Vol.  42  (1959-6o)  points  out,  p  46,  that  the 
customary  op.  ening  date  of  1761  refers  only  to  the 
section  of  the  canal  as  far  at  Stretford.  The  building 
of  the  final  stretch  into  Manchester  itself,  together 
with  associated  terminal  facilitiest  was  completed  only 
in  1764. 
76. canal  complex  emergedl  forming  an  inverted  T.  The 
horizontal  arms  extended  to  link  the  two  arterial  rivers 
of  the  east  and  west  Midlands,  their  seaports  and  catchment 
areas;  the  vertical  arm  reached  up  to  the  industrial  regions 
of  south  Lancashire  and  north  Cheshire,  When,  in  March 
1776,  the  Bridgewater  extension  to  the  Mersey  at  Runcorn 
was  finally  finished,  and  the  Trent  &  Mersey  fully  open  the 
following  year,  there  had  been  created  the  nucleus  of  a  now 
transport  systemv  uniting  two  key  growth  areas  of  the 
Industrial  Revolution. 
The  canals  were  opened  and  built  in  piecemeal  fashiong 
a  pattern  which  was  repeated  in  their  progressive  use  by 
traders.  The  introduction  of  canal  carrying  in  Manchester 
other  than  the  conveyance  of  coal  from  Worsley  and  the  Duke's 
2 
boats'to-and  from  Warrington  9came 
early  in  1774.  In  May 
of  that  year  Hugh  Henshall  &  Co  announced  the  commencement 
of  a  service  from  Birmingham  and  Stourport  to  Manchester  and 
30  31 
Liverpool.  Details  in  this  and  a  later  notice  demonstrate 
in  broad  outline  how  the  firm  combined  canal  and  road 
conveyance*  Two  main  traffic  flows  were  envisaged  -  to 
Birminghamq  Bristol  and  the  west  of  England  by  way  of  the 
Severno  and  to  Derby,  Nottingham,  east  coast  towns  and  also 
London,  by  way  of  the  Trent.  All  traffic  would  pass  over 
the  Bridgewater  and  Trent  &  Mersey  canals  as  far  as  Great 
Hayward  and  then  take  the  appropriate  line  by  canal  and  river. 
Henshall  &  Co.  must  have  been  one  of  the  earliest  firms  to 
I 
29  Manchester  directory  (Raffald)  1772,  p  59. 
30  Manchester  Mercury  j  May  1774. 
31  Ibid  18  Oct.  1774. 
77. combine  canal  and  river  conveyance  in  a  single  sorvice. 
Howeverg  Henshall  &  Co.  introduced  its  service  before  the 
canal  route  was  fully  available  and  so  road  haulage  had  to 
be  used  temporarily  for  Part  of  the  way.  There  were  two 
obstructions  on  the  canal  route  at  the  time,  the  Harecastle 
tunnel  on  the  Trent  &  Mersey  canalv  which  was  not  open  for 
I 
traffic  until  April  1775,  and  the  Preston  Brook  tunnelt 
the  entry  to  the  Bridgewater  canal,  which  was  opened  in 
February  1775.  These  obstructions  were  byý-passed  by 
using  road  haulage  from  Burslem  Wharf,  just  south  of  the 
Harecastle  tunnelt  to  Stockton  quay  near  Warrington.  This 
combination  of  road  and  canal  conveyance  for  long  distance 
traffic  continued  to  be  necessary  for  many  years, 
At  this  intermediate  stagev  the  full  benefits  of  canal 
carrying,  especially  that  of  lowering  transport  costsp  was 
inevitably  delayed.  Recourse  to  land  carriage  for  part  of 
the  wayv  involved  not  only  a  more  expensive  form  of  transport- 
ationp  but  also  additional  handling  at  each  trans-shipment 
point.  Excessive  work  of  this  kind  was  very  costly  and 
enormously  increased  the  risk  of  damage  or  loss.  Both 
factors  combined  to  inflate  overall  costs,  but  even  so  the 
Eke- 
cost  t  OA  user  was  still  considerably  cheaper  than  road  charges 
for 
t 
an  equivalent  distance.  Baines  figureSO32  in  table  3-lo 
were  designed  to  show  the  reduction  in  carriage  rates  which 
followed  the  opening  of,  the  Trent  &  Mersey  canal  by 
comparison  with  previous  land  rates.  When  bombined  with 
the  rates  quoted  by  Henshall  &  Co.  in  1774,  they  demonstrate 
the  full  reduction  in  costs  once  the  Harecastleandpreston 
Brook  tunnels  were  open, 
32  They  are  reproduced  by  Jackmanp  OP-cit-  P  724  who 
accepts  them  as  reliable.  See  next  page. 
78. Table  3.1 
A  comparison  of  land  and  canal  tonna  ge  charges 
between  Manchester  and  certain  towns 
Canal 
Land  Canal  (17Z4)  (after  1777) 
f.,  Ez 
Birmingham  4.  o.  o  2.12.6  11  10.0 
Derby  3-  0-  0  3.0.0  1.10.0 
Lichfield  4.  o.  0  2-  3-  0  1.0.0 
Nottingham  4.  o.  0  3.5.0  2.0.0 
Wolverhampton  4.13.4  2.8.0  1.5.0 
Source:  Columns  1  and  3.  Baines  History  of  the  commerce 
and  town  of  Liverpool  p  440 
Column  2.  Henshall's  advertisement  Manchester 
Mercur.  y  18  Oct.  1774 
An  element  of  land  charges  would  be  contained  in  all  of 
Henshall's  ratesq  and  in  those  for  Derby  and  Nottingham  they 
are  so  heavy  as  to  entirelyor  nearly  so,  off-set  the  benefit 
of  canal  conveyance,  However,  where  more  continuous  use 
of  canals  was  possible,  e.  g.  to  Birmingham  or  Wolverhampton, 
the  immediate  economies  were  substantial.  Even  at  this 
intermediate  stageg  theng  the  potential  of  canals  was 
considerable:  their  more  effective  contribution  to  a  cheaper 
service  over  any  great  distance  would  depend  on  how  quickly 
the  road  haulage  bottlenecks  could  be  removed. 
The  canal  carrying  trade  was  organised  almost  entirely 
by  private  carriers. 
33 
This  was  chiefly  because  the  canal 
33  Jackman  Op.  cit,.  p  432  ff 
79- companies  were,  by  their  Acts,  prohibited  from  acting  as 
carriers.  Unlike  turnpike  trusts,  canal  construction 
was  undertaken  by  joint-stock  companiest  private  concerns 
seeking  a  profitable  return  on  their  investment. 
Parliament  was  sensitive  to  the  danger  that  if  the 
companies  were  able  to  control  both  toll  charges  and 
freight  rat4ýs  over  their  lines,  large  scale  local  monopolies 
would  be  created  which  would  not  be  in  the  public  interest. 
Consequently,  until  the  Railway  &  Canal  Act  of  1845,  the 
power  of  canal  companies  was  limited  to  the  taking  of  tolls. 
34 
The  main  exceptions  to  this  rule  were  the  privately  owned 
canalsq  of  which  the  Bridgewater  was  the  most  conspicuous 
and  the  most  important.  As  well  as  owning  the  canalt  the 
Duke  of  Bridgewater's  vessels  carried  both  passengers  and 
goods  between  Liverpool  and  Manchester,  in  addition  to  the 
output  of  his  collieries  in  Worsley. 
35 
Parliament's  intentions  could,  however,  be  side-stepped; 
there  was  nothing  to  prevent  an  individual  or  a  Croup  of 
shareholders  from  setting  up  as  a  carrying  concern,  or  even 
such  a  concern  being  used  as  a  front  by  a  canal  company, 
This  seems  to  have  been  the  case  with  the  firm  of  Hugh 
ý6 
Henshall  &  Co.  Henshall  was  James  Brindley's  brother-in-law 
34  Because  tolls  were  the  sole  source  of  revenue,  Parliament' 
required  new  canal  companies  whose  line  would  subsequently 
reduce  the  traffic  on  existing  canals  to  guarantee  the 
income  of  canals  so  affected. 
35  jackman  Op.  cit.  p  435;  the  Trust  which  administered  his 
estate  a7fter  the  Dukets  death  retained  this  privilege. 
Jackman  believed  that  the  Basingstoke  canal  company  was 
one  of  a  very  few  public  companies  which  were  allowed  to 
carry, 
36  The  following  discussion  of  the  canal  carrying  firms  of 
Henshall  &  Co.  and  Worthington  &  Gilbert,  are  based  on 
Hadfield  -  Canals  of  west  midlands  (the  early  pages) 
and  A.  C.  Wood  'The  history  of  trade  and  transport  on  the 
river  Trent'  Transactions  of  the  Thoroton  Society  of 
Nottinghamshire  Vol.  LIV  ý1950)  P  35 
Bo. and  an  engineer  in  hisý  own  right;  he  was  clerk  of  works 
for  the  Trent  &  Mersey  and  ultimately  responsible  for  the 
completion  of  the  canal  after  Brindley's  death  in  1772. 
The  carrying  concern  bearing  his  name  was  set  up  by  a 
r-  to 
group  of  proprietors  to  attract  traffic  on,,  the  canal. 
Initially  it  was  independent  but  was  later  taken  over  by 
the  canal  company.  The  firm  was  actively  eneaged  in 
business  between  Shardlowt  on  the  river  Trentt  and  Great 
Hayward  by  the  middle  of  1770  and  presumably  extended  its 
coverage  as  the  various  canals  were  progressively  opened 
for  navigation.  In  1774,  the  firm  was  evidently  being 
used  to  draw  feeder  traffic  from  east  and  west  on  to  the 
canal  company's  main  line.  In  1790  the  bulk  of  traffic 
passing  between  the  Trent  &  Mersey  canal  and  the  river 
Trent  was  handled  by  Henshall  &  Co,  The  use  of  a  front 
company  was  successful  and  attracted  considerable  business 
to  the  canal. 
On  21  March  1776,  the  final  section  of  the  Bridgewater 
canal  at  Norton  Priory  was  completed  and  the  canal  opened 
throughoutt  allowing  uninterrupted  passage  off  the  Trent 
&  Mersey  to  Liverpool  as  well  as  Manchester. 
37 
Henshall  & 
Co.  extended  their  activities  and  from  1777 
38 
were  operating 
from  Castle  Quay,  the  terminus  of  the  Bridgewater  canal  in 
Manchester.  For  a  few  years  Henshall  &  Co,  remained  the 
37  Previously  only  direct  passage  to  Manchester  had  been 
.  possible. 
38  V.  I.  Tomlinson  tEarly  warehouses  on  Manchester  waterwayst 
Lancashire  and  Cheshire  Antiquarian  Society  Vol.  71  (1961) 
p  129  ff. 
81. only  canal  carrier  out  of  Manchester  other  than  the  Duke  of 
Bridgewater.  From  the  early  1780s,  however,  this  situation 
slowly  began  to  change.  In  1782  a  new  firm  of  canal 
carriersq  Worthington  &  Gilbert,  began  to  compete  with 
Henshall  &  Co.  for  the  trade  between  Manchester  and  Stourport. 
This  firm  also  was  not  a  genuinely  independent  carrying 
concern,  since  it  possessed  a  favourable  position  vis-a-vis 
the  Duke  of  Bridgewater,  Worthington  was  an  established 
road  carrierg  but  his  partnerp  John  Gilbert,  was  Agent  to 
the  Duke  and  a  member  of  the  Trent  &  Mersey  canal  committee. 
Competing  for  basically  the  same  traffic  as  Henshall  &  Co., 
conflic.  t  was  inevitable;  not  only  did  Worthington  &  Gilbert 
benefit  from  such  traffic  as  the  Duke  controlled,  but 
complaints  were  soon  voiced  of  undue  preference  at  Castle 
Quay,  Loss  of  traffic  by  Henshall  &  Co.  caused  a  rift  Within 
the  Trent  &  Mersey  canal  company.  The  committee  split 
into  pro-  and  anti-  Bridgewater  factions,  and  it  was  some 
time  before  a  settlement  was  reached,  The  issue  was 
particularly  disputed  because  competition  between  the  two 
concerns  was  centred  entirely  on  existing  traffic.  Canal 
carriage  from  Manchester  was  still  limited  to  the  midland 
regions. 
For  some  years  traffic  from  Manchester  to  London 
could  be  conveyed  only  Part  way  by  canal.  The  rest  of  the 
journey  had  to  beAcoastal  shipping  or  by  road.  Despite 
these  limitationsq  the  use  of  canal  conveyance  for  traffic 
passing  between  Manchester  and  London  slowly  developed. 
By  the  mid  1780s  Henshall  &  Co.  had  extended  its  interests 
to  include  su.  ch  traffic.  Goods-were  conveyed  the  whole 
length  of  the  Bridgewater  and  Trent  &  Mersey  canals  to 
Shardlow,  at  the  junction  with  the  river  Trentp  and  from 
82. there  transported  overland  to  London. 
39 
Traffic  had  been  Passing  between  London  and  Manchester 
at  least  in  part  by  canal  since  1783-  Among  the  carrying 
services  to  Manchester  in  that  year  was  one  "carriage  to 
the  canals  and  thence  in  barges"  from  the  Saracen's  Head, 
Snowhill,  London,  departing  three  times  a  week. 
4o 
This  is 
the  first  reference  which  has  been  found  to  the  use  of 
canal  conveyance  between  the  two  places  but  the  names  of 
those  responsible  remains  unknown.  It  is  just  possible 
that  this  venture  was  Matthew  Pickford's  for  only  six 
years  later  the  Saracen's  Head  can  be  identified  as  one  of 
the  inns  used  by  Pickfords  for  canal  conveyances 
41 
By 
that  time  Matthew  Pickford  had  already  taken  over  Henshall 
&  Co.  's  interest  in  London  traffic.  In  December  1786,  a 
notice  in  the  Manchester  Mercur  announced  that  "Matthew 
Pickford  continues  Hugh  Henshall  and  Company's  canal 
conveyance  of  goodsq  etc.,  to  London.  " 
42 
Since  Henshall 
&  Co.  remained  an  inportant  firm  of  canal  carriers,  the 
take-over  must  have  been  limited  to  this  one  part  of  its 
business,  As  the  canal  route  between  London  and  Lancashire 
steadily  developed  during  the  succeeding  years,  goods  were 
taken  by  water  over  greater  distances  until  land  carriage 
was  eliminated.  However  the  chronology  of  Pickfords' 
39  Interestingly  enough  not  by  sea,  despite  the  proximity 
of  Gainsborough  and  Hull  by  way  of  the  Trent. 
40  The  complete  guide  ...  to  London  (Osborm)  1783  entry  for 
Manchester,  Insofara5  the  canal  services  can  be 
identified  from  the  entries  in  the  trade  directories, 
Pickfords  appears  to  have  been  the  only  firm  for  some 
years  operating  canal  waggons  from  London  to  Manchester. 
41  Lowndes  directoryq  1789,  part  2,  Guide  to  stage-coaches, 
waggons  ...  Ip  56,  p  99. 
42  Manchester  Mercurl  19  Dec.  1786. 
63. adoption  of  canal  working  between  Manchester  and  London 
demonstrates  how  late  it  was  before  partial  reliance  on 
road  haulage  finally  cea5ed. 
From  the  end  of  1786,  when  the  take-over  of  HenshallIs 
London  interests  was  announced,  it  is  possible  to  build 
up  some  impression  of  Matthew  Pickford's  growing  involvement 
in  the  canal  carrying  trade,  Goods  were  forwarded  from 
Manchester  four  times  a  week  and  in  order  to  expedite  their 
delivery  in  London,  at  the  Swan  with  Two  Necksq  Lad  lane, 
the  connecting  waagons  were  moved  from  Shardlow  to  Rugeleyt 
a  town  further  north  on  the  Trent  &  Mersey  canal,  but  on 
a  more  direct  line  for  London. 
43 
In  1788  a  canal  waggon 
left  London  daily  for  Manchester  from  the  Swan  in  Lad  laneq 
the  same  inn  to  which  Matthew  Pickford  had  announced  two 
years  earlier  that  his  London  canal  traffic  from  Manchester 
would  be  directed. 
44 
In  1790  Pickfords  was  the  only 
carrying  concern  operating  from  the  Swan. 
45 
In  May  1788  Matthew  Pickford  approached  the  Coventry 
and  Oxford  canal  companies  for  wharf  and  warehouse  accommod- 
ation  at  Polesworth  and  Braunston'6n  their  respective  canals* 
46 
He  also  asked  that  until  a  junction  was  made  with  the 
Birmingham  &  Fazeley  canal  at  Fazeley  (which  would  thereby 
complete  the  canal  route  through  to  Lancashire)  he  should 
43  Ibid  19  Dec,  1786 
44  Kent's  London  directorv.  1788.  incorporatina  Shopkeeper 
and  Tradesman's  assistant  1788  P  72 
45  The  Universal  British  directory  Vol.  1  (Isted.,  2nd  issue, 
1790)  P  57-- 
46  Orders  of  general  meetings  and  minutes  of  committee  of 
proprietors,  7  May,  1788,  CVC  1/3-,  The  earliest  book  of 
rent  payments  for  the  lease  of  warehouses  unfortunately 
dates  only  from  1793  CVC  4/131. 
84. be  allowed  a  toll  reduction  of  two  shillings  a  ton  to 
off-set  the  cost  and  inconvenience  of  transporting  the 
goods  by  road  over  the  uncompleted  section  of  canal.  The 
Coventry  canal  company  found  these  terms  acceptable,  and 
by  inference  the  Oxford  company  alsot  and  the  trade 
commenced  within  a  few  weeks.  Matthew  Pickford's  interest 
was  clearly  in  the  route  to  London.  Polesworth  lies  on 
the  Coventry  canal  company's  portion  of  the  north-south 
linet  and  not  on  the  section  of  canal  leading  to  Coventry 
itself,  However  it  is  also  implicit  in  these  arrangements 
that  Matthew  Pickford  did  not  intend  to  use  the  Oxford 
canal  south  of  Braunston.  Neither  canal  was  complete  in 
1788  but  whereas  he  made  tOmporary  arrangements  with-the 
Coventry  canal  company  there  is  no  sign  of  similar  arrangements 
with  the  Oxford  company,  He  apparently  preferred  to 
approach  London  by  road  rather  than  by  the  circuitous  route 
of  the  Oxford  canal  south  of  Braunston  and  then  on  to  London 
by  way  of  the  Thames.  In  1789  a  navigation  waggon  was 
listed  as  departing  for  Manchester  daily  from  the  Swant 
Blossom's  Innq  and  Saracen's  Head,  the  three  London  inns 
which  Pickfords  was  identified  as  then  using. 
47 
In  the  summer  of  1790  the  final  section  of  the  Coventry 
canal,  between  Atherstone  and  Fazeley,  was  completed.  Since 
the  final  section  of  the  Oxford  canal,  between  Oxford  and 
Banbury,  had  also  been  opened  at  the  beeinning  of  the  same 
year,  there  was  now  available  a  through  water-route,  by 
47  Lowndes'  London  directoryj  part  29  P  56,  p  gg.  ' 
85. river  and  canal,  from  London  to  the  towns  of  the  midlands 
and  the  north-west.  The  conditions  had  therefore  been 
created  for  traffic  to  flow  freely  between  these  places, 
yet  even  so  the  need  for  road  transport  was  still  not 
removed, 
At  the  beginning  of  the  1790s  Pickfords'  canal 
operations  from  London  comprised  a  waggon  service  which 
departed  from  the  three  familiar  inns,  the  Swan,  Saracen's 
Head  and  Blossom's,  at  3  p.  m.  each  day. 
48 
The  wageon  was 
listed  as  serving  Braunstong  Atherstonet  TamworthqNewcastle- 
under-Lineg  Warrington  and  various  other  places  in  Lancashire 
and  Cheshire.  Braunston  stands  on  the  Oxford  canalv  and 
the  other  places  mentioned  either  on  or  adjacent  to  the 
Coventry,  Trent  &  Mersey,  and  Bridgewater  canals.  Continuous 
canal  conveyance  evidently  only  started  at  Braunston. 
Conveyance  by  road  over  the  ninety  or  so  miles  between  London 
and  Braunston  was  apparently  preferable  to  the  detour  and 
haz  - 
ards  of  the  through-route  by  way  of  the  Thames, 
49 
At 
least  for  Pickfords'  particular  range  of  traffic,  the 
availability  of  a  through  w  ater-route  was  not  of  itself 
sufficient  to  draw  itstraffIc  off  the  roads.  Indeed  the 
road  remained  competitive  until  there  was  a  canal  link 
direct  to  London, 
Throughout  the  1790s  Pickfords'  traffic  continued  to 
enter  London  by  road.  Moreover  goods  were  carried  CLn  even 
greater  distance  overland  as  Braunston  was  abandoned  in 
favour  of  Coventry  as  the  place-of  trans-shipment.  This 
49  Universal  British  directory  Vol.  1  P  506;  also  Bailey's 
London  directory  1790 
49  For  the  condition  of  the  Thames  route  E.  C.  R.  Hadfield 
'The  Thames  Navigation  and  the  canals  1770-1830'*, 
Economic  History  Review,  2nd  seriesq  Vol.  XIV  (1944-5) 
p  172. 
86. development  is  extremely  puzzlingt  given  the  fact  of 
Coventry's  greater  distance  from  London  and  the  many  miles 
of  canal  conveyance  sacrificed.  Perhaps  some  clue  is 
found  in  the  following  entry  in  the  committee  minutes  of 
the  Oxford  canal  company  in  November  1789. 
"It  is  the  opinion  of  this  committee  that 
as  the  warehouses  at  Braunston  were  erected 
for  the  accommodation  of  the  public  in 
general  notice  is  to  be  given  to  Mr.  Pickford 
who  now  occupies  them,  to  quit  the  same  at 
Mid-summer  next  in  order  that  the  same  may 
be  laid  open  for  tradexsin  general.  "  50 
No  further  reason  for  the  committee's  decision  was  given. 
Did  both  sides  feel  a  sense  of  resentment  -  Pickford  that 
he  had  been  unfairly  treatedo  the  committee  that  there  was 
no  sign  that  he  intended  to  use  the  rest  of  their  canal? 
Or  perhaps  was  it  that  having  lost  his  position  at  Braunston 
he  could  only  find  satisfactory  accommodation  at  Coventry? 
Whatever  the  reason,  it  was  to  Coventry  that  the  move 
was  made.  This  must  have  occurred  during  1790  for  by  the 
beginning  of  the  following  year  the  Coventry  canal  company 
was  already  being  asked  for  extensions  to  Pickfords' 
existing  warehouse  space*51  Coventry  was  itself  greatly 
stimulated  by  the  completion  of  its  canal  and  especially 
by  the  junction  with  the  Trent  &  Mersey  canal.  A  contemporary 
commented  on  the  remarkable  flow  of  goods  from  all  parts 
of  the  north  to  the  city,  "from  whence  they  are  taken  to 
London  by  Mr.  Pickford's  waggonst  who  has  large  warehouses 
on  the  wharf  to  store  goods,  It52  Similarly  the  Manchester 
50  Minutes  of  committee  10  Nov.  -1789t  OXC  1/4 
51  RpyZh  minutes  of  committee  meetinr  ,.  s,  5  Jan.  1791, 
CVC/1/23;  also  Ibid  5p  12  Dec.  1792, 
52  Universal  British  director):  Vol  2,  (County,  A  to  Dp 
1791)  p  618 
87o 
1 directory  for  1794  has  Matthew  Pickford's  boats  departing 
each  afternoon  (except  Sunday)  from  Castle  Quay  to 
Coventry.  IIN.  B.  The  goods  for  London  and  beyond,  are 
forwarded  from  Coventry(:  ýý-ý-oni)Fly-waggons.,,  53 
There  is, 
then,  no  doubt  that  Coventry  was  being  used  in  this  way. 
Coventry  remained  Pickford's  trans-shipment  place 
until  1796  or  7,  that  is  until  the  Grand  Junction  Canal, 
built  explicitly  to  bye-pass  the  long  detour  between  London 
and  Braunston  via  the  Thames  and  Oxford  canal. 
54 
was  well 
on-the  way  to  completion.  The  Grand  Junction  was  being 
built  from  1793  and  although  mostly  completed  by  1800  it 
was  divided  into  two  sections  by  the  need  to  drive  a  tunnel 
through  a  hill  at  Blisworth,  in  Northamptonshire.  The 
tunnel  was  not  finally  finished  until  1805.  As  usual, 
however,  the  two  completed  sections  of  the  canal  were  brought 
into  use  as  soon  as  they  were  ready;  until  1805  they  were 
linked  by  a  special  tramway  laid  down  over  the  hill. 
55 
The 
northern  section  of  the  canal  became  usable  in  1797  and 
it  was  then  that  Pickford's  trans-shipment  point  was  switched 
from  Coventry  to  Blisworth. 
Matthew  Pickford  first  approached  the  Grand  Junction 
canal  company  in  July  1796  . 
56 
and  presumably  worked  out 
satisfactory  terms  on  which  he  would  use  the  canal  for 
53  Manchester  and  Salford  director3:  (Scholets,  1794) 
p  186;  also  Universal  British  directory  Vol,  3  (county, 
E  to  M9  1794  P  779. 
54  C.  Hadfield  'The  Grand  Junction  canal'  Journal  of  Transport 
History  Vol.  IV9  (1959-6o)  p  96;  also  C.  Hadfield  The 
canals  of  the  east  midlands  p  108  ff. 
55  V.  A.  Hatley  'The  Blisworth  hill  railway,  1800-1905' 
Northamptonshire  Antiquarian  Society  (1962-3),  p  14  ff. 
56  Minutes,  meetings  of  general  assembly  of  proprietors 
and  general  committeep  27  JulY  17969  GJC  1/39. 
88. by  August  the  following  year  he  already  had  a  wharf  at 
Blisworth  and  the  canal  company  was  agreeing  to  build  an 
adequate  road  from  his  wharf  over  Blisworth  hill  to  the 
Northampton  turnpike, 
57 
From  1797  Pickfords'  fly-boats 
left  Castle  Quay  each  day  for  Coventry  and  Blisworth, 
but  London  goods  were  forwarded  by  waggon  from  Blisworth,  58 
By  November  1797  Pickfords'  warehouse  at  Blisworth  had 
become  the  centre  of  "a  most  valuable  trade  ...  between 
London  and  the  northern  parts  of  the  kingdom.,, 
59 
Two  years 
later  Pickfords'  waggons  were  listed  as  departing  twice 
a  day  from  London  to  Blisworth,  where  they  connected  with 
daily  fly-boats  to  Manchester. 
6o 
It  appears  that  waggons 
continued  to  be  used  in  this  context  until  the  Blisworth 
tunnel  had  been  completed. 
61 
There  was  every  reason  why  Pickfords  should  use  the 
northern  section  of  the  Grand  Junction  canal  once  it 
became  available;  what  is  less  clear  is  why  and  how  much 
use  was  made  of  the  southern  section  before  the  tunnel  was 
finished.  In  October  1797  several  members  of  the  Grand 
Junction  were  asked  to  meet  at  Two  Watersq  a  point  on  the 
canal  near  Hemel  Hempsteadt  "to  consider  the  accommodation 
necessary  for  Mro  Pickford,  11  with  powers  to  "give  orders 
for  carrying  the  interest  of  the  company  into  effect,  " 
62 
57  Ibid  8  Aug-1797. 
58  Manchester  and  Salford  directory  (Scholes,  1797)  p  185- 
59  Minutes,  meetinfy,,  s  of  proprietors  and  general  committee 
15  Nov.  1797  GJC  1/39- 
60  W.  Holden  Holdents  now,  easy  and  complete  referance  (sic) 
p  63. 
61  The  Manchester  trade'directories  include  this  form  of 
entry  in  1800  and  1804.  There  is  no  further  directory 
until  1808.1 
62  Minutes.  meetinas  of  proprietors  and  general  committee 
11  Oct.  17979  GJC/  1/39. 
89. The  precise  purpose  of  the  meeting  was  not  given.  The 
point  isq  was  the  meeting  place  significant?  Was  it  just 
a  convenient  place  to  meet  or  did  the  "accommodation" 
mentioned  refer  to  Two  Waters.  If  the  lattert  Matthew 
Pickford  would  be  directing  his  attention  to  the  southern 
section  of  the  canal.  This  Part  of  the  canal,  as  far  as 
Tringt  was  opened  in  1799.  In  February  1798  Pickford 
also  asked  for  accommodation  at  the  company's  wharf  at 
Whitefriars,  on  the  Thames. 
63 
One  explanation  would  be 
that  in  both  cases  Pickford  was  anticipating  future  rather 
than  current  needs.  Yet  insofaras  Pickfords'  interests 
were  still  centred  on  Manchester-London  traffict  and  there 
is  no  reason  to  question  that,  then  the  Whitefriars'  wharf 
would  be  irrelevant  since  by  that  date  the  line  of  the  Grand 
Junction  canal  had  already  been  changed  to  a  terminus  in 
Paddington  instead  of  the  Thames  at  Brentford.  Perhaps 
Pickfords  was  engaged  in  some  local  trade  on  the  southern 
section  of  the  canal. 
Some  supporting  evidence  of  such  an  interest  is 
provided  by  the  memories  of  a  Pickford  employee,  recalled 
in  old  age,  who  started  with  the  firm  in  1790. 
"179-  canal  open  to  Brentford:  wharf 
taken  at  Whitefriars:  Barges  loaded 
2  or  3a  week  &  trans-shipped  at 
Brentford  to  Boats"  64 
63  Ibid  14  Feb.  1798. 
64  William  Wright  to  Joseph  Baxendalet  25  May  1852. 
Wright  was  recording  the  memories  of  his  father 
of  the  told  days.  '  The  original  letter  was  lent  to 
Hon.  Mary  Pickford  during  her  work  but  is  now 
missing  from  Joseph  Baxendale's  papers  at  Framfield 
Place.  Miss  Pickford's  copy  of  the  letter  is  at 
KS/2/5  (b) 
0. Although  this  evidence  is  open  to  some  question  concerning 
its  reliability  in  points  of  detail,  there  is  no  reason  to 
doubt  its  substance.  Given  that,  the  traffic  referred  to 
here  does  not  easily  fit  with  what  is  known  from  other 
sources  about  the  organisation  of  the  Manchester  traffic. 
The  lease  of  a  wharf  at  Whitefriars  in  1798  only  seems  to 
make  sense  if  an  interest  in  some  local  traffic  is  posited. 
Moreover  the  Grand  Junction  canal  company  was  approached 
for  facilities  to  land  Pickfords'  goods  at  Brentford,  but 
65  1  not  until  April  1800.  Although  the  various  bits  of 
evidence  are  broadly  consistent,  the  precise  nature  and 
significance  of  these  activities  at  this  time  remain  unclear. 
Although  the  details  of  Pickfords'  early  canal  working 
remaint  obscure,  there  can  be  no  doubt  of  the  firm's  Growing 
involvement  in  the  canal  trade,  It  is  clear  from  the  evidence 
of  the  trade  directories  and  the  records  of  those  canal 
companies  with  which  pickfords,  had  dealings  that  its  canal 
interests  were  chiefly  centred  on  the  lone  distance  trade 
between  London  and  Lancashire.  Local  canal  operations 
were  confined  to  some  possible  activities  in  and  out  of 
London.  The  Grand  Junction,  Oxford  and  Coventry  canals 
together  constituted  a  major  portion  of  the  through  water- 
route  between  the  south  and  north  of  England.  Each  canal 
company  was  contacted  before  its  section  was  finished  and 
ready  for  trade.  In  addition  to  these  canals,  Pickford5l 
boats  also  travelled  over  part  of  the  Birmingham  canal. 
Since  Pickfords  was  not  trading  to  and  from  Birmingham  at 
the  time,  this  was  presumably  confined  to  that  portion  of 
the  company's  waterway  which  formed  part  of  the  north-south 
route. 
65  Minutes,  meetings,  of  proprietors  and  L[eneral  committee 
15  April  18009  GJC  1/40. 
91. It  is  possible  to  indicate  the  scale  of  Pickfords' 
canal  trade  only  in  general  terms.  In  1795  ten  boats  were 
registered  in  Matthew  Pickford's  name  as  trading  between 
Manchester  and  Coventry, 
66 
Henshall  &  Co.  had  sixty-five 
boats  registered. 
67 
These  ten  boats  were  only  a  beginning 
however,  for  within  a  couple  of  years  of  Matthew's  death 
their  number  had  risen  to  twenty-eight. 
68 
This  was  not 
the  only  capital  investment  specific  to  the  canal  trade, 
as  wharf  and  warehouse  facilities  were  also  required. 
Premises  were  taken  at  various  times  at  Polesworthq  Braunston 
Coventryq  Blisworth  and  Whitefriars  but,  for  reasons  already 
seeng  several  of  these  are  likely  to  have  been  held  only 
temporarily.  More  permanent  accommodation  was  taken  in 
Manchester  and  London.  In  Manchester  a  small  warehouse 
became  necessary  at  Castle  Quay  by  17949 
69 
to  which  further 
premises  were  later  added.  Substantial  premises  were 
taken  at  Paddingtong  in  London,  from  the  time  of  the  canal's 
opening. 
70 
Canals  undoubtedly  significantly  increased  the 
size  and  scale  of  Pickfords'  business. 
It  would  be  illuminating  if  these  developments  could 
be  translated  into  tonnage  figures,  but  unfortunately  that 
is  impossible.  The  only  relevant  evidence  before  Matthew 
Pickfords'  death  so  far  discovered  are  isolated  tonnage 
payments  to  two  canal  companies,  the  Oxford  and  the  Birmingham. 
66  Cheshire  Register  of  Bosts  and  Barges,  1795,  Cheshire 
Record  Office.  This  was  part  of  a  national  registration 
carried  out  under  the  auspices  of  the  Admiralty.  I  must 
thank  Mr.  H.  Hanson  for  this  information. 
67  C,  Hadfield  The  canals  of  the  west  midlands  (Newton  Aýbot 
1966)  P  38. 
68  see  below  pl(o 
69  V.  1,  Tomlinson  'Early  warehouses  on  Manchester  waterways' 
Lancashire  and  Cheshire  Antiquarian  SocietYgVol.  71(1961) 
pp  145-6;  H.  Clegg  IThe  third  Duke  of  Brideewater's  canal 
works  in  Manchester'  Lancashire  and  Cheshire  Antiquarian 
Society,  Vol.  65  (1955)  P  51  ff- 
70  see  below  pli(s 
92* In  August  1798  Matthew  Pickford  forwarded  two  bills  to 
the  Oxford  company  in  payment  of  tonnage  accounts,  one  for 
E184-7.8d  and  one  for  f.  143'.  l.  Od7l  The  tonnage  accounts 
of  the  Birmingham  canal  company  indicate  that  Pickfords 
was  a  relatively  small  user  of  that  line.  A  payment  of 
E85-10-5d  was  recorded  for  25  May  1799  and  another, 
L91-17-7d,  for  31  August  1799.  At  this  latter  date 
Henshall  &  Co.  's  account  totalled  L657.72 
The  development  of  canals  had  an  important  but  delayed 
impact  on  long-distance  goods  carriage  between  London  and 
Lancashire.  In  Pickfords'  experienceg  land  carriage  was 
not  finally  eliminated  until  the  early  years  of  the 
nineteenth  century.  Undoubtedly  canals  were  very  important 
in  the  context  of  local  trade  and  economic  development  lone 
before  this  date,  but  in  terms  of  a  national  system  Of 
communications  their  importance  as  the  primary  form  of 
transportation  can  be  easily  overstated.  If  PIckfords' 
experience  could  be  generalised  with  that  of  other  carriersq 
some  measure  might  be  available  of  testing  the  contribution 
of  canals  to  the  long-distance  carrying  trade  and  thus  to 
the  economy  in  a  wider  context. 
As  far  as  Pickfords  is  concerned,  the  1790S  marked  its 
commitment  to  canals  and  thus  a  decisive  stage  in  the  firm's 
development.  Permanent  effects  were  left  in  the  form  of 
71  Collection  of  historical  ...  records  p  27  OXC  4/110. 
72  These  entries  are  at  the  back  of  a  letter  book  for 
1793-18o4,  BCN  4/371  B. 
93- 
11 boats,  premises  and  a  now  scale  of  working  -  none  of  which 
resulted  from  the  prior  flirtation  with  the  coaching  trade, 
If  Pickfords  did  not  pioneer  canal  working  between  Manchester 
and  Londong  it  was  certainly  involved  at  an  early  date. 
The  canal  trade  came  to  bulk  increasingly  large,  and  during 
the  next  forty  years  became  the  foundation  of  Pickfords' 
business, 
94. CHAPTER 
PICKFORDS  AND  THE  CARRYING  TRADE9  1750-1800 I.  The  growth  of  carriage 
The  land-carriers'  business  developed  in  medieval 
times  out  of  the  corn  and  cloth  trades.  In  time  it  became 
possible  to  concentrate  on  the  carriage  of  goods  of  all 
kindst  until  what  had  originally  been  a  subsidiary  activity 
common  to  several  trades  became  a  specialised  occupation. 
The  full  growth  of  long-distance  carrying,  and  ultimately 
the  conditions  within  which  a  firm  like  Pickfords  could 
operateg  depended  on  two  main  conditionsp  the  expansion  of 
outputp  chiefly  in  the  manufacturing  sectorl  and  the  degree 
to  which  that  expansion  was  accompanied  by  increasing 
specialisation. 
Transport  facilities  of  all  kinds  expanded  considerably 
during  the  eighteenth  century,  and  with  them  the  number  and 
scope  of  the  carriers.  However  it  is  easier  to  suggestp 
as  a  generalisationg  that  the  opportunities  for  specialist 
functions  increased  during  the  period  than  demonstrate  the 
case  by  particular  examples.  Indeed  at  first  sight  the 
opposite  might  seem  to  be  the  case.  Agriculture  continued 
to  dominate  the  economy  throughout  the  century  and  most 
manufacturing  activity  was  associated  with  it  to  a  greater 
or  lesser  extent.  In  such  traditional  occupations  as  brewing 
or  the  leather  tradesq  the  basic  raw  materials  derived,  from 
agriculture  so  thatq  in  a  telling  phraseq  "manufacture  may 
be  seen  more  significantly  as  processing  the  harvest' 
a 
P.  Mathias 
- 
The  brewing  industry  in  England,  1700-1830 
(C.  U.  P.  1959)9  -PXxi. 
95. No  manufacture  displayed  this  close  linkage  of  industry  and 
agriculture  better  than  that  of  wool.  Not  only  was  the 
wool  home  produced,  but  the  traditional  hand-work  process 
of  manufacture  organised  chiefly  by  small  masters,  who 
retained  a  minor  interest  in  farming  to  provide  food  for 
their  families  and  fodder  for  their  horsesq  remained  typical 
until  at  least  the  18305.2  Indeed  in  any  industry  where 
the  domestic  system  of  manufacture  prevailed  there  was  a 
close  connection  with  agriculture. 
In  all  such  tradesq  the  degree  of,  specialisation  was 
small:  either  production  was  for  a  local  market  or,  as  in 
the  woollen  industryq  the  individual  entrepreneur  combined 
within  his  own  enterprise  all  the  functions  involved  in  the 
production  and  sale  of  his  goods.  However  in  the  'new' 
industries  which  rose  to  importance  during  the  eighteenth 
centuryq  chiefly  coal,  iron  and  cotton,  a  somewhat  different 
pattern  emerged.  For  most  of  the  century  the  coal  industry 
and  iron  to  a  lesser  degreev  remained  closely  bound  up  with 
landownership. 
3  Coal  mining  was  a  part  of  estate  exploitationg 
and  even  then  was  secondary  to  agriculture.  Even  so,  one 
aspect  of  the  industry  was  highly  developed,.  namely  the 
2  Mantoux  The  Industrial  Revolution,  p  60;  H.  Heaton  -- 
The  Yorkshire  woollen  and  worsted  industries,  esp.  p  290  ff. 
W.  b.  Crump  The  Leeds  woollen  industEy  1780-1820(Thoresby 
Society  Publications,  Vol.  xxxii,  1929)  esp.  P  77  ff,  the 
diary  of  Joseph  Rogerson.  Aikin  ,  Description  of  the 
country  ---  round  Manchesterg  P  93  commenting  on  the  use 
of  land  near  the  West  Riding  manufacturing  towns  noted 
that  "the  manufacturer  has  his  enclosures,  in  which  he 
keeps  milch  cows  for  the  support  of  his  family,  and  horses 
for  the  conveyance  of  his  goods. 
, 
11 
3  T.  S.  Ashton  and  J.  Sykes  The  coal  industry  of  the 
eighteenth  centur):,  (M 
*  U.  P.  second  edition,  19  pp  1-4; 
T.  S.  Ashton  Iron  and  steel  in  the  Industrial  Revolution 
(M.  U.  P.  1927  -P209. 
9.6. distribution  and  marketing  of  coal  in  London  from  the 
Northumberland  and  Durham  coalfields.  The  long  chain 
of  specialist  agentsq  fitterso  ships'  mastersq  factorst 
lightermeng  and  successive  buyersp 
4 
probably  constituted 
one  of  the  most  developed  service  structures  in  the  economy 
before  the  rise  of  cotton,  The  cotton  industry  grew  up 
on  the  basis  of  the  pre-existing  textile  manufactureq  the 
linen  and  fustian  trades,  which  has  already  possessed  a 
certain  degree  of  specialisation. 
5 
The  emergence  in  the 
later  eighteenth  century  of  selling  agents9  brokers  and 
other  dealers  reinforced  existing  trends  and  demonstrates 
how  the  rapid  rise  of  cotton  was  accompanied  by  an  equal 
demand  for  specialised  services. 
Specialisation  of  product  developed  on  a  geographical 
7  basis.  From  the  beginning  of  the  eighteenth  century  areas 
of  England  were  associated  with  particular  ranges  of  products 
Birmingham  with  guns  and  small  metal  manufactures,  Sheffield 
with  cutleryp  Leeds  and  the  West  Riding  with  woollensq 
Lancashire  with  linens.  and  fustians.  During  the  course  of 
the  centuryq  local  specialisation  was  intensified  and  its 
force  shaped  the  structure  of  the  local  economy.  Allied 
industries  or  preparatory  processes  grew  up;  specialised 
services,  including  marketing  and  distributionp  emerged. 
"Lines  of  communication  were  adapted  to  the  needs  of  the 
regional  trade:  specialised  dealerso  packers  and  carriers 
appeared.  " 
8 
Such  developments 
4  Ashton  and  Sykes,  OP.  Cit.  Chap.  xii,  P  194 
5  Wadsworth  and  Mann  Cotton  trade  and  industrial  Lancashire 
the  early  chapters. 
6  Ibid,  the  later  chapters;  also  M.  M.  Edwards  The  growth 
of  the  British  cotton  trade,  1780-1815  (M.  U.  P.  1967) 
passim, 
7  Ashton  Economic  history  of  Enaland,  p  96  ff. 
8  Ibid  p  97. 
9,7. are  of  great  51gnificanceg  as  they  indicate  the  separation 
of  centres  of  production  and  consumption.  Defoe's  assertion 
that  even  in  the  early  eighteenth  century  every  part  of 
England  produced  something  for  the  London  market  is  well 
known,  Londont  because  of  its  disproportionate  share  of 
population  and  purchasing  power,  remained  the  major  retail 
market  for  much  of  the  century,  and  also  the  most  important 
export  outlet.  As  the  volume  of  output  rose,  the  pressure 
on  transport  to  overcome  the  distance  between  producer  and 
consumer  or  exporter  could  only  increase,  Most  of  the 
pressure  was  doubtless  borne  by  water  transport,  hence  the 
familiar  river  and  port'improvement  schemes  of  these  years; 
but  land  carriageg  as  seen  already,  had  its  part  to  play. 
9 
Transport,  howeverv  was  more  than  a  bridge  between 
producer  and  consumer.  Its  wider  contribution  was  to 
underpin  the  commercial  and  credit  structure  on  which 
eighteenth  century  industry  was  based.  Banking,  creditj 
the  discounting  of  bills,  all  were  centred  on  London. 
Marketing  of  the  products  of  industry  was  similarly  directedp 
that  of  the  cotton  industry  in  particular. 
10 
As  early-as 
the  seventeenth  centuryg  the  Manchester  linen  drapers,  sought 
openings  in  London,  and  their  successors  the  following 
century  did  likewise.  Every  provincial  manufacturer  had 
his  London  warehouseman  who  not  only.  distributed  goods,  but 
who  also  provided  information  on  the  most  recent  market  trends, 
Indeed  by  the  beginning  of  the  nineteenth  century,  William 
Gray  of  Bolton  relied  on  such  weekly  reports  from  his  London 
9  The  contribution  of  land  carriage  to  the  Provincial  retail 
trade  is  indicated  by  Willan  An  eighteenth  century  shoL- 
keeper,  and  Marshall  (ed)  The  autobiography  of  William 
Stout  of  Lancaster. 
10  The  following  is  based  on  the  works  of  Wadsworth  and  Mann, 
and  Edwards. 
98. agents,  in  the  light  of  which  the  following  week's  production 
was  planned. 
11 
Such  a  degree  of  organisation  necessarily 
demanded  from  transport  at  least  a  minimum  level  of 
efficiency  to  allow  the  exchange  of  commercial  information, 
for  which  speed  and  reliability  were  essential  )  as  well  as 
the  actual  carriage  of  goods.  This  aspect  has  received 
little  attention.  In  the  most  rdcent  study  of  the  cotton 
trade,  the  purchase  of  cotton  woolq  where  knowledge  of  short- 
run  price  movements  was  important,  and  of  the  sale  of  yarn 
and  cloth,  often  at  a  distance,  are  discussed  with  scarcely 
any  reference  to  the  transport  facilities  which  alone  made 
these  activities  possible. 
12 
When  a  manufacturer  ceased 
to  transport  his  own  products  he,  became  dependent  on  the 
reliability  and  efficiency  of  the  available  regional  carriers 
at  least  before  the  advent  of  railways.  The  carriers 
provision  of  transport  services  is  thus  an  essential  part 
of  the  framework. 
As  the  eighteenth  century  advancedq  expansion  of  output 
was  accompanied  by  increasing  specialisation  in  certain  parts 
of  industry.  For  the  growth  of  long-distance  road  carrying 
trade,  two  developments,  were  of  particular  importance.  The 
first  was  the  location.  of  some  manufacturing  processes  away 
from  their  major  market  centres.  The  second  was  the  extended 
scale  of  industrial  activity  which  compelled  entrepreneurs 
to  shed  somefunctions  and  to  concentrate  on  the  organi5ation 
11  Edwards  OP-cit.  P  154. 
12  Edwards  Op.  cit.  chaps.  5  to  S. 
99. of  production. 
13 
One  task  so  released  was  the  transport- 
ation  of  goods  to  the  market, 
The  changing  location  of  an  industry  and  its*spatial 
separation  from  its  markets  is  best  illustrated  from  the 
textile  trades.  The  silk  industryg  in  which  for  much  of 
the  century  spinning  and  weaving  were  quite  distinctv 
provides  a  case  in  point.  '  Silk-throwing  was  begun  at 
Derby  in  1718 
14 
and  later  in  several  towns  of  north  Stafford- 
shire  and  north  east  Cheshire.  The  silk  spun  in  these  and 
other  mills  was  processed  by  the  Spitalfields  weavers  in 
London,  In  Macclesfield,  the  most  important  of  the  Cheshire 
silk  towns,  spinning  and  weaving  were  not  combined  until  1790- 
The  parts  of  Cheshire  and  Staffordshire  where  silk  was  spun 
lacked  any-form  of  water  transport  -  Macclesfield,  for 
exampleg  was  entirely  land-locked  until  its  canal  was  opened 
in  1831  -  so  the  conveyance  of  the  thread  must  have  depended 
at  least  in  Part  on  road  haulage. 
A  good  example  of  the  migration  of  an  industry  was  that 
15 
of  calico-printine.  Until  the  mid-eighteenth  century 
calico  printing  was  monopolised  by  London,  mainly  becauset 
as  the  chief  port  of  entry,  it  had  ready  access  to  the  imported 
calicoes  of  the  East  India  Company.  Later  on,  London's 
13,  For  a  more  extensive  discussion  of  this  point  with 
reference  to  the  retail 
, 
trade,  D.  Alexander  Retailing 
.  in  England  during  the  Industrial  Revolution  (1970) 
7hap.  lo 
14  W.  Hutton-  The  history  of  Derby  (ýnd  ed.  1817)  p  161  ff. 
There  is  little  published  work  on  the  silk  trade.  Mantoux 
has  scattered  references  PP  193-7  ;  see,  howeverv  G.  B.  Hertz 
'The  English,  silk  industry  in  the  eighteenth  century' 
English  Historical  Review,  1909  P  P  710-727. 
15  Tiadsworth  and  Mann  Cotton  trade  and  industrial 
Lancashire  p  129  ff;  G,  Turnbull  A  history  of  the 
Talico  printina  industry  of  Great  Britain  (Altrincham,  1951) 
p  23. 
loo. trading  dominance  preserved  its  monopoly  after  Scotch  and 
Irish  linens  had  been  introduced  into  use.  Similarly  with 
'Blackburn  greyspi  a  form  of  cloth  made  in  Lancashire  which 
proved  to  be  highly  suitable  for  printing;  it  was  taken  to 
London  in  its  raw  stýateq  by  land  carriage. 
16 
The  use  of 
these  cotton  greys  became  so  extensive  thatl  it  has  been 
suggested, 
17 
it  eventually  became  cheaper  to  print  the  cloth 
in  Lancashire.  Calico-printing  was  begun  in  Lancashire 
soon  after  1750  and  by  1800  the  entire  industry  had  moved 
there  from  London.  Printed  calicoes  were  used  particularly 
for  furnishings  and  throughout  the  period  this  trade  continued 
to  be  centred  on  London.  The  'London  furniture-printers' 
had  their  designs  printed  in  Lancashire  and  then  retailed 
them  through  their  West  End  shops  or  provincial  agents. 
18 
Consequently  although  an  entire  stage  in  the  process  of 
manufacture  had  left  London,  the  market  structure  was  basically 
unchanged.  At  some  point,  therefore,  the  printed  cloths  had 
to  be  taken  to  London,  and  at  that  point  transport  services 
had  to  be  provided. 
Evidence  of  entrepreneurs  ceasina  to  concern  themselves 
with  the  transport  of  their  goods  is  also  found  in  the  textile 
trades.  Even  in  the  early  seventeenth  century  not  all 
merchants  personally  organised  the  transportation  of  their 
raw  materials  and  manufactured  goods.  In  1626,  for  example, 
the  Chetham  brothers  of  Manchester  employed  carriers  to  take 
their  packs  of  cotton  wool  from  London  to  Manchester  and 
16  J.  Ogden  A  description  of  Manchester  ...  by  a  native 
of  the  town  (Manchester  1783)  pp  85-6. 
17  By  Ogden,  Ibid 
18  Edwards  Growth  of  British  cotton  trade,  pp  147-8; 
P.  Floud  'The  dark-ground  floral  chintz  style'  The 
Connoisseurv  April  19579  P  174;  P.  Floud  'The  drab 
style  and  the  designs  of  Daniel  Goddard'  The  Connoisseur, 
May  1957P  p  234;  P,  Floud  'Richard  Ovey  and  the  rise 
of  the  London  'Furniture-Printers'll  The  Connoisseur, 
Oct-  1957t  p  92, 
101. about  the  same  time  a  carrier  was  employed  by  another 
merchant  to  take  his  cloth  to  the  fairs  of  soutbern  England, 
19 
During  the  following  century  the  use  of  carriers  seems 
to  have  become  more  general.  The  growth  of  trade  in 
Manchester  brought  with  it  changes  of  organisation.  Instead 
of  searching  for  sales  of  raw  materialst  merchants  sent  out 
travellers  with  samples,  while  they  themselves  stayed  at 
home  to  supervise  the  manufactu3ýe  of  orders  which  came  in, 
Aikin's 
20 
description  of  these  changes  seems  to  imply  that 
the  merchants  employed  carriers  to  transport  their  goods, 
This  was  certainly  the  case  in  the  woollen  trade  of  the  West 
Riding. 
"...  Several  considerable  traders  in  Leeds 
used  to  go  with  droves  of  pack-horses,  loaded 
with  these  goods,  to  all  the  fairs  and  market 
towns  almost  over  the  whole  islandq  not  to  sell 
by  retale  (sic),  but  to  the  shops  by  wholesale... 
But  of  late  they  only  travel  for  orders,  and 
afterwards  send  the  goods,  by  the  common  carriers, 
to  the  different  places  intended.  "  21 
Although  there  are  many  examples  of  the  employment  of 
individual  carriers,  there  is  much  less  evidence  to  illustrate 
the,  type  of  change  in  entrepreneurial  function  suggested  here. 
These  two  references  date  from  the  first  half  of  the 
eighteenth  century,  but  the  likelihood  is  that  the  tendency 
which  they  indicate  became  more  pronounced  with  time.  I 
19  Wadsworth  and  Mann  Op.  cit.  P  31P  p  46. 
20  Aikin  Description  of  the  country  ...  round  Manchester 
P  183;  see  chap.  Ep 
21  Defoe  Tour  through  the  whole  island,  Vol.  iii,  p  126. 
102. II,  The  Pickfords 
These,  then,  were  the  conditions  within  which  carriers 
could  operate  in  the  eighteenth  century.  How  successful 
were  the  Pickfords  in  exploiting  them?  The  growth  of 
services  by  the  time  of  Matthew  Pickford's  death  in  1799 
has  already  been  seen,  But  how  far  is  it  possible  to 
assess  Pickfords'  performance  during  the  previous  fifty  or 
so  years  against  that  of  other  Manchester  carriers?  No 
significant  detail  is  known-about  other  concern5,  but  one 
test  that  can  be  applied  is  the  survival  rate  of  the  various 
firms. 
Between  1750  and  1800,  there  were  at  least  eighteen 
22 
different  firms  engaged  in  road  haulagetwork  at  various  times 
between  Manchester  and  London.  Some  of  these  appear  in  no 
more  than  a  single  reference.  Somet  for  example,  Thomas 
Sleath  &  Co.  23  lasted  only  a  few  years.  Yet  others  survived 
over  lengthy  periods.,  There  were  ten  signatories  to  the 
joint  advertisement  put  out  by  the  Manchester  and  London 
carriers  in  September  1765.24  Of  these  only  four  signed 
the  second  advertisement  two  years  later  25 
to  which  were 
added  three  new  names.  The  other  six  had  not  necessarily 
ceased  to  function,  howeverp  since  later  evidence  affirms  the 
existence  of  two  of  them.  None  the  less,  the  impression  is 
thato  particularly  at  this  early  stage  and  toa,  considerable 
22  On  the  evidence  of  the  Manchester  newspapers  and  trade 
directories. 
23  Advertisements  in  the  Manchester  MercurX  30  Aug.  1796, 
14  ]Feb.  22  Aug.  1797,29  May  1798-chronicle  Sleath's 
career  with  some  accuracy 
24  Manchester  MercurX  24  Sep;.  1765- 
25  Ibid  1  Dec.  1767. 
103. extent  later,  the  trade  was  characterised  by  frequent  entry 
and  drop-out.  By  about  1775,  the  trade  had  settled  down, 
and  was  in  the  hands  of  only  four  firmsp  Pickfordsq  Bass  & 
Co.,  Cooper  &  Co.,  and  Hulse  &  Co. 
The  firm  of  Bass  &  Co.  was  founddd  by  William  Bass 
94 
of  Burton-on-Trentq  later  better  known  for  the  beer  he  brewed* 
Bass  probably  started  off  as  local  carrier,  by  tradition 
making  delivery  for  local  brewers,  but  by  1762,  he  was 
engaged  in  the  Manchester  and  London  trade  and  signed  the  two 
joint  advertisements.  He  took  up  brewing  himself  in  1777, 
but  the  London  and  Manchester  trade  directories  show  that 
he  retained  an  interest  in  carrying,  in  the  partnership  of 
Bass  &  Morrisq  until  about  1795.  Thomas  Cooper  &  Co. 
27 
was 
a  later  arrival,  The  first  mention  of  this  firm  is  in  1772 
although  it  might  have  already  been  in  operation  for  some 
years.  It  lasted  a  comparatively  short  time,  disappearing 
probably  in  1789.  The  last  of  the  four,  Hulse  &  Co,  t  was 
the  only  firm  other  t1lan  Pickfords'  which  survived  to  the 
end  of  the  centuryt  albeit  in  a  modified  form.  Hulse  &  Co. 
was  a  partnership  of  three  families,  Hulse,  Widders  and 
Higginson,  of  whom  the  first  two  were  perhaps  the  more 
important.  By  1765  the  firm  was  listed  in  the  joint  advert- 
isement  as  Hulseq  Widders  &  Co,,  and  in  1767  as  William 
Widders  &  Co,  From  then  on  it  was  Imown  as  Hulse  &  Co.  until 
1794  when  the  partnership  was  re-formed  as  Higginson,  Twiss  & 
Co.,  under  which  name  it  continued  for'some  years  into  the 
26  Details  of  William  Bass  are  from  Fortunes  made  in  Business 
(N.  D.?  1884  p  121-ff;  C.  G.  Harper  The  Manchester  and 
Glasgow  Road  (London  and  Manchester  1907,2nd  revised  ed. 
1924)  p  229;  Wood  'Trade  and  transport  on  the  river  Trent' 
Thoroton  Society_p  19509p  23. 
27  1*  nformation  on  Cooper  &  C0.9  and  Hulse  &  Co.  is  from  the 
Manchester  newspapers  and  trade  directories. 
104. nineteenth  century. 
Against  this  background,  the  simple  fact  of  Pickfords' 
continued  existence  emerges  as  a  factor  of  some  consequence. 
While  most  other  concerns  fell  away  or  left  the  trade, 
Pickfords  were  one  of*only  two  firms  to  survive  throughout 
the  years  under  discussion.  There  is  also  a  further 
criterion  which  distinguishes  Pickfords  from  Hulse  &  Co.  and 
its  descendant.  While  Higginson,  Twiss  &  Co.  were  content 
to  remain  as  road  hauliers,  Pickfords  moved  on  to  the  canals, 
a  lead  which  no  other  land  carrier  in  Manchester  followed 
before  1800.  In  fact  in  1800,  there  were  only  three  carrying 
firms  working  by  canal  from  hanchester  and  both  the  other 
two  28 
commenced  business  specifically  as  canal  carriers, 
During  the  first  twenty  years  of  the  nineteenth  century  the 
number  of  canal  carriers  in  Manchester  expanded  considerablyq 
but  again  nearly  all  of  them  appear  to  have  been  new  firms, 
Not  until  approximately  1813  did  Higginson,  Twiss  &  Co. 
follow  Pickfords'  example  and  adopt  canal  working. 
What  problems  underlay  survival  in  the  carrying  tradeq 
and  what  qualities  were  necessary  to  solve  them?  If.  in  the 
early  stages  of  industrialisation,  it  was  necessary  for  the 
industrial  entrepreneur  to  have  fmanagerial  abilities  and# 
above  allf  the  ability  to  command  and  organise.  11  29  the 
direction  of  a  carrying  concern  would  seem  to  require  no 
less  capabilities,  Long-distance  carrying  had  its  own  range 
28  Henshall  &  Co.,  and  Worthington  &  Gilbex%t,. 
29  B.  F.  Hoselitz  'Main  concepts  in  the  aýnalysis  of  the 
social  implications  of  technical  change'  in  Industrial- 
isation  and  Society,  p  23,  quoted  by  S.  Pollard  The 
genesis  of  modern  management  (1965)  pp  4-5. 
105. of  problems,  Organising  abilities  were  necessary  to 
ensure  regular  services  and  a  constant  flow  of  traffic. 
More  difficult  was  the  problem  of  supervision.  Unlike  the 
manufacturer,  the  owner  of  a  carrying  concern  could  not  be 
at  hand  to  control  all  parts  of  the  business.  Operating 
over  considerable  distancesq  much  of  the  day-to-day  running 
was  inevitable  beyond  his  immediate  control.  As  long  as 
the  business  was  focused  on  one  chief  centre  the  owner  could 
probably  achieve  a  substantial  degree  of  overall  supervision 
and  success.  or  failure  would  depend  primarily  on  his  own 
efforts,  and  abilities.  But  success  could  bring  its  own 
problems  particularly  in  the  form  of  expansion  and  the 
establishment  of  subsidiary  bases  along  the  road.  Each  now 
depot  would  need  its  complement  Of  staff  and  thereby  reduce 
the  self-sufficiency  of  the  owner.  Continued  success  would 
now,  depend  on  more  than  his  own  efforts.  He  would  need  to 
build  up  an  efficient  Organisation,  and  be  able  to  pick  out 
reliable  men  to  operate  itL  at  the  local  level, 
Pickfords  development  possibly  took  the  following  lines. 
In  the  early  days  the  waagons  operated  between  Manchester  and 
London  without  a  permanent  base  in  either  place.  '  Both  Uames 
and  Matthew  Pickford  would  be  able  to  maintain  a  fair  degree 
of  personal  supervision  from  Poynton.  -This  position  began 
to  change  when  promises  were  taken  in  Manchester  from  the 
late  1780s  and  in  London  in  1794.  The  development  of  the 
Castle  Inn  as  a  London  headquarters  marked  an  important 
change,  As  the  collection  and  delivery  of  goods  was 
evidently  now  undertaken  in  London  general  as  well  as  super- 
visory  staff  would  be  required. 
30 
The  leasing  of  warehouses 
30  See  the  evidence  of  William  Wrightv  quoted  below. 
10.6. at  Braunston  and  Coventry  would  add  further  to  the  need  for 
local  staff  while  the  transhipment  of  goods  at  Blisworth 
presented  problems  of  its  own.  Reliable  staff  would  be 
necessary  to  safeguard  against  inefficiency  and  to  secure 
maximum  advantage  from  the  new  opportunities  of  the  canal 
trade. 
Overall  supervision  was  achieved  by  a  division  of 
responsibility.  Matthew  Pi  a  ckford  looked  after  the  Manchester 
end  of  the  business,  leaving  his  brother  Thomas  to  supervise 
the  London  end.  The  management  of  local  bases  could  be 
organised  in  various  ways,  A  depot  might  be  contracted  out 
for-a  given  share  of  the  profits.  Alternatively,  complete 
control  could  be  maintained  by  employing  staff  direct  and 
paying  a  salary.  A  third  possibility  would  combine  these 
two,  that  is,  to  pay  various  forms  of  bonuses,  so  that  a 
local  superintendent  would  have  a  vested  interest  in  his 
depot's  success.  In  days  of  only  postal  cominunication  and 
when  travelling  was  so  unpleasant  as  to  render  regular 
personal  supervision  extremely  arduous,  this  last  policy  had 
a  lot  to  recommend  it.  This  type  of  solution  seems  to 
have'been  adopted  in  London.  One  of  Pickfords'  employees  in 
London,  William  Wrightq  recalled  that 
"A  Mr.  Meakin  found  Portersp  labourv  had 
all  the  Bookings  and  Porterages  ...  and  in 
addition  to  these  charges  he  had  a  percentage.  e 
Mr.  Pickford  from  Market  Street  would  frequently, 
drive  up,  but  seldom  staid  (sic)  long..  his 
sons  would  come  on  Monday,  'return  on  SaturdaY.  "  31 
31  William  Wright,  Junior  to  Joseph  Baxendale  25  May  1852. 
KS/3/5(b),  See  also  chap.  3note  64 
.  Some  elements  of 
Wright's  statement  might  seem  to  imply  that  the  Castle 
had  been  contracted  out.  The  interpretation  adopted  is 
because  the  position  of  Thomas  Pickford  and  his  sons- 
would  seem  to  argue  against  this. 
107. Perhaps  the  same  method  was  also  applied  elsewhere. 
However,  these  problems  were  at  least  adequately  solved, 
For  Pickfords  not  only  survived  but  expanded,  The  development 
of  the  road  haulage  businessq  the  flirtation  with  coaching, 
the  use  of  canalso  all  of  these  suggest  a  degree  of  enterprise 
which  kept  Pickfords  in  the  forefront  of  advance.  The 
tendency  to  write  in  terms  of  Matthew  Pickford  alone,  to 
credit  him  with  these  signs  of  enterprise,  is  to  overlook  any 
part  his  brother  Thomas  might  have  had.  It  is  not  known 
precisely  when  Thomas  Pickford  became  a  partner  in  the  business 
and  settled  in  London. 
32 
The  loigic  of  his'presende  in  London 
is  that  Thomas  acted  in  a  supervisory  capacity.  But  if 
Wright's  comments  on  the  1790S  truly  reflected  Thomas's 
general  attention  to  businesst  his  effective  supervision  may 
have  been  somewhat  limited.  In  March  1799  the  partnership 
was  extended  to  take  in  certain  relations  by  marriage. 
33 
In  terms  of  personal  details  Matthew  Pickford  is  no  more 
substantial  a  figure  than  his  brother.  Throughout  the  period 
32  Harper  Stage  coach  and  mailt  Vol.  ii,  p  126,  says  that 
when  he  was  writing  (published  1903),  a  bill-head  of 
1780  was  still  preserved  which  showed  the  two  brothers  as 
partners.  This  no  longer  survives.  An  unidentified  piece 
of  paper  in  the  King  Sterndale  papers,  KS/7/1,  contains 
the  following  entries:  - 
1770  Thomas  Pickford,  Wagoner  of  Poynton,  and  Margarqt 
Worall  of  Adlington,  3  July  (Their  marriage) 
1781  Margaret,  Wife  of  Thomas  Pickford,  Islingtont  Oct,  ll 
age  32  years  (Her  death) 
Howeverg  Margaret  Worrall  was  buried  in  Prestbury-Churchyard, 
Cheshirej  with  the  other  Pickfordsq  as  'Margaretv  Wife  to 
Thomas  Pickford  of  Adlington.  1  Pickfordst  entry  in  the 
Manchester  directory  for  1781  shows-a  Thomas  Pickford  as 
book-keeper  to  Pickfords'  waaeons  in  London. 
The  Universal  British  directory-1-790,  Vol.  1  p  479  mentions 
'Pickford  &  Co.  '  which  implies  some  form  Of  partnership, 
33  Reference  back  is  made'to  this  in  Partnership  Agreement 
I  Oct.  1800  CHP/7- 
108. all  advertisements  and  similar  references  to  the  firm 
appear  in  Matthew's  name  alone.  The  flirtation  with 
coaching  was  exclusively  hist  and  the  first  approaches  to 
the  Coventry,  Oxford  and  Grand  Junction  canals  are  recorded 
in  his  name.  The  case  for  regarding  Matthew  Pickford  as 
the  main  driving  force  behind  this  stage  of  Pickfords' 
development  rests  on  this  evidence. 
It  is  easier  to  shed  light  on  the  development  of 
Pickfords'  road  haulage  business  than  the  nature  of  the 
traffic  handled.  As  carriers  for  Peter  Stubýs,  Pickfords 
deliveredTiles  "to  customers  in  all  Parts  of  the  kingdom"t 
chiefly  by  waggon*34  Pickford5  also  carried  Samuel  Oldknowls 
muslins  to  London  by  road, 
35  (Two'return  loads  contained 
four  bags  of  Barbados  cotton  wool,  574lbs  in  weight,  and  a 
"piano-forte  packed  up  very  carefully").  In  the  early  months 
of  1786  Pickfords'  waggons  were  bringing  from  Salte  regular 
consignments  of  9200  cash,  In  general  it  seems  that  Pickfords 
carried  whatever  required  transportation;  a  chest  of  tea, 
a  pack  of  goods9  some  deal  timber,  twenty-two  pieces  of 
printed  cloth  were  all  items  stolen  from  Pickfords'  waggons 
1  36 
in  1798  and  1799.  Just  a  few  Years  later  when  one  of 
I 
Pickfords'  drivers  attempted  to  force  a  passage  through  a 
flooded  section  of  road  at  Stony  Stratford,  the  waggon7load 
disappeared  under  the  waterg,  together  with  its  driver  and 
horses;  it  contained 
I 
"besides  various  hosiery  and  other  goods 
a  ton  of  cutlery  from  Sheffieldu 
37 
34  Ashton  Peter  Stubbs  p  91 
35  Un-win  Samuel  Oldknow  and  the  Arkwrighta  espec, 
Chaps.  iv  and  v., 
36  Extracts  in  the  Manchester  MercuEZ  of  these  years  from 
the  reports  of  the  'Society  for  Prosecution  of  Felons 
and  Receivers  of  Stolen  Goods.  ' 
37  Gentleman's  Magazine  Vol,  LXXXIX  (1809)  p  81. 
109, During  Matthew  Pickford's  lifetime  the  business 
expanded  substantially.  He  inherited  only  six  waggons 
and  fifty  four  horses.  At  the  end  of  his  life  the 
business  was  on  a  much  larger  scale.  No  estimate  of  the 
capital  stock  can  be  made  for  1799  but  a  few  years  later, 
in  1803,  as  a  patriotic  gesture  at  the  time  of  Napoleon's 
threatened  invasiong  Pickfords  offered  the  Government  the 
use  of  400  horses,  50  waggons  and  28  boats. 
38 
This  probably 
represented  the  capital  stock  much  as  Matthew  left  it,  and 
is  an  indication  of  the  expansion  which  had  taken  place 
during  his  lifetime. 
39 
Not  only  did  the  business  increase,  it  also  seems  to 
have  been  prosperous.  It  presumably  provided  the  resources 
from  which  Thomas  Pickford  bought  an  estate  at  Market  Streetv 
Flamsteadq  Hertfordshireq  in  1790,  for  E2,400.  He  was  able 
to  make  a  marriage  settlement  of  95,000  in  favour  of  his 
eldest  son  James  and  to  leave  two  separate  legacies  in  his 
will  of  L19000  each. 
4o 
Matthew  Pickford  shared  the  gains 
41 
38  Manchester  Mercury,  12  July  1803.  There  are  multiple 
references  to  this  event.  Similar  offers  were  made  by 
canal  companies  and  others.  T.  Baines  History  of  the 
dommerce  and  town  of  Liverpoolq  P  513;  C.  Hadfield 
British  canals  PP  115-116. 
39  The  only  known  additions  before  1803  were  the  waggons 
and  horses  bought  from  Robert  Clarke  of  Leicester, 
See  Chap.  59  section  2. 
40  Halfpenny  Papers,  Vol.  ii,  part  ii.  I  must  thank  Mr.  E. 
Halfpenny  for  the  use  of  these  papers.  Few  further 
details  of  Thomas  Pickford's  life  are  known.  He  held 
shares  in  the  Worcester  &  Birmingham  canal  (1791),  and 
the  Monmouthshire  canal,  (1799).  He  was  also  active  in 
the  promotion  of  the  Grand  Union  canal.  I  owe  this 
information  to  Mr.  C.  Hadfield.  Thomas  Pickford  ceased  to 
have  anything  to  do  with  the  carrying  business  in  1800 
and  died  in  1811.  His  obituary  in  the  Gentleman's 
Magazinev  Vol.  LXXXI  (1811)  Part  ii,  p'294,  spoke  of  him 
Ts--Ha  man  of  the  greatest  liberality  and  strict  integrity; 
an  affectionate  fatherg  a  generous  friendl  a  useful 
agriculturist;  and  maintained  throughout  life  an  unshaken 
loyalty  and  attachment  to  the  constitution  of  his  country 
both  in  Church  and  State.  " 
41  It  was  probably  in  the  1790s  that  King  Sterndale  Hall, 
Near  Buxtong  Derbyshire  was  bought.  Originally  a  holiday 
housev  it  became  the  family  home. 
110. and  advanced  up  the  social  ladder,  Born  a  Iyeoman,  t  he 
died  a  'gentleman.  '  The  seal  to  a  successful  career  was 
set  posthumously  in  June  1805,  by  a  grant  of  arms  to 
Matthew's  three  children  and  surviving  brother  Thomas, 
which  featured  the  carrier's  horses  and  carrier's  wheel 
and  motto  'Celeriter.  t  In  his  lifetime  Matthew  Pickford 
achieved  for  himself  a  notable  position  in  the  country's 
carrying  trade,  and  he  died  in  August,  1799,  "one  of  the 
most  extensive  proprietors  of  the  carrying  business  in  the 
kingdom.  jj42 
42  Gentleman's  Magazine,  p  Vol.  LXIX,  (1799)  p  815,  The 
Manchester  Mercury,  13  Aug.  and  the  Derby  Mercury, 
15  Aug.  also  reported  his  death.  He  is  buried  in 
Prestbury  churchyard,  Cheshire, 
111. CHAPTER 
YEARS  OF  PROMISE  AND  FAILURE  1800-1817. 1.  An  outline  of  the  business 
After  the  death  of  Matthey  Pickford.  the  remaining 
parties  to  the  partnership  agreement  of  March  1799  continued 
to  run  the  business  for  a  few  months,  Then  in  October  1800 
a  new  partnershipftformed.  Thomas  Pickfordq  brother  of  the 
deceased  Matthew,  retired  and  was  replaced  by  his  sons  James 
and  Matthew  II.  The  sons  of  the  late  Matthew  Pickford  also 
took  their  father's  place.  Matthew's  elder  son,  Thomas  II, 
became  a  partner  immediatelyg  and  provision  was  made  for 
the  younger  boy  Matthew  IIIt  then  aged  17.  The  other  parties 
to  the  previous  agreementq  Jonathan  Higginson  and  the  three 
Vaux  brothersq  continued  as  partners  for  the  time  being, 
So  within  a  few  months  there  was  a  complete  change  in  the 
ownership  and  management  of  the  business. 
The  main  provisions  of  the  partnership  agreement  followed 
the  customary  form  at  the  time.  2 
The  capital  was  divided 
into  the  following  shares:  Thomas  Pickford  II  was  to  have 
nine  sharesp  James  and  Matthew  Pickford  11  four  and  a  half 
shares  eachv  Higginson  three  sharesp  and  the  three  Vaux  one 
share  each.  The  partnership  was  to  last  until  1805  when 
Matthew  III  would  come  of  age.  If  he  should  die  earlier, 
the  partnership  was  to  die  with  him. 
The  name  of  the  firm  was  to.  be  Thomas.  and  James  Pickford 
and  Company*3  It  was  to  appear  on  all  boats  and  waggons  used 
1  Partnership  Agreement,  1  Oct.  1800  CHP/7- 
2  For  comparison  see  the  Carr.  on  partnership  agreements  of 
, 
1759  and  17739  Campbell,  Carron  Companj,  p  21  ff;  also 
the  Hollins-Oldknow  partnership  1785,  Pigott  Hollins 
PP  32-34.1 
3  In  fact  the  name  by  which  the  firm  was  known  varied  greatly. 
The  London  directories  tended  to  use  IM.  &  J*Pickford;  the 
Manchester  directoriesq  after  1805,  IT,  &  M,  &  j,  &.  M, 
Pickford9l  but  almost  every  possible  variation  was  used  at 
different  times. 
112. and  on  all  bills  drawn  in,  the  course  of  trade.  Proper 
accounts  were  to  be  kept  of  all  aspects  of  the  business  and 
a  record  of  all  money  handled  was  to  be  entered  into  the 
appropriate  books.  Each  partner  had  the  right  of  access 
to  accounts  and  books  at  all  times,  On  the  expiry  of  the 
partnership  the  accounts  were  to  be  settled  within  three 
months  and  the  appropriate  shareout  made,  All  rents,  taxes, 
wages, 
-debts 
were  to  be  paid"out  of  the  joint  stock  and  the 
gain  and  profits  therefrom.  "  The  partners  were  to  settle 
any  deficiencyv  in  due  proportion,  out  of  their  personal 
estates. 
Measures  were  taken  to  protect,  the  firm's  interests 
against  individual  partners.  No  partner  was  to  use  the 
, 
firm's  assets  or  credit  for  his  own  purposes  or,  except  for 
Jonathan  Higginsong  to  engage,  in  the  carrying  trade  either 
individually  or  with  another,  In  the  event  of  this  - 
stipulation  being  infringed,  the  partnership  was  entitled 
to  take  any  profits  so  made,  but  all  losses  would  have  to 
be  sustained  by  the  person,  concerned,  Similarly,  when 
security  was  needed  for  any  interest-bearing  loan  used  in 
the  businessv  the  written  consent  of  all  the  partners  was 
required.  The  full  onus  of  responsibility  rested  with  any 
partner  proceeding  unilaterally.  The  partners  were  expected 
to  be  "honest  and  faithful  to  the  others  in  all  their 
business  accounts  and  to  take  their  fair  share  and  concern 
for  the  business  according  to  their  shares.  " 
Particular  posts  in  the  business  were  specified  for 
certain  of  the  partners.  James  Vaux  retained  the  position 
he  already  held  as  'Principal  Clerk  and  Cash  Keeper'  at  the 
113. Manchester  warehouseq  where  he  would  perform  fall  lawful 
and  reasonable  orders  of  Thomas  Pickford  II  for  carrying 
on  the  business  in  Manchester.  '  For  this  Vaux  drew  a 
salary  of  E200,  plus  profits,  and  could  be  discharged  only 
with  the  written  consent  of  the  majority  of  the  partners, 
James  Pickford,  at  a  salary  of  C300,  plus  profitst  filled 
the  same  position  in  Londono  They  were  to  assure,  as  the 
agreement  requiredq  that  monthly  balances  were  drawn  up  in 
Manchester  and  London,  and  the  profits  distributed. 
Matthew  Pickford  11  was  to  be  clerk  to  James  in  London  at 
a  stipend  of  L20O.  ' 
Provision  was  made  for  the  re-allocation  of  shares 
should  any  partner  die  or  wish  to  retire  from  the  business. 
In  the  latter  case,  six  months  notice  had  to  be  given  to  each 
partnerg  after  which  a  final  account  would  be  drawn  up  and 
the  appropriate  division  made.  Lastlyq  provision  was  made 
for  the  arbitration  of  any  disputes. 
The  death  of  Matthew  Pickford,  so  soon  followed  by  the 
retirement  of  his  brother  Thomast  meant  the  loss  to  the 
firm  of  much  of  its  practical  experience.  From  October  1800 
Pickfords  essentially  had  new  managers  as 
Not  that  practical  knowledge  was  totally 
Matthew  Pickford  II  must  have  gained  some 
years  at  the  Castle. 
4 
How  long  they  had 
is  unknown  but  they  were  clearly  regarded 
See'Wright's  evidence,  Chap.  4  P107 
I 
.  well  as  new  owners. 
lacking,  James  and 
benefit  from  their 
worked  in  London 
to  be  sufficiently 
114. familiar  with  the  business'to  be  able  to  take  their  father's 
place.  What  Thomas  and  later  Matthew  Pickford  III  could 
contribute-to  the  management  of  the  business  is  also  unknown. 
The  partnership  agreement  seems-to'imply  that  James  Vaux 
was  to  act  for  Thomas  Pickford  II  in  Manchester,  in  which 
case  Thomas's  personal  involvement  might  have  been  limited, 
Virtually  nothing  is  known  of.  James  Vaux  prior  to  his 
inclusion  in  the  previous  partnership. 
5 
If  his  working 
knowledge  of  the  carrying  trade  extended  only  to  the  eighteen 
months  of  the  previous  partnership,  he  could  scarcely  have 
borne  the  main  responsibility.  Jonathan  Higginson,  -a 
carrier  of  long,  standingg  emerges  as  the  most  experienced 
man  among  the  partners, 
6 
He,  however,  had  other  demands  on 
his  time.  Making  use  of  the  exemption  allowed  him,  he  not 
only  kept  on  his  own  business  of  Higginson,  Twiss  &  Co,,  but 
continued  vigorously  in  business  even  after  the  partnership 
7 
with  Twiss  was  dissolved  in  1813,  Although  it  is  unknown 
5  Matthew  Pickford's  sister  Mary  had  married  a  John  Vaux 
In  1766  and  there  was  a  son,  James,  to  this  marriage  who 
received  a  legacy  of  E5_inFhrtha  Pickford's'will.  A 
James  Vaux  was  a  sponsor  at  the  christening  of  Matthew 
Pickford  III  in  1784.  It  is  not  clear  whether  this  is- 
the  same  James  Vaux  and  indeed  whether  the  John  and  James 
Vaux  of  the  partnership  are  the  same  as  these  two.  It 
is  more  than  likely  that  the  James  Vaux  of  the  partnership, 
who  became  principal  clerk  in  Manchesterwa5  the  son  of 
John  Vaux  and  Mary  Pickford.  But  whether  the  other  two 
Vaux,  John  and  Thomas  were  his  father  and/or  brother  or 
cousin  cannot  be  determined, 
6  Some  difficulty  arises  over  the  person  of  Jonathan  Higgin5on. 
The  earliest  knowledge  of  him  is  his  signature  to  an  advert- 
isement  of  Hulse  &  Co,,  Manchester  Mercury,  25  Oct.  1768, 
and  the  name  continues  to  appear  until  at  least  1817.  Is 
this  the  same  man  throughout,  or  was  there  a  son  of  the 
same  namep  who  perhaps  joined  the  partnership  when  it  was 
reformed  in  1795  as  Higginsont  Twiss  &  Co?,  It  could  have 
been  the  same  man.  Assuming  Hieginson  was  at  least  21 
in  17689  he  would  have  been  70  in  1817.  This  consideration 
is  important  because  it  materially  affects  the  degree  of 
experience  embodied  in  the  partners.  It  is  assumed  here 
that  it  was  the  same  man  throughout. 
7  Dissolution  of  partnershipq  Manchester  Mercury,  29  June,  1813; 
Ibid  16  April  1816  Higginson  advertised  fly-boats  to  London. 
He  is  last  mentioned  in  the  Manchester  directory  for  1817, 
and  presumably  died  or  left  the  trade  before  1819  when  the 
next  directory  appeared* 
llý. just  when  Higginson  retired  from  Pickfords,  it  is  possible 
that  the  firm  did  not  receive  a  great  deal  of  his  attention. 
All  in  all,  thereforeq  the  new  Partnership  might  well  have 
been  relatively  short  of  experienced  managementp  a  factor 
which  would  help  to  explain  later  failures, 
Initially  the  businesS  5GeMS  to  have  done  well  and 
considerable  expansion  took  place.  In  road  haulage  there 
were  two  important  developments.  First  the  carrying  concern 
belonging  to  Robert  Clarke  of  Leicester  was  purchasedq  a 
substantial  increase  in  Pickfords'  capital  stock.  The 
service  operated  by  the  newly  purchased  wageons  lay  between 
Sheffieldt  Leicester  and  London,  an  area  not  previously 
covered  by  Pickfords,  Secondly,  a  few  years  later,  Pickfords 
moved  into  a  new  era  in'road  transport,  with  the  introduction 
of  'fly-vans.  '  These  were  vehicles,  built  on  similar  lines 
to  those  of  stage-coachesp  which  completed  the  journey  between 
Manchester  and  London  in  thirty-six  hours  compared  with  four 
days  or  so  by  waggon,  Canal  conveyance  progressed  steadily, 
if  less  spectacularly,  as  canal  facilities  continued  to  be 
adopted.  '  It  was  the  growth  of  the  canal  trade  which  underlay 
Pickfords'  expansion  during  the  period, 
William  Wright  remembered  these  years. 
111801,  Canal  open  to  Paddington:  first  boat  loaded,,. 
with  cotton...  Warehouse  soon  finished  and  House 
built.  Within  six  months  Stable  built,  One  Horse 
and  Cart  placed  for  West  End:  business  increases  -a 
second  cart  placed  deliver  all  West  of  Fleet  Market.. 
1804.  A  Second  warehouse  built:  horses  increased  at 
Paddinatone 
1807-8.  The  next  wharf  taken...  Trade  increases  ...  18 
The  impression  is  that  of  steady  growth  and  successful  business. 
The  larger  volume  of  traffic  was  handled  with  regularity  and 
KS/2/5/b, 
l16 general  competencev  sufficient  to  draw  favourable  comment 
from  one  contemporary  writer. 
"Mr.  Pickford  has  a  great  number  of  boatsp  which 
proceed  as  regularly  day  and  night  upon  this 
canal  (Grand  Junction)  and  the  other  canals  north 
of  it,  as  the  mail  coaches  do  on  the  roadsq  although 
with  less  expedition...  (the  boats)  arrive  in 
London  with  as  much  punctuality  from  the  midlands  and 
some  of  the  most  distant  parts  of  the  Kingdom,  as 
the  waggons  do.  "  9 
The  extension  of  road  and  canal  services  demanded  extra 
accommodation,  In  1800  the  property  made  over  to  the  new 
partners  included  premises  in  Macclesfield,  Stokeg  Blisworth 
and  Brentfordq  as  well  as  those  in  Manchester  and  London. 
Wharfs  and  warehouses  leased  from  the  canal  companies  would 
also  be  required.  As  the  number  of  towns  in  which  Pickfords 
operated  from  permanent  premises  increased,  there  would  be 
a  proportionate  investment  outlay.  Table  5.1  illustrates 
this  aspect  of  Pickfords'  Growth. 
Each  column  gives  only  a  Partial  picture,  Each  has 
obvious  omis  sions 
10 
and  most  of  the  evidence  refers  to 
northern  towns  only,  Even  sop  allowing  for  variations  in 
recordingg  the  table  provides  a  General  indication  in  physical 
terms  of  the  growth  of  the  business. 
Howeverv  it  was  not  long  before  signs  of  stress  began 
to  appear$  Pickfords  faced  Growing  competition  after  1800. 
9  A.  Rees  The  Cyclopaedia:  or  universal  dictionary  of  arts, 
sciences  and  literature  (1819-20)0  Vol,  VII  article  on 
canals,  written  in  1805. 
10  No  mention  is  made  of  Leicester  until  1818  and  Nottingham 
at  all  where  Pickfords  are  known  to  have  had  premises 
before  1805.  Also  there  is  no  reason  why  Macclesfield 
should  be  omitted  in  column  2,  and  Sheffield  in  columns3and  4. 
lit7. Table  5.1  Towns  from  which  Pickfords'  services  are 
recorded,  1805-1818 
1805-7  1814-12 
Coventry  Halifax 
Derby  Leek 
Hinckleyý  Liverpool 
Macclesfield  Manchester 
Manchester  Rochdale 
Sheffield  Sheffield 
Wigan  Wigan 
1816-17 
Birmingham 
Halifax 
Leek 
Liverpool 
Macclesfield 
Manchester 
Stockport 
Wigan 
Wolverhampton 
1818 
Birmingham 
Coventry 
Derby 
Halifax 
Leek 
Leicester 
Liverpool 
Macclesfield 
Manchester 
Stockport 
Wigan 
Wolverhampton 
Source  Col,  1  Holden's  triennial  directory  (London) 
1805-79  Vol.  2. 
Col.  2  Commercial  directory  (Pigot)  'of  the  North, 
1814-15. 
Col,  3  Commercial  directory  (Pigot)  of  the  North, 
1816-17. 
Col.  4  Commercial  directory  (Pigot)  of  the  North, 
1818* as  the  supply  of  road  and  particularly  canal  services 
increased.  In  Manchester  alone  the  number  of  canal  carriers 
igrew  rapidly.  By  1800  William  Bache  &  Co.  of  Coventry 
had  begun  business  thereq 
11 
to  be  followed  by  many  others, 
In  1813  there  were  seventeen  canal  carriers  in  Manchesterp  of 
whom  five  or  six  catered  for  the  Midlands  and  London  trade, 
The,  continual  growth  of  output  and  trade  and  the  consequently 
increased  volume  of  traffic  was  favourable  to  the  emergence 
of  a  number  of  small  firms  alongside  the  very  few  large 
concerns.  Although  one  of  the  larger  concerns,  Pickfords 
was  still  vulnerable  to  the  competition  of  these  newcomers 
especially  if  slackness  or  inefficiency  of  working  appeared. 
In  a  situation  of  more  traffic  to  be  carried,  more  complex 
traffic  flows  to  be  organised  and  more  depots  to  be  supervised, 
close  attention  to  business  was  of  crucial  importance.  If 
the  chaotic  situation  later  discovered  at  Birmingham 
12 
was 
in  any  way  typicalt  there  was  certainly  a  failure  to  maintain 
a  close  watch  over  local  working. 
There  is  clear  evidence  that  by  1815  Pickfords  was  in 
serious  financial  difficulties.  Propert,  y  at  Paddington  was 
mortgaged  to  secure  debts  to  the  Grand  Junction  company  which 
in  1816  stood  at  914,000.  The  business  was  being  drained  of 
0  r. 
capital.  It  is  not  known  when  orwhat  terms  Higginson  and 
the  three  Vaux  left  the  partnership,  except  that  L8tOOO,  the 
balance  of  L189000p  was  still  owing  to  James  Vaux  after  1817. 
11  This  firm  apparently  began  trading  on  the  canals  in  1797 
Jopsom's  Coventry  Mercury,  7  Aug-1797 
12  See  below  Chap,  6  p15(ff. 
1118. In  addition,  in  May  1816,  James  and  Matthew  Pickford  Ii 
retiredv  taking  with  them  their  joint  capital  of  X259900. 
Neither  the  condition  of,  the  business  nor  the  personal 
fortunes  of  the  remaining  two  Pickford  brothers  were 
sufficient  to  pay  them  off,  They  had  little  option  but  to 
find  fresh  capital.  New  Partners  were  taken  inp  commencing 
from  1  April  1817.  From  that  date,  the  Pickfords  began  to 
lose  control  of  the  family  firm, 
2  Road  transport 
For  a  short  time  after  Matthew  Pickford's  death  an 
interest  in  the  coaching  trade  was  continu6d.  Between 
October  1802  and  June  1803  a  continuous  run  of  advertisements 
by  IPatersonj  Pickford  &  Co.  '  appeared  in  the  Manchester 
13  Mercury  for  the  'Cornwallis'  coach  to  London.  Departing 
every  day  except  Saturday,  the  coach.  "well  lighted  and  guarded 
and  out'one  night  only"  took  a  different  route  out  of 
Manchester  on  alternate  days,  One  day  it  went  by  way  of 
Buxton,  and  by  way  of  Macclesfield  and  Leek  the  next.  After 
1806  there  is  no  mention  made  of  Pickfords  in  such  advertise- 
ments:  this  marks  the  end  of  Pickfords'  association  with 
the  passenger  side  of  road  transportl  well_before  'the  great 
era  of  the  coaching  trade. 
The  purchase  of  another  road  carrying  business,  that  of 
Robert  Clarke  of  Leicesterq  brought  a  number  of  important 
results.  The  stock  in  trade  acquired  comprised  14  broad 
14 
wheel  waggons,  2  narrow-wheel  waggonsq  and.  136  "capital 
13  Manchester  Mercury,  19  Oct.  1802  to  21  June  1803P  Wheeler's 
Manchester  Chronicle  22  Jan.  1803#  Pic.  4/1;  also  Derbj 
Mercury  22  May  1806. 
14  Advertisement  for  the  sale  of  Clarkets  business9  Leicester 
Journal  6  Sept.  1793,  quoted  by  Copeland  Roads  and  their 
traffic,  P  76 
119. seasoned  horses  all  in  full  work,  "  Clarke  had  carried  from 
Leicester  to  London,  Leeds,  Manchester  and  Sheffieldq  although 
his  major  work  seems  to  have  been  on  the  line  of  Sheffield, 
Leicester  and  London. 
15 
This  was  new  territory  for  Pickfords 
and  a  useful  complement  to  the  existing  waggon  services. 
Pickfords  also  bought  Clarke's  warehouses  and  stables  in 
Sheffi'eld  and  Leicesterg  and  the  use  of  his  working  arrangements 
alone  the  road.  Clarke's  base  had  been  at  Leicester  where 
he  had  quite  extensive,  premisest  including  a  wheelwrightfs 
shop  and  a  blacksmith's  shop. 
16 
These  were  a  particularly 
useful  acquisition,  and  Leicester  became  an  important  centre 
of  Pickfords  organisation.  The  new  commitment  in  the  east 
Midlands  was  extended  to  include  Nottingham.  An  agreement 
of  May  1803  with  Robert  Mackley,  landlord  of-the  Black  Boy, 
in  Long  Row,  Nottingham  stated  that  Pickfords  had  recently  built 
on  adjoining  land  "a  warehouse  and  buildings  at  a  considerable 
expense..  to  receive  and  deposit  their  goods  therein  as 
necessary,  ,  17  Pickfords  now  offered  much  more  comprehensive 
road  haulage  facilities  from  London  to  the  north  of  England, 
The  date  of  these  purchases  is.  uncertain.  Clarke  had 
offered  his  business  for  sale  as  early  as  September  1793,18 
but  he  clearly  did  not  find  a  buyer.  By  the  beginning  of 
1802,  howevert  Pickfords  had  taken  over  and  were  running,  Clarkets 
waggons  in  their  own  name.  In  the  February,  Leicester  traders 
were  informed  that,  T.  &.  J.  Pickford  &  Co.  's  fly  waggons  "precisely 
the  same  as  to  time  and  warehouses  at  the  different  townst  as 
15  R.  Weston  The  Leicester  directory  1794.1  must  thank  Dr,  T, 
Gourvish  for  this  and  other  references  concerning  Pickfords' 
activities  in  Leicester, 
16  Bond  between  the  Clarkes  and  the  Pickfords  CHP/8. 
17  CHP/11' 
18  Copeland  Op.  cit.  P  76 
120, their  predecessor  Mr.  Robert  Clarke"  had  been  moved  in  London 
from  the  White-horse  inn  in  Cripplegate  to  the  White  Bear, 
Basinghall  Street. 
19 
The  wording  used  here  would  indicate 
that  the  take-over  had  been  recent.  The  following  year 
Robert  Clarke  and  his  son  entered  into  a  bond  for  C2000  not 
to  re-ent'er  the  trade,  or  use  their  influence  in  anyway  against 
PIckfords  in  the  carrying  trade, 
20 
Arrangements  were  made  to  bring  all  the  waggons  under  one 
working  arrangement.  Clarke  had  operated  from  the  'White  Bear 
in  London  and  owned  substantial  property  there,  including  a 
counting  housev  two  sets  of  stables,  a  warehouse  and  other 
storage  accommodation.  In  May  1803  Pickfords  took  them  on 
a  lease  from  Clarke  although  they  had  already  been  using  them 
since  the  sale. 
21 
The  Manchester  waggons  were  also  moved 
there  from  the  Castle  so  that  all  waggon  traffic  was  operated 
'1  from  the  one  centre.  The  White  Bear  thus  became  the  head- 
quarters  in  London  for  all  of  Pickfords'  road  carrying. 
The  integrated  running  of  the  waggon5  outside  of  London 
brought  Leicester  into  prominence  as  a  new  focal  point  of 
Pickfords'  road  services.  The  waggons  from  Manchester  had 
passed  through  Leicester  for  many  years  past  and  as  the  newly 
acquired  Sheffield  waggons  also  passed  through  the  town 
Leicester  became  an  ideal  staging  point  from  which  to  super- 
vise  all  of  Pickfords'  road  traffic  as  it  came  north  from 
London.  Leicester,  -therefore;  took  on  particular  significance 
for  Pickford5l  organisation  and  became,  with  Manchester  and 
London,  one  of  the  three  places  from  which  the  business  was 
controlled. 
22 
19  Leicester  Journal  26  Feb.  1802 
20  8-HP/8  Bond  of  L2000  25  June  1803 
21  CHP/12  Counterpart  leasev  25  May  1803 
22  This  explains  why  one  of  the  three  new  Partners  in  1817  was 
stationed  at  Leicester. 
121, The  introduction  of  'caravans',  or  tfly-vans'  as  they 
were  later  called,  was  an  important  event.  Technically  these 
were  a  considerable  advance  in  the  construction  of  road 
haulage  vehicles*  They  were  sprung  vehiclesq  much  lighter 
than  the  conventional  waggonst  and  required  only  four  horses. 
Their  similarity  of  construction  to  that  of  the  stage-coach 
underlay  a  later  d  escription  of  Pickfords'  van  as  "a  large 
oblong  vehicleg  like  an  immense  box,  on  springs,  drawn  by 
four  horsesp  with  a  coachman  in  front  and  a  guard  behind.  "  23 
With  fewer  horsesq  the  vans  were  able  to  achieve  much  higher 
speeds  than  was  possible  with  waggons. 
The  need  for  swifter  road  transport  to  and  from  London 
became  more  pressing  from  about  1810.24  The  new  vehicles  were 
a  response  to  this  demand.  They  were  introduced  on  6  July  1814, 
and  provided  a  daily  service  from  London  and  Manchester,  "to 
leave  each  place  at  six  o'clock  in  the  evening,  and  to  deliver 
goods  at  both  places  the  morning  but  one  after.  " 
25 
The  journey 
was  completed  in  thirty-six  hours.  To  achieve  this  the  horses 
travelled  at  a  trotting  pace,  andq  as  with  the  coaches,  several 
relays  of  horses  were  used  along  the  road. 
But  if  speeds  were  highert  so  too  were  charges,  perhaps 
double  the  waggon  rates  for  the  same  class  of  goods.  For  a 
pack  of  goodst  which  could  also  go  by  waggong  the  rates  were:  - 
23  J.  T.  Slugg  Reminiscences  of  Manchester  fifty  years  ago 
(Manchester  and  London  1881)  p  226. 
24  Harper  Staae-coach  and  mail.  Vol.  19  P  135; 
Jackman  Transportation  in  modern  England,  p  309'9  passes 
over  this  development  with  the  barest  mention.  Improved 
road  surfaces  consequent  upon  the  work  of  Telford  and 
McAdam  no  doubt  were  also  a  significant  factor. 
25  Manchester  MercurX9  5  July  1814;  Derby  Mercury,  7  July  1814 
The  notice  was  dated  1  July, 
lz2* From  Manchester  20/-  per  cwt. 
it  Stockport  20/-  per  cwt. 
It  Macclesfield  18/8  per  Owt. 
it  Leek  18/8  per  cwt. 
Ashbourne  18/8  per  cwt. 
Derby  14/-  per  cwt. 
Loughborough  9/4  per  cwt. 
Leicester  9/4  per  cwt, 
Northampton  9/4  per  cwt. 
The  only  comparison  between  these  and  waggon  rates  which 
can  be  made  is  for  the  towns  of  Ashbourne  and  Derby,  A  few 
years  earlier  the  justices'  assessed  rate  from  these  two  towns 
to  London  was  set  at  61-  per  cwt  in  summer  and  7/6d  per  cwt 
in  winter. 
26 
On  this  basis  conveyance  by  van  was  between 
two  and  three  times  as  expensive  as  that  by  waggon.  These 
were  high  charges  indeedt  but  then  a  highly  specialised 
service  was  involved. 
The  van  service  was  intended  to  cater  for  a  particular 
class  of  traffics  that  of  small  parcels.  All  parcels  weighing 
14  lbs  or  under  were  charged  a  special  rate;  above  that  weight 
the  bulk  charges  applied.  Small  parcels  between  London  and 
Leek,  Macclesfieldq  Stockport,  or  Manchester  cost  2/-  under 
six  pounds,  then  3d  per  pound  up  to  fourteen  pounds.  There 
was  also  a  booking  fee  of  2d  per  parcel.  The  delivery  of 
parcels  was  free  of  further  charge,  but  there  was  no  collection 
service;  parcels  had  to  be  taken  to  the  warehouse  by  the 
con51,  gnors. 
26  Derby  Mercury,  7  May  1801,5  May  1803; 
-also  chap-  7. 
123. The  terms  of  responsibility  were  also  clearly  laid  down. 
Full  responsibility  was  accepted  for  goods  in  transit  but 
additional  charges  were  made  for  items  which  contained  a  high 
element  of  risk. 
This  new  business  brought  in  considerable  profits 
27 
and 
the  vans  themselves  became  a  familiar  sight  on  England's  roads, 
Canal  transport 
Between  1800  and  1817  Pickfords'  canal  carrying  business 
expanded  considerably.  Several  new  canals  were  opened  after 
1800,  two,  of  which  were  the  Warwick  &  Birmingham  and  the 
Warwick  &  Napton  canals.  These  were  end-on  canals,  Their 
managements  were  closely  linked  and  both  were  stimulatedq  as 
branch  or  feeder  lines  by  the  building  of  the  Grand  Junction 
I 
canal.  Both  were  formally  opened  on  19  December-1799,  butý 
full  trading  did  not  start  until  March  1800,28  Although  there 
is  some  evidence  that  Pickfords  used  both  the  Warwick  canals 
in  18019 
29 
any  extensive  use  was  delayed  until  ten  years 
latere  in  July  1811  Pickfords  gave  notice  to  the  Warwick  & 
Napton  committee  of  their  intention  to  commence  trading  over 
that  canalq  provided  their  boats  received  the  same  facilities 
as  on  other  canals  used.  The  company  was  only  too  happy  to 
agree.  It  commented  "that  this  committee  are  of  the  opinion 
such  an  establishment  will  be  very  advantageous  to  this  canal 
and  that  they  will  afford  every  means  of  dispatch  that  can 
with  safety  to  the  canal  be  given  thereto.  "  The  Warwick  & 
27  See  chap.  7. 
28  Hadfield  Canals  of  east  Midlands,  p  163  ff. 
29  Two  letters  of  5  April  1801  imply  that  Pickfords  was 
using  them.  WBC  4/1  Letter  Bookq  1799-1801. 
124. Birmingham  company  was  asked  for  its  concurrence  and  assistance 
which  was  readily  forthcoming.  Pickfords  then  approached  the 
Warwick  &  Birmingham  committee  with'6  request  for  premises  at 
Digbeth  junction,  The  required  facilities  were  discussed  in 
some  detail.  In  addition  to  a  wharfp  warehouse  and  stables, 
a  small  house  was  builtt  to  which  was  later  added  a  piece  of 
gardeng  for  Pickfords'  local  agent  there.  These  premises 
c'ost  the  canal  company  about  C1500  to  build,  and  were  let  to 
Pickfords-  at  a  rent  of  C130  pea,  q  that  is  71%  of  the  cost. 
31 
Pickfords  also  applied  to  the  Worcester  &  Birmingham  canal 
company  before  the  canal  was  properly  open  for  traffic,  The 
committee  received  Pickfords'  application  in  July  1814'and 
agreed  to  supply  the  requested  accommodation,  a  wharf  and 
warehouse  at  th6  canal  basin  at  Lowesmere  near  Worcester.  The 
canal  was  open  over  its  whole  length  from  the  beginning  of  the 
December. 
32 
The  main  direction  of  Pickfords'  canal  trafficq  as  with 
the  roadsq  was  to  and  from  London.  In  1800  Pickfords  operated 
a  daily  fly-boat  service  from  Manchester  to  London  althoughq 
as  already  seeng  traffic  was  apparently  not  conveyed  all  the 
way  to  London  by  canal  until  the  Blisworth  tunnel  had  been 
33 
completed  in  1805-  Fly-boat  services  to  London  were  also 
31  Warwick  &  Birmingham  canal  company  minutes  12  Aug., 
1-1ý  Oct-.,  119  13  Nov.  9  9  Doc  1811;  13  Jan.,  9  March  1812. 
WBC  1/9.  This  seems  to  have  been  the  customary  rate  of 
interest  charged. 
32  Worcestdr  &  Birmingham  canal  companv  minutes  28  July  1815, 
3  JulYv  30  Aug.,  1816  WOBC  1/6;  14  Feb,  1817P  WOBC  1/7,, 
Pickfords'  rent  was  71%  of  the  cost  of  constructing  the 
premises. 
33  Manchester  trade  directories  1800  and  1804. 
125 introduced  from  other  towns.  By  September  1801  a  service  had 
been  started  from  Derby,  Boats  departed  two  afternoons  a  week, 
and  picked  up  Goods  en  route  at  Horninglowt  Fazeleyt  Atherstone 
and  Nuneaton.  34  Soon  after  this  Pickfords  began  to  operate 
from  Birminaham, 
35  Some  time  between  1803  and  1806  Pickfords 
acquired  the  premisesq  possibly  the  business  toog  of  the 
Birmingham  Boat  company.  Fly-boats  were  dispatched  daily,  "with 
or  without  loading"  to  Pickfords'  wharf  and  warehouses  at 
Paddington,  A  point  of  interest  is  that  in  Birmingham  Pickfords 
undertook  collection  and  delivery  sex-vices;  customers  were 
normally  expected  to  take  their  Goods  to  the  carrier's  warehouse, 
The  journey  between  London  and  Birmingham  by  fly-boat 
took  four  days  in  1806.  The  journey  to  Manchester  took  seven 
days  but  this  was  later  reduced  to  five,  Pickfords  came  to 
specialise  in  the  fly-boat  trade,  which  catered  for  the  lighter, 
merchandise  traffics  but  there  is  evidence  that  for  a  time  at 
least  the  firm  had  an  interest  in  the  slower  or  'tramp'  trade- 
boats  which  stopped  anywhere  alone  the  way,  Pickfords  were 
operating  some  boats  of  this  type  from  Derby  to  London  in  1801 
and  18029 
36 
althouCh  there  is  no  sign  of  them  elsewhere,  They 
were  stated  to  serve  a  whole  host  of  towns  along  the  way. 
Goods  carried  by  those  boats  were  charged  at  a  lower  rate  but 
wore  consiCnod  to  the  Grand  Junction  company's  wharf  at  White 
Friars,  on  the  Thameaq  and  not  to  Pickfords'  own  canal  head- 
quarters  at  Paddington,  37 
34  Derby  MorcuEZ,  17  Septq  8  Octo  18019  4  March  1802 
35  For  Birmingham,  Dirminpliam  Commercial  Herald  21  April  1806; 
Aris'Dirmingham  Gazette  9  Nov  1807,22  Feb.  1808; 
Chapman's  Birminnham  director;  1803  p  140;  Thomson  & 
Wrirhtson's  triennial  directorX  of-Birminaham,  1808  p,  152, 
Pickfords'  services  do  not  appear  in  the  1803  directory 
but  by  1806  the  firm  had  acquired  the  wharf  which  formerly 
belonged  to  the  Burton  Boat  companye 
36  DerbX  Mercury,  17  Sep.  1801t  4  March  1802 
37  fords  leased  number  1  and  2  wharfs  at  Paddington: 
Minutes  of  goneral  assembly  of  proprietors  and  f-eneral 
committee  5  May  1801  GJC  1/40. 
126. Pickfords'  main  canal  traffic  continued  to  be  that 
between  Londono  the  midlands  and  Lancashire,  but  during  these 
years  some  cross-country  traffic  was  superimposed  on  this 
north-south  patterni  From  1800  Pickfords,  operated  a  daily 
canal  service  along  the  Bridgewater  canal  between  Manchester 
and  Liverpool. 
38 
Some  years  later,  after  the  opening  of  the 
Grand  Union  canal  had-linked  Leicester  directly  to  the  main  - 
canal  networkv  a  service  was  introduced  between  that  town  and 
Birmingham,  A  pair  of  boats  left  Birmingham  every  Thursday 
afternoon'and  travelled  to  Leicester  by  a  round-about  route, 
via  Warwickv  Banbury  and  Oxford  and  arrived'at  their  destination 
the,  next  Monday.  They  returned  the  same  day  and  completed  the 
round  trip  on  the  Thursday  morningg'  ready  to  start  off  from 
Birmingham  again  the  same  afternoon. 
39 
Before  the  Grand  Union  canal  was  built  goods  were  conveyed 
by  Pickfords  to  Leicester  by  an  integrated  road  and  canal  - 
service* 
4o 
The  initial'intention  had  been  to  carry  goods  for 
Leices.  ter  and  district1by  canal  to  Brownsover  wharf  near  Rugby 
on  the  Oxford  canal,  and  thence  by  waggon  to  Leicester,  The 
building  of  the  Ashby-de-la--.  iZouch  canal  offered  a  shorter  road 
38  Manchester  and  Salford  directory  (Bancks)  1800  p  236 
Pickfords  first  appeared  in  Gore's  Liverpool  directories 
in  18039  but  was  not  included  in  the  list  of  canal  carriers 
until  181le 
39  AriýýRjnzljamjjaze-tte  28  Nov.  1814.1  owe  this  reference 
to  Mr.  C.  Hadfield; 
40  See  A.  T.  Patterson.  Radical  Leicester.  a  history  of  Leicester 
1780-1850  (Univ,.  College,  Leicester  1954)  PP  37-8; 
A,  T*Patt  rson  'The  making  of  the  Leicestershire  canals 
1766-18141  Transaction  of  the  Leicester  Archaeological 
Society  Vol.  XXVII  (1951)  T.  J.  Chandler  'The'canals  of 
Leicestershiret  their  development  and  trade'  The  east 
Midlands  Geographer  No.  10  1958'also  WrightsonIs  new 
triennial  directory  of  Birmin;  hjam  1815  P  193* 
1 
127. haul  and  the  canal  committee  successfully  sought  to  attract 
Pickfords'  traffic,  The  committee  decided  to  ask  "Mr,  Pickford 
to  consider  whether  he"might  not  advantageously  to  himself  and 
the  public  in  his  proposed  carriage  of  goods  to  and  from 
Leicester  adopt  as  a  depot  or  meeting  place  for  boats  and 
waggons  out  of  the  following  three  places  on  the  Ashby  canal... 
as  it  appears  to  the  committee  that  one  of  these  three  places 
will  be  a  very  advantageous  meeting  place  in  the  carriage  of 
such  goods.  " 
41 
This  was  two-years  before  the  canal  was-, 
opened  and  says  something  of  the  value  of  Pickfords'  traffic., 
Hinckley  was  chosen  as  the  point-of  trans-shipment  and  the 
Oxford  and  Coventry  canal  companies  agreed  to  help  the  trade 
along  by  co-operating  in  a  toll  reduction  on  all  groceries 
conveyed  between  London  and  Leicester. 
42 
,, 
An  indication  of  the  growth  of  Pickfordst  canal  traffic  I 
is  given  by  the  firm's  tonnage  payments'to  the  Coventry  canal 
company  from  1802  to  1807. 
Table  5.2  -  Pickfordsi'tonnag  e  PaZMents  I  t.  0t.  he  Cove  ntry 
canal  com2any  in  half-3:  ears,  1802-1807, 
- 
31  Aug-28  Feb  28  Feb-31  Aug 
1802-3  L821. 
_9. 
5.  1803  -  C807.  19.  0* 
- 
1803-4 
ýCý625- 
7.  5.  1804  L1618.  14.  2. 
1804-5  C1384.8.  41  1805  "  E1586.  ''0.1  3-. 
18o5-6-  L1794.16.  2.  18o6  92146.  12.  1. 
18o6-7  L25o6.4.  9.  1807  L2170.  13,  11. 
Source:  Memorandum  Book  1802-1808  CVC  4/156 
41.  Minutes  of  pro]2rietors  and  committee  22  Jan.  1802,  ASHC  1/3 
42  Ibid  17  March,  5,19  April  1802;  also  minutes  of  general 
meetings  of  committee  of  proprietors  9  March,  11  May,  1802 
CVC  1/27. 
128. During  these  five  years  Pickfordsl  tonnaGe  payments  tripled 
in  absolute  valuet  a  clear  indication  of  the  increasing  volume 
of  goods  being  carries.  This  same  source  shows  that  Pickfords 
were  by  far  the  largest  users  of  the  Coventry  canal  at  the 
time.,  In  the  first-half  year  for  which  there  are  figures, 
other  payments  recorded  were  Bache  9431.8.6d,  Henshall  &  Co. 
E105.13.  Id.  James  Golby  of  Banbury  E41.15.6d.  Pickfords 
contributed  nearly  twice  as  much  as  Bache,  the  second  largest. 
Predominence  of  Pickfords  over  other  carriers  is  also 
suggested  by  later  evidence.  Following  the  general  practiceq 
the  Coventry  canal  company  made  an  extra  charge  for  boats  using 
its  canal  at  night.  This  could  be  paid  on  each  boat  as  the 
occasion  aroset  or  alternatively  traders  were  allowed  to 
composit  the  charge  and  pay  an  annual  sum  per  boat,  On  the 
Coventry  canal  this  cost  three  guineas.  Boats  so  licenced  were 
allowed  to  pass  without  further  payment,  In  January  1810  the 
licences  for  the  Coventry  canal  were  renewed  for  the  succeeding 
year.  Pickfords  licenced  50  boats#  Bache  15,  Holt  &  Co,  5, 
Twiss  &  Co.  12.43  Assuming  these  figures  reflect  the  relative 
trading  position  of  the  firms  namedq  Pickfords  again  emerges 
as  the  largest  user  of  the  Covent'ry  canal.  It  is  impossible 
to  sayq  howeverg  whether  the  same  ratios  were  repeated  on 
other  canals* 
43  Minutes  of  general  meetings  of  committee  of  proprietors 
9  Jan,  18109  CVC  1/27. 
129. Financial  problems  and  crisis 
Towards  the  end  of  this  periodg  Pickfords  had  run  into 
grave  financial  trouble,  Despite  the  expansion  by  land  and 
water  which  has  been  described,  the  business  was  no  longer 
in  a  healthy  state.  Pickfords  got  into  difficulties  with 
some  canal  companieso  the  Grand  Junction  company  in  particular, 
By  18159  arrears  in  toll  payments  were  so  large  that  the 
committee  decided  that  some  security  was  necessary  to  cover 
them.  Accordingly  Pickfords  mortgaged  to  the  company  all  its 
leases  and  property  at  Paddington,  the  terminus  of  the  Grand 
Junctiont  to  serve  as  security  up  to  E15,000.  If  Pickfords' 
debts  were  not  settled  before  the  leases  expired  then  all 
land,  properties  and  equipment  would  be  re-possessed  by  the 
44 
canal  company  without  further  compensation. 
There  is  no  immediately  obvious  explanation  from  the 
general  condition  of  the  canal  trade  why  Pickfords'  payments 
position  with  the  Grand  Junction  canal  company  should  have 
been  so  bad  in'1815.  Pickfords'  tonnage  payments  to  the 
Coventry  canal  company  (Table  5,2)  would  suggest  that  at 
least  until  1807  the  firm  was  doing  well  enough;  there  is  no 
sign  of  accounts  beine,  overdue.  Similarly  the  volume  of 
canal,  trafficp  as  indicated  by  the  profits  from  toll  on  the 
Bridgewater  canal,  continued  to  rise  through  the  war  years  to 
181.5.45  For  the  Grand  Junction  canal  company,  1814  was  a 
44  Draft  and  final  version  of  the  indentures  between  Pickfords 
and  the  coin-pany  and  proprietors  of  the  Grand  Junction  canal. 
CHP/19  and  20;  also  minutes  of  aeneral  Committeeg  Regents 
canal  companyp  20  Sept.  1815  RGC  1/8. 
45  E,  Richards  James  Loch  and  the  House  of  Sutherland 
1812-1855  (Nottingham  University  Ph,  D,  Thes 
Appendix  I'q  P  334;  F.  C.  MatherAfter  the  canal  Duke. 
(Oxford  1970)  P  359  ff. 
1,30. particularly  good  year,  with  an  "unprecedented  demand  for 
boats  of  every  description.  " 
46 
On  the  face  of  it  the  years 
prior  to  1815  should  have  been  favourable  to  the  canal 
carrying  trade.  From  the  peace  of  18159however,  the  canal 
trade  suffered  from  the  depression  which  affected  the  economy 
as  a  whole.  Profits  on  the  Bridgewater  canal  collapsed 
while  trade  on  the  Grand  Junction  canal  was  so  depressed  that 
the  company  introduced  temporary  toll  reductions  in  an  effort 
to  stimulate  production.  One  carrier  on  the  Rochdale  canal 
failedt  with  debts  of  f.  525,  and  in  May  18169  a  proposal  was 
made  that  the  company  should  itself  undertake  carrying  services. 
There  seems  to  have  been  no  improvement  before  the  spring  of 
1817  at  the  earlieste 
47 
The  post-war  trade  depression  would  help  to  explain  why 
Pickfords'  accrued  debts  proved  difficult  to  shake  off.  Indeed 
things  got  Worse  rather  than  better.  In  1816  the  Grand  Junction 
company  Crew  more  insistent  for  Pickfords'  debt  to  be  discharged. 
in  February  1816  the  company  demanded  security  from  Pickfords 
to  the-value  of  914,  '000.  Pickfords'  account  showed  that  the 
sum  due  between  then  and  May  for  trade  to  the  end  of  January 
that  year  totalled  nearly  L11,300.  Pickfords  offered  to 
liquidate  the  arrears  by  an  immediate  payment  of  ClOOO  and 
then  four  monthly  payments  of  C3000  each.  However  it  seems 
that  this  schedule  was  not  maintained  for  in  the  September  the 
company  demanded  an  immediate  payment  of  C2000  or  the  firm's 
credit  would  be  stopped.  Finally-in  October  1816  the 
committee  ordered  that  failing  the  settlement  of  all  arrears 
46  Hadfield  Canals  of  east  Midlands  p  121. 
47  C,  Hadfield  and  G.  Biddle  The  canals  of  north  west  England 
(Newton  Abbot  1970)  p  281. 
131. or  satisfactory  security  by  the  17th  of  the  month,  credit 
to  Pickfords  would  be  suspended.  A  representative  from 
Pickfords  attended  the  next  meeting  of  the  committee  and 
asked  for  the  order  to  be  delayedl  promising  a  payment  of 
94000  before  the  end  of  the  month.  The  committeet  perhaps 
pinning  its  hopes  on  the  information  that  arrangements  were 
being  made  "for  the  better  carrying  on"  of  the  firm,  agreed 
48 
to  defer  their  order  until  1  November.  Pickfords  thus 
Gained  a  breathing  space:  it  is  not  clear  when  the  company 
finally  got  its  money,  but  payments  were  still  being  made 
in  the  1820s. 
A  depression  in  trade  isq  however,  only  a  part  of  the 
explanation  ) 
for  Pickfords  was  also  suffering  from  a  severe 
internal  financial  crisis.  Already  overtaxed  resources  were 
49 
further  strained  by  a  drain  of  capital  from  the  business, 
James  Vaux  had  U8,000  investedin  Pickfords,  and  when  he 
withdrew  the  Pickfords  could  only  manage  to  pay  him  C10,000. 
The  balance  remained  outstanding  for  several  years.  The 
retirement  of  the  two  Pickford  brothers  in  London,  James  and 
Matthew  11  in  1816  50 
was  a  heavy  blow,  They  took  with  them 
their  joint  capital  of  E25,900.  The  two  remaining  brothers 
Thomas  II  and  Matthew  III  Pickford  continued  alone.  They 
accepted  responsibility  for  the  debts  owed  by  the  former 
partnershipp  but  it  proved  quite  beyond  their  means  to  liquidate 
them.  A-statement  of  the  brothers'  joint,  affairs  in  October 
48  Minutes,  meetings  of  general-committee.  29  Feb.  18169  GJC  1/43; 
Minutes  of  Board,  11  June,  5,27  Sept.,  109  17  Oct.  1816; 
GJC  171,  Similar  debt  problems  were  experienced  with  the 
Birmingham  canal  company,  letter  of  12  June  1817,  BCN  4/373t 
and  with  the  Grand  Union  canal  companyq  Committee  minutes 
7  Jan-  1818ý  GUC  1/2. 
49  Much  of  the  material  on  which  the  following  is  based  is 
,  published  in  Halfpenny  -  'Pickfords'  expansion  and  crises' 
Business  Historyt  Vol.  1.  (1959)  P  117. 
50  The  London  Gazettet  18  May  1816.  The  notice  is  dated  4  April. 
132.  * 1820  revealed  an  excess  of  liabilities  over  assets  of  some 
f-709000.  The  list  of  creditors  did  not  include  the  Grand 
Junction  company  but  other  large  sums  were  owedq  including 
over  E20,000  to  the  Macclesfield  bankersp  Daintry  &  Ryle. 
The  two  brothers  eventually  came  to  terms  with  their  creditors, 
(who  still  included  their  two  cousins  to  the  full  extent  of 
their  capital)ý  by  paying  a  composition  of  ten  shillings  in 
the  pound.  Vaux  insisted  on  the  payment  of  his  Z8tOOO  in 
full. 
51 
The  heavy  burden  of  debt  caused  Thomas  and  Matthew 
Pickford  to  seek  now  partners  who  could  bring  fresh,  capital 
into  the  business,  Their  own  resourcesýwere  quite  insufficient 
to  restore  the  business  to  a  healthy  state.  In  the  third 
generationg  thereforet  the  family  business  faltered.  Its 
fortunes  were  restored  by  taking  in  partners  from  outside. 
So  ended  seventy  years  of  sole  ownership  by  the  Pickford  family, 
51  Letter  of  Licence  between  T,  &  M,  Pickford  and  their 
Creditors,  Pic.  3/1. 
133  e CHAPTER 
A  NEW  BEGINNING:  THE  PROGRESS  OF  THE  BUSINESS  1817-1847 The  thirty  years  between  1817  and  1847  contain  several 
crucial  developments  in  Pickfords'  history  which  make  them  a 
compact,  almost  distinct  period.  The  decision  in  1817  to 
bring,  new  blood  into  the  partnership  from  outside  the  extended 
family  marked  a  decisive  break-with  the  pastq  particularly  as, 
following  this  step,  the  Pickfords  progressively  lost  control 
of  the  business  to  their  new  partners.  At  the  time  of  Thomas 
Pickford's  death  in  1846,  the  family's  interest  had  been 
reduced  to  his  minority  shareholding.  With  his  death,  even 
that  residual  interest  ceased. 
By  18479  howeverv  much  more  than  the  firm's  oimership 
had  been  changed:  the  terms  of  reference  within  which  future 
development  was  to  take  place  had  been  radically  altered.  A 
change  for  the  better  had  been  the  restoration  of  Pickfords' 
fortunes:  the  firm  had  been  pulled  back  from  the  brink  of 
disaster,  By.  the  late  1830s  about  one  hundred  and  fifty 
agencies  were  employed  in  the  business,  and  Pickfords  had  come 
through  as  the  largest  carrying  firm  in  the  country.  The 
attainment  of  this  position  had  required  a'continuous  response 
to  changing  conditions.  The  stability  of  Integrated  road  and 
canal  conveyance,  which  probably  reached  its  peak  in  the  1820s 
was  the  product  of  a  long  period  of  adaptation.  But  it  was 
soon  to  give  way  to  a  state  of  flux,  on  the  advent  of  the  steam 
locomotive. 
Pickfords  was  ready  to  make  the  necessary  responses, 
Accordine  to  Thomas  Pickfordg,  writing  in  November,  1838.  "There 
is  a  great  change  in  the  carrying  business  ...  the  heavy  waggons 
134. being  done  away  with  by  the  Vans  and  now  the  Vans  are 
Edonje 
away  with  by  the  Railways  and  I  SUPP05e  they  will  also  take 
a  good  deal  of  carriage  from  the  canals  ultimately,  but  we 
are  ready  for  both  or  either  as  may  prove  best,  "'  In  the 
event,  however,  the  new  mode  of  transportation  proved  inimical 
to  the  old  system  of  carrying;  in  particular  it  reduced  the 
role  of  the  long-distance  goods  carriers  to  that  of  auxiliary 
to  the  railway  companies.  After  a  brief  but  bitter  struggle, 
Pickfords  acknowledged  its  loss  of  independence.  An  agency 
agreement  signed  with  the  newly-constituted  London  &  North 
Western  Railway  company  in  1847  set  the  conditions  of  business 
development  for  the  rest  of  the  century. 
In  the  new  partnership  of  1  April  1817,  Thomas  and  Matthew 
Pickford  Atained  between  them  only  a  half  share  of  the 
original  family  enterprise.  The  other  half  was  divided  in 
equal  portions  between  their  three  new  partners,  Zachary  Langton 
Joseph  Baxendale,  and  Charles  Inman. 
Who  were  these  men?  From  where  did  they  draw  their 
capital?  How  did  they  come  to  be  connected  with  Pickfords? 
Langtong  Baxendale  and  Inman  were  themselves  inter-related 
both  by  kinship  and  business.  2 
Jointly  they  had  access  to 
Thomas  Pickfordq  15  Nov.  1838,  to  unknown  correspondent. 
KS/2/1(b)o 
2  The  translation  of  family  connections  into  business  structures 
is  a  familiar  feature  of  the  business  scene  of  the  period, 
For  manufacturingo  see  D.  C.  Coleman  The  British  paper  industrX 
149ý-1860  (Oxford  1958)  P  155  ff.,  and  Chap.  IX,  passim,  esp 
p  245  ff;,  for  banking  G,  Chandler  Four  centuries  of  Banking 
Vol.  2p  pp  20-120. 
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Ic substantial  financial  resources  and  enjoyed  the  support  of 
widely  ramifying  business  and  family  connections.  Zachary 
Lanaton,  more  than  twenty  years  the  senior  of  his  two 
associatest  belonged  to  one  of  three,  by  thent  wealthy 
families  -  The  Birleys  and  the  Hornbys  were  the  other  two  - 
who  had  long  been  closely  connected  by  marriage  and  a  variety 
3 
of  business  interests  .  In  the  late  seventeenth  and  early 
eighteenth  centuries  members  of  all  three  families  had  moved 
into  the  small  town  of  Kirkham,  near  131ackpool,  and,  by  way  of 
Interlocking  partnerships  between  themselves  and  established 
tradersq  which  were  invariably  reinforced  by  marriage  alliances, 
soon  became  absorbed  into  the  local  society, 
4 
Their  mutual 
business  intere5tSq  flax-spinningý  sail-cloth  manufacture,  the 
West  Indiap  Russia  and  Baltic  trades#  all  reflect  the  temporary 
prosperity  of  overseas  and  coastal  shipping,  together  with 
allied  industriesq  along  that  stretch  of  the  Lancashire  coast 
during  the  second  half  of  the  eighteenth  century. 
5  So 
successful  were  the  late-comers  that  by  about'the  middle  of 
the  eighteenth  centuryp  they  had  reached  a  position  of  primacy 
in  the  local  economy  and  society. 
The  Lanf;  tons  were  the  first  of  the  three  families  to  make 
their  mark,  They  married  into  the  older  Kirkham  families  and 
3  For  the  succeeding  section,  reference  should  be  made  to  the 
accompanying  chart  of  the  several  families. 
4  See  R.  Cunliffe  Shaw  Kirkham  in  Amounderness,  The  story  o 
a  Lancashire  communitIq  J-Preston  1949)  passim,  and  esp, 
p  692  ff;  H,  Fishwick  The  history  ofthe  parish  of  Kirkham 
7ter  hetham  Society  Publications,  in  the  county  of  Lancas  FG 
Vol.  XCII#  1874);  J,  Porter  History  of  the  Fylde  of  Lancashire 
(Fleetwood  and  Blackpool,  1876)  PP  363-401. 
M,  M,  Schofield  Outlines  of  an  economic  history  of  Lancaster, 
1680-1860  (2  partsv  1946,1951;  Transactions  of  the 
Lancaster  Branch  of  the  Historical  Associationg  Nos.  1  and  2) 
esp.  Part  1  1680-1800,  Chaps.  III-VI. 
136. they  were  much  less  heavily  inter-married  with  their  business 
colleagues  than  the  Birleys  and  Hornbys  were  with  each  other. 
In  businessq  however,  the  connections  were'much  tighter. 
The  partnership  of  John  Langtong  Zachary  Langtonts  grand- 
fatherg  with  John  Birley  and  Thomas  Shepherd  dated  from  the 
early  eighteenth  century  and  introduced  flax  manufacture  into 
Kirkham. 
6 
Zacharyts  fatherg  Thomas  Langton,  continued  the 
connectiong  while  engaging  in  the  Baltic  trade  to  some  extent 
on  his  own  account.  Zachary  himselfg  the  third  son,  pursued 
an  independent  codrse  by  going  off  to  London  where,  by  about 
1786,  he  was  in  business  in  his  own  name  as  a  dealer  in 
7 
Manchester  goods. 
Even  in  Londont  however,  he  remained,  firmly  linked,  for 
business  purposes,  with  his  Lancashire  connections,  and 
retained  an  interest  in  the  affairs  of  his  home  town. 
8 
.6 
Porter  OP-ci  -P  392 
11  7  It  is  not  known  exactly  when  Zachary  Langton  began  business 
in  London, 
, 
There  is  mention  of  a  'John  Langtong  Linen 
Draperg  of  Cheapsidet  in  Baileyts  Western  and  Midland 
directory  1783  p  94,  who  could  possibly  have  been  Zachary's 
elder  brother;  but  if  so  a  family  deed  of  settlement, 
Shaw  Opecito  p  6949  of  1796,  following  their  father's  deathq 
would  place  John  back  in  Kirkham.  In  the  records  of 
Cardwellq  Birley  &  Hornby  (John  Rylands  Libraryt  English 
MS  1199/1)9  entries  appear  in  the  name  of  Leigh  and  Langton 
in  1785,  and  in  the  name  of  Zachary  Langton  alone,  from  1786 
onwards.  Baileyls  London  director  Y  1790  lists,  p  146t 
tLanaton  Zacharyq  Manchester  Warehouseq  63  Bread  Street, 
Cheapside".  See  also  Universal  British  directory  Vol-*I, 
(1st.  ed.  2nd.  issue,  1790)  p  207. 
8  Between  1794  and  1803  regular  donations  were  made  to  the 
girls'  charity  school  in  Kirkham  by  'Mr,  Zachary  Langton  of 
LondonIq  Shaw,  OP-cit.  Pp  542-3.  Againg  in  1816,  Langton 
joined  with  his  kinswoman  Mrs.  Mary  Bradkirk  in  investing 
C320  tin  the  Navy  five  percents',  the  income  of  which  was 
to  be  used  for  the  poor  people  of  Kirkham.  Porter  Op.  cit. 
p  401;  Fishwick  Op.  cit.  p  162. 
137- Within  a  short  time,  the  Langtons  seem  to  have  lost  their 
position'in  Kirkham  to  the  Birley  family.  The  latter,  with 
their  multifarious  family  and  business  connections  over 
three  or  four  generations,  fill  a  central  place  in  establishing 
the  interlocking  pattern  of  relationships  under  discussion 
and  explainine  the  association  of  the  three  new  members  of 
the  Pickford  partnership. 
John  Birleyt  originally  a  West  India  merchant,  established 
the  family  in  the  social  and  industrial  structure  of  Kirkhamp 
but  it  is  his  second  son,  Richard,  who  is  important  here. 
Richard  Birleyp  presumably  with  his  fatherts  money  to  draw  on, 
moved  to  Blackburn  whereq  in  partnership  with  Richard  Cardwell, 
he  founded  an  important  cotton  firm.  Marriage  ties  no  doubt 
eased  the-way  for  further  finance,  the  investment  in  1784  of 
L109000  by  Birley's  brother-in-law,  Thomas  Hornby,  who  joined 
the  firm  as  a  sleeping  partner,  Marriage  tiesq  toog  serve,  ' 
to  introduce  the  second  of  the  three  partnersp  Joseph  Baxendale 
whop  in  1815t  married  Birley's  younger  daughterg  Mary.  By 
his  marriageg  Baxendale  gained  entrance  to  the  widely  spread 
Langton-Birley-Hornby  nexus.  Joseph  Baxendale  borrowed  from 
his  wife's  trustees  the  C89000  he  needed  to  buy  his  share  in 
Pickfords, 
9 
-t  The  firm  of  Cardwellt  Birley  Hornby  Is  itself  of  some 
considerable  importance  in  elucidating  this  complex  framework 
9  Joseph  Baxendale  to'-Joseph  Hornby  Baxendale923  March  1868 
F.  P. 
1  138. of  relationships.  Surviving  records  of  the  Blackburn 
concern  suggestthat  it  was  an  important  source  of  supply  for 
Zachary  Langton's  London  warehouse.  Indeed  Langton  was  even 
more  deeply  committed,  since  in  1793  Birley,  Cardwell  &  Co,, 
in  conjunction  with  other  members  of  the  Langton  and  Birley 
familie5q  and  a  number  of  Blackburn  men,  including  the 
Fieldenst  stood  surety  for  a  loan  of  E15,000  to  Langton  by 
10 
a  group  of  London  merchants.  Although  Baxendale  had  no 
such  direct  links,  it  is  likely  that  he  was  acquainted  with 
Birley,  Cardwell  &  Co.  9  for  some  time  before  his  marriage. 
The  London  Warehouseman,  Samuel  Croughton,  with  whom  Baxendale 
first  entered  upon  business  lifO9  was  also  a  customer  of  the 
firm.  '  This  connection  continued  in  Baxendale's  subsequent 
partnership  with  Charles  Swainson  in  a  calico-printing  business 
at  Bannister  Hallv  near  Preston.  It  was  possibly  through 
his  partner  that  Baxendale  came  to  know  the  Birley  family 
directly,  for  Swainson's  sister  was  married  to  William  Birley, 
the  first  cousin  of  Mary  Birleyv  Baxendale's  wife. 
Mention  of  Charles  Swainson'leads  directly  on  to  Charles 
Inmang  the  third  of  the  new  entrants  to  Pickfords  in  1817; 
Inman  and  Swainson  were  first  cousins.  Nothing  has  been 
discovered  of  Inman's  earlier  lifeg  and  he  is  much  less  firmly 
placed  to  the  main  pattern  of  relationships  developed  here 
I- 
10  John  Ryland5  Library,  Eng.  MS  1199/1  p  238b;  the  bond 
wa5  cancelled  in  1813. 
1399 than  either  Langton  or  Baxendale. 
11 
His  grandfather's 
death  in  Kingston,  Jamaica,  hints  at  some  concern  with  the 
West  India  trade,  like  the  first  John  Birley,  but  beyond  that 
only  his  connection  with  Lancasterg  Baxendale's  home  town, 
is  known. 
The  Pickfords'  new  partners  can  be  placed  in  their 
business  and  social  setting,  but  how  they  came  to  be  connected 
with  the  Pickfords  in  the  first  place  remains  a  puzzle, 
Nothing  in  the  PickfOrd  or  Baxendale'family  papers  throws  any 
direct  light  on  this  vital  question,  It  is  possible  that 
the  link  was  through  the  firm  of  Birleyv  Caldwell  &  Co, 
The  name  IM.  Pickford'  appears  in  the  firm's  ledger  accounts 
for  17979  and  again  the  following  year,  C40  to  the  credit  of 
IM,  Pickfordlq  appears  in  the  entries  under  'money  on  interest'- 
12 
Between  1798  and  1813  there,  is  a  gap  in  the  books,  but  from 
1813  through  to  the  1820s  similar  entries  recur.  Obviously  no 
great  stress  could  be  put*on  this  evidenceg  and  it  still  leaves 
the  essential  'why'?  and  'how'?  untouched.  Possibly  Pickfords 
did  some  carrying  for  the  Blackburnýfirm,  perhaps  delivering 
Langton's-,  supplies  in  London,  Over  the  years  the  two  sides 
might  have  acquired  a  deeper  knowledge  of  each  other,  so  that 
Pickfords  were  not  approaching  complete  strangers  in  their 
search  for  now  capital*  This  conjecture  would  at  least  be 
consistent  with  the  type  of,  intermediary  role,  as  outlined, 
11  Inman  seems  to  have  possessed  smaller  means  than  Langton 
and  Baxendale.  This  is  suggested  in  a  letter  of  Inman  to 
H.  H.  Birleyt  30  June  1821,  F.  P.  in  which  he  draws  a  contrast 
between  Langton  and  Baxendale  as  'men  of  property'  and 
himself  -  "what  I  have  is  chiefly  borrowed.  "  The  Swainsons 
also  show  a  whiff  of  the  West  India  trade;  Thomas  Swainson 
a,  -great-uncle  of  Charles,  died  in  Kingston  in  1786. 
12  John  Rylands  Libraryo  English  MS  11C19/2. 
1-4o. that  the  Blackburn  firm  had  in  the  relationships  between 
Langton,  Baxendale  and  Inman  themselves.  It  is  also 
supported  by  the  content  of  a  letter,  of  March  18179  between 
the  two  Pickfords  who  had  already  left  the  partnership,  which 
shows  that  negotiations  on  behalf  of  the  new  partners  were 
being  conducted  by  'Mr.  Birley. 
13 
Once  agreement  in  principle  had  been  reached  two  matters 
required  particular  attention,  the  transfer  of  the  assets  from 
the  'old'  to  the  'new'  firm#  and  the  terms  on  which  the  new 
partnership  would  do  business.  14 
On  both  of  these  countsp 
Langton  and  colleagues  sought  to  indemnify  themselves  against 
any  responsibility  for  the  Pickfords'  accumulated  past  debts 
and  thus  to  secure  a  fresh  start, 
All  the  four  Pickford--  cousins  were  concerned  in  the 
arrangements  transferring  the  property  and  stock  of  their  old 
partnership  to  the  new  enterprise.  James  and  Matthew  Pickford  II, 
although-retired  from  the-fIrm  were  presumably  drawn  in  because 
the  inability  of  Thomas  and  Matthew  Pickford  III  to  repay  the 
capital  owed  to  their  cousins-conferred  on  the  latter  an 
entitlement  to  be  represented  in  any  proposal  which  might 
materially  affect  the  chances-of  their  debt  being  settled.  The 
main  requirement  was  to  secure  an  agreed  valuation  of  Pickfords' 
assetsp  to  serve  as  the  basis  for  their  transfer  and  thus  to 
determine  the  relative  share  payments  to  be  made  in  the  new 
enterprise.  The  original  intention  to  have  an  independent 
13  James  Pickford  to  Matthew  Pickford  11  24  March  1817,  quoted 
by  Halfpenny-9  11  Tickfordst:  expansion  and  crisis",  Business 
Historyo  Vol*I  (June  1959),  p  119.  The  'Mr.  Birley'  mentioned 
was  possibly  Hugh  Hornby  Birleyq  Baxendale's  brother-in-law, 
14  As  settled  by  two  documents,  on  which  the  following  is  based. 
(1),  Draft-Agreemento  1  April  1817,  assigning  Pickfords' 
assets  to  the  new  partnershipq  Halfpenny  Papers.  (2)  Draft 
Partnership  Agreementt  1  April  1817,  CHP/25,  For  ease  of 
referencet  Pickfords  prior  to  1  April  1817  is  referred  to 
as  the  told'  firmt,  and  thereafter  as  the  'new'  firm. 
14-1. valuation,  by  an  'indifferent  personIq  was  not  carried  out, 
and  in  its  place  a  pro  forma  valuation  of  E48,000,  as'estimated 
by  James  and  Matthew  Pickford  II,  was  accepted.  On  this  basis, 
and  with  a  continued  indemnity  for  the  debts  of  the  told' 
firm,  the  transfer  of  assets  was  agreed, 
The  Partnership  agreement  determined  the  capital  shares  to 
be  subscribedp  half  by  Thomas  and  Matthew  Pickford,  in  equal 
parts9  half  by  the  other  three  partners,  also  in  equal  parts. 
Each  partner  received  an  annual  salary  of  C500  and  five  per  cent 
on  his  capitalp  which  was  to  be  the  extent  of  his  drawings  on 
the  firm.  All  distributed  profits  were  to  be  re-invested  and 
could  only  be  withdrawn  by  express  agreement  of  all  the  partners, 
Any  misuse  of  funds  was  penali'Sed  by  a  fine  of  U,  000  and 
expulsion  from  the  partnership.  Such'strict  measured  to 
defend  a  firm's  finances  were  common  at  the  time,  but  seemingly 
a  novel  arrangement  'in  Pickfords.  Customary  measures  were 
also  taken  to  secure,  on  the  death  of  a  partner,  the  interests 
of  both  the  deceased  and  surviving  partners,  The  firm  was  to 
trade  under  the  name  of  T.  &  M.  Pickford  &  Co.  in  Manchester, 
and  Messrs*  Matthew  Pickford  &  Co,  in  London.  15 
The  text  of  the  agreement  shows  that  Manchester  was  still 
regarded  as  Pickfords'  headquarters;  all  accounts  were  to 
be  kept  there,  all  settlements  and  payments  made  there. 
Responsibility  for  the  Manchester  end  of  the  business  was 
allocated-jointly  to  Thomas  P'ickford  and  Joseph  Baxendale. 
In  London  Matthew  Pickford  and  Zachary  Langton  were  in  control, 
and  Charles  Inman  took  up  station  at  Leicester,  No  precise 
1.5  The  London  Gazette  8  April  18179  p  872, 
142. allocation  of  management  duties  was  madet  perhaps  a  dangerous 
omission.  It  seems  that  in  practice  each  partner  supervised 
the  daily  running  of  his  own  branch,  but  overall  management 
control  seems  to  have  been  left  with-the  Pickfords. 
The  final  question  to  be  settled  was  the-accumulated 
trading  debt  of  previous  partnerships,  The  bulk  of  such 
debts  remained  the  continued  responsibility  of  the  two  Pickford 
brotherst  and  they  were  aided  by  their  new  colleagues  only  to 
the  extent  of  E10,000,  part  of  a  debt  owed  to  Wilsont  Crewdson 
&,  Co,  g  the  Kendal  bankers,  This  LlOtOOO  was  secured  by 
mortgages  on  Pickfords'  premises  in  Manchester,  London  and 
elsewhere,  and  thus  directly  impinged  on  the  new  partnership, 
Consequently  Langtong  Baxendale  and  Inman  joined  with  the 
Pickfords  to  secure  this  part  of  the  loan  by  a  joint  bond  and 
to  pay  interest  until  it  was-paid  off  in  three  years  time. 
Even  so,  there  were  strings,  attached;  this  accommodation. 
.  _ýwas 
to  be  taken  as  their  purchase  of  half 
Pickfords'  goodwill,  itself  valued  at  E10,000, 
Lack  of  money  had  almost  certainly  been  the  critical 
force  impelling  Thomas  and  Matthew  Pickford  to  seek  new  capital, 
and  in  approaching  Lanoton  and  associates  they  hado  for  reasons 
outlined  abovev  undoubtedly  chosen  well.  It  was  not  to  be 
expected  that  the  arrival  of  fresh  funds  would  dispel  all 
difficulties  overnight.  Indeed  the  financial  situation 
remained  not  only  pressing  but  probably  deteriorated  even  further. 
Without  in  any  way  suggesting  any  dishonest  dealings  -  it  is 
likely  that  the  Pickfords  simply  did  not  know  how  heavily  in 
I 
debt  they  were 
16 
-  Langton  and  his  colleagues*probably  joined 
16  For  examplep  Zachary  Langton  to  Hugh  Hornby  Birley,  29  June 
1821  commenting  on  the  great  reserve  with  which  Thomas  Pickford 
had  revealed  the  real  state  of  his  affairsq  mentions  "the 
great  degree  of  incorrectness  with  which  such  states  have  at 
various  times  been  brought  forward,  " 
143. Pickfords  in  the  belief  that  they  were  investing  in  a  basically 
sound,  viable  concern  which  needed  only,  the  injection  of  their 
capital  to  restore  it  to  a  profitable  trading  position.  They 
certainly  had  not  expected  to  discover,  as  they  soon  didl  that 
Pickfords  was  virtually  bankrupt. 
A  few  surviving  letters17  exchanged  between  Langtont 
Baxendale  and  Inman,  chiefly  dating  from  1817  to  18209  show 
that  cash  was  a  continuous  problem.  Margins  were  so  tight 
that  failure  seemed  as  certain  as  the  next  dawn.  In  November 
1818  Langton  reported  to  Baxendale  "I  have  now  to  say  that 
besides  the  U9000  which  you  direct  me  to  advance  ...  there  has 
come  today  from  Liverpool  L5009  and  as  much  from  Manchester, 
This  keeps  the  Wolf  from  the  door  today  and  tomorrow...  (and) 
enables  me  to  pay  C500  borrowed  yesterday,  "  This,  however, 
was  only  a-temporary  respite;  "although  the  Wolf  is  not  quite 
so  near,  yet  as  he  may  again  approach  there  can  be  no  harm  in 
preparing  to  receive  him,  "  18 
Aýlittle  earlier  Inman  had  been 
anxious  to  discover  whether  they,  had  the  resources  to  meet 
some  C1,500  worth  of  bills  due  within  a  few  days.  19 
Apparently 
on  thatq  as  on  other  occasionsq  accommodation  was  found  somewhere. 
The  provision  of  daY  to  day-finance  seems  to  have  been 
the  concern-of  Langton  and  Baxendale  althought  because  of  the 
limited  nature,  of  the  evidence,  the  Pickfords  cannot  be 
excluded,  from  having  had  any  share  in  this,  20 
17  Most  of  these  are  in  the  Baxendale  papers  at  Framfield  Place, 
but  one  or  two  are  at  Pic  4/27.  They  were'exchanged  between 
the  three  partnersq  and  thus  concentrate  on  their  position 
in  Pickfords.  There  are  only  one  or  two  letters  of  Thomas 
Pickford  at  Kings  Sterndale  which  are  relevant  to  these 
years, 
18  Langton  to  Baxendale,  28  Nov.  1818.  Pic  4/27. 
19  Inman  to  Langton,  2  May  1818  F.  P. 
20  For  examplep  a  brief  reference  in  Langton  to  Baxendale,  27  Nov. 
1818  suggests  that  Matthew  Pickford  was  active  in  securing 
short-term  funds. 
144. Thirty  years  a  London  merchantq  Langton  would  presumably  have 
his  contacts  in  the  discount  houses.  Baxendale's  position  in 
Manchester,  still  Pickfords'  headquarters,  would  inevitably 
Involve  him  in  cash  matters,  and  his  main  concern  was  apparently 
to  supply  the  cash  and  credit  needs  of  the  London  office. 
Outside  of  Londong  Baxendale  seems  to  have  used  the  Kendal 
bankers,  Wilsong  Crewdson  &  Co,  p  who  had  been  the  Pickfords' 
bankers  also.  It  would  be  surpris'ingt  however,  if  Langton  and 
Baxendale  failed  to  tap  the  non-institutional  money  sources, 
available  to  them  by  virtue  of  their  family  connectionso 
especially  for  their  medium  term  capital  needs,  The  loan  to 
Pickfords  of  92000  by  the  Hornby  family  for  a  twelve-month 
period 
22 
is  unlikely  to  have  been  unique, 
In  view  of  the  scale  on  which  Pickfords  was  now  operatine  - 
there  were  fifty-six  agencies  in  March  1818  -  working  Costs 
must  have  been  high,  requiring  a  comparable  degree  of  liquidity. 
Canal  tonnage  payments9  road  tollsp  contractors  charges,  feed, 
wagesq  all  were  recurrent  expensesq  requiring  a  ready  supply 
of  cash  or  bills.  'When  money  was  scarce,  it  had  to  be  rationed* 
"Cash  matters  have  due  attention  but  do  not  pay  the  Grand 
Junction  canal  account  on  the  first  lest  you  may  want  the  money 
for  the-following  days'  payments,  "  23 
Cannal  tonnage  payments 
seem  to  have  been  particularly  troublesome,  as  the  re-formed- 
partnership  found  itself  called  upon  to  settle  the  balance  of 
accounts  standing  due  from  the  old  firm.  At  one  time  the 
21  Several  of  Baxendalels  letters  to  Langton  or  the  London 
office  (the  Castle)  refer  to  the  arrangements  he  had  made 
in  this  respect* 
22  Langton  to  Baxendale  1  Jan.  (1819-21,  precise  date  uncertain) 
23  T.  &  M.  Pickford  &  Co.  (Baxendale)  Manchester  to  Messrs. 
Matthew  Pickford  &  Co.,  London,  25  Jan.  182  0.  F.  P. 
145. the  Birmingham  canal  committee  threatened  to  withdraw  Pickfords, 
credit,  but  satisfactory  terms  were  negotiated  with  both  them 
and  the  Grand  Union  canal  company. 
24 
Relations  with  the  Grand 
Junction  committee  were  less  happy  and,  although  no  explanatory 
details  survivep  Baxendale  for  one  thought  that  the  canal 
company  had  acted  pretty  poorly  towards  them.  "You  know  not 
how  much"t  he  wrote  to  Langton  in  1820,  "how  very  much  I  regret 
your  transaction  with  the  Grand  Junction  canal  company.  I 
would  have  seen  them  beyond  the  Atlantic  rather  than  have  paid 
them  one  half.  As  to  their  shabbiness  and  meanness  it  is  upon 
a  par  with  the  Rochdale  canal  companyp  than  which  none  can  be 
worsee  There  are  some  companies  that  really  do  act  honourably..  "  2 
.5 
The  need  for  liquidity  to  meet  current  expenditure  had 
to  be  combined  with  the  long  term  financing  of  fixed  investment, 
especially  in  boats  and  premises  for  the  canal  trade,  This 
would  demand  delicate  judgment  in  the  allocation  of  limited 
resources  between  the  two  objectives,  both  of  which  were 
necessaryg  but  raised  competitive  claims  in  the  immediate  short 
rune  Over-commitment  in  either  direction  would  have  been 
equally  damaging,  It  is  not  known  how  the  reconciliation  was 
madet  but  Baxendale  for  one  showed  himself  aware  of  the  essential 
problem.  Pickfords  was  advanced  C5,000  by  the  Regents  canal 
company  as  an  inducement  to  remove  its  canal  headquarters  from 
Paddington  to  the  company's  own,  more  central,  terminus  at  City 
road  basin. 
24  Birmingham  canal  company  to  Pickfords,  12,30  June,  23  July 
1817,  Copy  Letter  Book  *  BCN  4/3739  1817-1822;  Grand  Union 
canal  companyt  Board  Minutes  7  Jan.  1818,  GUC  1/2. 
25  Baxendale  to  Langton,  15  Feb,  1820  F.  P. 
14,6. When,  in  the  course  of  1820,  new  buildings  were  being  erected 
preparatory  to  the  canalls,  opening  at  the  end  of  the  year, 
Baxendale  counselled  against  exceeding  the  sum  allowed  by 
the  canal  company  until  the  next  stock-takine  clarified  the 
firm's  position:  "so  very  large  (a  proportion)  of  our  property 
is  sunk  in  premises  that  we  must  be  particularly  cautious  in 
our  proceedings;  "  it  was  necessary  to  "have  as  large  a  capital 
(at  hand)  as  possible  to  meet  any  contingency  that  may 
26 
arise&" 
After  four  years'  tradingg  finance  was  still  pressing. 
In  September  1820  Baxendale  was  still  urging  the  London  office 
1127  to  exert  all  efforts  "to  get  in  every  pound  you  can  Progress 
had  apparently  been  slight,  and  the  response  to  the  additional 
capital  small.  Indications  are  that  Pickfords'  performance 
was  felt  to  have  been  inferior  to  that  of  their  competitiors. 
In  1819  Bache  &  Co.  was  conveying  such  a  quantity  of  goods  that 
Thomas  Pickford  found  inexplicable  and  "very  astonishing.  " 
28 
An  investigation  of  the  design  and  capacity  of  Bache's  boats 
found  them  to  be  in  no  way  superior  to  Pickfords'  own,  and 
concluded  that  if  they  carried  larger  loads  than  Pickfords'  boats, 
it  was  "owing  to  circumstances  wholly  unconnected  with  their  size 
and  construction.  1129  It  would  be  POS5ible  only  to  Guess  at 
the  causes  of  this  sluggishness.  Surviving  business  corres- 
pondence  shows  Langton,  Baxendale  and  Inman  actively  supervising 
their  own  sections  of  the  business,  but  there  is  no  evidence 
26  T.  &.  M.  Pickford  &  Co.  (Baxondalo)  Manchester  to  Messrs 
Matthew  Pickford  &  Co.,  London,  9  Sept.  1820  IF.  P. 
27  Baxendale  to  Messrs  Matthew  Pickford  &  Co.  9  London  21  Feb,  1821; 
this  is  the  last  of  the  surviving  letters 
28  Thomas  Pickford  to  Joseph  Baxendale,  7  Jaý,  1819/20  KS/2/5(a) 
29  T.  &.  M.  Pickford  &  Co.  9  Manchester  (?  to  London)  12  Aug.  1819, 
F.  P. 
147. as  to  the,  condition  of  the  total  concern.  Decisions  affecting 
overalll  operations  seem  to  have  been  left  to  Matthew  Pickford 
in  London. 
30. 
Since  Langton  and  his  colleagues  were  newcomers 
to  the  carrying  trade  it  was  fair  policy  to  leave  such  matters 
to  their  experienced  partners.  In  so  far  as  Pickfordst  real 
troubles  in  1817,  howevert  extended  beyond  temporary  financial 
difficulties,  to  the  management  capability  of  the  Pickfords, 
reliance  on  their  judgement  In  respect  of  routine  working  only 
continued  the  situation  which  had  ended  in  crisis. 
The  new  partnership  found  that  despite  its  indemnity  it 
could  not  escape  involvement  in  the  two  Pickfords'  accumulated 
debts,  Some  overdue  canal  accounts  from  the  previous  partnership 
had'had  to  be  accepted  and  paid.  Towards  the  end  of  November, 
1818,  Langton  was  horrified  to  discover  the  critical  state  of 
the  Pickfords'  indebtedness.  Between  the  first  and  fifth  of 
Decemberv  1818ý  they  were  liable  for  over  C59300  owed  to  Dainty 
&  Co,  q  of  Macclesfield  and  Praeds.  "Since  yesterday",  he  wrote 
to  Baxendaleq  he  had  "looked  at  their  situation  as  so  extremely 
critical"  that  he  had  taken  legal  advice  as  to  what  position 
to  adopt  in  the  event  of  a  "blow  up".  LanctQn  was  clearly 
shocked;  the  trouble  was  that  "what  so  much  concerns  them  I 
canno  -t  look  at  as  a  matter  of  indifference  to  us.,, 
31 
This 
indeed  was  the  crux  of  the  matter.  If  the  Pickfords  were  simply 
abandoned  to  their  fate,  the  firm  would  be  brought  down  in  the 
crash,  and  themselves  with  it.  It  was  thus  in  their  own  interest 
30  Again  it  is  important  to  enter  a  caveat  about  the  exclusive 
nature  of  the  evidence,  The  letters  show  both  Inman  and 
Baxendale  putting  up  various  suggestionsq  on  which  the 
decision  was  left  to  Matthew  Pickford  * 
31  Langton  to  Baxendale,  27  Nov.  1818,  F:  P. 
148. to  bale  out  the  Pickfords.  Baxendale  had  in  factq  already 
suggested  to  Langton  the  advisability,  for  their  own  saket  of- 
helping  out  the  Pickfords  if  this  would  finally  clear  their 
debts. 
32  However,  far  more  substantial  assistance  was  needed 
than  the  moderate  sum  Baxendale  had  envisaged.  The  final 
position  is  briefly  summarised  by  two  documents.  The  first  is 
an  estimate  of  the  assets  and  liabilities  of  the  loldt  firm 
drawn  up  by  Matthew  Pickford  III  in  October  1820,  which 
revealed  a  deficiency  of,  about  C70  1000,, 
33 
The  second  document 
is  a  Letter  of  Licence,  dated  2  April  18210  which  declared 
Thomas  and  Matthew  Pickford  bankrupt  in  respect  of  their 
business  debts  and  appointed  a  trustee,  Hugh  Hornby  Birley, 
Baxendale's  brother-in-law,  to  administer  the  Pickfordst  estate 
and  arrange  for  the  liquidation  of  their  debts,  approximately 
L67,500,  at  a  composition  of  ten  shillings  in  the  pound. 
34 
This  latter  documentq  together  with  relevant  correspondence, 
shows  how  heavily  indebted.  the  Pickfords  had  become  to  their 
partnersp  and  were  now  totally  dependent  on  them.  Over  the  years, 
the  Pickfords  had  been  accommodated  by  their  partners,  by  loans 
or  excess  drawings  on  the  firm's  profits,  in  response  to 
repeated  requests  for  helpp  each  of  them  presentedl  apparently 
as  positively  the  last.  In_1819p  presumably  in  recognition  of 
32  Baxendale  to  Langton,  4  July  18179  F.  P. 
33  quoted  by  Halfpenny.  0p.  cit.  pp  120-121, 
34  Letter  of  Licenceg  between  Thomas  and  Matthew  Pickford  and 
their  creditors,  Pic  3/1;  draft  copies  are  at  F.  P.  and 
Halfpenny  Papers.  Hugh  Hornby  Birley,  the  trustee  appointed, 
was  president  of  the  Manchester  Chamber  of  Commerce  1820-27. 
He  was  also  Captain  of  the  Manchester  and  Salford  Yeomanry 
whose  charge  initiated  the  'Massacre'  of  Peterloo.  See 
R.  J.  Whitev  Waterloo  to  Peterloo  (1957)  pp  185-6  for  comment 
on  the  social  structure  of  the  Yeomanry.  According  to 
the  Report  of  the  Proceedings  in  the  Cause  Redford  v.  Birley 
and  ;  thers.  (Manchester  Local  History  Library,  N.  D,,  Trial 
64-6t  8-9  April,  1822),  the  yeomanry  cavalry  assembled  in 
Pickfords'  yard9  near  Portland  Street,  and  from  there  advanced 
on  St.  Peter's  Fields, 
149. such  advancest  the  partnership  terms  had  been  redrawn,  so  as 
to  put  all  five  partners  on  an  equal  footing,  thus  placing  the 
Pickfords  In  a  minority.  By  1821t  the  Pickfords  were  overdrawn 
to  the  extent  of  E179031-17.7dg  "or  thereabouts'19  whilst,  in 
recompense,  their  partners  now  held  a  general  lien  over  the 
entire  propertyt  stock  and  profits  of  the  co-partnership.  In 
effective  terms  the  Pickfords  had  already  surrendered  the 
business  to  their  partners. 
. 
The  two  brothers  were  unable  to  pay  even  this  composition 
withoutýthe  continued  help  of  their  partners,  This  was  forth- 
coming,  but  only  on  the  most  stringent  conditions.  The  appoint- 
ment  of  Birley  as  trustee  is  an  indication  that  they  had 
despaired  of  the-Pickfords'  ability  to  settle  their  debts 
themselvest  but  were  determined  to  sort  the  matter  out  once  and 
for  all  . 
35 
Accordingly,  although  the  Pickfords  were  allowed 
to  continue  to  participate  in  profits,  the  use  of  this  money, 
was  strictly  determined.  The  first  claim,  before  any  further 
distribution  was  the  payment.  of  five  per  cent  interest  on  the 
C17,000  owed  to  their  partners.  The  remainder  was  to  be 
administered  by  the  trustee,  who  would  allow  the  Pickfords  C500 
each  for  personal  income,  and  use  the  balance  to  discharge 
their  debts.  Birley,  as  the  Pickfords  representativet  was 
to  exercise  their  rights  and  privileges  in  the  partnershipq 
but  it  was  a  condition  of  the  contract  that  no  creditor  had  any 
35  Langton  expressedg  in  strong  terms,  his  dissatisfaction  at 
the  continued  failure  of  Thomas  Pickford  to  live  according 
to  his  current  means  and  pay  off  his  debts.  Both  Langton 
and  Inman  privately  called  for  more  than  a  bare  assurance 
that  such  debts  would  be  reduced  in  response  to  their  aid, 
Without  something  more  formal,  wrote  Inman,  "we  should  be 
mad!  to  make  an  further  advances",  Inman  to  H.  H.  Birley, 
30  June  1821. 
R 
150. power  to  interfere  in  the  business.  These  terms  were  to 
apply  for  the  nineteen  years  of  the  1819  partnership  agreement, 
during  which  time  the  Pickfords  were  to  be  in  no  way  molested 
by  their  creditors.  Any  infringement  of  the  contract  rendered 
It  null  and  void,  and  freed  the  Pickfords  from  all  their 
obligations.  It  was  1835  before  all  the  creditors  were  paid 
off. 
The  terms  imposed  by  the  Pickfords'  partners  demonstrates 
that  they  were  now  firmly  in  control  of  the  business.  At 
about  the  same  time  Joseph  Baxendale  began  to  exercise  a  wider 
management  role  in  Pickfords.  Formal  recognition  of  Baxendale's 
new  position  is  probably  indicated  in  the  surviving  journal 
of  the  Manchester  office  by  a  gap  of  several  blank  pages  after 
the  entries  for  March,  1820.  This  was  the  last  month  of 
Pickfords'  financial  year.  All  succeedina  paGes,  from  April 
36 
onwards  carry  Baxendale's  initials,  At  much  the  same  time, 
there  is  a  subtle  change  in  the  tone  of  letters  written  from 
the  Manchester  office,  almost  certainly  Baxendale's  workq  to 
the  London  office,  What  had  previously  appeared  as  advice  or 
suggestions  now  became  clear  directives. 
As  Part  of  his  wi  der  dutiest  Baxendale  embarked  on  an 
inspection  of  Pickfords'  agencies.  In  February  1820  he 
visited  Birmingham,  and  found  there  such  a  staggering  state 
of  disorder  that  when  he  left,  after  putting  things  to  rights, 
he  was  in  need  of  a  holiday.  In  passing9the  'Birmingham  affair' 
36  Pic  4/4. 
151. also  gives  some  insight  into  the  failings  of  the  'old'  firm.  37 
The  Birmingham  agency'was  in  chaos.  Unsettled  accounts 
were  found  dating  from  as  early  as  18129  claims  had  been  left 
unattended,  paid-up  accounts  had  not  been  entered  in  the  books, 
unpaid  accounts  had  been  entered  as  paid,  every  description 
of  fraud  was  uncovered.  Baxendale  reckoned  that  thousands 
of  pounds  had  been  lost  to  say  nothing  of  the  damage  to 
Pickfords'  name.  The  agent  was  sacked  and  Prosecutedq  and 
most  of  the  rest  of  the''establishment  discharged,  Baxendale 
had  no  option  but  to  move  in  as  temporary  agent  and,  with 
himself  working  up  to  nineteen  hours  a  day  and'the  part-time 
assistance  of  four  clerks,  stick  to  it  "until  I  either  kill  or 
cure".  The  accounts  were  in  a  terrible  state  of  confusiont 
chiefly  arising  from  the  affairs  of  the  told'  concern:  "In 
the  whole  course  of  my  life  I  never  either  saw  or  imagined  such 
a-set  of  accounts  and  such  mismanagement.  "  The  stock  was  in 
an  equally  deplorabld. 
-  state,  -  It  took  Baxendale  nearly  two 
months  of  assiduous  labour  to  bring  order  out  of  chaos.  The 
experience  taught.  Baxondale  a  lesson,  one  which  he  soon  had 
occasion  to  apply.  On  a  visit  to  Liverpoolv  within  a  short 
time  of  leaving  Birmingham,  he  found  that  a  newly  appointed 
clark  was  already  defrauding  the  firm,  whereupon  "Monsiour  (sic) 
the,  Caravan  Clerk  was  invited  to  the  right  about  instanter.  08 
The  shambles  at  Birmingham  was  doubtless  an  isolated  case. 
Indeed  it  is  difficult  to  imagine  how  Pickfords  could  have 
37  The  following  is  based  on  eight  letters  written  by  Baxendale 
mainly  to  Langtong  between  12  Feb  and  20  March  1820,  All 
but  one  are  at  F,  P.  the  exception  being  at  Pic  4/7. 
38  Baxendale  to  Langton  (?  )  12  April  1820,  r 
152. survived  many  repetitions  of  such  chaos.  By  contrast  when 
Baxendale  took  time  off  from  his  labours  to  visit  Worcester 
he  found  everything  in  order  and  the  difference  Imost 
wonderful*'  However  more  than  a  few  even  lesser  'Birmingharrd 
would  have  been  extremely  damaging  andq  although  there  is  no 
further  evidence  concerning  the  condition  of  other  agencies, 
similar  neglect  and  inefficiency  probably  contributed  to 
Pickfords'  failure  before  1817  and  the  continued  sluggishness 
after  that  date,  The  events  at  Birmingham  illustrate  the 
ravages  caused  by  inadequate  management  and  provide  some  kind 
of  pointer  to  the  size  of  the  task  involved  in  refurbishing 
Pickfords  I  fortuneS 
Eventually  Pickfords'  profitability  was  restored  to  a 
healthy  stateg  but  there  is  no  direct  evidence  as  to  when  the 
repair  was  complete.  In  1828'the  firm  was  reported  to  be 
"very  prosperous,, 
39  but  this  might  reflect  the  one  year's 
trading  rather  than  a  true  underlying  trend.  A  neat  sequence 
of  profit  figures  would  be  welcome  but  the  non-survival  of  the 
appropriate  books  makes  this  impossible.  The  only  quantitative 
estimates  that  can  be  made  are  presented  in  Table  6.1.  These 
figures  come  from  Joseph  Baxendale's  personal  papers.  They 
were  drawn  up  for  his  own  purposes,  so  that  any  use  of  them 
outside  of  that  context  must  be  with  the  greatest  caution, 
40 
They-,  areq  howevert  the  only  source  available  and  are  probably 
a  rough  indication  of  the  course  of  Pickford5l  profitE6 
39  Halfpenny  Op.  cit.  p  124. 
40  For  a  more  extended  comment  on  these  figures,  see  appendix  2, 
153. The  figures  show  that  until  the  early  1840s  profits  fluctuated 
sharply  from  year  to  year  so  thatj  in  the  upper  ranges,  only 
rarely  did  they  stand  at-approximately  the  same  level  in 
consecutive  yearsq  e.  g.  1818-19,1827-8.  Within  this  broad 
pattern  there  was,  however,,  a  significant  difference  of 
experience  between  the  1820s  and  the  1830s.  Until,  about  1830 
profits  in  absolute  terms  rose  markedly  on  several  occasions 
e.  g.  1818,18199  '1821t  1825,  etc.,  but  on  the  downswing  they 
could  drop  away  almost  to  nothingp  as  happened  in  1826,  for 
example.  By  contrastp  after  1830,  although  the  shifts  were 
no  less  sharp,  the  bottom  of  the  troughs  was  very  much  higher. 
Perhaps  the  years  1829-1832  might  be  selected  as  marking  the 
transition  to  a  fluctuation  around  a  higher  and  more  consistent 
level  of  profits.  In  the  sixteen  years  between  1832  and  1847P 
profits  fell  below  C159000  on  only  four  occasions:  during  the 
previous  fourteen  years  that  figure  had  been  exceeded  only 
three  times,  It  seems  reasonable  to  suggest,  therefore,  that 
It  was  not  until  the  early  thirtiesq  after  almost  a  decade  of 
effort  by  Baxendale,  that,  Pickfords'  finances  attained  some 
regularity  and  solidity.  By  the-1830s  Pickfords  had  also 
41 
secured  a  name  for  prompt,  and.  efficient  attention  to  business. 
It  was  on  the  strength  of  developments  such  as  these  that  John 
Mosst  Chairman  of  the  Grand  Junction  railway  company,  was  able 
to  say  in  1840t  that  "Mr.  Baxendale  was  the  greatest  carrier 
on  the  canals*" 
42 
41  Nasmyth  Gaskell  &  Co.  to  Messrs.  Pickford  &  Co.  23  Dec.  1839, 
Letter  Book  6,  James  Nasmyth  Collection  '  Eccles  Public 
Library,  In  the  1820s  Pickfords  were  also  carrying  for 
Jedediah  Struttl  R.  S.  Fitton  and  A.  P.  Wadsworth,  The  Strutts- 
and  the  Arkwrightspl758-1830  (M.  U.  P.  1958)  p  290,  The 
authors  concludeq  p  291,  on  the  basis  of  negative  evidence 
that  Strutt  was  efficiently  served  by  his  carriers.  ýt  a 
later  date  John  Owen  preferred  to  use  Pickfords'  canalboat 
to  London  than  the  railway.  B.  W.  Clappq  John  Owens  Manchester 
Merchant  (M.  U.  P.  1965)  p  156* 
42  Fift7j  rdport  and  evidence  S.  C.  on  Railway  Communications 
pp  1840  (Vol.  XIII)  Q.  3468;  also  W.  Bass,  S.  C.  on  Oxford 
Worcester  and  Wolverham2ton  railway  pp  1845  (V01-  XI)Q-3287- 
154  9 As  Moss's  comment  impliesq  Baxendale  ultimately  came  to 
imprint  his  personality  on  Pickfords'so  deeply  that  there  is 
great  danger  of  distorting  the  historical  record  by  writing 
under  the  influence  of  hindsight,  It  seems  clear  that 
Baxendale  played  the  crucial  role  in  restoring  Pickfords' 
fortunes  but  it  would  be  only  too  easy  to  interpret  the  whole 
period  after  1817  in  the  light  of  his  later  dominance  and  so, 
for  examplev  to  regard  Langton,  Inman  or  the  Pickfords  as 
mere  appendages  to  Baxendale  right  from  the  start,  Some 
assessment  is  therefore  needed  of  Baxendalets  individual 
contributiong  not  only  for  the  sake  of  historical  accuracy  but 
because  through  it  Baxendalets.  true  achievement  should  be 
placed  in  the  proper  perspective.  The  episode  at  Birmingham 
gives  some  indication  of  the  scale  of  the  undertaking  involved 
in  renovating  Pickfords.  The  firm's  renewed  prosperity 
witnesses  the  successful  completion  of  this  task.  The 
question  to  be  answered  here  is  how  much  of  this  is  to  be 
attributed  to  Baxendale  himself,  and  how  much  to  his  partners, 
to  the  quality  of  Pickfords'  employees,  or  even  to  purely 
external  factorS  5uch  a5  the.  level  of  activity  in  the  economy, 
The  final  issue  would  seem  to  depend  on  the  quality  of 
managementq  in  particular,  the  effective  rýsponsibility  and 
decision  making  for  the  total  concern.  It  has  already  been 
suggested  that  the  Pickfords  were  probably  found  wanting  in 
this  respecte  By  contrast,  it  is  argued  here  that  Pickfords' 
revival  derived  largely  from  Baxendale's  personal  powers  of 
management.  Is  it,  then,  possible  to  determine  when  Baxendale 
155. attained  a  position  of  leadership  and  thus  free  rein  for  his 
abilities?  Among  the  fragmentary  evidence  of  the  1820s  and 
1830s,  there  is  nothing  which  illustrates  'management-in- 
action.  '  it  is  possible  to  indicate  the  trend  of  Pickfords' 
actions  but  not  to  explain  why  or  on  precisely  whose  decision 
such  actions  were  made.  However,  largely  by  virtue  of 
negative  evidenceg  some  points  can  be  made  concerning  the 
extent  of  each  partner's  contribution  to  the  management  of 
Pickfords, 
To,  look  first  at  the  Pickford  brothers,  with  whomq 
seeminglyt  overall  responsibility  initially  lay.  Thomas 
Pickford  is  difficult  to  assess9  easy  to  dismiss,  There  is 
no  indication  of  his  being  actively  involved  in  the  business 
to  any  extentg  even  within  the  limited  context  of  the 
Manchester  office.  Yet,  not  only  did  he  remain  in  the 
partnership  until  his  death,  but  his  comments  to  a  correspondent 
in  18399  quoted  earlierg  show  that  heýwas  well  aware  of  the 
forces  which  had  shaped  the  development  of  land  and  canal 
conveyance  over  the  years,  and  the  likely  impact  of  steam 
locomotion.  So  he  know  well  what  had  been  happening  in 
Pickfords  and  the  nature  of  future  plans,  but  such  knowledge 
does  not  necessarily  imply  any  share  in  the  process  of  decision 
making,  Thus  Thomas  Pickford  is  conspicuous  chiefly  by  his 
absenceg  although  this  impression  might  well  be  due  to  the 
nature  of  the  surviving  evidence.  Of  Matthew  Pickfordq  a 
little  more  of  substance  can  be  said,  In  the  first  years  of 
the  partnership  Matthew  was  busy  in  Londong  consulted  by 
Inman  and  others  about  the  running  of  the  vansg"'- 
43 
left  to 
43  London  office  to  Leicester  21  Nov.  1818;  Inman  to  Langton 
23  Oct-  1818;  Langton  to  Matthew  Pickford  6  Sept.  1819 
All  F.  P.  Irunan  to  Messrs  M.  Pickford  &  Co.  9  London  30 
ýov-(?  ) 
1818,  Pic  4/27. 
156. decide  on  Baxendale's  suggestion  for  an  extra  boat  to 
Wolverhampton. 
44 
The  settlement  of  a  dispute  with  the 
boatmen  in  October  1818  was  his  concern. 
45 
However  Matthew 
did  not  continue  long  in  this  position.  Alrea  dy  by  1820 
he  seems  to  have  been  sharing  such  powers  with  Baxendale, 
and  his  retirement  from  the  partnership  in  1823  concluded  his 
contribution  to  the  firm. 
46 
There  are  equal  problems  in  assessing  the  position  of 
Langton  and  Inmang  with  whom  it  would  seem  a  similar  process 
of  disengagement  took  place.  Both  remained  for  the  full 
nineteen  year  term  of  the  partnership,  to  1838,  but  by  then 
neither  was  apparently  contributing  much  to  the  direction  of 
Pickfords.  Langton  was  76  in  1838,  so  age  alone  might  be  a 
consideration.  In  the  early  days  Langton's  position  in 
London  was  essentially  the  same  as  that  of  Baxendale  and 
Inman  in,  Manchester  and  Leicester,  perhaps  combined  with  some 
special  responsibility  for  financial  matters.  It  ist  however, 
impossible  to  say  when  he  withdrew  from  this  position,  Apart 
from  Pickfordsv  his  own  warehousing  business,  in  which  he 
47 
continued  until  at  least  1820)  must  have  claimed  part  of  his 
attention,  No  further  reference  to  Langton  as  an  active 
44  Langton  to  Baxendale,  27  Nov.  1818  Pic  4/27. 
45  Lea  (Pickfords'  agent  at  Braunstoný  to  Langton  22  Oct  1818; 
Lea  to  Messrs  M.  Pickford  &  Co.,  London,  23  Oct  1818;  Inman 
to  Langton  23  Oct.  1818.  All  F.  P. 
46  London  Gazette  16  Sept.  1823  P  1537;  Bazendale  notes  that 
Matthew  Pickford  signed  the  stock  account  for  the  last  time 
on  29  April  1823.  From  then  on  Birley  signed  theli'ccount 
as  trustee  until  1835  when  the  Pickfords'  composition  was 
complete.  In  another  context  he  notes  that  "From  lst  April 
1823,  though  Mw  Pickford  no  longer  a  Partner  the  1/5  share 
paid  the  same  as  to  the  other  4  partners  -  so  continue  till 
lst  April  1833".  From  1  April  1834  the  four.  surviving 
partners  took  equal  shares. 
47  Langton  is  entered  in  this  capacity  in  Kent's  London 
directory  of  1819  and  1820t  but  not  1822;  but  he  does  not 
appear  in  the  j!  ost  Office  directory  (Critchett  &  Woods)  in 
1820  or  1821, 
1-57- partner  appears  after  that  date,  but  any  accurate  determination 
48 
of  his  withdrawal  is  impossible.  The  position  of  Inman  is 
only  slightly  clearer.  Between  1817  and  1820  Inman  was 
plainly  concerned  in  management  matters  at  Leicester,  but  there 
the  record  stops.  In  a  quite  different  context,  however, 
Inman  is  on  record  as  stating,  in  July  1832,  that  he  was  "not 
an  acting  partner  in  the  business;  "  although  he  too,  like 
Thomas  Pickford,  was  well  versed  in  the  general  running  of  the 
firm. 
49 
Finally,  what  of  Baxendale  himself?  From  about  1820  he 
began  to  exercise  wider  powersq  and  presumably  his  position  was 
enhanced  on  Matthew  Pickfords'  retirement.  Some  confirmation 
is  found  in  Baxendale's  removal  from  Manchester  to  London  and 
the  purchase  in  April  1824,  of  a  small  estate  at  Whetstone, 
then  just  out  of  London  on  the  Great  North  Road, 
50 
At  the 
same  time  his  salary  was  raised,  for  the  year  commencing  1  April 
1824,  from  9550  to  L800,  suggesting  increased  responsibility. 
From  then  on  Baxendale  worked  from  London,  perhaps  replacing 
Langton  in  the  process,  and  the  City  Basin  canal  depot  became 
Pickfordst  acknowledged  headquartersq  recognition  that  Pickfordst 
business  was  now  really  centred  in  London,  not  Manchesterg  and 
that  the  canal  trade  lay  at  the  heart  of  it. 
48  The  only  subsequent  mention  of  Langton  is  in  the  Grand 
Junction  canal  company  minutes.  In  reply  to  their  inquiry, 
Langton  wrote  to  say  he  was  no  longer  connected  with 
Pickford  &  Co.  Board  Minutes  2  Aug.  1838  GJC  116. 
49  Report  andevidencev  S.  C.  on  the  Observance  of  the  Sabbath 
Rayq  pp  1831/20  (Vol,  VII)  Q,  1990.  I  would  like  to  thank 
Mr,  R.  Scola,  of  the  University  of  Kent  at  Canterbury,  for 
this  reference. 
50  Baxendalet  in  a  journal  type  bookt  a  mixture  of  diary  and 
accountst  date5  the  move  as  1823-4,  completed  in  April  1824 
by  the  purchase  of  the  Whetstone  property  for  96,500,  loaned 
to  him  by  the  firm, 
158. Although  Baxendale  probably  acted  as  a  kind  of  managing- 
director  from  about  April  1824,  it  is  impossible  to  say  in  any 
precise  way  how  far  he  relied  on  or  was  independent  of  the 
continued  assistance  of  his  partners.  Evidence  of  the  late 
1830s  and  beyondp  by  which  time  something  of  the  'myth'  had 
Gathered  round  his  remarkable  success,  tends  to  emphasise  the 
'single-handedt  aspect  of  Baxendale's  achievement.  An  obvious 
point  to  make,  in  the  first  place,  is  that  Baxendale  inevitably 
depended  on  the  constant  support  and  efficiency  of  the  many 
agents  and  clerks  throughout  the  country.  However,  the 
quality  of  their  work  performance  would  be  to  a  considerable 
extent  a  function  of  Baxendale's  own  ability  to  attract  and 
select  men  of  high  calibre,  to  draw  from  them  and  transmit 
through  them  down  to  the  junior  office  boy  a  concept  of  the 
firm  which  demanded  a  high  level  of  industry  and  integrity. 
Mention  of  this  proviso  in  no  way  lessens  the  scale  of 
Baxendale's  achievement;  on  the  contrary  it  must  surely 
heighten  it,  since  on  this  count  part  of  the  renewal  involved 
toning  up  the  efficiency  of  the  total  machine. 
A  secondv  and  perhaps  less  obvious  point,  is  to  notice 
that  Baxendale's  path  had  been  smoothed  by  the  action  already 
taken  to  discharge  the  Pickfords'  business  debts.  This  created 
a  favourable  climate  for  the  future.  Although  legally  distinct, 
the  'new'  firm  trading  under  the  name  of  Pickford  &  Co.  could 
not  in  practice  escape  the  reputation  already  attached  to  that 
name.  Howeverv  thanks  to  the  settlement  of  1821,  creditors 
had  sure  knowledge  of  how  much,  on  what  terms  and  when  their 
159. debts  would  be  paid,  enough  to  ensure  a  tolerant  attitude  to 
the  firm.  In  addition,  Baxendale,  with  similar  certainty, 
could  plan  for  the  future  confident  that  no  new  debts  would 
descend  on  him  and  that  the  scheduled  repayment  of  all  existing 
debts  was  guaranteed.  This  was  a  necessary  deck-clearing 
operation  before  any  real  forward  movement  could  be  achieved. 
As  essentially  a  joint  decision  of  all  the  partners,  with 
important  on-going  consequences,  this  step  created  the  basic 
framework  within  which  Baxendale  was  able  to  work.  To  this 
extent,  therefore',  Baxendale  remained  constantly  oblieed  to 
his  colleagues. 
What  was  there  about  Joseph  Baxendale,  which  enabled  him 
to  have  such  a  dramatic  effect  on  Pickfordst  fortunes?  Born 
in*1785  the  son  of  a  Lancaster  surgeon,  he  was  32  when  he 
joined  Pickfords.  The  Baxendales  were  originally  a  Liverpool 
familyp  cabinet-makersv  and  freemen  of  the  borough  of  Lancaster, 
the  county  town.  Josiah  Baxendaleq  Joseph's  father,  left 
the  family  trade  and  town,  and  moved  to  Lancaster  some  time 
before  1783  or  4.  '51  In  December  1784,  he  married  Mabella 
Salisburyt  the  daughter  of  a  lesser  gentry  family,  and  Joseph 
was  born  the  following  September.  Nothing  is  known  of 
Baxendale's  childhood  and  youtho  except  that,  although  he  is 
%52  reported  to  have  received  'a  good  education  he  himself  later 
51  Record  Society  of  Lancashire  and  Cheshire  Vol.  87  (1935), 
The  Rolls  of  the  Freemen  of  the  Borough  of  Lancaster  1688-1840 
Part  10  A.  to  L.  p  20  1732-3,  Baxendalev  Josiah,  of  Liverpool 
cabinet-maker;  p  27  1767-8,  Baxendale,  Joseph,  of  Liverpool, 
cabinet-makerg  son  of  Josiah;  p  29  Baxendale,  Lloyd,  of 
Liverpoolq  upholsterer,  son  of  Josiah;  P  36  1783-49  Baxendale 
Josiah,  of  Lancaster,  surgeon,  son  of  Joseph,  late  of  Liverpool. 
52  Samuel  Smilesq  Thrift  (1892)  Chapter  IX  'Little  Things', 
contains  a  brief  memoir  of  Baxendale.  In  the  Framfield  Papers 
there  are  a  few  letters  dated  1874,  a  couple  by  Smiles, 
intimating  that  the  family  were  thinking  of  a  biography  of 
Baxendale  to  be  written  by  Smiles.  This  chapter  is  the  only 
visible  outcome  of  the  correspondence.  It  must  be  treated 
with  caution  in  that  it  tends  to  reflect  the  'myth'  accruing 
to  Baxendale  by  then. 
160, called  these  years  "Educationg  with  uncertainty  of  calling 
or  professiong  a  hopeless  period  and  very  wretched. 
03 
Apart 
from  the  social  position  implied  by  his  father's  profossion 
54 
and  his  motherts  family  background,  little  can  be  said 
about  the  influences  of  his  home  environment  which  might  have 
shaped  his  development.  Josiah  Baxendale  seems  to  have  been 
a  forthright  mang  with  an  independent  turn  of  mind,  and  in 
this  son  clearly  took  after  father.  Baxendale  also  had  a 
great  love  for  his  mother  and  she  was  evidently  a  great 
influence  on  him. 
In  September  1804  Baxendale  left  Lancaster  for  Preston, 
"to  fight  my  way  through  life".  as  he  wrote  in  old  age. 
55 
From  there  he  moved  on  to  London  where,  in  March  1806,  he  was 
established  with  Samuel  Croughton,  wholesale  linen  draper  of 
33  St-  Paul's  Churchyard. 
56 
In  Londong  Baxendale  was 
apparently  representing  the  interests  of  a  Mr,  Swainson  at 
Croughton's  warehouse.  The  evidence  for  this  episode  is  very 
incomplete  and  obscure,  but  the  following  seems  a  reasonable 
interpretation  of  the  situation.  Croughton's  was  evidently 
the  London  warehouse  outlet  for  the  calico-printing  works 
founded  at  Bannister  Hallt  near  Preston,  at  the  end  of  the 
53  Baxendale  to  his  son  Joseph  Hornby  Baxendale,  23  March  1868  FF 
54  Mabella  Salisbury's  mother,  Mary  Salisbury,  had  her  portrait 
painted  by  George  Romney  who  had  a  large,  fashionable 
clientele  in  later  eighteenth  century  London.  H,  Ward  and 
W,  Roberts,  Romnej,  a  bioaraphy  and  criticalessay  with  a 
catalogue,  eaisonn6  of  his  works  (1904)  Vol.  U,  p  139.  Ue-r 
husband,  Thomas  Salisbury,  moved  from  Giggleswick  to 
Lancastert  where  he  became  a  freeman  in  1764-5.  He  is 
entered  on  the  freedom  rolls  as  'gentleman'. 
55  Memorandum  of  my  life  1785  to  187- 
, 
F.  P 
56  Croughton  is  so  described  in  several  of  the  London  directories 
e.  g.  Holden's  Triennial  directorX  1799,  and  1805;  Post  Office 
directoryp  1803  and  1808. 
16.1. previous  century  by  Richard  Jackson  and  John  Stephenson.  57 
They  became  the  leading  calico-printers  in  the  country, 
intimately  connected  with  Richard  Oveyp  then  the  most 
Influential  of  the  London  'furniture  printers.  158  In  1804 
the  partnership  was  extended  to  take  in  a  John  Swainson,  who 
Is  almost  certainly  the  Mr.  Swainson  who  figurest"correspondence 
A 
exchanged  between  Baxendale  and  his  father  in  1808.  Although 
not  actually  saying  sov  Baxendale  implies  that  Swainson  was 
a  partner  in  the  Bannister  Hall  concern;  Jackson,  one  of  the 
other  partnersg  features  prominently  in  the  letters*59 
From  this  period  there  survives  a  letter  written  by  Josiah 
Baxendale  to  Joseph,  soon  after  his  arrival  in  London, 
60 
Its 
contentsq  practical  advice  on  how  Joseph  should  conduct  himself 
and  put  his  time  to  the  best  use,  give  some  insight  into  the 
57  Information  concerning  Bannister  Hall  has  been  supplied  to 
me  by  Barbara  J.  Morrisq  Assistant  Keeper  of  Circulation  at 
, 
the  Victoria  and  Albert  Museum,  South  Kensington,  whom  I 
would  like  to  thank.  See  also  G.  Turnbull  A  history  of  the 
calico-printing  industry  for  the  development  of  calico- 
printing  in  Lancashire.  'For  its  relation  with  the  cotton 
trade  generallyp  Edwards,  The  British  cotton  trade  1780-1815 
P  150  ff- 
58  P.  Floudj  fRichard  Ovey  and  the 
' 
rise  of  the  London  'Furniture 
Printerstv  The  Connoisseur  Oc  :  -L 
t-  1957  P  92.  This  and 
similar  'articles  by  P.  Floud  and  Barbara  J.  Morris  in  The 
Connoisseur  April,  May  1957  and  March  1958  are  based  on  a 
continuous  series  of  pattern-books  from  1802-1840,  surviving 
from  Bannister  Hall. 
59  At  no  time  does  Baxendale  give  a  Christian  nameto  this' 
Mr.  Swainsono  a  fact  which  leads  to  some  difficulties.  There 
is  recordp  Baileyls  British  director):  (178419  Vol.  III,  entry 
for  Prestont  of  a  John  Swainsono  linen  draper.  Calico- 
printing  Crew  out  of  the  linen  trade,  and  if  this  Swainson 
were  the  one  who  joined  Bannister  Hall  in  1804t  such  a 
connection  might  explain  Baxendalets  move  first  to  Preston 
in  1804p  and  then  on  to  London  in  1806. 
60  Dated  19  March  1806;  for  similar  letters  of:  fbLther  to  son, 
see  that  of  Jedediah  Strutt  to  his  son  William,  Fitton  and 
Wadsworth  The  Strutts  and  the  Arkwrights,  p  144  ff  and  those 
of  George  Courtauld  I  to  Samuel  Courtaula  III,  D.  C.  Coleman 
Courtaulds.  An  economic  and  social  history  (Oxford  1969) 
Vol,  Ip  4-5-ff,  There  are  notable  similarities  of  character 
between  Baxendale  and  Samuel  Courtauld  III. 
162. character  of  Josiah  himself,  Baxendalels  retention  of  the 
letter  is  also  significantp  perhaps  because  it  symbolically 
marked  the  commencement  of  his  business  life,  or,  more  deeply, 
because  he  accepted  his  father's  advice  and  tried  to  model 
himself  on  it.  Offering  his  "advice  in  respect  of  your 
present  and  future  conduct,  as  upon  it,  in  a  great  measure, 
will  depend'your  happiness  and  welfare"  Josiah  first  warned 
his  son  against  joining  any  military  associations,  as  possible 
occasions  of  "forming  improper  cormexions",  or  dissipating  his 
time  in  the  many  clubs  and  meeting  places.  Instead 
"I  would  wish  you  to  endeavour  to  make  yourself  a 
perfect  master  of  Book-keepinev  which  you  may 
accomplish  very  easily,  by  paying  a  little  attention 
and  court  to  your  Book-keeper.  The  advantage  you 
will  ultimately  receive  from  it,  there  is  no 
appreciating.  I  would  advise  you  to  read,  occasionally 
the  best  French  authors,  for  at  some  period  your 
knowledge  of  that  language  may  be  of  essential  service 
to  you.  If  you  have  leisure  and  inclination  to  improve 
yourself  in  the  Italian  language,  I  would  recommend 
you  to  make-yourself  a  master  of  it;  but  above  all 
things,  I  would  wish  you  to  make  yourself  acquainted, 
which  you  may  do  of  an  evening,  with  all  the  best 
English  authorst  as  it  will  be  a  source  of  improvement 
and  continual  amusement  ...  and  if  you  get  the  character 
of  having  a  little  more  learning  and  knowledge  than 
your  neighbour,  it  will  not  be  any  disadvantage  to  you.  " 
Although  dauntingl  Josiahts  training  programme  was  eminently 
practical  and  relevant  to  the  needs  of  the  time. 
Baxendale  did  not  stay  long  in  London.  Early  in  1809  he 
left  Croughton  and  returned  to  Lancashire,  where  he  borrowed 
some  capital  and  bought  himself  a  share  in  the  Bannister  Hall 
partnership.  For  94,000  he  received  5/19ths  of  the  profits, 
in  association  with  Charles  Swainson. 
61 
Againg  few  important 
61  Charles  Swainson,  's  relationship  with  his  predecessor  in  the 
partnershipq  John  Swainson,  is  something  of  a  mystery.  Charles 
Swainsonis  father,  is  named  in  the  family  pedigree,  Burkes' 
Landed  Gentry  (1863  and  subsequent  editions),  'John  Swainson 
of  Preston't  but  who,  according  to  the  pedigree,  died  in  1800, 
Thus,  he  could  not  have  been  the  John  Swainson  who  joined 
Bannister  Hall  in  1804.  Yet  there  is  no  other  obvious 
candidate  in  the  Swainson  family,  whilst  the-succession  of 
two  persons  of  the  same  name  in  the  same  partnership  but  in 
no  way  related  seems  too  much  of  a  coincidence, 
163. details  of  this  phase  of  his  life  survive.  He  built  himself 
a  cottage  at  Walton-le-Daleg  near  the  factory  and  bleaching 
groundst  and  from  there  travelled  in  search  of  orders,  In 
the  bitter  calico-printing  strike  of  1815 
62 
he  was  shot  at 
on  boarding  the  stage  one  evening,  an  incident  which,  not 
surprisingly,  seems  to  have  remained  a  vivid  memory,  In  the 
same  year  he  became  engaged  to  Mary  Birleyq  a  connection  which 
undoubtedly  influenced  the  course  of  his  later  life.  When 
Baxendale  retired  from  the  partnership  in  December  1816,  he 
had  netted  about  C6,000  in  profits  and  interest,  enough  to 
pay  his  wayq  and  pay  off  part  of  his  capital.  Entrance  to 
Pickfords  was  at  the  cost  of  further  and  more  extensive 
borrowing. 
Although  gained  in  a  different  conte:  ktv  Baxendale  thus 
brought  some  management  experience  to  Pickfords.  In  addition 
he  brought  a  knowledge  of  book-keeping,  He  had  anticipated 
by  a  couple  of  years  his  fatherts  advice  on  the  merits  of  a 
sound  grasp  of  book-keeping  in  that  since  leaving  home  in 
1804  he  had  kept  a  detailed  cash  account  of  his  personal  income 
and  expenditure. 
63. 
Baxendale  was  interested  in  the  analysis- 
of  figuresq  as  expressed  in  a  characteristic  and  indicative 
phrase  of  his  'to  sift  to  the  marrow'  some  problem  or  difficulty. 
This  suggests  a  degree  of  thoroughness  comparable  to  that 
advocated  by  his  father,  for  Josiah  desired  not  just  a 
62  Turnbullo  Op,  cit,  p  191 
63  In  these  he  kept  the  most  detailed  record  of  even  the 
smallest  sums  paid  out,  e.  g.  threepence  lost  at  an  evening's 
whistq  and  such  like.  Two  books  survivey  one  1804  to  1809, 
the  second  1809-1818.  The  latter  gives  the  source  of  his 
capital  for  the  Swainson  partnership,  and  a  yearly  statement 
of  his  profitsp  losses  and  interest  payments  from  the  concerno 
16U. smattering  of  book-keeping  or  Italian,  but  the  mastery  of 
them, 
Baxendale's  letters  to  his  father,  in  1808,  gives  the 
impression  of  him,  at  the  age  of  twenty-three,  as  a  competent 
and  self-assured  young  man.  Independence  and  self-reliance 
were  features  on  which  Josiah  evidently  put  some  stress. 
Not  unnaturallyt  when  Baxendale  found  himself  in  difficulties 
or  in  need  of  financial  help,  he  turned  to  his  father  for 
advice  and  support,  This  was  forthcoming,  but  not  on  terms 
that  released  him  from  further  responsibility  or  effort.  So 
when  Josiah  made  C29000  available,  half  the  capital  needed 
64 
to  Go  in  with  Swainsong  it  was  as  a  loan  on  which  he  charged 
the  customary  five  per  cent  interest.  On  a  later  occasion, 
Josiah  reminded  his  son  that  life  was  a  harsh  schoolq  but 
that  there  was  only  one  way  in  which  its  lessons  could  be 
learnt.  Even  his  abortive  years  in  London  could.  be  put  to 
good  account.  "An  early  lesson  [in  life]  sometimes  makes  a 
lasting'impressiong  which  makes  people  cautious  in  their  money 
transactions..  I  hope  now  things  will  go  on  more  smoothly  with 
you  and  that  You  will  reap  the  benefits  which  will  arise  from 
65 
these  distressing  times.  " 
Baxendale's  response  to  these  promptIngs  seems  to  have 
been,  among  othersq  a  confidence  in  his  own  abilities,  suggested 
for  exampleg  by  his  entry  to  the  partnership  of  Bannister  Hall. 
His  willingness  to  take  this  step  on  the  basis  of  borrowed 
moneyl  repeated  at  a  higher  level  of  borrowing  when  he  joined 
Pickfords,  'is  in  line  with  the  moderate  risk-taking  reearded 
64  Of  the  rest,  he  got  C1,000  from  his  great-uncle,  Lloyd 
Baxendaleq  and  C10000  from  John  Stoutp  a  family  friend, 
both  at  five  per  cent.. 
65  Josiah  to  Joseph  Baxendale,  27  Oct.  1810  F.  P. 
165. as  a  hall-mark  of  the-classic  entrepreneur,  It  seems  a  fair 
presumption  that  Baxendale  was  hard-working,  yet  he  was 
constantly  on  the  move  during  these  years,  For  example, 
from  mid-October  to  mid-December  1811,  he  went  on  an  extended 
tour,  by  gig  and  horse,  of  the  west  midlands  and  the  west 
countryq  and  he  was  on  the  move  again  in  the  following  years. 
66 
Such  journeying  may  well  have  been  in  the  course  of  business  t 
seeking  orders  for  new  patterns  and  designs,  but  miGht  also 
indicate  symptons  of  restlessness.  If  so,  he  soon  found  in 
PIckfords  enough  to  absorb  any  surplus  energy, 
Combining  the  foregoing  with  what  can  be  discovered  about 
the  mature  Baxendale,  certain  attributes  emerge  which  seem 
material  to  his  success  in  Pibkfords.  Notably  he  possessed 
sound  business  judgement,  a  forceful  yet  attractive  personality, 
a  large  capacity  for  hard  workq  and  a  thorouGhq  methodical 
mind  allied  to  some  ability  with  accounts.  In  the  context  of 
Pickfords',  immediate  troubles,  perhaps  the  last  mentioned 
qualityp  method  and  orderliness  together  with  some  knowledge 
of  accounting  was  the  most  directly  relevant.  On  Baxendale's 
own  statement,  Pickfordst  accounts  were  found  to  be  in  "the 
most  wretched  state  of  confusion",  so  that  the  new  partnership 
only  avoided  bankruptcy  by  keeping  its  own  accounts  strictly 
separate  from  those  of  the  loldl  firm, 
67 
It  might  be  an 
66  Several  letters  at  F.  P,  show  that  Baxendale  was  engaged  in 
the  sale  of  patterns,  especially  among  his  family  circle 
and  friends.  One  undated  and  unsigned,  but  written  from 
Chalfont  St,  Giles,  Bucks.,  in  the  style  of  an  aunt, 
expresses  disappointment  at  not  getting  a  visit  that  month, 
having  heardq  "that  your  partner  has  been  in  town.  instead 
of  you,  "  This  suggests  regular  business  trips  of  this  kind. 
67  Memoranda  of  my  Life  F.  P.  Enclosed  in  the  flap  of  these 
books  are  two  sheets  of  paper,  pages  1  and  3  of  some 
consecutive  thoughts  Baxendale  wrote  down  in  1866.  Sheet  1 
refers  to  the  commencement  of  the  partnership, 
166. exaggeration  to  say  that  Baxendale  was  obsessed  with  figures, 
but  certainly  in  his  surviving  papers  collections  of  figures 
and  their  analysis  abound.  They  give  the  impression  that, 
on  the  basis  of  contemporary-'accounting  knowledgeg  Baxendale 
was  more  than  competentp 
68 
Conventional  mercantile  accounting, 
although  inadequate  for  the  more  sophisticated  needs  of 
capital  accountancy,  could  be  adopted  sufficiently  to  provide 
a  guide  to  overall  profitabilityO  provided  it  was  performed 
with  care  and  method,  The  chaos  at  Birmingham  was  sorted 
out,  not  by  complex  technique  but  by  perseverance,  long  hours 
of  careful  checking,  reconstituting  the  books.  As  much  as 
anything..  this  required  mental  discipline  and  strong  motivationg 
reinfor.  ced  perhaps  in  Baxendale's  case  by  the  threat  of 
bankruptcy. 
69 
It  is  difficult  to  say-how  far  Baxendale  could  use  his 
skills  as  a  'tool  of  management.  '  He  certainly  expected  an 
examination  of  the  books  to  guide  the  firm  in  its  progress. 
70 
His  surviving  jotters7l,  contain  thi 
revenue  analysis.  Labour  charges 
the  itemised  construction  costs  of 
costsq.  including  wear  and  tearl  of 
Manchester  and  Liverpool,  all  were 
e  most  detailed  unit  cost/ 
of  all  categories  and  rates, 
a  new  boat,  daily  working 
two  boats  working  between 
carefully  noted,  He  could 
68  The  following  paragraphs  are  influenced  by  S.  Pollard 
The  Genesis  of  modern  management,  (1965)  chap.  Six, 
Accountancy  and  Management, 
69  Pollardq  Op.  cit,  p,  245  and  note  21  comments  that  efforts 
to  produce  really  accurate  accounts  invariably  followed  a 
crisis  of  some  sort, 
70  An  apt  illustration  occurs  in  a  letter  to  his  son,  in  the 
last  years  of  his  life.  "That  I  am  not  satisfied  with  the 
accounts  I  fully  admit,  and  it  may  be  owing  to  my  own 
densenessp  all  that  I  ask  is,  to  endeavour  to  show  me  how 
I  am  wrongg  by  for  instance  take  Portsmouth,  and  analise 
these  accounts  to  their  very  marrow.  "  Joseph  Baxendale  to 
Joseph  Hornby  Baxendale,  16  Aug.  1868,  F.  P.;  also  Baxendale 
to  Lloyd  Baxendalet  16  July  1863,  Pic  4/27, 
71  One  dates  from  1821-22  at  Manchester,  the  other  was  probabl-,.  - 
written  up  In  1833,  with  later  additions.  This  contains 
extensive  details  about  Pickfords  stock  of  boats,  their 
numberst  agep  valuet  second-hand  pricet  etc. 
167. calculate  the  average  quarterly  earnings  of  selected  fly- 
boats  over  roughly  comparable  periods  in  1827,1830t  18329  and 
1837,  down  to  earnings  per  day  and  per  mile.  The  road  haulage 
working  costs  used  below, 
72 
and  similar  statistical  material 
73 
in  Pickfords'  paperst  are  almost  certainly  Baxendale's  work 
or  inspired  by  him, 
In  his  own  notes#  Baxendale  depreciated  his  fixed  capital 
as  represented  by  Pickfords'  boats;  the  horses  too  were 
obviously  written  down  at  the  annual  stock-taking.  But  what 
principles  were  applied  and  how  capital  was  charged  to  the 
accounts  is  unknown,  An  interesting  development  in  this 
respect  was  the  establishment  of  a  reserve  fund  in  1838,  to 
which  one-fourth  of  the  profits  were  allocated.  This  was 
probably  by  way  of  a  sinking  fund  rather  than  the  proper 
provision  of  reserves  to  meet  depreciation,  and  the  amount 
allowed  suggests  a  round  rather  than  a  calculated  sum.  This 
impression  is  suggested  by  the  fact  that  on  a  further  adjustment 
to  the  partnership  in  18439  this  amount  was  reduced  by  a  half. 
Baxendale  was  also  a  skilled  administrator,  with  the 
ability  to  simplify  and  in  so  doing  strengthen  Pickfords' 
organisation  and  method.  D.  Stevenson,  who  from  his  experience 
in  the  goods  traffic  department  of  the  London  &  Birmingham 
72  Pic  4/7  Memo  Book,  and  Chap.  7  below 
73  For  example  in  Pic  4/7  P  107  are  details  of  provender  cost 
for  four  years  1831-2  to  1834-5,  giving  average  price  per 
quarter/hundredweight  for  oats,  beans,  hayp  straw,  according 
to  place  of  purchaseo  -There  is  a  more  extensive  statement 
on  similar  linesp  for  1839-1901  in  Pic  4/25  P  74.  Again 
Pic.  4/79,  PP  109-1109  for  1829-1835,  is  a  statement  of 
average  costs  per  mile  of  the  boats,  and  horses,  incorporating 
provender  costst  wages,  salary,  rent,  stock  repairs, 
travelling  expenses,  blacksmithl  saddler,  oilý  stabling, 
taxesq  tolls,  sundried,  wear  and  tear  on  horses.  Pic  4/25 
also  contains  P  73  (1)  Statement  of  number  of  horses  returned 
for  assessed  taxest  1822-66,  (2)  stock  of  horses,  31  March 
1831;  each  entered  with  its  nameg  description  and  value. 
168. railway  companyp  was  in  a  position  to  know  Baxendale  wellq 
declared  that  "the  success  of  Pickford  &  Co,  j  and  the  general 
efficiency  of  that  establishment,  proved  his  administrative 
powersý-  and  his  foresight  and  wisdom  at  this  critical  time 
for  carriers  were  borne  out  by  eminent  results.  His  clear 
system  of  forms  and  arrangements,  by  which  a  hold  of  the  Goods 
conveyed  is  maintained  from  the  time  they  leave  the  consignor 
until  they  reach  their  destination,  continues  to  be  the  basis 
of  the  carrying  business  all  over  the  kingdom.,,  74 
This  was 
not  the  only  borrowing  by  railway  companies.  The  Eastern 
Counties  railway,  in  addition  to  several  staff,  also  took 
Pickfords  as  a  model  for  dealing  with  its  correspondence.  To 
each  outgoing  communication  was  attached  a  letter  of  the 
alphabet  denoting  the  office  or  clerk  responsible  for  it.  As 
a  result  all  queries  or  business  arising  could  be  channelled 
75 
to  the  appropriate  person  for  prompt  attention.  This  form 
of  office  structure  survived  in  PIckfords  through  to  the  end 
of  the  period  studied  here,  The  earliest  use  of  it  discovered 
to  date'  is  in  correspondence  with  the  Oxford  canal  company  in 
1824,  but  this  may  be  explained  by  the  chance  survival  of 
records.  It  is  noticeable  however  that  this  date  accords  with 
the  emergence  of  Baxendale,  and  the  principles  underlying  the 
procedure  is  consistent  with  his  dictumt  'method  is  the  hinge 
of  business.  ' 
74  D.  Stevensonj)Fiftý:  years  on  the  London  and  North  Western 
railway  (189  p  14. 
75  Neele,  Op.  cit,,  p  8;  see  also  my  article  'A  note  on  the 
supply  of  staff  for  the  early  railways'  Transport  Histor 
Vol,  1  (1968). 
Ery- 
: L69  . Baxendale  was  an  energetic  mano  an  essential  quality  in  view 
of  Pickfords'  wide  geographical  spread  of  agencies  and  staging 
points.  The  carrying  trade  in  particular  made  great  demands 
on  personal  supervision.  Baxendale  spent  much  of  his  time 
on  the  move,  by  land  and  water,  checking  the  operational 
efficiency  of  the  concern.  His  personal  records  show  that  he 
applied  himself  to  this,  task  with  considerable  vigour,  as  he 
constantly  travelled  on  tours  of  inspection.  For  example, 
between  mid-December  1834  and  the  same  time  the  following  year, 
he  spent  127  days  on  the  move,  travelling  by  boat,  coach  and 
post-horse  a  total  dis,  tance,  of  4,622  miles.  A  special  boatt 
the  'Joseph'  was  allocated  for  this  useq  to  be  replaced  in 
1827  by  the  'Lark',  a  purpose-built  craftq  which  cost  C350-as 
opposed  to  9190-200  for  a  normal  trading  boat.  The  canal 
companies  were  accommodating;  the  Warwick  &  Napton  committee 
agreed  to  let  Pickfords'  representatives  pass  free  of  toll  when 
using  their  boat  for  business  or  pleasure  purposes. 
76  Baxendale 
wasted  no  time  on  these  trips.  His  father  Josiah  Baxendale 
accompanied  him,  on  one  trip  and  kept  a  diary  of  their  journey.  77 
The  presence  of  guests  was  not  allowed  to  slow  the  pace.  The 
continuous  record  of  late  nights  and  early  morningst  5-00  to 
6,00  a,  m,  rise  was  the  norm.  suggests  that  a  pretty  robust 
constitution  was  required  for  prolonged  travel  of  this  kind, 
The  E500  "voted  to  Joseph  Baxendale  for  his  exertions"  in  1836 
was  thoroughly  earned, 
By  the  later  18:,  3-Os  Baxendale  was  able  to  relax  his  efforts 
on  Pickfords'  behalfg  but  his  business  interests.  and  proved 
76  Board  Minutes,.  1  Aug..  1820,7  Sept.  1821  WNC  1/9. 
77  There  is  a  copy  of  this  diary  at  Pic  4/26. 
170. ability,  were  not  confined  to  Pickfords.  In  1836  he  joined 
the  board  of  the  Regents  canal  company,  and  remained  for  three 
years.  A  spell  as  adviser  on  goods'  traffic  and  superintendent 
of  the  out-door  department  on  the  London  &  Birmingham  railway 
followed  in  1839,  -but  that,  in  conjunction  with  his  other 
activities  I 
over-taxed  him  and  had  to  be  given  up,  A  strong 
connection  with  the  railways  remainedg  however.  He  became  a 
director  of  the  South  Eastern  railway  company  in  1837  and  as 
chairman  in  the  early  forties  was  instrumental  in  pushing  the 
line  through  to  Folkestone,  and  establishing  a  through-route 
between  London  and  Paris  by  way  of  Boulogne,  Other  railway 
interests  in  the  1840s  included  a  seat  on  the  board  of  the 
East  India  railway  company,  a  directorship-of  the  Amions  & 
Boulogne  railway978  and  a  substantial  investmentl  possibly  a 
director's  rolet  in  the  Compagnie  du  Chemin  do  For  du  Nord, 
79 
He  was  also  for  a  time  adviser  to  the  Belgian  state  railways, 
80 
His  efforts  on  behalf  of  the  South  Easternp  coming  after  many 
years-of  strenuous  work,  proved  too  much,  and  his  health  cracked, 
In  July  1844  he  left  on  a  long  continental  holiday,  and  during 
his  absence  a  rival  faction  engineered  his  removal  from  the 
chairmanship  of  the  railway  company. 
78  Baxendale's  papers  contain'a  series  of  letters,  1845-52, 
from  Lafittep  Blount  &  Co.  of  Paris,  the  Anglo-French 
bankers  who  promoted  several  French  linesq  notifying  him 
of  the  payment  of  calls  on 
, 
his  shares,  and  credits  placed 
to  his  account  by  the  Amiens  &  Boulogne  railway  Company, 
One  letter  in  1845  notifies  Baxendale  of  F,  15625  placed 
to  his  account  with  them  by  the  railway  company  as  his 
portion  of  the  commission-of  1%  allowed  by  the  company  for 
the  raising  of  the  capital.  A  later  note,  Nov.  1846, 
refers  to  Baxendale  as  administrator  of  the  company. 
79  According  to  an  admission  card  for  the  company's  General 
meeting  in  1858,  Baxendale  had  100  shares  and  two  votes, 
80  Second  reportq  S.  C.  on  Railways,  pp'  1839  (Vol-  X)  QQ-5702- 
5752, 
171. Along  with  energy  went  enterprise.  Baxendale  had  a 
sound  business  mind  and  on  many  occasions  his  foresight 
proved  invaluable.  For  example,  he  quickly  appreciated 
the  opportunJties  offered  by  railways,  and  was  looking  to 
the  Liverpool  &  Manchester  and  Grand  Junction  lines  even 
before  they  were  operational.  In  1838  he  correctly  anticipated 
a  failure  of  the  water  supply  at  Trine  summit  on  the  Grand 
Junction  canall  a  little  way  out  of  London,  and  when  the  time 
came,  he  had  the  details  of  an  arrangement  with  the  London  & 
Birmingham  company  all  tied  up,  so  that  he  could  smoothly 
transfer  his  essential  traffic  to  the  railway,  while  his  rivals 
were  left  floundering,  Again,  convinced  that  the  accommodation 
for  Goods  traffic  planned  by  the  London  &  Birmingham  railway. 
company  would  be  totally  inadequate,  he  bought  a  site  at 
Camden  and  built  a  warehouse  on  it  for  his  own  use.  Events 
quickly  proyed  his  foresight.  Not  only  Pickfords  benefited; 
the  development  of  Folkestone  harbour  by  the  South  Eastern 
railway  company  as  the  terminus  of  a  rail  ferry  service  to  the 
continent  owed  much  to  Baxendale's  appreciation  of  its 
potentialities. 
81 
Railways  were  a  supreme  challenge  to  the 
established  order  of  the  transport  world  and  Baxendale's 
response  to  them  is  indicative.  While  canal  companies  and 
many  carriers  and  coach  proprietors  hung  back,  Baxendale, 
together  with  the  likes  of  Chaplin  and  Hornel  souGht  to  turn 
them  to  advantage, 
82 
81  An  editorial  in  the  Folkestone  Chronicle,,  30  March  1872, 
on  his  deatht  recorded  the  townts  debt  to  Baxendale,  and 
emphasised  his  personal  role  in  the  development  of 
Folkestone  as  a  port  and  the  benefits  his  foresight  had 
brought  to  the  town, 
82  For  a  discussion  of  Pickfords  in  this  wider  context,  see 
my  article  'Therailway  revolution  and  carriers'  response: 
Messrs.  Pickford  and  Company,  1830-501  Transport  History, 
vol.  11  (1969)  p  48  ff. 
172. Baxendale  was  supported  by  a  forceful  personality,  His 
portraitv  presented  to  Mrs,  Baxendale  in  1847  by  Pickfords' 
agents  as  a  tribute  to  his  achievement  in  the  previous  thirty 
yearst  has  the  pose  of  a  confidentq  self-assured  man. 
83 
The 
timing  of  the  railwayslýchallenget  coming  within  a  relatively 
few  years'  of  his  overhaul  of  Pickfords,  and  his  response  to 
it,  proved  his  strength  of  character.  His  was  a  dominant 
personality,  without  being  domineering.  Stevenson  considered 
him  "cheerful  and  witty  in  conversation,  ever  had  a  word  of 
encouragement  for  the  youngsters,  and  was  universally  beloved 
by  those  whom  he  employed.  " 
84 
He  was  fond  of  aphorisms  such 
as  'Nothing  without  labour,  '  and  'He  who  spends  all  he  gets  is 
on  the  way  to  beggary,  t  a  selection  of  which  he  had  posted  in 
Pickfords'  offices  and  warehouses,  He  was,  in  short,  Victorian 
'thrift'  writ  largeý  exhibiting  all  the  virtues  so  highly 
esteemed  by  Samuel  Smiles,  and  enjoying  the  appropriate  awards. 
85 
When  the  partnership  of  1819  expired,  and  Langton  and 
Inman  retiredt  Pickfords  was  soundly  based,  the  largest  canal 
carrying  concern  in  the  country.  Baxendale  and  Thomas  Pickford 
continued  the  partnership,  leasing,  rather  than  purchasing, 
from  the  expired  partnership  all  the  firm's  premises  and 
fixturest  for  E4,100  per  annum,  -and  the  canal  boats  at  C12  per 
annum  each*  The  proceeds  of  this  arrangement  were  to  serve 
83  The  original  hangs  at  Framfield  Placet  together  with  an 
inscribed  roll  containing  a  dedication  to  Mrs.  Baxendale 
and  the  signatures  and  length  of  service  of  all  the  agents, 
who  had-jointly  commissioned,  the  portrait.  One  of  them  had 
been  with  Pickfords  for  46  yearsq  four  for  30  years  or 
moreq  and  fourteen  for  twenty  years  or  more. 
84  Stevenson  Fifty  years,  on  the  London  and  North  Western 
rai  p  14, 
85  Smiles  Thriftl  Chap.  IX. 
17-3* partly  as  an  indemnityg  partly  as  an  investment  fund  for  the 
86 
benefit  of  the  previous  partners,  Baxendale  and 
Pickford  took  over  44  depotsp  as  listed  in  the  agreement, 
together  with  a  hundred  or  so  smaller  agencies,  112  trading 
boats,  and  about  800  horses. 
87 
Although  Baxendale  became 
the-major  partner  with  a  half  share  to  Thomas  Pickford's  quarter 
sharel  he  seems  to  have  given  up  the  day-to-day  management  of 
Pickfords  and  confined  his  attention  to  matters  of  overall 
policy. 
A  new  generation  of  Baxendales  joined  the  firm.  J.  H. 
Baxendalep  the  oldest  song  entered  the  firm  in  1836,88  and-was 
89 
followed  in  time  by  his  three  younger  brothers  .  In  1843 
Baxendalets  two  elder  sons  Joseph  Ilornby  and  Lloyd  were  brought 
into  the  partnership  and  each  received  a  sixteenth  share  in 
the  business. 
go  Thomas  Pickford  retained  his  position  until 
his  death$  after  which  the  remaining  Pickford  family  interest 
was  bought  out. 
91  Pickfords  passed  fully  into  the  ownership 
and  control  of  the  Baxendales. 
86  Deed  of  Arrangement,  3  May  1838  KS/2/2.  An  earlier  draft 
at  FoPe  gives  a  pro  forma  valuation  of  the  boats  at  940  each. 
87  Pic.  4/25  P  73t  'Statement  of  number  of  horses  returned  for 
assessed  taxes,  1822-1866. 
88  Diary  of  Joseph  Hornby  Baxendale,  Pic  HH. 
89  Only  the  elder  three  eventually  stayed  with  the  firm. 
Salisburyp  the  youngest,  apparently  did  not  take  to  business. 
go  Memoranda  of  my  lifel  attached  sheets  in  the  flap. 
91  London  Gazette  27  Aug.  1850  published  the  expiration  of  the 
partnership.  This  shows  that  the  third  son,  Richard  Birley, 
was  now  a  partnert  so  there  must  have  been  a  further  re- 
arrangement  after  1843.  From  1850,  Baxendale  and  his  three 
sons  continued  alone.  The  terms  of  the  arrangement  with 
Mrs.  Elizabeth  Pickford,  Thomas'  widow,  dated  20  July  1865, 
are  at  CHP/27- 
174. CHAPTER 
THE  APOGEE  OF  ROAD  TRANSPORT The  road  and  canal  transport  industries  had  both  enjoyed 
many  years  of  boom  conditions  before  they  were  replaced  by  the 
railways, 
1  By  1820  the  worst  of  the  post-war  depression  had 
passed;  Britain  then  experienced  some  fifteen  years  of  strong, 
if  erraticy  economic  progress. 
2 
Rising  real  incomes,  rising 
output,  increased  exports  and  importsv  all  meant  that  the 
quantum  of  goods  to  be,  transported  to  domestic  and  foreign 
markets  rapidly  increased. 
The  sustained  pressure  of  demand  induced  similar  expansion 
in  the  road  and  canal  transport  sectors,  as  well  as  the  eventual 
emergence  of  railways.  The  large  profits  enjoyed  by  certain 
canal  companies  are  a  familiar  feature  of  these  years.  At  the 
same  time  the  coaching  industry  reached  its  peak.  Inter-city 
coaches  were  abundantp  speeds  the  fastest  yet  recorded, 
competition  keen  to  the 
coaching  'empires'  were 
and  Sherman.  The  boom 
from  confined  to  passen, 
by  road  also  prospered. 
transport  to  Manchester 
point  of  ruination,  Considerable 
built  up  by  people  like  Chaplin,  Horne 
in  road  transportv  however,  was  far 
3er  travel.  The  conveyance  of  Goods 
For  all  the  great  importance  of  canal 
the  city  still  supported  in  1816  "nearly 
two  hundred  land  carriers,  who  carry  goods  to  and  from  the 
various  parts  of  the  kingdom,  in  waggons  or  carts. 
0 
Years 
of  rapid  economic  expansion  could  only  increase  the  opportunities 
open  to  road  Iýauliersq  to  which  Pickfords  responded  with  a 
notable  expansion  of  its  van  and  waggon  services. 
1,  This  chapter  focuses  on  the  1820s  and  1830s.  There  are  two 
important  sources  in  Pickfordst  records,  a  Journal  1817-1822 
Pic  4/4  and  a  Memo  book  Pic  4/7  which  gives  details  of  road 
operations  in  the  1830s, 
2  S.  G.  Checkland  The  rise  of  industrial  society  in  England,, 
1815-1885  (1964)  chap.  2t  esP,  PP  11-17. 
3  J.  Aston  A  picture  of  Manchester  (Manchester  1816)  p  230. 
175. Pickfordst  van,  'on  springs  and  guardedlt  was  introduced 
in  July  1814  on  the  route  between  London  and  Manchester  by  way 
of  Northampton,  Leicesterg  Loughborough  and  Derby, 
4 
This  line 
remained  the  basic  core  of,  Pickfords'  van  service  to  which 
various  extensions  were  made  from  the  autumn  of  1819  onwards. 
In  September  1819  a  van  service  was  started  from  Sheffield, 
taking  in  Chesterfield,  Mansfield  and  Nottingham  along  the  way 
and  connecting  with  the  London-bound  vans  at  Leicester,  5 
By 
1825  the  s  ervice  was  run  on  a  daily  basis. 
6 
Liverpool  was  next 
to  be  joined  to  the  system.  In  December  18,97  a  van  was 
introduced  between  Manchester  and  Liverpool  but  soon  a  more 
direct  link  with  London  was  established  by  way  of  a  branch  van 
from  Macclesfield.  The  down  London  van  to  Manchester  arrived 
at  Macclesfield  at  2.35  am  and  at  4.00  am  a  van  left  for 
Liverpool.  Having  completed  the  journey  in  seven  hours,  it 
returned  the  same  day  to  connect  with  the  up  London  van  which 
arrived  in  Macclesfield  at  10.00  pm. 
8A 
van  was  also  run 
between  Macclesfield 
. 
and  Congleton.  Finallyfrom  March  1821  a 
further  van  was  started  between  Sheffield  and  Leeds  which 
completed  a  round  trip  each  day.  9 
Additional  vans  were  run 
between  various  places  along  existing  routes  as  the  weight  of 
4  Manchester  MercuEX,  5  July  1814. 
5  Commencing  2  Sept.  1819,  according  to  mileage  payment  to 
John  Stonest  the  contractor  for  this  and  the  London-Manchester 
van,  Journalv  Pic  4/4  March  1820. 
6  Sheffie 
, 
ld  directory  (Gell)  1825  p  177. 
7  Commencing  6  Dec.  1819;  payment  to  J.  Arrowsmith,  horse 
contractorp  Journal, 
, 
Pic  4/4  March  1820 
8  J.  Earles  Streets  and  houses  of  old  Macclesfield  (Macclesfield 
1915)q  p  18  _jCiting  an  'Old  Macclesfield  directory  of  18201; 
see  also  J.  Plant  and 
, 
T,  Gregory  The  history  and  directorX  of 
Macclesfield  and  its  vicinity  (Manchester  1825)  p  183.  - 
9  Commencing  6  March  1821;  Journal,  Pic  4/4  June  1821. 
176. traffic  demanded,  Although  the  van  service  to  Liverpool  and 
Sheffield  commenced  as  branch  services  off  the  main  route 
between  London  and  Manchester,  it  is  likely  that  eventually 
throuGh-vans  from  London  were  run  to  both  of  these  places. 
The  vans  provided  a  specialist  service,  with  speed  of 
transit  as  the  prime  factor.  They  travelled  at  approximately 
6  mph',  a  speed  roughly  half-way  between  that  attained  by  the 
slower  waggons  and  faster'coaches,  In  the  1830st  the  186 
miles  between  London  and  Manchester  were  completed  in  thirty- 
four  hourst  a  reduction  of  two  hours  compared  with  the  original 
timing, 
10  Coaches  took  between  seventeen  and  nineteen  hours 
for  the  same  Journey, 
11,  Similar  reductions  in.  van  times  took 
place  on  the  Sheffield  and  Liverpool  routes.  The  running  of 
the  vans  had  many  features  in  common  with  the  coaching  trade. 
The  horses  travelled  at  a  trotting  pace  and  each  team  of  four 
was  replaced  at  regular  intervals.  To  maintain  the  necessary 
speed  the  horses  had'to  be  of  a  calibre  comparable  to  that  of 
the  best  coach  horses.  Indeed'rac6s  between  vans  and  coaches 
were  not  uncommon. 
12  The  vans  were  run  according  to  a  carefully 
timed  schedule.  Contractors  who  horsed  the  vans  were  fined  if 
they  failed  to  maintain  the.  schedule. 
13 
Initially  Pickfords 
relied  quite  heavily  on  outside  contractors  for  the  supply  of 
10  By  comparison  of  advertisements  in  various  trade  directories. 
11  Jackman'Transportation  in  modern  Eng 
- 
land  Pp  700-701. 
12  Inman  to  Pickford  &  Co.,  London,  30  No:  ý-.  (?  1818)  Pic  4/27  P  5. 
13  Inman  to  Pickford  &  Co.,  "London  18  Nov.  1818,  F.  P.;  also 
30  Nov,  (?  1818)t  Pic'4/27t  P  5;  fine  against  van  horse 
contractor  J.  Bass,  Journal  Pic  4/4  Dec.  1821, 
177. both  vans  and  horses;  in  1820  Pickfords  horsed  only  the  stage 
immediately  in  and  out  of  London.  By  the  later  1830s,  however, 
PIckfords  supplied  all  the  horses  it  needed, 
14 
Conveyance  of  goods  by  van  was  speedyq  but  it  was  expensive. 
Meaningful  figures  of  the  cost  of  road  haulage  during  this 
period  are  particularly  sparse  whether  for  coach,  van  or  wageon. 
The  trend  of  haulage  costs  was  perhaps  upwards  in  the  post- 
Napoleonic  war  years 
15 
although  in  1838,  before  railway 
competition  was  yet  effectivet  Daniel  Deacon,  forty  years  a 
carrierg  claimed  that  charges  between  London  and  Yorkshire  had 
fallen  by.  more  than  half  compared  with  twenty  to  twenty-five 
years  previously. 
16  The  cost  of  conveyance  by  van  was  in 
excess  of  that  by  waggon  andprobably  Generally,  but  not 
necessarily,  less  than  that  by  coach,  Deacon  Gave  the  relative 
charges  per  cwt  between  London  and  Yorkshire  as  coach  18/-dl 
van  12/-p  waggon  61-.  Pickfords'  opening  charge  by  van  between 
Manchester  and  London  was  20/-  per  cwt  or  2d  per  lb.,  which  by 
july  1822  had  been  raised  to  23/4  per  cwt.  Although  rates  were 
later  reduced  to  meet  the  competition  of  a  rival,  their  lowest 
point  was  16/-d  per  cwt  or  something  less  than  lid  per  lb,  17 
14  Journal  Pic  4/4,  passimt  payments  to  horse  contractors; 
Memo  book,  Pic  4/7  names  Pickfords'  van  horse  stations  and 
the  timing  of  the  vans  at  each,  There  is  a  gap  of  80  miles 
between  Brixworthq  near  Northampton,  and  Leek.  In  1837 
Baxendale  said  Pickfords  provided  all  the  van  horses  the  firm 
needed.  S.  C.  on  Railroad  communicationt  PP  1837-8  (Vol.  XVI) 
Q-1135. 
15  W.  Albert  'The  Justices'  rates  for  land  carriage',  Transport 
History  Vol,  1  (1968)  p  120.  It  should  be  noted  that  the 
rates  given  by  Copeland  Roads  and  their  traffic  P  70  are  not 
for  road  as  stated  therep  but  for  canal  conveyance. 
16  Evidence  of  Daniel  Deacont  Second  report  S.  C.  on  Postage 
pp  1837-8  (XX)  q-7267- 
17  Samuel  Saltt  Railway  and  commercial  informationL  (London  and 
Manchester  1850)  P  119  item  No.  19.  Sali  frequently  gives  no 
source  for  his  informationg  but  whenever  it  can  be  chocked  it 
is  always  accurate.  - 
178- It  is  impossible  to  say  how  these  compare  with  coach  rates  over 
the  same  distance  and  time  period.  Jackman  quotes  a  rate  of 
ld  per  lb.  by  coach  from  Birminaham.  to  London  in  1833,18  and 
there  is  some  evidence  that  Pickfords'  van  rate  from  Nottingham 
in  1819  exceeded  that  by  coach. 
19  But  the  whole  question  awaits 
further  evidence, 
Similarly  there  is  only  the  most  limited  information  as  to 
theltraffic  conveyed  by  the  vans.  One  regular  consignment  was 
bullion.  Bankers  found  the  vansq  protected  by  armed  Guards, 
particularly  useful.  "Two,  at  least,  of  the  old  Manchester 
banks  were  accustomed  to  send  their  heavy  London  packets  by 
Pickfords'  van  ý-  an  institution  now  defunct,  but  which  once 
formed  one  of  the  most  interesting  features  of  English  commercial 
lifeo  The  great  vans  were  as  familiar  as  the  railway  trains  of 
today.  " 
20 
Other  articles  included  silk  goods  and  also  meat 
brought  up  to  London  fromleicester  and  Northampton. 
21 
In  general, 
therefore,  Ivan  goods'  would  be  high  value,  low  volume  articles 
or  commodities,  like  meatq  where  speed  of  conveyance  was 
essential. 
A  reliable  source  quotes  the  following  figures  as  Pickfords' 
AJL. 
profit  on  its  Manchester  to  London  van  between  1818  and  1825. 
j 
18  Jackman  Transportation  in  modern  Enrr 
, 
land  P  723. 
19  Langton  to  Matthew  PIckford  6  Sept.  1819,  F.  P. 
20  L.  H.  Grindon,  Manchester  banks  and  bankers,  (2nd  ed  1878)  P  173. 
Also  Baxendalets  evidence  SC  on  Railways  rp  1838 
jVol. 
X) 
Q.  2527;  Inman  to  Langton  23  Sept.  1818,  Pic  4/27  P  1. 
21  'Fifth  report  and  evidence,  SC  on  Railway  communicatiorrpp)  1840 
(Vol.  XIII)  evidence  of  William  Prentice  and  Thomas  Bonser 
meat  salesmenýof  Newgate  Market. 
22  Salt  Op.  cite  p  11  Between  1820  and  1825  the  movement  of  profits 
broadly  corresponds  to  price  fluctuations  as  indicated  by  the 
Gayer,  Rustou  &  Schwartz  index  of  domestic  commodities.  The 
rise  in  profits  from  1818  to  1820,  against  a  strong  price  fall, 
would  suggest  a  real  increase  in  profits  in  those  years. 
See  appendix  2.  fig.  l. 
179. 1818  C23tO39.  6.  2d 
1819  C239532.  5.  9d 
1820  E259260.  2.  7d 
1821  L24,384.  16.  4d 
1822  C229615.  16.  6d 
1823  C23,423.  4.  6d 
1824  C23,653.  15.  6d 
1825  923p835.  13.  9d 
The  implication  was  that  such  profits  were  excessive:  the 
figures  were  intended  to  show  the  cost  reductions  achieved  by 
the  railways.  Profits  were  at  least  sufficiently  large  to 
attract  a  competitor  to  Pickfordst  van  in  Manchester.  In 
February  1825  the  'Association  Van'  was  set  up  and  it  was  to 
meet  this  competition  that  the  reduction  in  van  rates  noted 
above  was  made.  When  the  rate  had  falled  to  161-  per  cwt 
Pickfords  bought  off  the  opposition. 
Iloweverv  other  competitors  remained.  John  Johnson  &  Co., 
ran  vans  from  Manchester  and  Liverpool  to  London  in  much  the 
same  time  as  Pickfords  in  the  1820s.  In  Sheffield,  too', 
Pickfords  were  opposed  by  a  competing  vang  that  of  Deacon, 
Harrison  &  Co.,  which  followed  a  different  route  but  arrived  in 
London  at  the  same  time. 
23 
Deacong  Harrison  &  Co.,  were  a 
substantial  firm,  mainly  engaged  in  land  carriageo  which 
competed  with  Pickfords  over  a  wide  area  between  Londong  the 
east  midlands  and  Yorkshire.  As  well  as  a  van  service,  both 
firms  had  a  mixed  road  and  canal  service  from  Sheffield  to 
London  -  by  waggon  to  Leicester  and  then  on  to  London,  in  six 
days,  by  fly  boat.  Deacono  Harrison  &  Co,  j  also  had  a  waggon 
service  direct  to  London,  in  eighty  hours. 
24 
The  trade 
23  Sheffield  directory  (Gell)  1825;  Nottinpham  director  (Glover) 
182.5. 
24  Deacon's  evidencet  second  report  SC  on  Postage  -pp  1838  (658) 
Q-7224  ff.;  Sheffield  directory  (G-e-1--17-1825. 
1ý0. directories  of  London  and  provincial  towns  demonstrate  the 
extent  of  the  carriers'  competing  services,  and  especially  the 
wide  coverage  of  land  carriage  in  the  1820s  and  1830S. 
The  vansp  catering  for  a  particular  type  of  traffic,  were 
thus  an  addition  to  the  existing  road  transport  facilities. 
They  did  not  replace  the  conventional  waggons.  Throughout  these 
years,  Pickfords  continued  to  include  its  London  waggons  as 
part  of  its  normal  road  services  from  Manchester  and  when  canal 
transport  was  interruptedv  by  frost  or  the  annual  summer 
stoppage  for  maintenance  workq  the  waggons  came  into  their  own 
again.  There  was  thus  sufficient  demand  for  conventional 
road  servicesq  irrespective  of  canal  transport,  to  keep  some 
waagons  in  regular  use.  Moreover  there  were  areas  where  canals 
either  did  not  exist'or  involved  circuitous  routes,  for  example 
in  the  east  Pennine  region  where  Pickfords  found  considerable 
scope  for  road  haulage.  In  September  1820  a  waggon  service, 
six  days  a  week,  was  introduced  between  Sheffield  and  Nottingham. 
The  thirty-five  miles  were  completed  in  seventeen  hours.  25 
Sometime  between  1822  and  1825  Sheffield  was  linked  to  Manchester 
by  waggon.  Initially  the  Sheffield  waggons  approached 
Manchester  from  a  northerly  direction  by  way  of  Glossopq  Staley- 
bridge,  and  Ashton  but  in  March  1835  a  southerly  approach  via 
Castleton  and  Bullock  Smithy  was  adopted,  In  July  the  same 
year  the  service  was  stepped  up  to  twice  daily.  26 
There  was 
also  a  road  service  between  Manchester  and  Halifax. 
27 
Finally 
25  Commencing  17  Sept.  18209  Journal,  Pic  4/4,  Oct.  1820;  the 
time  schedule  appears  in  the  Memo  bookq  Pic  4/7. 
26  Sheffield  directory  (Gell)  1875.  There  is  no  mention  of  this 
in  the  Journal  which  ends  March  1822.  The  later  details  are 
from  the  Memo  book  Pic  4/7. 
27  See  the  accompanying  maps  for  1829  and  1832,  following  pt87S 
below. 
18a.. during  the  18305  Pickford5  was  also  operating  a  daily  waggon 
service  from  Huddersfield  to  Leedsp  Bradford  and  Halifax, 
28 
Since  both  Leeds  and  Bradford  had  access  to  canal  transport  by 
their  position  on  the  Leeds  &  Liverpool  canal  some  competition 
between  road  and  canal  transport  is  suggested.  For  traffic 
passing  between  either  of  these  two  places  and  south  Lancashireq 
the  Leeds  &  Liverpool  canal  was  a  circuitous  route.  The  long 
detour  would  be  eliminated  if  goods  were  sent  by  road  to 
Huddersfield  and  thence  by  the  Huddersfield  canal  to  Manchester. 
There  was  no  comparable  water  link  between  Sheffield  and 
Manchester  or  Nottingham, 
Limited  comment  is  possible  on  Pickfords'  capital  and 
working  costs  for  road  transport  during  these  years. 
29 
The 
cost  of  certain  items  is  known  but  since  the  number  of  waggons, 
vans  and  horses  Pickfords  actually  used  is  unknown  no  reliable 
estimate  of  total  capital  cost  can  be  made.  In  March  1820 
two  new  four-wheel  vans  were  bought  for  the  Manchester  to 
Liverpool  service  at  a  cost  of  f.  162.14.6d.  If  Pickfords  owned 
only  a  dozen  vans  to  cover  all  its  services  the  purchase  cost 
would  be  nearly  C1900O.  '  Wageons  were  less  expensive;  a  three- 
inch  wheel,  waggon  cost  E37  and  a  six-inch  wheel  waggon,  the  more 
common  vehicle,  cost  L48.  The  new  price  of  horses  is  unknown 
but  in  1831,  when  Pickfords  had  some  250  horses  in  use  on  the 
roadsv  van  horses  were  valued  at  an  average  of  917.10.  Od  each 
and  waggon  horses  at  L16  each,  By  comparison  boat  horses  were 
valued  at  only  L7  each.  On  the  basis  of  these  figures  the 
28  Memo  book  Pic  4/7. 
29  Most  of  the  following  figures  derive  from  the  Journal  Pic  4/4, 
or  the  Memo  book,  Pic  4/7-  The  number  and  value  of  horses  in 
1831  are  from  1,  Statement  of  number  of  horses  returned  for 
assessed  taxes  1822-1866';  2,  Stock  of  horses,  31  March  1831; 
both.  at  Pic  4/25  P.  73. 
182. cost  of  putting  a  four-horse  van  on  the  road  would  be  9150  and 
that  of  a  six-inch  wheel  waggon  and  team  of  seven  horses  C160. 
The  capital  cost  of  the  waggon  and  horses  for  the  Huddersfield 
service  would  have  been  C570. 
Pickfords  avoided  part  of  the  total  cost  by  hiring  some  of 
the  necessary  stock.  At  Iluddersfieldv  Pickfords  owned  only  two 
of  the  six  waggons  in  use.  The  wageons  for  the  Manchester  to 
Sheffield  service  were  also  hired.  During  the  years  1817  to 
1822  vans  were  hired  at  4d  to  41d  per  double  mile,  van  horses 
on  average  at  1/11  to  2/-,  per  double  mile,  with  some  small 
downward  reduction  over  the  five-year  period  to  which  these 
figures  relateo  Waggon.  s,  at  3d  per  double  mile,  and  waggon- 
horses  at  1/6d,  were  a  little  cheaper.  The  capital  saving 
to  Pickfords  of  hiring  four  of  the  Huddersfield  wageons  was 
C171i  the  equivalent  of  two  years  rent  for  them. 
An  indication  of  the  structure  of  working  costs  for  road 
vehicles  is  provided  by  an  analysis  of  Pickfords'  waggonsv  two 
a  day  in  each  directiong  between  Manchester  and  Sheffield, 
calculated  in  September  1835.30 
Cost  of  operation 
Waggonerst  wages 
Horsekeepers'  wages 
Mileage  of  waggons 
Rent 
Tolls 
0 
app,  repate  expenses  per  annum 
£6,5o.  o.  0. 
£293.  16.  0. 
£319.  16.  0. 
£69.  1-2.  0. 
£1123.  4.  0. 
Total  £2456.  8.  0. 
The  omission  of  any  allowance  for  the  supply  and  feeding  of  horses, 
maintenance  and  other  chargesq  means  that  these  figures  cannot  be- 
taken  as  an  accurate  statement  of  all  working  costs.  As  they 
30  Memo  book  Pic  4/7- 
1U. Pickfords"  services  by  land  and  water,  1829 
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I, 
approximately  forty  per  cent. 
31 
Throughout  these  years,  then,  road  haulage  by  waggon  as 
well  as  by  van  remained  a  distinct  and  independent  sphere  of 
operation.  But  there  was  also  scope  for  integrating  road 
transport  services  with  those  provided  by  canals  and  also,  for 
a  short  time,  railways.  Only  occasionally  could  road  challenge 
32 
canal  over,  any  distance,  and  railways  not  at  all.  The 
accompanying  maps  of  Pickfords'  services  published  in  1829 
33 
and  183234  .  show  that  short  road  links  to  canal  wharfs  were 
common.  Che5tert  ShreW5buryq  Bridgnortht  Stafford,  Ayle5bury, 
were  all  joined  by  road  to  the  canal  system.  The  wharf  at 
Stoke,  on  the  Trent  &  Mersey  canal,  was  the  focus  of  road 
links  to  Leekand  Macclesfield.  In  1815  a  cart  left  Leek  each 
week  for  Stoke35  and  from  about  1820  Macclesfield  was  the 
departure  point  for  a  daily  waggong  carrying  both  passengers  and 
goods,  which  passed  through  Congleton  and  Newcastle  en  route 
to  Stoke. 
36 
In  some  cases  road  transport  was  fully  integrated 
with  the  canal  trade  in  that  certain  canal  rates  were  quoted  as 
inclusive  of  collection  and  delivery  at  the  place  of  origin  or 
destination.  This  included  traffic  conveyed  from  wharfs  on  the 
Grand  Junction  canal  to  Warwick  and  traffic  from  Rugely,  near 
Staffordo  to  Manchester.  Similarly  traffic  between  Radford, 
31  Unf 
' 
ortunately  very  few  records  survive  of  turnpike  trusts 
around  Manchester.  Some  payments,  for  1818p  are  recorded 
in  the  accounts  of  the  Manchester  and  Wilmslow  Trust,  but 
the  entries  are  for  total  sums  paid  only. 
32  See  below  chap.  '8. 
33  Manchester  directory  (Pigot)  1829. 
34  Manchester  directory  ýPigotý  1832 
35  Commercial  directory  ýPigot)  1814-15.  (Towns  and  cities  of 
the  north  of  England). 
36  Earles,  Old  Macc 
' 
lesfield  p.  184;  I.  Finney  Macklesfelde  in 
Ze  olden  times  (Macclesfield,  1873)  p.  80  who  refers  to  the 
passenger  aspect.  Directory  of  Cheshire  (Pigot)  18309  P  35 
Macclesfield  entry. 
184. on  the  Staffordshire  &  Worcester  canal,  and  Bristol,  Liverpool, 
London  and  Manchester  included  collection  and  delivery  to  and 
from  Stafford,  the  nearest  town  and  the  presumed  destination  of 
the  goods. 
37 
It  was  not  until  the  later  1830s  that  Pickfords'  road 
services  were  seriously  affected  by  railways.  The  facilities 
provided  by  the  Liverpool  &  Manchester  railway  were  absorbed 
with  the  little  difficulty.  -Sheffield  goods  which  had  previously 
been  sent  on  from  Manchester  'by  caravan,  waggon  and  canal' 
were  now  'forwarded  to  Liverpool  by  the  railway'. 
38 
Pickfords 
was  soon  paying  the  Liverpool  &  Manchester  railway  company  L200 
a  month  for  its  van  and  Sheffield  goods  from  Liverpool  and 
received  the  use  of  a  warehouse  from  the  company  free  of  charge. 
39 
As  a  short,  isolated  line  the  Liverpool  &  Manchester  railway 
was  absorbed  quite  easily  into  the  existing  structure  of  services. 
when,  however,  long  lines  of  rail  were  brought  into  uýet 
railway  competition  began  to  bite  sharply.  Toll  receipts  on 
the  Ashbourne  to  Leek  turnpike  reached  their  peak  in  1837,  but 
the  trustees  were  already  casting  an  anxious  look  at  the  future. 
Anticipating  "a  considerable  decrease  ...  in  the  rents  on  letting 
the  tolls  ...  in  consequence  of  the  railroads  intended  shortly  to 
be  openedg"  they  decided  to  offer  rebates  if  any  stage-coaches 
were  taken  off. 
4o 
This  was  in  June  1837,  a  month  before  the 
Grand  Junction  railway  between.,  Liverpool  and  Birmingham  was 
37  pic  4/8  passim. 
38  Sheffield  directory  (Gell)  1825,  P-178;  Sheffield  directory 
TWite)  1833  P  143. 
39  Evidence  of  A.  Comber,  fifth  report  SC  on  Railway  Communication 
PP  1840  (Vol-  XIII)  QQ-3729-3733 
40  A,  -.  E.  &  E.  M.  Dodd,  IThe  old  road 
ýrom 
Ashbourne  to  Leek' 
Transactions  of  the  North  Staffordshire  Field  Club  Vol.  L=Vljl 
(11948-9)  P-56. 
1.85. opened  for  traffic.  Pickfords  was  also  assessing  the  effects 
of  railways9  especially  on  the  vans  whose  maintdvantagov  speed, 
was  about  to  be  nullified.  Accordingly  in  June  1837  Pickfords 
put  its  London  van  horses  up  for  sale:  "twenty  remarkably  fine, 
powerful,  youngt  fresh,  good-actionedg  short-logged  horses,  in 
beautiful  condition...  just  taken  off  their  well-known  London, 
Manchester  and  Liverpool  van,  in  consequence  of  the  intended 
opening  of  the  railroad  from  Liverpool  to  Birmingham.  1141  The 
van  horses  at  Leicester  were  also  sold. 
42 
However  this  action 
proved  to  be  slightly  precipitate.  Conditions  on  the  Grand 
Junction  railway  were  apparently  rather  confused  in  the  early 
days,  and  some  of  Pickfords'  clients9  bullion  merchants  in 
particulart  preferred  to  continue  using  the  vans.  "We  therefore 
were  under  the  necessity  of  continuing  our  vans  three  days  in 
the  weekt  and  regretted  that  we  had  abandoned  them  at  all.  " 
43 
But  this  was  a  short-term  measure  at  best.  When  the  London  & 
Birmingham  railway  was  opened  early  the  following  year,  a  through- 
route  was*available  between  Londont'Liverpool  and  Manchester. 
Pickfords'  vans  were  finally  taken  off  in  May  1838,  In  1840  the 
trustees  of  the  Ashbourne  to  L66k  turnpike  offered  reduced  tolls 
to  Pickfords,  among  others,,  -in  an  effort  to  hold  up  sagging 
receipts. 
44 
The  vans  were  thus  quickly  super 
f 
eded  butt  unlike-some  of 
the  coach  proprietorsq  Baxendale  did  not  try  to  oppose  the 
railways*  Moreover  this  was  not  quite  the  end  of  road  transport 
41  The  Times,  20  June  1837;  this  was  the  second  half  of  a  40 
horse  jol;  lot.  See  prior  advertisement  The  Times  14  June  1837. 
42  Copeland  Roads  and  their  traffic  Pp  189. 
43  Baxendale's  evidencet  SC  on  Railroad  Communications  PP  1837-8 
(Vol.  XVI)  Q-1136. 
44  Dodd  Op.  cit.  P  57. 
186. since  the  piecemeal  way  in  which  the  rail  network  was  brought  into 
use  over  the  next  three  or  four  years  left  many  temporary  gaps 
which  could  be  filled  by  road  services.  In  May  1841,  for 
example,  a  van  was  put  on  from  Stoke  to  connect  with  the  railway 
network  at  Birmingham 
45 
and  anotherl  about  the  same  timep  between 
Derby  and  Manchester. 
46 
The  accompanying  maps  of  Pickfords' 
47  48 
services  published  in  1839,1841  and  1844  shows  the 
flexibility  with  which  Pickfords'  road  vehicles  were  switched 
as  changing  circumstances  required.  The  main  scope  was  in  the 
provision  of  temporary  road  links  to  towns  like  Bradfordq 
Doncasterg  Warwickq  Northampton,  Maidstone,  and  Canterbury  which 
still  lacked  branch  lines  or,  in  the  case  of  the  north-east 
route  to  Scotlandt  an  extension  to  the  line  of  rail  in  use  at 
any  time.  Pickfords  continued  to  operate  road  waggons  in  the 
north  until  the  Berwick-Newcastle  section  of  the  line,  opened 
in  Julyp  1847P  completed  the  route. 
49 
By  the  later  1840sp  thereforeq  Pickfords'  long  distance 
road  haulage  services  had  come  to  an  end.  However  road  transport 
did  not  disappear,  Indeed  if  anything  the  effect  of  railways 
was  greatly  to  strengthen  the  demand  for  such  facilities,  but 
in  the  restricted  context  of  urban  cartage.  The  revival  of  long- 
distance  road  transport  awaited  the  development  of  motor 
transport  at  the  end  of  the  century. 
45.  Commencing  17  May  1841,  G,  Neville  to  W.  Lewis  15  May  1841 
Pic  HH, 
46  Derby  directory  (Glover)  (taken  18429  published  1843)  P-158. 
47  Pic  4/3,  source  unknown:  Chap,  9  belowt  following  p.  IAI 
48  CHP  28  and  29;  Chap.  9  belowq  following  p  I:  L( 
49  Glasgow  Post  Office  directory  1847/8  p.  139. 
187. CHAPTER  8 
THE  AGE  OF  CANALS By  1817  the  canal  side  of  Pickfords'  business  was  firmly 
based.  In  the  use  of  contractors  for  the  Supply  of  horses, 
and  some  boats, 
I 
the  principles  applied  in  road-haulageý  of 
meeting  internally  only  a  part  of  the  firm's  capital  needs, 
were  repeated.  Pickfords  owned  about  eighty  boats  in  1817  and 
hired  about  a  dozen  moreq  a  small  proportion  of  the  total  in 
use*  Moreover  the  hiring  of  boats  was  quickly  phased  out. 
Reliance  on  horse  contractors  was  much  more  extensive  and  long- 
lasting;  until  1825  Pickfords  owned  no  boat  horses  at  all. 
All  the  firm's  canal  work,  which  was  chiefly  centred  along  the 
route  between  Manchester  and  London,  was  contracted  out,  Ono 
manp  Samuel  Leat  contracted,  for  fifteen  different  staGes,  a 
total  of  868  miles. 
1  Lea,  a  wealthy  mail  on  his  own  account, 
also  acted  as  Pickfords'  agent  at  Braunston. 
From  about  1820  Pickfords  supplidd  more  of  its  needs 
directly-  Not  only  was  the  hiring  of  boats  stopped,  but  the 
entire  stock  of  canal  boats  was  extensively  overhauled.  In 
the  year  1821-29  Pickfords  owned  eiGhty-three  boats,  of  which 
seventy  six  were  classed  as  old  and  seven  only  as  new.  During 
the  next  five  years,  Pickfords  disposed  of  eighty  boats  and 
built  sixty-nine  new  ones,  the  bulk  of  them  (fifty)  between 
1822  and  1824.2  All  new  boats  had  to  be  registered  with  the 
canal  companies  to  measure  their  tonnage  displacement  for  toll 
purposes.  The  Grand  Junction  canal  boat  register  recorded 
1.  These  details  of  working  are  shown  by  the  payments  recorded 
in  Pic.  4/4,  Journal  of  the  Manchester  Office,  1817-22.  The 
entries  for  June  1817t  P.  79  give  a  complete  break-down  of 
the  names  of  contractors,  the  length  of  stages,  etc,  The 
stages  listed  are  chiefly  on  the  line  Manchester  to  London, 
with  some-side-shoots  to  Leicester  and  Worcester.  Contractors 
were  paid  10d  fer  double  mile  per  horse.  The  same  source  also 
shows  that  by  1822  Pickfords  were  no  longer  hiring  any  boats. 
2.  Baxendalets  note-bookv  Details  of  boats,  etc,  F.  p. 
188. thirteen  of  Pickfords'  boats  in  1822,  and  a  further  twenty-five 
the  following  year. 
3  -The 
primary  purpose  of  this  rebuilding 
seems  to  have  been  straight  replacement  of  stock  since  numbers 
were  held  stable  at  about  eighty-five  to  ninety  boats  for  the 
rest  of  that  decade.  Since  the  new  boats  probably  had  a 
higher  loading  factor  than  those  they  replaced,  there  would  be, 
as  a  secondary  effect,  some  addition  to  aggregate  capacity.  A 
second,  lesser  phase  of  building,  in  1830  and  1834-5,  seems  to 
have  represented  a  conscious  pol-icy  of  expansion  as  net  additions 
to  stock  pushed  the  total  up  to  116  trading  boats  by  1838.4 
There  is  no  evidence  as  to  the  purpose  of  these  changes. 
Possibly  a  desire  for  self-sufficiency,  and  thus  a  tighter 
control  of  the  working  machinet  dictated  Pickfords'  decision  to 
build  up  its  own  stock  of  horsesq  as  well  as  expanding  its  supply 
of  boats.  A  first 
I 
purchase  of  110  horses  in  1825  was  increased 
to  150  the  following  year.  That  remained  the  total  until  1835, 
wheng  in  a  second  spurt,  it  jumped  to  320  and  on  to  a  peak  of 
398  in  1830  It  is  impossible  to  say  what  significance,  if  any, 
lay  behind  these  sudden  increases  in  numbers. 
The  growth  of  Pickfords'  trading  capacity  was  accompanied 
by  increased  investment  in  wharfsq  warehousesq  and  other  premises 
for  its  expanding  canal  trade.  Premises  were  taken  at  Birmingham 
and  Diglis  from  the  Worcester  &  Birmingham  canal  companyt 
6 
3  Grand  Junction  Canal  Boat  Register,  1821-23,  GJC  4/2,  Other 
volumes  for  1818  and  1830-2  survive,  but  contain  no  reference 
to  Pickfords. 
4  Deed  of  Arrangementq  Schedule  Two,  3  May  1838,  KS/2/2, 
5  Pic  4/25  P.  739  Statement  of  number  of  horses  returned  for 
assessed  taxesq  1822-66. 
6  WOBC  1/89  13  Dec,  1822,10  March  1826,9  Oct.  1829;  1/9, 
12  Aug.  1836. 
189. and  extra  accommodation  at  the  terminals  of  the  Warwick  & 
7  Birmingham  canal.  The  horizon  of  Pickfords'  operations 
widened  to  take  in  canal  routes  hitherto  unused.  It  was 
apparently  not  until  1825,  for  example,  that  Pickfords  first 
traded  on  the  Staffordshire  &  Worcester  canal, 
8 
one  of  the 
earliest  to  be  built.  In  additiont  several  of  the  new  canals 
opened  after  1820  affected  Pickfords'  organisation.  The 
Macclesfield  canal,  for  exampleg  opened  in  November  1831, 
provided  a  more  convenient  route  into  Manchester  than  that  by 
way  of  Preston  Brook  and  the  Bridgewater  canal  and  was  quickly 
adopted,  The  Grand  Junction  canal  company  agreed  to  extend  to 
the  new  route  the  20%  commission  already  allowed  on  Manchester 
goods  declared  by  way  of  Preston  Brook.  9 
but  the  question 
remains  as  to  how  far  this  would  compensate  for  the  loss  to 
Pickfords  on  its  establishments  on  the  previous  routeg  and  the 
cost  of  providing  facilities  on  the  new  line.  The  Gloucester 
&  Berkeley  canal,  strictly  a  ship  canalv  opened  in  1827,  was 
likewise  promptly  adopted  by  Pickfords  for  its  trade  between 
Worcester  and  Bristol, 
10 
but  the  Birmingham  &  Liverpool 
Junction  canalv  perhaps  the  most  ambitious  of  the  last  generation 
of  canalsq  was  apparently  little  used. 
In  London  the  most  important  development  was  the  opening 
6f  the  Regents  canal  in  August  1820,  by  which  the  focus  of  the 
7  WBC  1/109  2  Aprilt  10  May,  11  Oct.  1824;  16  Nov..,  12  Dec.  1825; 
13  Febt  8  May,  11  Dec.  1826. 
8  STW  1/59  11  Oct.  1825t  is  the  first  reference  to  Pickfords  in 
this  company's  minutesq  though  the  names  of  other  carriers 
appear  regularly.  In  1826  Pickford5  lipenced  only  three 
boats  on  the  canal. 
9  GJC  1/5  8  Feb.  1832.  CjVP  P 
10  Hadfield  Canals  of  west  midlands  P.  118;  /30.  "/30/1- 
11  Appendix-Dq  Transcript  of  tonnage  journal,  March  1836,  in 
W.  Cubittt  A  Second  report  on  the  financial  state  of  the 
Birminl,  _ham  and  Liverpool  Junction  canal,  with  an  aDDendix 
:  Yu--ly  1836.  iF.  P. 
190. canal  trade  shifted  from  Paddington,  the  terminus  of  the  Grand 
Junction  canall  to  the  new  canal  companyts  more  central  basin 
at  City  Road.  The  Regents  canal  company  valued  Pickfordst 
business  so  highly  that,  as  an  inducement  to  move  to  City  Road, 
it  bought  out  Pickfords'  lease  at  Paddington  and  in  addition 
allowed  Pickfords  E5,000  towards  the  C209000  cost  of  new 
buildings  there. 
12  Pickfords  moved  from  Paddington  in  December 
1820  and  for  the  next  twenty,  years  or  so  City  Basin  stood  at 
the  centre  of  PiCkfords'  organisation.  As  well  as  being  the 
main  depot  for  Pickfords'  canal  trade,  it  served  as  the 
headquarters  of  the  total  concern  when  Baxendale  made  the  move 
from  Manchester.  In  addition  to  wharfst  warehouses,  loading 
bays't  and  a  special  cut  from  the  main  line  of  the  canal, 
extensive  administrative  offices'were  built  from  which  contact 
with  all  the  agencies  and  depots  was  maintained.  In  February 
1824  many  of  the  building's  were  gutted  by  fire13  but  the  property 
14 
was  well  insuredv  and  soon  rebuilt  on  the  same  scale  and 
principles. 
15 
By  about  18309  Pickfords'  canal  boats  travelled 
over  a  wide  area  of  England,  within  well  established  limits, 
giving  a  geographical  spread  of'transport  services  which  was 
not  basically  altered  until  the  advent  Of  railways. 
12  For  Pickfords'  relations  with  the  Regent  canal  company,  see 
GJCý/lq  5  March  1818;  RGC  1/14,18  Feb.,  25  March,  1,8  April 
1818;  1116  16  July,  29  Dec.,  1819;  1/18t  12  May,  6.14  June, 
19  JulYv  13  Dec.  1820.  Also  Pic  3/200  Case  and  opinion  of 
Counselq  re  acquisition  by  the  Regents  canal  company  of  the 
premises  at  Paddington,  1/1  1851. 
13  The  Courier,  v  27  Feb.  1824 
14  In  1821-2  9  City  Basin  was  insured  with  the  Norwich  Union  for 
C25,750  Pic.  4/4,  Journalg  Manchester  Office,  p  5L2. 
15  The  Penny  Makazine,  August  18429  PP  327-8, 
191. The  organisation  of  canal  traffic  was  highly  complex- 
16 
The  optimum  would  be  a  continuous  flow  of  traffic  sufficient  to 
fill  all  boats  to  capacity,  which  in  the  case  of  Pickfordst 
boats  launched  in  1822-3  varied  between  twenty-five  and  twenty- 
six  tons.  The  minimum  economic  loading  in  the  late  1830s  was 
about  fifteen  tons. 
17 
Working  policy  was  to  avoid  breaking 
bulkq  for  it  was  this  which  sent  costs  soaring'and  heightened 
the  chance  of  loss  or  damage.  Full  through-loads  which  could 
be  trunked  direct  to  their  destination  undisturbed  were  highly 
desirable  butv  in  Pickfords'  experiencet  represented  a  relatively 
small  proportion  of  the  total  tonnage  between  London,  the 
midlands  and  the  north.  The  bulk  of  Pickfords'  traffic  was  of 
an  intermediate  kindq  which  came  on  to  the  main  north-south  route 
from  east  and  west.  This  was  directed  to  certain  staging 
pointsp  sortedp  and  thence  dispatched  to  its  destination.  Cross- 
traffic  of  this  kind  was  tricky  to  organisep  and  required  very 
clear  methods  of  procedure.  According  to  Baxendale  a  cargo 
of  fifteen  tons  might  involve  up  to  150  consignees  and  thus  the 
same  number  of  invoices.  Here  was  a  potential  source  of  chaos. 
To  ensure  that  cross-flows  were  promptly  and  accurately  directed, 
constant  care  and  supervision  was  necessary, 
Pickfords  channelbd  traffic  to  and  from  the  west  midlands 
and  west  of  England  through  Braunston,  then  a  thriving  canal 
town,  which  stood  at  the  junction  of  the  Oxford  and  the  Grand 
Junction  canals,  At  Napton,  nearby,  the  Oxford  canal  connected 
16  This  discussion  of  the  organisation  of  canal  traffic  is  based 
on  Baxendale's  discussion  with  directors  of  the  Grand  Junction 
railway  companyv  GJR  1/10  21  Sept.  1836;  also  Diary  of  Josiah 
Baxendalev  accompanying  his  son  Joseph  on  a  tour  of  Pickfords' 
canal  bo  stations,  27  Sept  to  13  Octt  1821.  Pic  4/26. 
17  Baxendale's  evidencev  second  report,  SC  on  Railways  pp  1839 
(Vol.  X)  Q,  2515, 
192. 
a Pickfords'  services  by  canal  and  river,  July  1841 
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Source:  CHP/28 with  the  Warwick  canals,  giving  entry  to  Birmingham  and  the 
west.  -Situated  on  the  north-south  line  and  with  easy  access 
to  the  westg  Braunston  was  in  many  ways  the  focal  point  of  the 
canal  network  of  the  south  midlands,  The  central  position  of 
Braunston  took  on  a  critical  function  for  Pickfords'  working 
methods.  A  regular  schedule  of  fly-boats  from  the  many  towns 
and  cities  from  which  Pickfords  operated  required  the  dispatch 
of  boats  with  only  partial  loads  if  necessary,  This  was 
feasible  becausep  in  addition  to  picking  up  some  goods  en  route, 
sufficient  cargo  to  complete  a  load  could  be  ensured  at  Braunston 
and  similar  places.  This  was  particularly  important  for  boats 
departing  from  London,  as  the  balance  of  traffic  tended  to  be 
up  to  the  capital.  At  Braunstonv  additional  goods  could  be 
taken  on  or  the  boat  taken  off  completely  and  its  contents 
distributed  between  other  boats. 
18 
Traffic  from  the  east  of  the  country  was  assembled  at 
Shardlow,  the  termination  of  the  Trent  &  Mersey  canal  at  its 
junction  with  the  river  Trent.  Although  predominantly  a  canal 
concerng  Pickfords  had  a  small  interest  in  river  traffic.  A 
few  of  the  large  Trent  boats  and,  at  a  later  dateg  establishments 
at  Newarkp  Gainsborough  and  Hull, 
19 
were  the  means  by  which  the 
firm  was  able  to  draw  on  the  river  system  of  the  east  midlands. 
Similarly  in  the  westq  Pickfords  had  some  interest  in  traffic 
on  the  river  Severn,  between  Worcester  and  Bristol. 
Canal  carriers  gained  a  reputation  for  great  regularity  in 
the  p  erformance  of  their  business  -  in  1840  supporters  of  the 
18  Josiah  Baxendalet  in  his  Diaryq  emphasised  the  special  role 
of  Braunston  in  Pickfords'  organisation. 
19  CHP/28  A  sketch  of  Pickford  &  Co.  's  Line  of  Canal  and  River 
Conveyance,  July  1841;  Glasgow  Post  Office  directory,  1849-50 
Appendix  p  149t  Pickfords'  advertisement  refers  to  carriage 
on  the  Trent  and  Humber. 
193. canal  interest  claimed  that  from  the  time  their  goods  reached 
the  carrier  in  Manchester,  they  could  calculate  to  within  a 
20 
few  hours  their  time  of  arrival  in  London.  But  this 
achievement  has  to-be  seen  within  the  context  of  certain 
constraints.  The  high  cost  and  high  loading  factor  of  the 
typical  canal  boat  rendered  it  not'only  an,  unwieldy  unit  of 
transportation  but  made  continuous  employment  of  the  capital 
invested  in  it  both  necessary  and  difficult.  Capacity  could  be 
maximised  by  reducing  delaysq  shortening  turn-round  times#  and 
maintaining  a  keen  regard  to  working  efficiency.  Swifter 
journey  times  would  also  allow  the  more  intensive  use  of  stock. 
To  facilitate  thisp  canal  companies  introduced  at  an  early  date 
a  special  system  of  licences  whereby,  on  payment  of  the 
prescribed  charge,  carriers  were  allowed  to  pass  a  given  number 
of  boats  through  th6'company's  locks  by  night.  Payments  could 
be  made  per  boat-journey,  or  as  an'annual  composition  on  an 
agreed  number  of  boats.  Pickfords  had  already  composited 
with  the  Coventry  canal  company  for  fifty  boats  in  1808,  and 
continued  the  arrangement  for  as  long  as  licences  remained  in 
use,  Similar  agreements  were  made  with  the  chief  companies  of 
the  canal  network.  Such  measures,  however,  were  inevitably 
negativelwhenever  the  canals  were  closed  by  frost  in  winter  or 
the  annual  stoppage  in  the  summer.  Manufacturers  could  build 
up  stocks  in  anticipation  of  such  occurences  but  essential 
supplies  could  only  be  had  by  land  carriage,  at  the  appropriate 
prices. 
20  Fifth  Report  and  evidence  S.  C.  on  Railway  Communications 
Pr  1840  (Vol.  XIII),  evidence  of  several  merchants, 
'especially  Mr.  Alderman  Lainson,  Q-1795. 
194. Canal  transport  was  thus  of  itself  subject  to  certain 
limitations.  In  addition  no  carrier  could,  as  a  general  rule, 
afford  to  carry  sufficient  reserves  to  meet  all  temporary  shifts 
in  demand,  and  even  the  most  efficient  carrier  was  unable. 
immediately  to  cope  with  a  sudden  rush  of  traffic. 
21 
Given 
noticet  boats  could  be  called  in  from  elsewhere,  but  this  took 
time.  Even  if  traffic  were  dispatched  in  strict  order  of 
arrivalv  delay  was  as  inevitable  as  the  consequent  complaints 
from  disappointed  customers. 
in  the  trade  cycle  in  the  1820s 
Bearing  in  mind  the  sharp  shifts 
and  the  continuing  fluctuations 
in  the  1830s,  it  is  difficult  to  see  what  else  the  carrier  could 
do,  Experience  must  have  shown  that  upsurees  in  trade  were 
rarely  sustained  and  a  reliablev  rising  trend,  sufficient  to 
justify  further  capital  investmentv  difficult  to  detect.  In  these 
circumstances  cautious  expansion  of  capacity,  such  as  the  slow 
increase  in  Pickfords'  stock  of  canal  boats  after  1830,  was, 
contrary  to  the  accusations  of  inertia  frequently  levelled  against 
the  canal  carriersq  sound  business  sense.  Consequently,  an 
increase  in  the  supply  of  canal  services,  in  terms  of  aggregate 
capacityq  was  inevitably  in  the  form  of  a  lagged  response  to  a 
sustained  increase  in  demand*  As  a  result,  demand  probably 
persistently  exceeded  supplyq  chronically  so  in  short-run  boom 
conditions*  It  is  difficult  to  see  how  the  canal  carriers  could 
have  escaped  from  this  dilemma  without  rashly  exposing  themselves, 
but  it  provided  their  opponents  with  a  convenient  stick  with 
21  For  a  general  discussion  of  the  difficulties  of  canal  operation 
see,  A.  Rees,  The  CYclopa  dia  (in  39  volumest  1819-20)9  article 
ICanal't  Vol*  VI  (1819);  T.  Boyle  Hope  for  the  Canals  (1848) 
written  with  reference  to  railway  competition.  Jackman's 
discussiong  Transportation  in  iýodern  England  440  ff,  leans 
heavily  on  Boyle.  J,  Hassell  Tour  of  the  Grand  Junction 
(1819)  is  also  of  interest, 
19-5. to  beat  them. 
22 
In  the  controversy  between  canals  and  railways,  the  canal 
carriers  were  accused  of  restrictive  practices  and  collusion, 
in  particular  of  keeping  their  rates  a  close  secrett  char,  -,  ing 
differentially  according  to  category  of  customer  rather  than 
type  of  trafficp  and  rigging  the  market  by  agreeing  not  to 
underquote  a  competitor*  Because  carriers  quoted  virtually 
the  same  ratesq  it  does  not  necessarily  mean,  however,  that 
competition  was  lacking;  it  was  prosecuted  by  way  of  service 
rather  than  price, 
23  Custom  was  attracted  by  offering  traders 
inducements  other  than  price  reductions,  such  as  varying  the 
length  of  time  accounts  could  be  left  unsettled,  allowing 
discount  for  the  prompt  settlement  of  accounts,  carrying  empties 
and  samples  free  of  charget  or  allowing  free  storage  for  goods 
awaiting  collection  for  up  to  forty-eight  hours  or  more, 
24 
The  firm  with  the  best  name  for  efficiency  and  prompt  attention 
to  business,  together  with  the  financial  resources  to  5USiain 
such  accommodationt  attracted  the  most  custom. 
25 
The  merchant 
sending  goods  off  reguiarlyo  therefore,  tended  to  use  one  carrier 
and  could  use  his  trading  account  with  him  to  extract  favourable 
terms.  These  are  likely  to  have  been  more  rewarding  to  him 
than  occasion&1  rashes  of  rate-cutting. 
22  The 
, 
allegations  made  by  the  promoters  of  the  Liverpool  & 
Manchester  railway  on  that  score  are  well  known.  My  colleague 
Dr.  M.  C.  Reed  points  out  that  in  the  changed  economic  conditions 
of  1826,  when  boom  had  given  way  to  slump,  these  complaints 
were  dropped.  No  doubt  the  fact  that  the  Bridgewater 
trustees  had  by  then  come  to  terms  with  the  railway  company 
also  had  a  part-in  this.  F.  C.  Mather  After  the  Canal  Duke 
P.  38  ff- 
23  Boyle  OP-cit.  p.  24  ff;  Mather  Op.  cit.  p"'-.  106. 
24  it  was  chiefly  through  concessions  of  this  kind  that  the  canal 
carriers  later  tried  to  compete  with  the  railwaysp  since  they 
could  not  hope  to  offer  directly  competitive  rates. 
Consequently  they  were  singled  out  for  attack  when  carriers 
sought  agreements  with  the  railway  companies, 
25  See  the  memos  on  the  canal  companies'  and  canal  carriers' 
working  methods  and  chargesq  HL2/6  R47t  11  Sept.  1838. 
1 
196. The  parallel  rates  structure  of  various  carriers  is 
demonstrated  by  a  set  of  figures  drawn  up  by  the  Peak  Forest 
canal  company  in  18399  partly  to  illustrate  the  effect  railways 
had  had  on  canal  rates.  Rates  were  given  for  three  carriersp 
Pickfords,  Kenworthy  &  Co.,  and  Robins  &  Co.  #  but  the  sample  of 
quotations  for  all  three  firms  is  limited  to  only  six  categories 
of  goods,  Of  these  identical  charges  were  made  by  all  three 
for  two  categories  and  Pickfords  and  Kenworthy  'Were  identical 
for  two  more:  of  the  remaining,  two  categoriesq  Pickfords  and 
Robins  agrged,  on  one,  and  Kenworthy  and  Robins  agreed  on  the 
other,  A  more  revealing  series  is  for  Kenworthy  and  Robins 
alone.  Comparative  charges  were  given  for  twenty-tix  categories 
of  goods:  before  the  railwaysq  twenty-two  of  these  had  been 
26 
identical,  but  the  number  had,  by  then  been  reduced  to  twelve*. 
A  bland  gloss  on  these  figures  would  be  that  they  simply  show  how 
the  free  working  of  perfect  competition  had  reduced  rates  to 
their  lowest  remunerative  level.  There  is  some  evidencep  however, 
which,  although  possibly  quite  innocuousq  would  cast  suspicion 
on  such  close  identity.  A  note  in  a  manuscript  book  of  Pickfords' 
canal  ratesq  of  the  period  1828-36f  reads  "In  the  event  of  any 
goods  offeri  ng  for  conveyance  that  are  not  provided  for  by  a 
specific  ratet  no  agent  of  the  parties  to  have  power  to  state 
terms,  except  in  concert  with  agents  of  the  other  carriers,  nor 
under  any  circumstances  should  such  authority  be  exercised  if 
there  is  time  to  correspond  with  the  principals.  " 
27 
26  PFC  1/49  27  March  1839 
27  Pic  4/89  PP  57-8. 
197. By  discharging  his  transport  requirements  through  a  single 
carrier  a  merchant  could  enormously  simplify  his  book-keeping 
problems.  Not  so  the  carrierl  who  faced  a  highly  complex 
and  onerous  burden  on  this  score.  The  principles  of  canal 
charges,  sufficiently  intricate  in  themselves,  were  further 
complicated  by  the  need,  in  the  case  of  through  routes  and  rates 
for  exampleg  to  engage  in  protracted  negotiations  with  each 
company  concerned.  Reluctant  to  commit  itself  unilaterally, 
each  company  would  agree  to  a  proposed  alteration  of  rates  and 
the  appropriate  apportionmentg  provided  that  all  other  companies 
concerned  acted  likewise.  The  absence  of  any  type  of  clearing- 
house,  either  for  processing  routine  traffic  or  regulating 
through-traffic  agreements  of  this  kindo  resulted  in  this 
cumbersome  and  tedious  procedure.  Instead  of  being  able  to 
discharge  their  tonnage  payments  through  a  central  agency,  the 
carriers  were  obliged  to  keep  a  separate  account  for  each  canal 
used,  in  Pickfords'  case  probably  twenty  or  more  different 
sets  of  accounts. 
The  administration  of  these  accounts  was  extremely  complicated. 
Over  and  above  the  basic  schedule  of  charges  there  was  an 
intricate  system  of  drawbacks,  special  rates  or  reductions  in 
favour  of  particular  routes  or  particular  categories  of  goods, 
some  purely  temporaryq  others  on  traffic  in  one  direction  only. 
Not  only  were  there  disputes  about  over-charging  by  the  canal 
companies  or  false  declarations  by  the  carrier,  but  the  figures 
on  the  basis-of  which  accounts  were  rendered  were  often  neither 
complete  nor  compatible.  The  confusion  got  worse  as  time  went 
198. on,  so  that,  as  Pickfords  wrote  to  the  Oxford  canal  company  in 
18329  "the  canal  accounts  are  now  becoming  so  complex  that  it  is 
difficult  to  know  where  we  stand  -  some  things  being  charged 
different  ratesq  according  as  they  are  coming  up  or  going 
down  -  and  in  some  cases  where  a  reduction  is  madeq  part  of  the 
goods  are  charged  the  reduced  rate  and  part  the  full  rate  in  the 
tonnage  accounts  leaving  a  portion  to  be  obtained  by  way  of 
overchargesq  and  again  some  allowances  are  made  from  statements 
furnished  by  us  and  some  from  accounts  rendered  by  other  canal 
cols  000,128  In  this  situation  it  is  not  surprising  that 
Pickfords  was  finding  the  c.  ost  of  keeping  the  tonnage  accounts 
in  order  "no  light  tax  upon  the  drawbacks.  " 
29 
One  of  the  most  persistent  and  difficult  problems  the  canal 
carriers  had  to  deal  with  was  the  pilfering  of  goods  from  the 
boats  and  wharfs.  The  boatmen,  like  the  river  men  before  them, 
30 
enjoyed  a  singularly  unsavoury  reputation.  "A  vile  set  of  rogues", 
Lea,  Pickfordst  agent  at  Braunston  called  them:  his  idea  of 
Industrial  relations  was  to  turn  out  the  police  against  strikers, 
and  clap  a,  few  of  the  leaders  in  Newgate. 
31 
Inman  too,  giving 
evidence  to  the  parliamentary  committee  enquiring  into  the 
observance  of  the  Sabbath,  expressed  grave  doubts  about  the 
state  of  the  boatmen's  morals  and  said-that  Pickfords  had  to  take 
precautions  against  the  ments  thieving. 
32 
The  control  of  an  undisciplined  work  force,  in  particular  its 
penchant  for  theftp  was  thus  no  less  a  pr6blem  for  the  canal 
28  in-Letter  Book,  OXq4/63,13  March  1832, 
29  In-Letter  Bookq  OXC4/61,24  Dec.  1830. 
30  Dubbed,  "inland  pirates"  by  E.  Meteyard,  Life  of  Josiah 
Wedgewood.  (1865-6),  Vol.  I.  p  275. 
31  Lea  to  Langtont  22  Oct.  1818,  Lea  to  Pickford  &  Co.,  London, 
23  Octo  1818.  F.  P. 
32  Report  and  evidence  S.  C.  on  the  Observance  of  the  Sabbath  Day 
pp  1831-2,  (Vol.  VIIT-tQ.  1990  ff, 
199. carriers  than  their  counterparts  in  manufacturing,  It  was  a 
long-standing-and  continuous  problem.  Matthew  Pickford  was 
approached  in  1798  by  the  Birmingham  canal  company  for  his 
assistance  in  discovering  the  identity  of  three  of  his  men  seen 
throwing  coping  stones  into  the  canal  off  a  road  bridge  near 
Fazeleyp  apparently  in  an  effort  to  block  the  channel. 
33 
Similar  instances  recur  in  the  records  of  the  canal  companies 
during  this  period.  The  companies  often  found  that  their  own 
employees  were  associates  of  the  boatmenp  acting  as  receivers  to 
dispose  of  the  ill-gotten  gains.  Probably  the  most  spectacular 
ýincidentf  in  Pickfords'  experience  was  one  which  happened  in 
March  1809  involving  a  boat  which  left  Paddington  with  a  mixed 
cargo'of  goods  including  various  barrels  of  brandy,  rump  and 
gun-powder.  In  search  of  a  nightcap,  two  of  the  crew  tackled 
one  of  the  barrels  with  a  gimlet  and  no  doubt  a  lantern  to  light 
the  good  work.  Unfortunately  they  chose  the  wrong  barrel,  blew 
up  themselves  and  the  boat,  and  set  fire  to  three  hay  stacks  on 
the  canal  bank  for,  good  measure, 
34 
Pilfering  was  particularly  difficult  to  eliminate.  Matthew 
Pickford  approached  the  Grand  Junction  company  in  1798  with  an 
35 
unspecified  plan  to  combat  the  problem,  but  although  the 
committee  declared  its  support  for  his  ideas  nothing  seems 
33  Out-Letter  Bookq  BCN  4/371  B9  15  June  1798. 
34  The  Gentleman's  Magazine,  Vol,  LXXIX  (1809)  P  372.  Pickford's 
services  were  also  used  for  the  conveyance  of  emigrant  labour 
from  the  south  of  England  to  the  industrial  towns  of  the  north 
under  the  auspices  of  the  Poor  Law  removal  scheme  of  the  later 
1830S.  A,  Redford  Labour  migration  in_England  1815-50 
(2nd.  ed.  1964)  PP  105-6,  R.  Boyson  The  Ashworth  cotton 
entergrise  (OxfordI97O)  P  190- 
35  GJC  11399  4  April,  1798. 
200. immediately  to  have  come-of  this,  initiative,  Eventually  an 
organisation  was  set  up,  with  the  somewhat  ponderous  title 
lInland  Navigation:  Association  for  Apprehending 
. and  Prosecuting 
Felons.  "  In  the  name  of  all  the  leading  carrierst  various 
monetary  rewards  were  offered  for  information  leading  to 
prosecutions* 
36 
The  joint  action  indicates  the  wide-spread 
nature  of  this  problem  and  the  oblique  attack  on  it,  by  recourse 
to  a  system  of  informersq  demonstrates  the  great  difficulty  of 
effectively  policing  goods  in  transit.  Although  such  measures 
might  contain  the  problem,  they  would  scarcely  eliminate  it. 
Pickfordsv  indeedo  by  the  1830s  had  devised  a  much  tighter 
means  of  control.  Under  this  scheme  the  boatmaster,  whether 
as  normal  practice  or  special  occasion  only  is  unknown,  was  held 
responsible  by  a  legally  binding  contract  for  all  goods  in  his 
charge  until  he  had  delivered  his  cargo.  If  it  was  not  intact, 
the  loss  was  set  off  against  Pickfords'  payment  to  him,  The 
effectiveness  of  this  step  is  suggested  by  the  fact  thatj  in  the 
court  of  Exchequerg  an  appeal  was  made  against  Pickfords' 
enforcine  one  such  contract,  and  that  the  appeal  failed. 
37 
Theft  was  not  confined  to  the  boatment  however:  the 
clerical  staff  presented  equal  problems  of  embezzlement.  Pickfords 
followed  the  custom  of  requiring  sureties  from  anyone  handling 
casht  but  this  was  only  partially  successful;  guarantors  did 
not  always  stand  up  to  the  test.  Offences  of  this  kind  were 
savagely  punished,  with  transportation  the  common  penalty  for 
36  The  Derby  Mercury  14  Oct.  180,  ý;  21  June  1804. 
37  Cleworth  v.  Pickford  (COurt  of  Exchequer,  1840)  See  E,  B, 
Ivatts  Carriers'  Lawq  relating  to  goods  and  passenger  traffic 
on  rail:;  -iaysg  canals  and  steamships,  with  cases  (1883)  p.  444'.. 
201. even  trivial  sums.  Improved  accounting,  by  increasing  the 
chances  of  detection,  might  limit  the  likelihood  of  embezzlement, 
but  Pickfords  was  long  troubled  by  it.  In  1837  one  of  the 
firm's  Liverpool  staff  was  found  to  have  embezzled  over  E750.38 
One  undetected  embezzlerv  troubled  in  conscience  in  his  old  age, 
desired  to  make  restitution  and  sent  Pickfords  a  C50  note, 
sufficient  to  cover  "the  amount  of  your  property  improperly 
appliedv  together  with  interest  thereon.,, 
3  9 
At  one  point 
Baxendale  considered  ptotedting  himself  against  embezzlement  by 
requiring  all  clerks  with  access  to  cash  to  insure  themselves 
with  a  special  Guarantee  Societyq  but  the  idea  came  to  nothing. 
40 
The  canal  carriersp  thereforev  were  confronted  by  many 
problems  intrinsic  to  the  canal  trade.  But  there  were  also  many 
forces  pressing  on  the  canal  trade  from  the  outside.  Raw 
materials  like  coalq  stone,  lime  and  graing  comprised  the  main 
bulk  of  canal  traffic.  Long  distance  traffic,  the  needs  of 
which  were  met  by  the  'fly-trade'  in  which  Pickfords  specialised, 
was  chiefly  composed  of  the  lighter  range  of  merchandise.  Heavy 
merchandise  usually  went  by  sea.  This  division, 
41 
however,  was 
never  absolutev  and  throughout  the  period  under  consideration 
canal  transport  was  pressed  by  other  forms  of  transportation. 
The  integration  of  land  and  canal  has  already  been  discussed. 
Competition  between  road  and  canal  conveyance,  although  uncommong 
increased  after  1815  as  improved  road  conditions  fostered 
speedier  road  haulage.  Direct  competition  was  usually  restricted 
to  short-haul  traffic.  For  example,  in  1825,  Pickfords 
38  Pic.  4/27,  po  Up  p.  12. 
39  Pic.  4/1,  'P.  58. 
40  At  F.  P.  are  the  prospectus  of  the  society,  and  an  unfavourable 
report  on  it,  by  Baxendalels  solicitors.  Although  he 
apparently  did  not  introduce  the  scheme,  notices  of  general 
meetings  for  1845  and  1848  show  that  Baxendale  had  100  shares 
in  the  society. 
41  As  outlined  in  PFC  1/49  27  March  1839. 
2. 
20,  Z. introduced  a  road  link  between  Birmingham  and  Kidderminster, 
in  direct  competition  with  the  Staffordshire  &  Worcester  canal 
42 
over  the  short  distance  involved,  A  relatively  rare  example 
of  longer  distance  competition  did'occur  between  London  and 
Leicester.  In  1828  Messrs.  'Deaconq  Harrison  &  Co.  9  started  a 
regular  service  of  road  waggo'ns  at  a  charge  no  higher  than 
canal  rates  and  presumably  at  comparable,  possibly  swifter 
speeds.  Baxendale  reacied  by  seeking  to  cut  Pickfords'  canal 
rates  by  ten  shillings  per  ton  and  applied  to  the  canal  companies 
for  comparable  reductions  in  tolls  to  enable  him  and  other 
carriers  take  this  step.  I  The  Grand  Union  canal  company,  more 
vulnerable  to  the  loss  of  such  traffic,  readily  agreed  but  the 
Grand  Junction  company,  which  enjoyed  a  firmer  traffic-base, 
needed  more  persuasion.  At  length  it  was  agreed  to  extend  to 
Leicester  trafficp  for  an  experimental  period  of  three  months, 
the  existing  preferences  allowed,  on  goods  declared  for  places 
north  of  the  Trent.  -The  experiment  was  subsequently  continued 
for  a  further  three  months,  and  the  concessions  extended  to 
include  traffic  to  Market  Harborough,  but,  there  is  no  sign  that 
the  waggons  were  driven  off. 
43 
Indeed  the  competitive  position 
of  the  canals  in  that  area  seems  to  have  deteriorated  further, 
since  in  1835  both  theýLeicester  and  Loughborough  canal  companies 
were  being  outbid  for  traffic  to  and  from  Birmingham  by  road 
transport. 
44 
At  much  the  same  time  some  of  Pickfords'  canal  trade  between 
London  and  Oxford  was  being  lost  to  competitors  using  the  Thames 
42  Hadfield  Canals  of  west  Midlands,  P-  130. 
43  GJC  1/4P  3  Dec.,  30  Dec.,  1828,18  March  1829;  GUC  1/2 
19  Dec.,  1828. 
44  Hadfield  Canals  of  east  Midlands,  p.  82. 
203. Navigationg  with  the  support  of  road  haulage  connections. 
Early  in  1828  Pickfords,  suggested  to  the  Regents  canal  company 
that,  to  combat  this,  the  company  should  cut  its  rates  in  line 
with  reductions  already  made  by  the  Oxford  and  Grand  Junction 
canal  companies.  Investigation  revealed  that  the  measures 
referred  to  by  Pickfords  were  not  of  recent  date,  and  as  neither 
of  the  other  two  companies  intended  any  further  step  to  meet 
this  particular  contingencyq  the  Regents  canal  company  felt  it 
could  not  damage  itself  by  making  a  unilateral  reduction. 
45 
The  loss  of  traffic  continued,  and  from  1830  onwards  Pickfords 
repeatedly  pressed  the  Oxford  canal  company  in  particular  for 
improved  facilitiest 
46 
but  without  success. 
In  its  approach  to  the  Oxford  canal  company  one  of  the  Points 
raised  by  Pickfords  was  the  threat  posed  by  the  appearance  of 
steam-powered  coasting  vessels.  Steamers  were  introduced 
between  London  and  Goole  early  in  1834  and  were  soon  competing 
successfully  for  Manchester  traffic  by  providing  a  swifter 
service  than  that  of  the  canal  carriers. 
47 
Even  before  the 
advent  of  steamers,  canals  had  felt  the  competition  of  coasting 
vessels  trading  to  the  rivers  Humber  and  Trent.  In  1823 
pickfords  and  Deacong  Harrison  &  Co.,  had  received  special  terms 
from  the  Grand  Junction  company  for  several  categories  of  heavy 
groceries  declared  for  Leicester  and  northwards  by  way  of  the 
river  Soarg  to  meet  the  competition  of  coasting  vessels  coming 
into  Gainsborough. 
48 
The  introduction  of  steam-ships  between 
45  RGC  1/30 
't 
27  Feb.,  26  March,  1828;  GJC  1/59  26  July  1832. 
46  out-Letter  Book  OXC/4/51,21  Oct.,  1831,4/529  19  Dec.,  1836; 
In-Letter  Book  QXC/4/619  27  Nov.  $  1830;  4/629  24  Oct.,  1831. 
47  In-Letter-Book  OXC/4/649  2  Sept.  1834. 
48  GJC  1/3v  17  Nov.,  1823. 
2o4. London  and  Goole  brought.  a  new  dimension  into  the  situation, 
one  which  was  not  easily  countered,  Appeals  from  Pickfords, 
Bache  and  Kenworthy-for  increased  co-operation  received  serious 
attention  from  the  Grand  Junction  companyq  in  the  realisation 
that  the  company's  own  interests  were  at  stake.  What  was  needed, 
as  with  railway  competition  later,  was  real  inter-company  co- 
operation,  something  which  proved  very  difficult  to  achieve.  As 
late  as  October  1838t,  in  full  knowledge  that  two  leading  canal 
carriers  had  already  turned  to  steamers,  a  further  initiative 
of  the  Grand  Junction  company  was  frustrated  by  the  non-cooperation 
of  the  other  companies. 
49 
The  assertion5O  that  canal  companies  failed  to  anticipate 
railway  competition  and  were  quickly  brushed  aside  could  no 
longer  be  accepted. 
51 
For  example  the  Rochdale  canal  company, 
as  early  as  1823P  took  note  of  the  projected  railway  between 
Liverpool  and  Manchester  and  although  the  news  caused  no  alarm 
steps  were  taken  to  forestall  possible  competition  from  that  and 
other  sources*  Following  the  opening  of  the  Liverpool  & 
Manchester  railwayo  the  Manchester,  Bolton  &  Bury  canal  company 
promptly  decided  to  convert  itself  into  a  combined  railway  and 
canal  companyq  with  the  intention  of  operating  both  lines  as  an 
integrated  concern  -  the  canal  to  take  heavy  traffic,  the  railway 
passengers  and  merchandise.  The  Lancaster  canal  company,  too, 
greeted  railway  competition  very  calmly  and  managed  to  extract 
advantage  from  the  situation, 
52 
49  GJC  1/5t  7  Oct,,  29  Nov.,  1834,16  Jan,,  1835;  1/69  30  Oct., 
1838. 
50  J.  H.  Clapham  An  economic  histor):  of  modern  Britain  (2nd  ed. 
1934)  P.  396*  - 
51  When  Clapham  wrote  the  canal  company  records  were  not  open 
for  study.  The  published  work  of  Charles  Hadfield  in 
particular  has  done  much  to  revise  previous  ideas;  also 
F.  C.  Mather's  work  on  the  Bridgewater  Trust. 
52  C.  Hadfield  &  G.  Biddle,  The  canals  of  north  west  England 
(Newton  Abbot  1970)  chaps.  VIII,  IXt  X. 
205. However  these  were  all  individual  companiest  acting  separately; 
the  canal  companies'  main  fa:  Iure  was  their  inability  to  act 
jointly  in  opposition  to  railways.  Too  much  of  the  companiest 
activities  took  the  form  of  strikes  against  neighbouring  canals 
in  defence  of  narrow,  local  interests. 
53 
This  applied  especially 
to  the  promotion  of  through  traffic  by  tend-on'  canal  companies. 
Even  when  a  few  companies  did  combine  to  promote  joint  interests, 
e.  g.,  the  Rochdale,  Calder  &  Hebble  and  Aire  &  Calder  companies 
in  opposition  to  the  Manchester  &  Leeds  railway, 
54 
there  was 
always  the  possibility  that  one.  would  ditch  its  partners  in 
order  to  secure  selfish.,  interests. 
Canal  transport  suffered  from  serious  physical  defects 
which  were  not  easily  overcome.  The  Piecemeal  construction  of 
canalsq  without  standardisation  of  type  or  gauge  produced  the 
well-known  impediments  to  a  free-flow  of  traffic.  As  well  as 
I 
problems  of  trans-shipment,  the  passage  of  tunnels  and  locks  was 
cumbersome  and  slow. 
_, 
Toll-reductions  apart,  some  canal  companies 
responded  by  tackling  some  of  the  more  obvious  obstacles  to  the 
flow  of  traffic.  Inevitably  this  was  only  partial  and 
inadequate.  The  capital  cost  of  redeveloping  the  canal  network 
according  to  a  uniform  scale  would  have  been  enormous  assuming 
the  necessary  resources  could  have  been  found  in  a  capital 
market  which  was  increasingly  looking  to  an  alternative  form 
of  transportation.  The  shortening  of  the  northern  arm  of  the 
Oxford  canalp  for  example,  alone  cost  over  Z150tOOO,  Completed 
in  1834,  the  need  to  recoup  the  capital  expended  was  the 
53  Mather  After  the  Canal  Duke 
, 
p,  122  ff;  pp.  138-140. 
54  Hadfield  &  Biddle  Op.  cit.  pp.  289-29,3 
206. 
1 justification  for  repeated  refusals  to  make  any  further 
reductions  in  tolls,  even  in  the  face  of  railway  competition, 
55 
In  the  case  of  the  Bridgewater  canal,  the  trustees  clearly 
lacked  the  resources  rather  than  the  will  to  carry  out  repairs 
and  improvements.  When  money  was  made  availablet  in  the  late 
56 
1820sq  substantial  improvements  were  undertaken.  The  boldest 
project  of  allg  the  Birmingham  &  Liverpool  Junction  canalo 
intended  to  demonstrate  the  superfluity  of  a  railway  connection 
between  the  two  towns,  57  foundered  in  the  morass  of  Shelmore 
Great  Bank. 
58  It  was  extremely  costly  to  build;  at  approximately 
C800,000,  the  capital  expended  was  about  half  the  total  spent  on 
the  Grand  Junction  canal  thirty  years  earlier  for  a  canal  only 
a  third  its  length.  Opened  in  March  1835,  it  enjoyed-a  brief 
flurry  of  activity  before  it  was  overtaken  by  its  rival,  the 
Grand  Junction  railway. 
Efforts  to  reduce  Journey  times  included  measures  to  speed 
up  the  passage  of  boats  through  the  locks.  Overall  journey 
times  were  determined  as  much  by  the  number  of  locks  to  be 
negotiated  as  the  total  mileage  to  be  traversed.  It  took  five 
and  a  half  minutes  to  raise  the  water  level  of  a  lock  by  eight 
59 
feetp  thus  making  for  very  slow  progress  on  a  canal  like  the 
Leeds  &  Liverpool,  with  a  long  flight  of  locks  to  the  summit. 
One  possibility  was  to  build  a  parallel  flight  of  locks  to 
double  the  number  of  boats  which  could-be  accommodated  at  any  one 
time.,  This  was  done  by  the  Bridgewater  trustees  and  the  Mersey  & 
Irwell  company  at  Runcorn  in  the  late  1820s, 
6o 
and  by  the  Oxford 
canal  company 
55  Hadfield  Canals  of  east  Midlands,  pp  161-2;  OXC'4/52t 
out-Letter  Bookv  1836-45,  passim. 
56  Mather  Op.  cit  VP  22-3v  p  42t  PP  54-6. 
57  Hadfield 
. 
6anals  of  west  Midlandsl,  PP  184-5. 
58  L.  T.  C.  Rolt  Thomas  Telford  (1958)  PP  182-6;  E.  S.  Richards 
James  Loch  and  the  House  of  Sutherland  p  103  ffo  p  120  ff. 
59.  According  to  Rees  The  CycloRaedla-Val.  VII  'Canal' 
60  Hadfield  &  iddle  Oj2.  cit.,  PP  289-29Z) 
207. at  Hillmorton  in  1840.61  Such  measures  were  costlyt  prohibitively 
so  at  the  points  where  they  were  most  needed,  A  simple,  but 
apparently  effective  alternativep  adopted  by  the  Grand  Junction 
company  in  1833,  was  to  fit  extra  paddles  to  the  upper  gate  of 
a  lock  to  speed  the  flow  of  water  into  it.  Using  this  method 
boats  could  be  passed  through,  on  a  seven  foot  rise  of  water,  in 
one  and  a  half  minutes.  Tests  of  the  new  device  drew  a 
favourable  report  from  Joseph  Baxendale  and  the  decision  to 
extend  the  system  as  soon  as  possible. 
62 
Further  progress  depended  on  improvements  in  motive  powerv 
that  isp  the  better  use  of  horses  and,  in  particular,  the 
adaptation  of  steam-power  to  canal  use.  Within  the  limited 
context  of  passenger  traffic,  speeds  of  up  to  ten  miles  per  hour 
were  attained  on  the  Glasgow,  Paisley  &  Johnstone  canal,  and  also 
on  the  Lancaster  canalq 
63 
by  the  use  of  specially  designed  light- 
weight  boats,  hauled  by  high-quality  horses.  In  this  way,  the 
canalv  during  the  1830s  was  able  to  compete  with  stage-coach  and 
steam-carriage  services  between  Paisley  and  GlasGow. 
64 
Baxendale 
figure4  in  several  experiments,  during 
principles  to  the  Grand  Junction  canal 
traffic  between  London  and  Uxbridge, 
65 
trials  were  inconclusivep  and  soon  had 
became  apparent  that  in  their  existing 
1833-4,  to  apply  the  s.  ame 
company's  passenger 
The  results  of  these 
to  be  abandoned  when  it 
condition  the  canal  banks 
61  Hadfield  Canals  of  east  Midlands  p.  161. 
62  GJC  1/5  9  24  June  1833, 
-  63  (G.  C.  Clark)  Lancaster  records,  or  leaves  from  local  historl 
1801-1850  (1869)  p.  212. 
64.  J.  Lindsay  The  canals  of  Scotland  (Newton  Abbot,  1968) 
p.  92  ff.  Passenger  traffic  in  the  Manchester  area  is  fully 
discussed  by  Hadfield  &  Biddle  Op.  cit.  passim. 
65  GJC  1/59  30  Oct-9  1832;  15  May,  '  1  June'  1833;  22  July,  19  Aug., 
1834;  10  March  1835. 
208. were  not  strong  enough  to  support  the  added  pressuree  This  same 
structural  weakness  also  impeded  the  use  of  steam-power  on  canals 
in  any  but  a  limited  context.  Intermittent  efforts  over  a  period 
of  fifty  years  repeatedly  foundered  on  this  same  difficulty, 
Experiments  with  steam-boats  were  made  on  the  Forth  &  Clyde 
canal  as  early  as  1789 
66 
and  on  the  Sankey  Brook, 
67 
the  Mersey 
&  Irwell  and  the  Bridgewater  in  the  17908.68  The  main  requirement 
was  the  direct  application  of  steam  to  canal  boats,  but  this 
proved  too  difficult  to  achieve.  What  success  there  was  mainly 
took  the  form  of  steam-powered  tugs  to  pull  'barge-trainslg  or 
to  shunt  boats  through  the  longer  canal  tunnels.  other  ideas 
included  the  use  of  locomotives  to  haul  canal  boats,  working 
from  a  track  laid  along  the  canal  bank,  and  even  "moving  steam- 
boats  by  means  of  an  artificial  fishes  (sic)  tail". 
69 
Although  also  a  response  to  competing  forms  of  transportation, 
the  canal  carrier's  interest  in  the  possibility  of  steam-power 
had  a  logic  of  its  own.  Successful  innovation  of  the  new 
technology  would  represent  a  powerful  and  dramatic  challenge 
to  the  existing  structure  of  the  canal  trade.  The  conanercial 
viability  of  steam-power,  thereforet  especially  in  the  hands  of 
a  rival,  required  watchful  attention.  At  least  these  were  the 
terms  in  which  Zachary  Langton  of  Pickfords  seems  to  have 
construed  the  position.  In  1819  a  Mr.  Maibon  approached  Pickfords 
with  an  invention  for  which  he  clearly  made  large  claims,  and 
seemingly  offered  Pickfords  the  monopoly  of  it.  Although 
66  Linds,  ay,  Op.  cit,  p,  26  ff. 
67  T.  C.  Barker  and  J,  R.  Harris  A  MerseZside  town  in 
- 
the  Industrial 
Revolution,  St.  Helens.  1750-1900  (Cass  Reprint,  1959)  P.  193. 
68  Hadfield  &  Biddle  Op.  cit.  pp.  99-100 
69  Richardsv  Op.  cit.  p.  26.  ff. 
209. doubtful  that  this  would  be  any  more  successful  than  previous 
devices  of  a  similar.  kind,.,  Langton  reckoned  lie  could  not  afford 
to  ionore  it,  "for  if  it  should  so  turn  out  that  ho  really  can 
perform  what  he  proposes  to  undertake  and  that  he  disposes  of 
his  invention  to  others  who  may  adapt  it  to  canal  navioation, 
a  competitorv  with  such  an  exclusive  rightg  would  be  more  than 
we  could  contend  with.,, 
70 
The  more  sustained  experimentation  with  steam  power  for 
several  years  from  the  mid-1830s  onwards  was  probably  more 
directly  motivated  by  the  onset  of  railway  competition.  Pickfords 
and  another  carrior,  Messrs,  Robins,  Mills  &  Co,  q  were  involved 
in  a  number  of  trials  during  this  period.  Robins  &  Co.  directly 
promoted  experimental  work  with  steam  engines7l  but  dorived 
little  benefit  from  it.  Indeed  the  firm's  finances  were  soon 
in  a  very  parlous  condition. 
72 
A  paddle-boat  belonging  to 
Robins  &,  Co.  was.  tested  on  the  Macclesfield  Canal  in  1838  and 
although  reported  capable  of  travelling  at  five  miles  per  hour, 
in  practice  it  only  managed  four  miles  per  hour,  a  performance 
in  no  way  superior  to  that  of  horses,  and  without  any  additional 
loading  fgxctor  by  way  of  compensation. 
73 
Pickfords  seems  to 
have  relied  on  other  people's  work,  but 
. 
-it,  ý,  experience  was  much 
74 
the  same.  A  trial  run  of  a  steam-boat  hauling  a  conventional  barge 
between  Manchester  and  London,  in  September,  1836,  and  further 
trials  on  the  Grand  Junction  canal  in  184275  both  failed  to 
produce  any  significant  result. 
70  Langton  to  Matthew  Pickford,  4  Sept.  1819,  F.  P;  also  Langton 
to  Matthew  Pickfordt  31  Aug.,  1819,  Pie.  4/27. 
71  GJC  1/6,18  Nov  1835. 
72  Both  the  Macclesfield  and  Grand  Junction  canal  companies  had 
occasion  to  discuss  the  firm's  defaults  in  tonnage  payments 
MCC  1/29  8  Sept.  9  18369  22  June,  1840;  GJC  1/79  30  May  1839. 
-73 
The  Macclesfield  Courier  and  Herald  18  Aug.  1838-;  also  MCC  1/29 
7  Nov  1835. 
74  The  Macclesfield  Courier  and  Herald  24  Sept.  1836;  MCC  1/29 
6-Oct-P  1836. 
75  S.  Salt  Statistics  and  calculations  essentially  necessary  to 
persons  connected  with  railways_or  canals  (London  and 
Manchestert  second  edit.  1846)  p.  84  quoting  from  Rai.  1w 
Magazine,  30  April  1842;  also  RGC  1/389  18  May  184ý7.  - 
7-10. One  effect  of  railways  was  to  show  that  the  interests  of 
the  canal  carriers  and  those  of  the  canal  companies  were  far  from 
identical.  Although  there  are  examples  to  the  contraryt  the 
canal  carriers  seem  to  have  responded  vigorously  to  the  challenge 
of  railway  competition.  Between  Manchester  and  Liverpool,  the 
water  carriers  enjoyed  exceptionally  favourable  circumstances 
and  successfully  withstood  periodic  rate  cutting  by  the  railway 
company.  In  fact  their  competition  was  so  successful  thatq 
under  a  traffic-sharing  arrangement  of  1845  between  the  Bridgewater 
trustees  and  the  railway  company,  not  only  was  the  bulk  of  the 
traffic  allocated  to  water-transport,  but,  for  a  few  years,  the 
trustees  were  obliged  to  pay  substantial  compensation  for 
76 
exc4eýeding  their  quota.  The  carrierst 
fressiveness 
was  a 
frequent  source  of  embarrassment  to'the  trusteesv  who  were 
obliged  to  take  steps  to  check  it. 
Firms  like  PickfordsV  Kenworthy  and  Bachel  which  carried 
merbhandise  traffic  over  long  distances  and  several  canals  were 
far  more  vulnerable,  Their  traffic  was  a  prime  target  for  the 
railway  companies  and  they  immediately  felt  the  full  force  of 
railway  cbmpetition.  For  the  carriers  their  entire  business 
was  at  stake  but  to  many  canal  companies  on  through-routes, 
especially  between  Lancashire  and  London,  the  carrierst  traffic 
was  a  relatively  small  proportion  of  the  total  passing  alone  their 
canal,  -  Consequently  they  were  not  so  immediately  concerned  or 
always  so  swift  in  taking  the  alleviating  measures  the  carriers 
requested. 
'The  carriers'  main  step,  even  before  railway 
competition  was  fully  effectivev  was  to  warn  the  canal  companies 
that  unless  they  fostered  the  'fly-trade'  with  all  speed  and 
at  the  lowest  possible  charge  it  would  quickly  leave  the  canals. 
76  F.  C-Mather  "The  Duke  of  Bridgewaterts  Trustees  and  the 
coming  of  the  railways'19  Transactions  of  the  Royal  Historical 
Societyo  5th  series,  Vol.  14,1964,  p.  1439  P.  148  ff. 
24. In  particular  the  carriers  campaigned  for  the  abolition  of 
liC'ences.  77  long  resented  and  a  proportionately  greater  burden 
as  traffic  volumes  dropped.  To  the  carriers  the  abolition 
of  licences  seems  to  have  been  regarded  as  the  critical  test 
by  which  they  judged  the  real  willingness  of  the  canal  companies 
to  help  them.  The  Grand  Junction  and  Coventry  canal  companies 
had  both  dropped  licences  by  the  end  of  1839,  butp  as  always, 
the  Oxford  canal  company  required  more  persuasion  and  drew 
78 
repeated  Protests  from  Pickfords  before  it  followed  suit. 
If  the  companies,  or  any  one  of  them,  proved  unco-operative, 
there  was  little  the  carriers  could  dov  short  of  abandoning  canal 
transport  altogether, 
If  the  canal  carriers  between  Lancashire  and  London  were  to 
meet  railway  competition'it  could  only  have  been  with  the  maximum 
encouragement  and  assistance  of  the  canal  companieso  especially 
in  fostering  the  through-trade.  This  required  that  the  Trent 
&  Mersey  and  Oxford  canal  companies,  for  example,  should  abandon 
their  entrenched  positions  butg  until  far  too  late,  little 
effective  pressure  could  be  brought  to  bear  on  them.  Through- 
traffic  was  too  small  a  proportion  of  the  total  traffic  on  the 
two  canals  for  its  loss,  potential  or  actual,  to  be,  of  itself, 
a  significant  bargaining  factor.  Since  toll  reductions  on  the 
Trent  &  Mersey  in  favour  of  through-traffic  would  have  to  be 
extended  to  local  trafficq  the  disincentive  was  even  stronger. 
79 
As  James  Locho  agent  to  the  Marquess  of  Stafford  and  from 
1837  superintendent  of  the  Bridgewater  Trust,  found  outt  joint 
77  GJC  1169  23  July  18389  memorial  from  Mr.  J.  Robinst  of 
Robins,  Mills  &  Co. 
78  In  Letter-book  OXC  4/70  14  Jan.,  20  Jan.,  5  Feb.,  184o 
79  The  works  by  Richards  James  Loch  and  the  House  of  Sut 
, 
herland 
and  F.  C.  Mather  After  the  Canal  Duke  conta  in  a  most  useful 
discussion  of  Loch's  experience  as  agent  and  manager  of  the 
Bridgewater  canal. 
212. action  of  any  kind  either  in  the  restricted  context  of  through- 
traffic  or  a  broadly  conceived  arrangement  between  canal  and 
railway  interests  proved  impossible  to  achieve,  Loch  expressed 
himself  strongly  on  the  blindness  of  canal  managers  but  he  was 
not  himself  without  fault.  Loch  refused  to  participate  in  the 
conference  of  canal  companies  and  carriers,  at  Birmingham  in 
1838,  (discussed  below),  chiefly,  it  would  seem,  because  it 
might  threaten  his  freedom  of  action  on  the  Bridgewater. 
80 
Declining  revenues  and  dividends  eventually  forced  even  the 
most  entrenched  canal  company  to  reconsider  its  position.  But 
until  the  railway  network  was  widely  spreadv  individual  canal 
companies  like  the  Oxford,  for  whom  railway  competition  was 
delayed  until  1842,  could  continue  their  parochial  policies  and 
remain  unresponsive  to  the  carriers  repeated  requests  especially 
for  through  toll. 
The  almost  total  inability  of  the  canal  companies  to  adopt 
any  agreed  measures  was  shown  by  the  failure  of  two  conferences 
of  company  representatives  and  carriers,  called  to  discuss  the 
impact  of  railwaysq  to  produce  any  practical  results. 
81 
The 
first  conference,  at  Birmingham  in  August  1838,  broke  up  with 
nothing  achieved.  A  schedule  of  railway  freight-rates  was  not 
yet  available  and  it  was  decided  that  in  the  absence  of  such 
informationo  together  with  certain  difficulties  being  experienced 
by  the  Grand  Junction  company  with  its  water  supply  at  Tring 
summit,  no  steps  could  be  taken  except  to  agree  to  meet  again 
80  Mather  Op.  *  pp.  200-201 
81  The  following  paragraphs  are  based  on  lengthy  minutes  in 
the  records  of  the  Peak  Forest  and  Macclesfield  canal  companies. 
Together  with  the  Ashton  company,  they  sent  a  joint  delegation 
to  discuss  the  position  of  canal  trade  with  the  companies  of 
the  south  and  midlands.  The  three  were  end-on  canals,  their 
interests  were  basically  the  same  and  they  often  acted  jointly, 
PFC  1/4,30  Jan.,  27  March  1839;  MCC  1/29  16  July  1840. 
213- when  the  railway  rates  were  known.  This  was  no  use  for  the 
Grand  Junction  canal  company  which,  from  the  spring  of  1839, 
had  to  compete  with  the,  London  &  Birmingham  railway,  fully 
prepared  for  goods  traffic.  The  Grand  Junction  company, 
therefore,  tried  to  force  the-pace  and  deflect  traffic  by  means 
of  preferential  tolls  away  from  those  canal  companies,  especially 
the  Coventry  and  Oxford  companies,  which  would  not  agree  to  its 
own  policy  of  adopting  an  average  toll  of  one  penny  per  ton  per 
mile.  - 
One  result  of  this  move  was  to  aggr  ate  the  loss  of  traffic 
to  railways  already  being  felt  by  the  Macclesfield,  Peak  Forest 
and  Ashton  canals.  Two  lengthy  minutes  in  the  records  of  the 
Peak  Forest  canal  company  are  extremely  informative  of  the 
condition  of  the  canal  trade  and  relations  between  the  canal 
companies*  Bouveriet  manager  of  the  Grand  Junctiong  explained 
the  purpose  of  his  policy  to  delegates  of  the  three  northern 
canal  companie5l  and  agreed  to  extend  the  concession  to  either 
or  both  the  Coventry  and  Oxford  companies  if  the  delegates 
could  persuade  them  to  co-operate.  Although  the  Coventry 
company  proved  willingg  the  Oxford  company  was  less  thcLn 
enthusiastic.  A  spokesman  for  the  company  felt  no  urgency  or 
need  to  call  a  special  board  meeting  to  discuss  the  delegatesl 
proposals.  He  suggested  that  the  carriers  were  only  playing 
the  canal  companies  off  against  the  railways  for  their  own 
purposes  and  remained  unaffected  when  informed  that  "Messrs 
Pickfords  had  already  transferred  a  large  portion  of  their 
trade  (and  that)  Messrs.  Bache  &  Co.  were  also  on  the  railway 
and  other  parties  threatening  to  leave  us.  " 
82 
82  PFC  1/49  30  Jan.,  1839. 
214. A  further  approach  soon  afterwards  met  with  a  similar  response, 
Perhaps  the  delegates  were  not  too  surprised  at  this  reaction, 
for  one  thing  their  report  made  clear  was  the  bad  state  of 
relations  between  the  southern  canal  companies. 
"To  show  the  feeling  which  exists  bet,  %ýeen  the  several 
canal  companies  in  the  south  we  may  incidentally  mention 
one  member  of  a  committee  in  allusion  to  the  late  meeting 
at  Birmingham  asked  us  somewhat  roughly  'why  the  devil  we 
had  not  joined  them  in  Blackguarding  Bouverie.  1  83 
In  this  atmosphere  it  is  not  surprising  that  a  further 
conferenceq  at  Coventry  in  June  1840t  was  as  ineffective  as  its 
predecessor.  Delegates  agreed  to  urge  their  companies  to  make 
further  reductionsq  but  as  the  Oxford  company  was  not  present 
at  the  meeting  and  is  unlikely  to  have  been  sympathetic  to  the 
recommendationq  little  effect  is  likely  to  have  resulted. 
Relations  were  particularly  bad  between  the  Oxford  company  and 
the  Grand  Junction  company,  The  latter,  pressed  by  railways 
from  an  early  dateg  felt  that  the  Oxford  company  was  exploiting 
its  position  on  the  through-route,  especially  its  temporary 
freedom  from  railway  competition,  by  exacting  unduly  high 
charges  and  thereby  inflating  rates  off  its  own  section. 
84 
The 
Grand  Junction  saw  the  only  salvation  for  canals  in  the  lowest 
possible  tollsq  but,  although  it  applied  every  type  of  pressure 
no  real  compromise  was  reached  until  184d5  By  then,  the 
canal  carriers'  trade  had  virtually  gone. 
While  the  canal  companies  ditheredq  the  carriers  found  they 
had  to  act,  generally  by  adopting  railroad  transportation.  In 
Pickfords'  case  the  decision  was  precipitated  by  a  failure  on 
83  'Ibid, 
84  MCC  1/29  16  July  1840.  A  statement  Of  tolls,  according  to 
distance  and  canal  companyq  for  the  route  between  London  and 
Manchester  shows  that  in  July  1840,  the  Oxford  company  was 
alone  in  charging  2'41d  per  ton-mile.  All  other  companies 
charged  ld  or  lid.  except  the  Trent  &  Mersey  and  the  Ashton 
canal  companies  which,  on  very  short  stretches  of  their  routes- 
for  a  total  of  71  miles  in  236ý  miles  -  charged  2d.  6 
85  Hadfield  Canals  of  east  Midlands'pp  218-219. 
215. the  Grand  Junction  canal.  Early  in  1838  Pickfords  put  some  of 
its  van  traffic  on  to  the  railway  but  continued  satisfied  with 
canals  for  Its  bulkier  traffic.  In  any  case  the  London  & 
Birmingham  railway  could  not  then  cope  with  much  goods  traffic. 
Later  in  the  year  the  water  level  of  the  Grand  Junction  company's 
reservoir  at  Tring  summit  began  to  fall  -  the  effect,  ironically 
enough,  of  engineering  works  for  the  railway  line  -  and 
threatened  to  disrupt  seriouslyp  even  hal-E,  the  flow  of  traffic 
in  and  out  of  London. 
86 
In  anticipation  of  such  an  eventuality 
Pickfords  made  a  special  arrangement  with  the  London  &  Birmingham 
company  to  use  the  railway  as  far  as  Wolverton.  Having  bye- 
Passed  the  trouble  spot  it  would  there  return  to  the  canal.  By 
September  conditions  at  Tring  were  so  bad  that  Pickfords  began 
to  use  the  railway,  The  fact  that  Pickfords  returned  to  the 
canal  at  Wolverton  indicated  that  the  move  was  intended  as  a 
temporary  expedient  but  it  was  apparently  so  successful  that  when 
the  crisis  passed  Pickfords  did  not  resume  canal  conveyance  but 
instead  beean  to  adopt  railway  transportation  on  a  permanent 
basis. 
Pickfords  got  into  a  lot  of  trouble  over  this  incident. 
Other  carriers  complained  that  Baxendale  had  abused  his  position 
with  the  London  &  Birmingham  railway  company  -  he  was  then 
Superintendent  of  the  Outdoor  Department  -  to  gain  an  unfair 
advantage  to  Pickfords  by  shutting  out  its  competitbrs.  A  little 
later,  the  Regents  canal  companyt  unhappy  that  Pickfords  should 
use  promises-at  City  Basin  for  railway  worIct  threatened  an 
injunction  to  compel  Pickfords  to  continue  on  the  canals. 
86  GJC  1/6,13  Jan.  t  7  Aprilt  5  Aug.  t  30  Aug.,  1838. 
2  16,. Baxendale  replied  that  the  public  would  be  the  arbiter  between 
railway  and  canal  and  that,  although  he  personally  would  welcome 
some  accommodation  between  the  new  and  old  form  of  transportation, 
the  company's  attitude  would.  only  damage  its  own  and  Pickfords' 
interests. 
87 
In  any  caseq  Baxendale  did  not  allow  this  threat 
to  slow  up  his  adoption  of  railways. 
In  January  1839  the  Peak  Forest  canal  reported  the  loss  of 
some  of  Pickfords'  traffic;  by  March  it  was  down  to  half  of  its 
previous  level. 
88 
From  then  on  Pickfords  steadily  abandoned 
the  canals.  By  1841  Pickfords  had  virtually  ceased  using  the 
Macclesfield 
89 
canal  while  in  1843,  a  significant  movev  Pickfords' 
head  office  was  transferred  from  City  Basin  to  the  Castle  Inn, 
Wood  Streetv 
90 
the  firmts  earliest  premises  in  London.  The 
decisive  years  were  1845-70  during  which  the  Coventryt  Oxford 
and  Worcester  &  Birmingham  companies  were  all  notified  by 
Pickfords  of  its  intention  to  quit  its  canal  premisese 
91 
If  one 
particular  year  were  to  be  selected  as  critical,  it  would  be  1846 
when  Pickfords'  stock  of  canal  horses  dropped  from  379  in  the 
previous  year  to  231.  It  was  then  quickly  run  down  to  32  by 
92 
1849. 
87  Correspondence  with  London  &  Birmingham  railway  company  and 
the  Regents  canal  company  about  the  construction  of  a  'lay-byl 
on  the  canal  at  Pickfords'  wharf  near  the  railway  company's 
depot  at  Camden.  January  to  April  1839  Pic.  3/21.  This 
follows  on  from  the  agreement  reached  between  Baxendale  and 
the  canal  company  RGC  1/36,16P  30  Jan.,  13,27  Feb.  9  13,27 
MarchvlO'pAkpril  1839;  1/389  10  March  1841.  See  also  Case  and 
opinion  of  Counsel  l/l/1851,  Pic.  3/20. 
88  PFC  1/49  30  Jan.  9  27  March  1839. 
89  MCC  1/2t  17  Aug-,  1841 
90  Diary  of  J.  H.  Baxendale,  1843,  Pic.  HH. 
91  In-Letter  Bookq  CVC  8/79  19  Dec.,  1845,12  June  1846; 
In-Letter  Bookv  OXC  4/789  20  June,  1846,  oxc  4/79,27  Sept.  1847; 
Board  Minutesq  WOBC  l/llj  8  Oct.,  1847. 
92  Statement  of  Horses 
I 
Pic.  4/25- 
217. Pickfords'  recorded  tonnage  payments  to  the  Coventry  canal  companyl 
Table  8:  1,  had  already  dropped  off  sharply  before  this  date,  but 
1846  perhaps  represented  the  point  of  no  return, 
93 
In  October  1847  Pickfords  was  reported  to  becbtermined  "to 
abandon  at  Christmas  next  the  canal  as  a  means  of  transit  for 
,,  94 
goods  .  No  doubt  Pickfords  would  have  preferred  to'run  down 
its  canal  operations  more  slowlyo  but  in  the  meantime  important 
developments  had  t,  aken'-place  in  the  railway  world.  Several 
61 
railway  companies,  the  London  &  Birmingham  and  the  Grand  Junction 
among  them,  had  come  together  to  form  the  London  &  North 
Western  Railway.  From  October  1846  Pickfords  was  negotiating 
an  agency  agreement  with  the  new  company.  The  successful 
conclusion  of  these  negotiations  marked  the  end  of  an  important 
phase  of  Pickfords'  history. 
-V 
93  Clapham.  OP-cit.  P.  398  qoted  1846  as  the  critical  years 
for  Acts  by  whiý7h  railway  companies  sought  to  purchase  or 
lease  canal  companies. 
94  EWC  1/2  8  Oct.  1847,  noting  a  report  from  the  Grand  Junction 
company* 
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11 CHAPTER 
THE  COMING  OF  RAILWAYS. Railways  radically  changed  Pickfords'  fundamental  position 
as  an  independent  carrier.  The  innovation  of  steam  locomotives 
proceeded  at  a  rapid  rate,  and  road  and  canal  conýeyance  were 
soon  supplanted  for  long  distance  freight  traffic.  Consequently 
Pickfords  had  to  reorganise.  They  were  obliged  to  abandon 
canals  and  adopt  railwayltransportation.  Despite  the  cost  of 
replacing  obsolete  capital,  the  transition  was  readily  pursued. 
Almost  as  quickly,  a  divergence  of  interests  arose  between 
the  canal  carriers  and  the  new  railway  companies.  The  companies 
decidedv  some  sooner  than  others,  that  efficient  working  and 
satisfactory  returns  to.  capital  demanded  direct  control  of  all 
branches  of  the  enterprise.  For  freight  traffic,  the  railway 
company  either  became  a  public  carrier  itself  or  employed  a 
private  carrier  in  the,  subordinate  role  of  agent.  Contrary  to 
the  carriers'  hopesp  the  coming  of  railways  did  not  enhance  their 
position;  indeed  in  the  long  run  it  destroyed  their  role  in  the 
existing  structure  of  the  carrying  trade,  In  the  new  pattern 
which  emergedq  the  dominant  place  was  held  by  the  railway 
companies.  Many  canal  carriers  went  out  of  business,  but 
Pickfords  survivedo  in  the  reduced  role  of  agent  to  the  railway 
companies. 
In  the  early  days,  howeverg  this  outcome  was  not  anticipated. 
Baxendale  reacted  positively  to  railwayso  regarding  them  as  an 
opportunity  to  be  turned  to  advantage  rather  than  a  threat  to  be 
resisted*  He  had  probably  been  fore-warned  of  the  future 
potential  for  railways  and  their  implications  for  Pickfords.  In 
1825  William  Cubitt  visited  Killingworth  colliery  on  behalf  of 
the  committee  of  the  Liverpool  &  Manchester  railway  company  to 
219. report  on  the  working  of  George  Stephensonts  locomotives  there. 
Baxendale  possessed  a  copy  of  this  report. 
1 
Cubitt  was  greatly 
impressed  by  what  he  saw,  and  reported  his  conviction  of  the 
practicability  of  railways  and  steam-locomotives.  In  particular, 
Cubitt  concluded  that  only  in  rare  circumstances  would  railways 
fail  to  superfede  canals  --a  prediction  which  Baxendale's  later 
experience  of  railways  confirmed, 
Initially  at  least  Pickfords  regarded  access  to  a  railway 
line  as  a  right,  on  payment  of  toll,  as  laid  down  in  the  early 
railway  Actso  and  not  as  a  subject  for  negotiation  with  the 
railway  company.  In  October  18299  some  months  before  the  line 
was  openedo  Pickfords  informed  the  directors  of  the  Liverpool  & 
ýCs 
Manchester  railway  company  of  "intention  to  conduct  part  of 
Cits  Aj 
business  on  the  railway.  "  2  Use  of  the  line,  and  to  what  extent, 
was  regarded  as  being  at  the  carrier's  discretion.  Pickfords 
did  not  claim  unrestricted  access;  it  proposed  using  its  own 
waggons  but  there  was  no  suggestion  of  using  its  own  locomotives. 
Even  sog  Pickfords  found  it  could  not  impose  itself  on  the 
railway  but  had  to  seek  terms,  which  the  company,  not  the  carrierp 
dictated.  A  few  years  latert  when  the  Grand  Junction  railway 
was  nearing  completiont  Baxendale  showed  he  had  learnt  the  lesson 
by  making  a  personal  approach  to  the  company.  Despite  efforts 
t,  o  impress  the  directors  with  the  scale  and  complexity  of 
Pickfords'  operationsq  and  the  firm's  command  of  thetraffic 
between  London  and  Lancashire,  he  failed  to  convince  them  that 
R_eport  of  William  Cubitt,  February'1825j_to  the  chairman  and 
committee  of  the  Liverpool  and  Manchester  railway  companj  F.  P. 
Baxendale  told  the  S.  C.  on  Railwayspfifth  report,  PP'  1844 
(Vol-  XI)  Q-33621  that  he  had  watched  the  development  of 
railways  since  1824. 
2  LVM  1/1  Board  Minutes  19  Oct.  1829. 
220. 3 
he  held  the  upper  hand.  Once  again  the  railway  company 
dictated  conditions.  Hard  experience  rendered  the  strict 
terms  of  the  early  railway  Acts  unenforceable.  Baxendale 
discovered  this  sooner  than  others.  In  1837p  before  there 
was  much  practical  experience  of  railway  workine  on  any  scale, 
Baxendale  rejected  as  unworkable  the  claim  of  unrestricted 
access  to  railway  lines  to  which  others  still  clung* 
4 
Pickfords  sought  to  use  railways  at  the  earliest  opportunity. 
Approaches  to  the  Liverpool  &  Manchester  and  the  Grand  Junction 
railway  companies  well  in  advance  of  completion,  were  repeated 
in  the  case  of  the  London  &  Birmingham  railway.  Contact  was 
made  with  the  Company  towards  the  end  of  1837,  but  Pickfords 
did  not  use  the  line  until  the  following  summerv  and  then  only 
as  a  temporary  expedient  in  the  emergency  created  by  the  failure 
of  water  supplies  at  Tring  Summit  on  the  Grand  Junction  canal. 
Only  in  January  1839  was  this  arrangement  made  permanent.  In 
September  that  year  Pickfords  had  a  daily  service  by  rail  between 
Leeds  and  York. 
5 
and  by  1840  was  also  using  the  Birmingham  & 
Derby  and  the  Midland  Counties  railways. 
6 
Piecemeal  additions 
continued  -  the  Manchester  &  Leeds  railway,  followed,  in  1843, 
by  the  South  Eastern  and  South  We5tern  lines. 
7 
The  maps  for 
1839p  1841  and  1844 
8 
mark  clearly  the  geographical  Growth  of 
3  GJR  1/1  21  Sept.  1836. 
4  S.  C.  on-Railroad  Communication  PP.,  1837-8  (Vol.  XVI)  Q.  1112 
Baxendale's  evidence  was  given  in  December  1837;  compare  Mr. 
Wallacev  M.  P.  for  Greenock,  who  statedq  in  the  debate  on  this 
reportp  that  as  far  as  the  carriage  of  mail  was  concerned  the 
government  was  at  liberty  to  put  its  own  engines  on  any  line; 
any  difficulties  raised  were  "mere  bugbear.  '$  Parliamentary 
Debatest  Third  Series  Vol.  44,  Column  447  ff. 
5  Advertisement  Sept.  1839  Pic  4/3  P.  12. 
6  Fifth  reportv  S.  C.  on  Railway  Communication,  PP.  1840  (voi.  xii) 
Q.  432. 
7  Railway  Times  25  March  1843P  P  361;  and  3  June,  p  623. 
8  1839  -  Pic  4/3;  1841  and  1844,  CHP/28  and  29. 
221. Pickfords'  services  by  land,  water  and  railwayv  September  1839 
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Source:  CEP/29 Pickfords'  railway  services  over  the  period.  Furthermore, 
they  demonstrate'that  Pickfords  had  made  the  important  policy 
decision  to  follow  the  logic  of  ýa-ilway  building  and  extend  its 
coverage  according  to  the  current  or  anticipated  expansion  of 
the  railway  network.  The  advent  of  railways  initiated  a  new, 
phase  in  Pickfords'  development  as  a  business  concern;  not 
just  a  new  branch  of  businessq'but  a  new  size  and  scaleg  with 
additional  agencies  yet  further  afield, 
This  policy  took  Pickfords  into  many  parts  of  the  country 
not  previously  served  by  the  firm,  Use  of  the  South  Eastern 
ýrailway  caused  Pickfords  to-rent  warehouses  at 
Inbridge, 
9 
Staplehurst  and  Ashford-.  Road  links  to  Maids7oneg  Canterbury 
and  Hastings  brought  those  towns  into  the  orbit  of  rail  services 
N 
before  branch  lines  were  built  to  them,  Depots  were  opened  at 
Doverp  Folkestonep  Hythe-and  Cranbrookq  and  at  several  other 
places  along  the  South  coast.  By  contrastp  Pickfords"  u5e  of 
the  South  Western  and  Great  Western  railways  was  limited  and 
was  not  followed  by  comparable  expansion.  Pickfords'  build-up 
in  Kent  was  the  first,  substantial  penetration  south  of  London, 
a  step  which  also  carried  the  firm  across 
I 
the  Channel  to  Calais.  10 
Other  areas  of  future  development  were  also  marked  outq  in 
the  west  and  south-west  of  Englandq  eastern  England  and  south 
Wales,  In  the  north,  Pickfords'  interests  extended  into 
Scotland,  In  1847  premises'were  taken  in  Glasgow  and  Edinburgh 
a  few  months  before  the  I  completion  of  rail  links  with  England,, 
12 
9  SEA  1/17  Board  Minutes-4  July  1843. 
10  See  the  map  for  1844. 
11  Ibid 
12  Glasgow  Post  Office-directory  1847-8,  Appendix  p  139. 
222. With  this  step  Pi6kfords  became  a  truly  national  transport 
concern.  By  the  end  of  the  1840s,  although  by  then  as  railway 
13 
agent  rather  than  independent  carrierv  Pickfords'  rail  services 
covered  most  of  Britain. 
Pickfords'  attitude  to  railways  was  clear  and  uncomplicated  - 
a  valuable  innovation  to  be  adopted  as  rapidly  as  possible. 
But,  from  the  railway  companiest  point  of  view,  the  situation  was 
not  so  simple.  They  had  certain  expectations  from  their  lines 
which  did  not  necessarily  coincide  with  the  carrierst  interest, 
Indeed  they  often  conflicted. 
The  railway  companies  had  to  decide  whetheqr,  in  order  to 
acquire  and.  organise  their  goods  traffic,  they  needed  to  become 
public  carriers  or  could  rely  on  the  established  carrying  firms. 
To  employ  the  private  carriers  would  save  capital,  a  factor  of 
some  importance  at  the  time,  and  would  draw  traffic,  and  thus 
revenueg  to  the  company.  In  additiont  railway  companies  faced,  ' 
many  quite  new  management  problems, 
14 
and'a  policy  which  exploited 
relevant  experience  and  expertise  had  much  to  recommend  it.  But 
there  were  several  possible  drawbacks.  The  carrier's  profit 
would  be  a  loss  of  revenue  to  the  company,  a  cost  to  be  set 
against  capital  savings.  Secondly,  the  carrier,  with  substantial 
investment  in  road  and  canal  transport,  might  be  expected  to 
minimize  his  capital  commitment  to  railways,  to  bring  only 
essential  traffic  to  the  line  and  thus  depress  the  company's 
revenue  below  the  optimum,  Finallyq  exploitation  apart,  lack 
13  Glasgow  Post  Office  directory  1849-50,  Appendix  p.  149. 
According  to  this  entry  Pickfords  were  agent  to  the  Caledonian, 
London  &  North  Western,  Yorkq  Newcastle  &  Berwickv  York  & 
North  Midlandq  Midland  and  Bristol-t  and  Birmingham  railway 
companiesp  and  carried  on  their  own  account  on  the  Great 
Western,  South  Western,  South  Easternt  S,  Devont  Eastern 
Counties  and  Brighton  railways. 
14  T,  R.  Gourvishq  British  railway 
- 
anagement  in  the  nineteenth 
century.  with  special  reference  to  the  career  of  Captain  Mark 
Huish  (18o8-186Z).  (Unpublished  London  University  Ph.  D. 
thesist  1967)  P  19ff. 
223. of  direct  control  by  the  railway  company  opened  the  way  to 
inefficient  use  of  plant  and  equipment,  a  danger  which  would 
increase  with  each  additional  carrier  employed. 
Each  railway  company  had  to  formulate  a  policy  according 
to  its  judgement,  on  the  basis  of  local  circumatancesq  of  the 
balance  of  advantage.  Decisions  varied  widely.  At  one 
extreme  both  the  Liverpool  &  Manchester  and  Grand  Junction 
railway  companies  tended  to  follow  a  policy  which  reserved  all 
traffict  including  freightv  exclusively  to  themselves.  By 
contrast  the,  London  &  Birmingham  company  left  the  organisation 
of  its  goods  traffic  to  open  competition  between  the  carriers  and 
restricted  its  role  to  the  provision  of  waggons  and  locomotive 
power.  In  18399  of  the  eight  principal  railway  companies  then 
in  operation,  the  Liverpool  &  Manchester,  Leeds  &  Selby,  and 
Newcastle  &  Carlisle  companies  adopted  an  exclusive  policy;  the 
Bolton  &  Leigh  company  leased  its  traffic  to  a  single  carrier; 
the  North  Union  claimed  to  follow  the  same  open  policy  as  the 
London  &  Birmingham  company;  the  Stockton  &  Darlington  company 
carried  along  with  other  parties.  The  Grand  Junction  company 
desired  to  be  exclusive,  carriers  and  reserved  all  traffic  between 
Birmingham  and  Liverpool  to  itself,  but  circumstances  demanded 
that  carriers  be  admitted  for  London  traffic-  15 
Five  years 
later,  although  most  companies  by  then  were  carriersq  exclusively 
or  otherwiseq  such  important  companies  as  the  Manchester  &  Leeds, 
North  Midland  and  Midland  Counties  continued  to  follow  an  open 
policy. 
16  Decisions  could  be  later  reversed,  The  South  Eastern 
15  Second  reporiv  S.  C.  on  Railwaysq  PP-  1839  (Vol.  X) 
16  Appendix  29  p  229  fifth  report  S.  C.  on  Railways  rp..  1844 
(Vol.  XI) 
224. railway  company,  for  exampleg  under  Baxendale's  guidance, 
initially  pursued  an  open  policy,  but  after  his  removal  from 
the  chairmanshipq  the  company  began  to  carry  in  its  own  riGht, 
although  not  to  the  exclusion  of  other  carriers. 
17 
The  variety  of  policies  pursued  would  suggest  railway  companies 
found  the  decision  a  difficult  one. 
18 
The  directors  of  the 
Liverpool  &  Manchester  railway,  for  examplet  considered  this 
issue  some  eighteen  months  before  opening, 
19 
but  a  year  passed 
before  any  decision  was  made.  A  particular  problem  was  the 
company's  obligationg  contained  in  its  Actaf  1826,  to  convey  all 
goods  brought  to  its  stations.  In  law  the  company  was  being 
required  to  function  as  a  public  carrier  and  so  had  to  make 
appropriate  arrangements.  The  directors  considered  the  possibility 
of  using  existing  carriers, 
20 
and  sounded  them  out  for  terms,  but 
finally  decided  that  the  company  should  proceed,  "without  the 
intervention  of  separate  carriers,  (as  Pickfordt  Kenworthy,  and 
others)  but  without  excluding  such  carriers  from  the  railway, 
should  the  directors  be  able  to  make  satisfactory  arrangements  for 
their  becoming  carriers  on  the  line.  '  21 
The  necessary  skills  and 
experience  were  bought  by  attracting  into  the  company's  employment 
17  Pickfords  was  closely  associated  with  the  South  Eastern 
railway  company  but,  after  the  change  of  policyq  strongly 
denied  thatp  through  Baxendale,  the  firm  had  enjoyed  a 
preferred  position.  SER  1/180  25  Sept.  1844.  For  Pickfords' 
use  of  the  linev  SER  1/17  and  1/18  (1841-1845)  passim;  also 
Diary  of  Joseph  Hornby  Baxendale,  entry  for  1843,  Pic  HH. 
18  Hardman  Earle  and  Theodore  Rathgone,  both  directors  of  the 
North  Union  (Rathbone  was  Deputy  Chairman)  and  other  railways 
held  diametrically  opposed  views  on  this  issue.  Rathbone 
regarded  the  London  &  Birmingham  railway  as  a  'sounder  and 
better  system.  '  Individual  evidenceg  second  report,  SC  on 
Rýilwaysq  PP.  1839  (Vol.  X) 
19  Explicitly  formulated  as  capital  saving  off-set  against 
carriers'  profit  LVM  1/1  9  June  1828. 
20  Ibidq  16  June  1828. 
21  Ibidq  19  June  1829. 
225. supervisory  staff  from  the  canal  carriers. 
22 
In  practice  the 
company  remained  cautious  of  the  carriers  and  seems  to  have 
been  unable  to  find  satisfactory  terms.  Pickfords  finally 
negotiated  a  special  contract  for  its  van  traffic  between 
Manchester  and  Liverpool, 
23 
but  neither  Pickfords  nor  any  other 
carrier  apparently  operated  independently  over  the  line.  General 
merchandise  traffic  between  Liverpool  and  Manchester  was  reserved 
exclusively  to  the  company* 
24 
The  Grand  Junction  companyo  many  of  whose  directors  also 
sat  on  the  Liverpool  &  Manchester  board'  sought  independence  in 
all  aspects  of  its  enterprise.  When  Baxendale  met  representatives 
of  the  boardt  he  was  explicitly  told  that  the  company  intended 
to  keep  passengers  and  parcels  trafficq  locomotive  power  and 
waggons  under  its  own  control  to  prevent  any  possible  dependence 
on  the  carriers.  The  company  would  also  engage  in  the  carrying 
trade  on  its  own  account  should  this  appear  necessary  or  desirableý5 
E;  ven*for  the  special  category  of  van  traffic,  for  which  Pickfords 
sought  similar  arrangements  to  those  already  agreed  with  the 
Liverpool  &  Manchester  company,  the  Grand  Junction  company  was 
Slow  to  commit  itself.  Baxendale  met  the  directors  in  September 
1836,  the  line  was  opened  in  July,  1837,  yet  not  until  March  1838 
did  the  company  agree  to  provide  any  waggons  specially  for 
Pickfords'  use, 
26 
Prior  to  that  Pickfords  had  had  to  take  its 
22  Ibid  61  16  Nov.,  21  Dec.,  1829,8  Feb.,  1830.  This  became 
standard  practice  for  other  companies  following  similar 
policies,  and  Pickfords  became  a  regular  target  for  such 
kaids.  See  my  article  'A  note  on  the  supply  of  staff  for 
the  early  railways'  Transport  HistoEZ_Vol.  1  1968.  In 
addition  to  persons  mentioned  there,  were  Henry  Wyatt  of 
the  London  &  Birmingham  companyq  and  Robert  and  William 
Moseley  who  joined  the  Eastern  Counties  railway.  G.  P.  Neale 
Railway  Reminiscences  (1904)  P  7. 
23  LVM  1/2t  22  Nov.,  1830 
24  Evidence  of  Laurence  and  Booth  (chairman  and  treasurer)q 
first  reportq  S.  C.  on  RailwaXs,  PP-  1839  (VO1-X)  OR  789-794 
25  GJR  1/ly  21  Sept.,  1836; 
26  GJR  1/29  160  21  March  1838. 
226. chance  on  there  being  sufficient  room  available  for  its  van 
goods  on  the  company's  scheduled  passenger  trains. 
The  Grand  Junction  company  began  by  reserving  to  itself 
all  general  merchandise  trafficle  But  a  large  share  of  such 
freight  out  of  Liverpool  was  through-traffic  to  Londong  and  the 
company  failed  to  draw  very  much  of  this  from  the  canal  carriers* 
A  contributory  factort  no  doubtf  was  the  lack  of  a  continuous 
rail  link  to  Londonp  which,  seriously  weakened  the  companyls 
competitive  position.  Until  April  1839,  when  the  railway 
became  fully  operationalg  most  traffic  passing  between  London  and 
Birmingham,  over  half  the  total  distance  to  Liverpoolv  had  to  go 
by  canalv 
27 
'which  thus  preserved  the  canal  carriers'  position  in 
the  trade,  Substantial  canal  services  continued  to  be  necessary, 
while  in  addition  trans-shipment  costs  between  rail  and  canal  at 
Birmingham  would  almost  certainly  have  off-set  any  competitive 
pricing  the  railway  company  could  offer.  Even  when  the  London 
&  Birmingham  line  became  available,  the  private  carriers  continued 
in  a  position  of  some  strength.  The  Grand  Junction  company 
had  no  means  of  providing  directly  for  traffic  south  of  Birmingham, 
andl,  since  the  London  &  Birmingham  company  did  not  act  as  a  carrier 
over  its  own  linel,  an  lend-on'  agreement  for  goods  traffic 
between  the  two  companies  was  precluded.  Although  the  company 
tried  to  solve  this  problem  by  negotiating  for  an  agent  to  act 
for  it  on  the  London  &  Birmingham  line,  no  significant  success 
28 
was  achieved  before  the  spring  of  1840.  In  the  meantime  only 
27  That  is  except  for  the  quantities  Pickfords  and  Bache  were 
able  to  carry  on  London  &  Birmingham  rails  by  special 
agreement. 
28  The  company  tried  two  firms  Robins  &  Co.  9  and  then  John  Jolly, 
a  carrier  between  London  and  Birmingham,  but  neither  was  able 
to  discharge  the  job  efficiently.  Success  came  when  terms 
were  agreed  with  Chaplin  &  Horne  early  in  1840.  Chorley  and 
Mossv  fifth  report  S.  C.  on  Railway  Communication  PP.  1840 
(vol.  XIII). 
227. the  private  carriers  could  offer  customers  a  service  which 
ensured  full  responsibility  for  goods  over  the  entire  distance 
between  London  and  Liverpool.  The  mode  of  conveyance  was  left 
to  the  carrier's  discretion  andt  except  for  a  limited  range.  of 
traffic  for  which  speed  of  transit  was  important,  there  was 
every  reason,  of  cost  and  conveniencel  for  the  bulk  of  freight 
to  go  by  canal.  To  a  considerable  extentp  therefore,  the 
carriers  were,  able  to  dictate  how  much  merchandise  traffic  went 
by  Grand  Junction  rails  and  the  company's  exclusive  policy  was 
reason  for  them  to  keep  it  to  a  minimum. 
In  order  toattract  this  traffic,  the  Grand  Junction  company 
found  it  necessary  to.  modify  its  policy,  Late  in  1838  the  company 
responded  to  prior  promptings  from  Pickfords  29 
and  signed  contracts 
whereby  Pickfords  and  others  became  independent  carriers  on 
Grand  Junction  rails, 
-30  But  it  was  essentially  only  a  modification 
not  an  abandonmentt  of  existing  policy.  The  agreement  applied 
only  to  through-traffic  between  the  terminals  at  Liverpool  and 
London:  traffic  between  Liverpool  and  Birmingham  continued  to 
be  the  company's  prerogativet  and  a:  request  from  Pickfords  to  be 
allowed  to  carry  from  stations  along  the  line  was  rejected, 
31 
The  intention  clearly  was  to  bring  traffic,  and  thus  revenue,  to 
the  railway  and  not  to  Provide  the  means  for  the  private  carriers 
to  compete  with  the  railway  company  over  its  own  line,  The 
29  GJR  1/29  179  21  Nov.  1838. 
30  Pickfords'  contract  was  dated  17  Dec.  9  1838.  It  is  reproduced 
at  S.  C.  on  Railway  Communication  PP.  1840  (Vol-XIII)  q-729. 
Similar  agreements  were  made  with  Bache  &  Co,  (GJR  1/2,24 
Nov.  #  1838)q  and,  according  to  Chorleyq  treasurer  of  the  Grand 
Junctiony  q-33109  with  Kenworthy  &  Co.  The  company's  agreement 
with  Robins  &  Co  (reproduced  q-1973)  did  not  commence  until 
April  1839.  Both  the  terms  of  the  contracts  and  the  relations 
between  the  company  and  carriers  derives  from  evidence  given 
to  this  committee. 
31  GJR  1/29  22  May  1839, 
228. company  insisted  on  an  equal  balance  of  traffic  in  each  directiong 
and  a  minimum  daily  loading  of  30  to  40  tons.  The  carriers 
could  not  charge  less  than  the  company's  published  rates  and  all 
special  rates  and  discountsv  the  canal  carriers'  chief  means  of 
competing  with  each  other,  were  prohibited,  The  carrier  had  to 
find  his  profit  out  of  the  20%  allowed  off  the  monthly  carriage 
accountq  after  meeting  his  terminal  costs,  liability  for  damage 
and  so  on.  The  chief  benefit  to  the  carriers  was  that  the 
agreement  allowed  for  the  trucks  of  the  Grand  Junction  and  London 
&  Birmingham  companies  to  pass  onto  each  other's  lines,  so  that 
goods  could  now  be  sent  by  rail  undisturbed  the  whole  distance 
between  London  and  Lancashire.  With  the  eliminatian  of  costly 
trans-shipmentg  the  full  benefits  of  railway  transportation 
between  the  two  points  were  enjoyed  for  the  first  time. 
While  modifying  its  policy,  the  Grand  Junction  company  gave 
little  away,  It  allowed  the  carriers  to  act  independently  but 
within  strictly  controlled  limits.  The  carriers  interpreted 
the  move  as  a  grudging  concessiong  with  the  ulterior  motive  of 
discovering  the  source  of  their  traffic,  which  the  company  would 
then  seek  for  itself.  In  this  situationt  when  each  side  saw 
the  threat  of  exploitation  in  the  other's  moves,  it  is  not 
surprising  that  mutual  recriminations  broke  out.  The  Grand 
junction  company  accused  Pickfords  of  falsifying  invoicest  and 
was  particularly  angry  at  Pickfords'  practice  of  bulking  small 
parcels  into  larger  bundlesq  to  avoid  paying  per  parcel,  which 
the  company  regarded  as  totally  dishonest  if  not  technically 
illegal.  Pickfords  replied  with  charges  of  discrimination  and 
poaching  'of  traffic.  The  situation  became  more  explosive  when 
the  company  made  a  general  reduction  of  rates,  and  then  even 
229. further  depressed  the  value  of  the  carriers'  20ý  allowance  by 
deducting  from  it  chaiges  forthe  loading  and  unloading  of 
wagigons  at  Manchester  by  employees  of  the  Liverpool  &  Manchester 
company,  a  task  which  the  carriers  had  Previously  carried  out 
themselves,  The  break  came  in  autumn  1840.  By  then  the  Grand 
Junction  company  had  negotiated  terms  with  Chaplin  &  Horne  for 
that  firm  to  act  as  its  agent,:  Ln  London  and  on  London  &  Birmingham 
rails,  and  so  was  able  to  do  without  the  carriers.  Pickfords 
wanted  to  continue-  its  use  of  Grand  Junction  rails  after  the 
termination  of  its  contract  with  the  companY32  and  asked  for  the 
same  terms  as  those  allowed  to  Chaplin  &  Horne.  The  companyls 
refusal  initiated  a  protracted  legal  wrangle. 
Since  so  much  of  the  firm's  traffic  passed  between  London 
and  Lancashireq  Pickfords'  railway  ambitions  were  materially 
affected  by  the  Grand  Junction  company's  decisions,  Had  the 
London  &  Birmingham  company  followed  the  same  policyp  Pickfords, 
hopes  of  an  independent  railway  carrying  service  would  have  been 
frustrated.  Because  it  took  the  opposite  view,  the  company's 
rails  provided  the  spring-board  from  which  Pickfords  was  able  to 
mount  its  incursion  into  railway  carriage  and  bye-pass  the 
restrictions  thrown  up  by  the  Grand  Junction  company. 
Although  the  London  &  Birmingham  company  did  not  change  its 
working  practice  for  goods  traffic  during'its  independent 
existence,  the  evidence  suggests  the  company  was  not  wholly  sure 
of  its  open  policy.  First  inclinations  were  to  contract  out 
32  GJR  1/3t  30  Sept.  1840  and  passim  in  subsequent  months. 
230. the  carrying  department*  In  November  1837  draft  terms  were 
d15cussed  with  Baxendale  whereby  Pickford5  would  organise  the 
goods  traffico  In  the  company's  namet  for  a  fee  of  5%  of  the 
net  profits.  Pickfords  would  divert  to  the  railway  as  much' 
of  its  canal  traffic  as  possible. 
33 
Such  a  policy  would  have 
been  exclusive,  to  the  selectea  agent,  but  without  tight  control 
being  exercised  by  the  company.  Dest  advantage  was  seen  to  lie 
in  the  ready  supply  of  technical  skillsq  experienced  management 
and  an  immediate  flow  of  traffic  which  such  a  connection  would 
bring  to  the  line. 
However,  this  policy  was  not  implemented.  A  year  later, 
despite  a  proposal  that  the  company  should  be  the  exclusive 
carrier  on  its  line  and  ) 
implicitlyv  retain  a  special  relationship 
with  Pickfords, 
34. 
the  company  had  decided  to  leave  its  goods 
traffic  to  open  competition  between  the  carriers.  Thus  Pickfords' 
first  use  of  the  London  &  Birmingham  line,  in  the  emergency 
conditions-on  the  Grand  Junction  canal  in  September  1838,  was  by 
way  of  a  special  and  explicitly  temporary  arrangement. 
35 
Other 
carriers  who  applied  for  similar  facilities  were  told  that  the 
company  then  lacked  the  resources  to  handle  more  than  a  small 
volume  of  goods  traffic.  Indeed  Pickfords  could  only  send 
limited  quantities  and  had  to  provide  its  own  staff  and  facilities. 
But  the  directors  tempered  their  refusal  with  the  promise  that, 
33  HL  2/199  R  316,  Heads  of  agreement  between  London  &  Birmingham 
Company  with  Mr.  Baxendale  on  behalf  of  Messrs,  Pickford  & 
Co.  for  undertaking  the  superintendence  of  the  Goods  Carrying 
Department  24  Nov.,  1837.  This  agreement  was  recommended  for 
approval  by  the  Management  Committeel  minutes  6  Dec.,  1837 
LBM  1/85-  The  same  minute  also  recommended  an  agreement  with 
Chaplin  &  Horne  for  the  conveyance  of  passengers,  luggage  and 
coach  parcelso  of  which  details  are  at  HL  2/6  R34. 
34  HL2/6  R489  Committee  of  Management 
,9 
12  Sept.,  1838  'Plan  to 
be  proposed  for  carrying  on  the  railway  business.  ' 
35  LBM  1/85  Minutes  of  Management  Committee,  3  Sept.  9  1838. 
231. once  the  appropriate  arrangements  were  madep  all  the  carriers 
would 
. 
be  placed  on  an  equal  footing, 
36 
It  is  not  clear  why 
the  company  dropped  the  favoured  position  originally  intended 
37 
for  Pickfords.  Possibly  the  directors  were  already  sensitive 
to  the  charge  of  undue  preference  to  Pickfords  which  the 
'  38 
disappointed  carriers  raised.  The  company  vigorously  rejected 
this  charge  and  insisted  that  the  arrangements  were  purely 
temporary  and  that  the  company  in  no  way  wished  to  be  a  carrier. 
39 
Despite  this,  an  element  of  uncertainty  continued.  At  the 
annual  general  meeting  of  the  London  &  Birmingham  company, 
1  Februaryq  18399  shareholders  were  told  that  the  line  would  be 
open  to  all  carriers  but  the  company  would  carry  on  its  own 
account  to  ensure  fair  rates. 
40 
Such  a  policy  had  little  to 
recommend  it  sinceg  as  the  Grand  Junction  company  found,  the 
company  would  only  with  difficulty  have  avoided  conflict 
36  LBM  1/3  Board  Minutes  5  Oct-9  1838.  This  conformed  to  the 
position  taken  by  the  Committee  of  Administration,  HL  2/6 
R51;  also  LBM  1/85- 
, I'' 
37  According  to  Baxendale  the  change  was  made  on  the  company's 
initiativev  apparently  at  a  time  when  it  was  felt  the  company 
should  itself  carry  -  second  report,  S.  C.  on  Railways,  PP  1839 
(Vol.  X)  Q.  2422. 
38  Petition  to  Parliament  presented  by  Lord  Granville  Somerset 
on  behalf  of  warehousemen  and  carriersq  Parliamentary  Debates 
Third  Series  Vol.  46  Columns  1220-1221;  also  The  Times 
27  March  1839p  page  5  Col.  d#  For  early  relations  between 
Pickfords  and  the  London  &  Birmingham  railway  company,  see 
Baxendale's  evidence  S.  C.  on  London  &  Birmingham  Railway  Bill 
PP  1839  (Vol.  XIII)v  and  S.  C.  on  Railways.,  VP,  )  1839  (Vol-X); 
also  the  early  pages  of  D.  Stevenson  Fifty  years  on  the 
London  and  North  Western  Railway  (1891). 
39  Evidence  of  George  Carr  Glyn  and  Richard  Creedq  chairman 
and  secretaryo  S.  C.  on  Railways.  9  PP  1839  (Vol-X);  the 
surviving  company  records  support  their  statements.  Pickfords 
also  found  it  necessary  to  put  out  a  circular,  Jointly  with 
the  London  &  Birmingham  companyq  denying  any  attempted 
monopoly*  HL  2/19,  R62.  A.  Since  the  company's  original 
Act  did  not  contain  a  clause  prohibiting  'undue  preference' 
such  a  step  would  not  have  been  illegal.  As  part  of  a 
subsequent  Act  the  company  came  into  line  with  what  had 
become  standard  practice  by  inserting  such  a  clause,  Evidence 
Glyn  and  Creedq  first  report,  S.  C.  on  Railways  PP  1839  (Vol-X) 
Q.  93  ff- 
40  RAC  1/226.1  must  thank  my  colleague  Dr.  M.  C.  Reed  for  this 
reference. 
1 
232. with  its  competitors.  In  the  event  the  company  did  not  engage 
in  carrying  when  the  line  was  fully  opened.  A  year  later, 
howeverg.  Baxendale  asked  the  directors  to  dispel  rumours  that 
the  company  was  considering  whether  to  become  carriers.  As  he 
was  about  to  invest  heavily  in  railway  facilities  he  sought 
assurance  that  his  capital  expenditure  would  not  be  negativod  by 
the  company  reversing  its  poli  cy;  "should  the  company  contemplate 
becoming  carriers  it  would  be  worse  than  folly  for  private 
Individuals  entering  into  competition.  " 
41 
The  continuing  doubts 
suggest  uncertainty  on  the  company's  part  as  to  its  best  policy. 
Presumably  Baxendale  received  a  satisfactory  reply  to  his 
questiong  for  he  proceeded  with  his  investment  plans,  Central 
to  these  was  undoubtedly  the  establishment  he  had  built  at 
Camden  Town  as  the  focal  point  of  Pickfords'  railway  operations. 
City  Basin,  Pickfords'  canal  headquarterst  proved  to  be 
inadequate  for  rail  -  traffic 
42 
and  had  to  be  replaced.  Baxendale 
believed  that  the  London  &  Birmingham  company's  building  plans 
seriously  underestimated  the  probable  growth  of  goods  traffic, 
43 
and  so  decided  to  provide  for  his  own  needs.  He  bought  a  plot 
of  land  on  the  south  bank  of  the  Regents  canalp  adjacent  to 
Camden  Town  goods  stationg  and  there  built  a  large  depotq  a 
warehouse  and  administrative  centre  combined,  the  unique  design 
of  whicho  according  to  the  needs  of  railway  traffic,  the  scalep 
extensive  facilities  and  speed  of  traffic  through-put,  drew 
41  Baxendale  to  the  chairman  and  directors  of  the  London  & 
Birihingham  ýcailway'ýcompany,  5  Feb.,  1840.  Pic  4/27  P  14. 
42  Hayward,  one  of-Pickfords'  senior  clerksp  Report  of  the 
Gauge  Commissioners  PP  1846  (VOl-  XVI)  Q-5858. 
43  R.  C.  on  Metropolitan  Termini  PP  1846  (Vol.  XVII)  Q.  544 
233. 44 
admiring  comment.  The  overall  scheme  incorporated  a  private 
dock  and  lay-by  on  the  Regents  canal, 
45 
potentially  the  means 
of  integrating  canal  and  rail  traffic,  together  with  a  private 
bridge  over  the  canal  which  gave  access  to  London  &  Birmingham 
rails. 
46 
The  capital  cost  was  considerable,  some  L20,  -25,000 
for  the  warehouse  alonev 
47, 
and  in  excess  of  C309000  for  the 
total  project* 
48 
In  the  context  of  railway  capital  formation, 
this  was  a  substantial  sum  for  an  individual  private  firm  to 
lay  outo 
49 
and  Baxendale's  caution  before  committing  himself  to 
Investment  on,  this  scale  was  wholly  reasonable. 
The  Camden  depot  was  to  be  the  hub  of  a  country-wide 
railway  carrying  network.  Pickfords'  ability  to  build  up  a 
railway  carrying  trade  comparable  to  that  on  the  canals,  in 
44  Penny  Maga:  ý,  ine  8,22  Oct.,  1842  PP  394-50  411-2;  Railway 
Times  4  Dee,  1841  p  1264  reported  the  depotts  opening; 
S,  Salt  Railway  and  commercial  information  p  18t  quoting 
Quarterly  Review  Dec  1848.  In  the  contemporary  manner, 
comment  was  made  on  the  number  of  cranes  and  quantity  of 
steam-power  deployedg  the  number  of  bricks  consumed  in  the 
buildingt  and  the  special  facilities  for  men  and  horses. 
45  Intended  partly  to  pacify  the  Regents  canal  company  who 
threatened  a  court  action  to  compel  Pickfords  to  continue 
using  the  canal  as  long  as  it  held  the  lease  of  City  Basin. 
RGC  1/36  169  30  Jan,  13,27  Feb.  9  139  27  March,  10,24  April, 
1839;  1/399  10  March  1841;  1/400  26  June  1844,6  Nov.,  1846, 
17  Feb*  1847.  Also  Pic  3/21  correspondence  between  Baxendale 
and  Regents  canal  company.  Jan  to  April  1839. 
46  LBM  1/4  22  Nov  1839,18  Dec.  1840,8  Oct.  1841.  Later 
additional  rails  and  a  turn  table  were  put  downg(LBM  1/5 
12  July  1844)  and  then  a  sidings  for  Pickfords  adjoining  the 
company's  depot  (LBM  116t  13  March  1846). 
47  Railway  Times  1841,  p  1244  estimated  the  cost  at  920,000, 
Hayward  put  it  at  L25,000.  'Report  of  the  Gauge  Commissioners 
PP  1846  (Vol.  XVI)  Q-5858. 
48  In  1846ý  Baxendale  said  he  had  spent  930  -40,000  on  Camden 
R.  C.  on  Metropolitan  Termini  pp  1846  (XVII)  Q-545.  In  Sept. 
!  847  the  premises  were  sold  to  the  London  &  North  Western 
railway  company  for  C319420.19.4d  Duplicate  conveyance  Pic 
This  compares  with  the  C20,000  spent  on  City  Basin  in  1820. 
49  It  is  difficult  to  relate  this  figure  to  contemporary  spending 
by  railway  companies  since  data  for  comparable  building  is  not 
available.  J.  R.  Kellett  The  impact  of  railways  on  Victorian 
cities  (1969),  gives  the  cost  of  Lime  Street  Stationg  Liverpool, 
in  1832  as  C1359000t  and  L150,000  for  Central  Station, 
Manchester  in  1860. 
234. particular  the  ability  to  manipulate  the  flow  of  traffic 
according  to  its-own  interestst  ultimately  rested  on  the  open 
policy  pursued  by  the  London  &  Birmingham  railway  co  . mpany.  As 
carriers  primarily  between  London  and  Lancashire,  it  was  the 
one  line  Pickfords  had  to  use,  Fortunately  Pickfords  enjoyed 
good  relations  with  the  Company,  whose  line  gave  access  to  the 
Midland  and  Yorkshire  railways,  and  thus  a  route  to  Manchester 
and  Liverpool  which  avoided  the  Grand  Junction  railway. 
Pickfords'  position  as  a  national  railway  carrier  was,  therefore 
tenable  so  long  as  the  London  &  Birmingham  company  found  no 
cause  to  modify  its  policy,  Pickfords  was,  the  biggest  single 
user  of-the  London  &.  Birmingham  line.  50 
In  1846  traffic  was 
passing  through  the  Camden  depot  at  the  rate  of  1600  tons  per 
week, 
51 
or  85,000  tons  per  annumt  possibly  a  tenth  of  the  total' 
freight  on  the  line,  52 
and  Pickfords  paid  the  company  some 
, 
00,000  in  respect  of  it.  53 
The  choice  of  Camden  for  Pickfords'  railway  headquarters 
emphasised  the  firm's  continuing  primary  concern,  from  its  canal 
trade,  with  traffic  between  London  and  the  North.  Very  little 
merchandise  was  carried  on  to  the  lines  to  the  west  and  south 
of 
.  London. 
54 
In  the  organisation  of  traffic,  too, 
. 
50  Followed  by  Chdplin  &  Horne.  Millsq  manager  of  the  London  & 
Birmingham  goods  department  at  Camden  Report  of_Gua,  -,  e 
Commissioners  PP  1846  (XVI)  Q-1954  ff;  Carr  Glyn,  Ibid  Q.  1460. 
51  Hayward  R.  C.  on  Metropolitan  Termini  PP  1846  (XVIIT--qR  1351-5. 
Chaplin  &  Horne  carried  1200-1500  tons  per  week.  Horne,  Ibid 
Q.  475- 
52  Hayward  Ibid  Q-13639  QQ-1377-80,  By  1848  Pickfords  was 
handling  over  840  tons  per  day  through  Camden.  Salt,  Railway 
and  commercial  information  p  18. 
53  Baxendal-e  Ibid  Q-546. 
54  Because#  in  Baxendale's  words,  these  areas  "have  no  manufactures" 
Ibid  qq.  582-3. 
235. railways  reinforced  prior  trends  rather  than  introduced  any 
fundamental  changes.  As  more  railways  openedt  multilateral 
flows  of  trafficq  which  Pickfords  had  been  developing  in  its 
canal  boat  schedulesq  gained  greater  prominenceq  helped  on  from 
55 
1842  by  the  work  of  Railway  Clearing  House.  Traffic  to 
Bristol  and  the  west  of  England,  for  exampleg  which  had  previously 
been  channelled  through  London  was  increasingly  sent  direct. 
56 
Benefits  accrued  on  all  sides  as  the  dangers  and  costs  of  repeated 
trans-shipment  were  eliminated.  But  in  the  mid-1840s  most  of 
this  lay  in  the  future.  Trade  still  retained  the  stamp  of  the 
eighteenth  century  economy  in  that  the  bulk  of  traffic  still 
flowed  to  and  from  London,  and  the  greater  part  of  it  was 
directed  to  and  redistributed  by  London  warehousemen. 
57 
Railways  created  some  new  types  of  traffic  but  by  and  large 
the  same  mixed  pattern  of  the  canal  traffic  was  repeated. 
pickfords  carried  by  rail  a  wide  variety  of  goods  from  large 
boilers  and  railway  turn-tables  to  raspberries  and  elephant  St 
teeth.  There  was,  howeverg  a  broad  distinction  in  the 
composition  of  traffic  in  and  out  of  London.  Pickfords  brought 
chiefly  manufactured  goods  up  to  London  and  took  down  commodities 
like  groceries  and  draperies  in  exchange. 
58 
On  occasion  the 
same  items  might  be  moved  up  and  down  within  the  space  of  two 
or  three  months.  For  example,  sugar  imported  at  Liverpool  and 
sent  to  London  for  sale  might  be  returned  to  Liverpool  if  market 
conditions  there  became  more  favourable,  59 
Switching  commodities 
55  P.  S.  Bagwell  The  Railway  Clearing  House  in  the  British  economy 
1842-192  9 
(-1-9)M8ý. 
56  Haywardq  Reportof  Gaure  Commissioners  PP  1846  (xvT,  )  (1-5838. 
57  Ibid.  Q-5837 
58  Hayward  R.  -C.  on  Metropolitan  Termini  Pp  1846  (XVII)  QCL.  1356-9. 
59  Ibid  QQ-1361-2. 
236. between  markets  like  this  was  not  now.  Although  railways 
added  greater  flexibility  they  had  clearly  not  yet  smoothed 
out  regional  variations  in  price  structures. 
Goods  handling  procedures  at  Camden  depended  on  the 
direction  of  traffic. 
6o 
'Up'  trafficp  coming  in  by  day  but 
chiefly  by  nighto  had  to  be  unloaded  from  the  trucksy  sorted 
according  to  the  London  delivery  districts  and  re-loaded  on  to 
road  wagaons  ready  for  immediate  distribution.  'Down'  traffic 
came  in  over-night  from  the  London  warehouses  and  had  to  be 
sorted  and  loaded  according  to  the  town  of  consignment,  ready 
for  the  first  goods  train  at  6.00  a.  m.  The  direction  of  traffic 
thus  demanded  its  own  range  of  knowledge  and  procedures.  The 
Camden  depot  was  designed  to  meet  these  separate  needs,  and  so 
was  divided  into  two  independently  operating  units  each  with  its 
own  staff  of  porters  and  clerks.  The  rhythm  of  work  also 
differed,  according  to  the  time-table  of  goods  trains  set  down  by 
the  London  &  Birmingham  company,  but  as  round-the-clock  working 
was  called  for  in  both  parts  of  the  depot,  a  double  relay  of 
staff  was  necessary. 
In  despatching  goods  from  Camden  the  overriding  principle, 
as  before  on  the  canalsq  wasp  whenever  possiblep  to  trunk  traffic 
direct  to  its  place  of  destination. 
61 
Some  trans-shipment  was 
found  to  be  necessaryt  for  exampleg  between  canal  and  railway  at 
Camdeng  Rugby  and  Birmingham.  The  objective  was  to  send  whole 
truck  loads  to  each  town  to  which  the  firm  carried  by  rail, 
60  This  paragraph  is  based  on  Penny  Magazine  8,22  Oct.,  1842 
pp  394-51  411-2, 
61  The  following  is  based  on  the  evidence  of  Bass  and  Hayward 
to  the-Gauge  Commissioners,  esp.  QQ.  5819-20. 
237. When  these  conditions  were  absent  Pickfords  preferred  for  the 
sake  of  a  regular  service  and  alternative  cost,  to  send  the 
minimum  truck  loading  of  30  cwts  which  the  company  would  allow 
and  pay  for  31,  tons,  the  minimum  charge,  if  this-would  got  goods 
to  their  destination  undisturbed.  The  smaller  pay-load  of 
standard  gauge  trucks  gave  much  greater  flexibility  to  the 
carriers  in  this  respect,  and  were  also  more  economical  of 
storage  and  loading  space  at  stations  where  accommodation  was 
cramped. 
62 
Incomplete  loads  were  put  together  and  sent  to 
Derby 
63 
where  Pickfords  absorbed  traffic  from  the  west  of  England. 
Full  loads  could  be  guaranteed  from  Derby  northwards.  Although 
the  focal  points  were  different  the  basic  principles  and  structure 
of  Pickfords1traffic  flow  remained  much  the  same  as  in  canal  days. 
The  topent  system  of  goods  working  was  clearly  preferable  to 
Pickfordsj  since  it  allowed  the  carrier  to  regulate  his  own 
traffic.  But  considerable  technical  and  economic  inefficiency 
was  built  into  this  system.  ThIrty-hundred  weight  loadings  in 
3-1  ton  trucks  wasted  waggon  space  and  locomotive  power,  a  cost 
which,  together  with  the  reduplication  of  terminal  facilities, 
was  multiplied  in  proportion  to  the  number  of  carriers  on  the  line. 
Disputes  between  carrier  and  railway  company  increased  the  waste. 
To  maintain  opposition  to  the  Grand  Junction  company,  Pickfords 
62  Hence  the  reason  why  officials  of  Pickfords  gave  evidence  in 
favour  of  the  standard  gauge.  Pickfords  had  to  deal  with  the 
break  of  gauge  at  Gloucester  for  Bristol  and  west  of  England 
traffic.  Also  S.  C.  on  Oxford, 
_Worcester 
&  Wolverhampton  and 
oxford  &  Ruaby  railway  bill.  PP  1845  (V61.  XI)q  evidence  of 
Bass  QQ.  3286-3433,  Stephens  QQ.  4647-4697,  Hayward  QQ-5102-5146. 
63  Thus  avoiding  the  Grand-Junction  railway,  with  which  Pickfords 
was  still  in  dispute  when  Hayward  gave  evidence  (Nov.  1845).. 
238. diverted  traffic  by  way  of  the  Midlands  railways  and  the 
Manchester  &  Leeds  railway.  Pickfords  quoted  competitive 
rates  and  held  traffic  off  the  Grand  Junction  line, 
64 
but 
railway  resources  were  being  wastefully  used.  The  Grand 
Junction  company's  policy  was  technically  and  probably 
economically  more  efficiGnt,  as  it  would  benefit  from  economies 
of  scale.  Adequate  data  by  which  to  test  the  alternatives  does 
not  existv  and  efforts  to  show  the  greater  economic  efficiency 
of  the  'closed'  5ystemper-se  are  not  convincing. 
65 
The  Grand 
Junction  company  was  satisfied  that  its  system  brought  best 
returns  and  it  is  significant  that,  even  before  the  amalgamation 
which  formed  the  London  &  North  Western  railway  companyv  in 
July  1846,  the  London  &  Birmingham  company  was  reconsidering  its 
own  position  on  the  carrying  question, 
66 
However  the  reversal 
of  policy  on  the  London  &  Birmingham  section  of  the  amalgamated 
line  was  for  the  sake  of  uniformity  of  practice  rather  than  a 
studied'consideration  of  the  relative  merits  of  the  case. 
67 
The 
opýtjmum  economic  relationship  between  railway  companies  and  private 
carriers  remains  difficult  to  assess.  Even  though  the  lopent 
system  involved  an  element  of  waste,  it  might  still  be  justified 
for  social  reasons.  The  carriers,  for  example,  argued  that  their 
64  See  various  letters  to  the  Editor  RailwaX  Times  1841,  P  705 
P  10789  P  1101- 
65  B.  Poole,  TwentX  short  reasons  for  railway  companies  becoming 
themselves  the  carriers  of  goods.  (LIverpool  1844)  Manuscript 
version  Pic  4/25  Poole's  analysis  takes  no  account  ) 
for  example, 
of  differences  of  traffic  or  terrain. 
66  Evidence  of  Glyn  and  Creedp  second  report,  S.  C.  on  Railway  Acts 
Enactments  PP  1846  (Vol.  XIV),  The  directors  felt  reductions 
were  not  being  passed  on  to  the  public,  Although  this  evidence 
was  given  in  1845  it  is  impossible  to  say  how  far  it  reflected 
the  company's  independent  experience  and  how  far  it  owed 
something  to  the  forthcoming  amalgamation.  Joint  Board 
meetings  were  held  with  the  exppLnded  Grand  Junction  companyq 
in  anticipation  of  parliamentary  approvalq  from  December  1845. 
I  owe  this  information  to  my  colleague  Dr,  T.  R.  Gourvish, 
67  Huishq  general  manager,  confidential  report  to  the  chairman  and 
directors  of  the  LNWR  on  the  working  of  the  merchandise  traffic 
for  the  half  year  ending  31  Dec.  v  1847.  HL  2/i9  R  99B; 
Gourvish  British  railway  mana,  -,  ement,  p  174. 
239. continued  existence  was  desirable  in  the  public  interest  since 
they  alone  countered  the  threat  of  a  railway  monopoly. 
Relations  between  railway  companies  and  carriers  attracted 
considerable  contemporary  discussion,  yet  a  similar  problem  of 
equal  public  interest  received  little  or  no  attention.  This 
was  the  optimum  relationship  between  railways  and  canals,  in 
the  sense  of  an  integrated  national  transport  system.  In  the 
light  of  the  road  versus  rail  debate,  of.  the  present  century,  it 
is  striking  that  no  ..  Ixationalisation  of  function  between  canal 
and  railway  was  attempted,  Why? 
. 
Cumulative  canal  investment  was  estimated  at  some  El8m.  in 
18429 
68 
equal  to  about  4%  of  National  Incomeg 
69 
compared  to 
E62.45m-  then  invested  in  railways. 
70 
Additional  was  the  value 
of  carriers'  trading  capital$  which  was  certainly  considerable 
but  could  only  be  guessed  at,  The  resources  so  allocated  were 
sufficiently  large  for  it  to  be  socially  and  economically 
undesirable  for  them  to  be  unnecessarily  dissipated,  Any 
controlling  measures  would  have  had  to  come  from  Parliament  but 
there  was  little  sign  that  the  question  was  at  all  appreciated. 
James  Morrison  argued  that  Parliament  should  prevent  "the 
unnecessary  waste  of  public  capital"  but  he  had  in  mind  reduplica- 
tion  of  routes  by  canals  or  railways  rather  than  the  control  of 
68  Salt  Statistics  and  calculationsv  P  38.  Mather  After  the 
Canal  Duke  PP  70-71  has  a  figure  of  920m  for  1829;  similarly 
Habakkuk  &  Deane  in  W.  W.  Rostow  (ed)  The  economics  of  Takze-off 
into  sustained  growth.  (International  Economics  Association, 
19K3-)  P  73  estimate  the  cumulative  capital  investment  In  canals 
1760-1835  at  about  L20m, 
69  P.  Dean  &  W.  A  Colev*British  economic,  growth  1688-1959  (1264) 
Table  37  P  196  figure  for  1841. 
70  G.  R.  Hawke  &  M.  C.  Reed,  'Railway  capital  in  the  United  Kingdom 
in  the  nineteenth  century'  Economic  History  Review  Second 
Serie5q  Vol.  XXIIV  (1969)  Table  1,  pp  270-1. 
240. competition  between  canal  and  railway. 
71 
Poulett  Thomson 
also  suggested  that  railway  applications  should  be  considered, 
amongst  other  criteria,  by  the  sufficiency  of  existina  means 
of  conveyance,  but  this  was  scarcely  to  be  a  strict  system  of 
regulation. 
72 
Railways  were  not  necessarily  destructive  of  canals, 
73 
the 
basis  of  a  compromise  existed.  Although  the  objective  of  breaking 
an  alleged  canal  monopoly  lay  behind  the  promotion  of  the 
Liverpool  &  Manchester  railway. 
74 
railway  investment  was  not 
necessarily  antagonistic  to  the  canals.  John  Moss,  for 
exampleg  went  out  of  his  way  to  gain  the  support  of  the  Staffordsl 
canal  interests  in  the  first  promotional  stages  of  the  Grand 
Junction  railway.  To  forestall  canal  opposition,  Moss  approached 
James  Loch  in  the  hope  of  involving  interested  canal  companies 
in  the  project.  But  Loch  was  unable  to  get  any  response  and 
so  Moss  had  to  proceed  without  the  hoped-for  co-operation.  He 
quickly  found  that  this  was  no  hindrance  and  that  potential 
canal  opposition  could  be  discounted.  75 
To  a  considerable  extent, 
it  would  seem,  the  canals'  fate  was  a  product  of  the  canal 
companies'  inertia. 
71  Parliament  Debates,  Third  Series  Vol-  33  1836  Cols.  980-1. 
72  Ibid  Vol.  31  Debate  on  the  Committee  on  Railways,  1  March 
1836. 
73  See  Mather's  discussion  of  Claphamts  assertion  to  the 
contrary  After  the  Canal  Duke  Chap  VII  esp.  p  1219  1339  and 
p  147. 
74  This  was  Huskisson's  stated  reason  for  supporting  the 
Liverpool  &.  Manchester  railway  billt  Parliamentary  Debates 
New  Series,  q  Vol.  15  (1826)  Col.  29.  However  collusion 
between  the  Bridgewater  and  the  Mersey  &  Irwell  companies 
has  been  rejected  by  Hadfield  &  Biddle  Canals  of  north  west 
England  ChaP5  5P  107  ff.  and  Mather  Op.  cit.  chap  1p  14  ff. 
75  M.  C.  Reed  'The  origins  of  the  Grand.  Junction  railway  1829-1833' 
Transport  History  Vol.  3  1970;  Mather  Op.  cit.  'p  65  ff. 
241. Parliament  seems  to  have  lacked  both  the  will  and  the 
means  of  formulating  a  national  transport  policy.  The  failure 
to  harmonise  canals  and  railways  can  be  set  against  the  equal 
failure  to  ensure  a  uniform  gauge  for  the  whole  railway  system. 
During  the  critical  formative  Years  of  the  early  1830s  railways 
were  regarded  as  chiefly  local  matters,  to  be  left  to  the 
partie,  s  concerned,  The  view  that  all  railways  were  of'national 
concern  hnd  required  an  element  of  central  direction  was 
apparently  held  only  by  a  minority.  No  action  followed  Sir 
Harry  V  rney's  call 
P 
in  1836,  for  the  establishment  of  a 
Railway  Commission  to'perform  this  task. 
76 
Some  years  earlier 
Robert  Peel  had  temporarily  inclined  to  James  Loch's  proposal 
for  a  Government  Board  to  supervise  all  transport  under  . takings. 
77 
The  essential  principle  of  Loch's  scheme  was  implemented  with 
the  creation  of  a  Railway  Board  under  Lord  Dalhousie  in  1844, 
but  the  Board  was  disliked  as  an  extra-parliamentary  body  and 
its  rationale  was  destroyed  when  Peel  headed-a  vote  against  the 
Board's  report'  i:  ýfavouýf  the  Oxfordq  Worcester  &  Wolverhampton 
Railway  Bill. 
78 
Parliament's  failure  to  devise  any  direct  form  of  control 
meant  that  railways  were  regulated  by  the  private  bill  committee 
procedure  of  the  House  of  Commons,  The  unreformed  committee 
system  wasq  from  a  national  point  of  view,  an  inadequate  way 
76  Parliamentary  Debates,  Third  Series,  Vol-  319  18369  Cols. 
1113-4;  also  see  The  Times  8  Aug,  1836  P7  Col.  b.  9  proposals 
for  control  of  railway  building. 
77  Reed  Op.  cit.  p  9, 
78  H.  Parriso  'Railway  Policy  in  Peel's  administration  1841-18461 
Bulletin  of  the  Institute  of  Historical  Research,  Vol-  3jq 
19  0. 
242. of  assessing  a  projected  railway.  Applications  were  considered 
in  isolation  from  comparable  bills;  committee  members  could 
vote  without  being  present  during  the  taking  of  evidencet  and 
in  particular  "the  private  Bill  Committee  thought  of  itself 
as  an  umpire  in  a  contest  between  two  private  parties,  not  as 
the  guardian  of  the  public  interest.,, 
79 
Central  control  of 
I 
railways  by  Parliament  was  thusInot  a  live  issue  during  this 
period.  Parliament  might  intervene  to  ensure  fair  competition 
but  not  positively  to  shape  the  economic  structure. 
80 
ComVetition  between  the  private  carriers  and  railway 
companies  for  goods  traffic  was  a  matter  for  Parliament's 
concern  and  was  taken  up  by  successive  select  committees,  The 
Icarrying  question'  became  the  centre  of  lively  debate  in  committee, 
press  and  pamphlet, 
81 
Practical  experience  soon  eXtinguished 
the  belief  that  railways  could  be  regarded  as  a  form  of  public 
highway*  The  need  for  a  company  to  have  total  control  of 
Its  line  was  accepted  and'also  the  railways'  de  facto  monopoly 
of  passenger  traffic.  Difficulty  arose  over  goods  traffic, 
due  to  the  failure  of  canals  to  retain  more  than  low  value 
goods.  The  danger  of  a  railway  monopoly  of  all  transport  forms 
was  raisedt  a  potential  threat  to  the  public  interest, 
82 
The 
private  carriers  warned  that  monopolists  could  fix  their  rates 
at  will  and  that  only  their  continued  existence  ensured  fair  rates 
to  the  public.  To  defend  what  it  saw  as  its  legal  rights 
79  H,  Parris  Government  and  the  railways  in  nineteenth  centur2: 
Britain_(1965)  p  21. 
80  There  was  some  sort  of  prectdentt  howeverlin  the  calls  for  a 
unified  system  of  roads  under  control  controlv  mentioned  by 
Pratt  History  of  transport  p  81  ff.  Pratt  quotes  the  report 
of  the  S.  C.  on  the  highways  of  the  kingdom  (1819),  W.  K.  Delany 
The  Ceneral  turnpike  act'9  (1823) 
1 
Westminster  Review  Oct.  1825. 
81  for  further  details'and  refer  s,  see  Jackman  Transportation 
in  modern  Enaland.  pp.  pendix  14,  and  my  article  t-Railway 
revolutiont'  Transport  History,  Vol.  11  1969.,  The  following 
paragraph  summarise  the  essence  of  the  controversy. 
82  James  Loch  shared  this  opinion.  Mather  0  cit.  pp  104-5  UP 
243. Pickfords  fought  an  extended  legal  battle  with  the  Grand 
Junction  railway  company  through  the  early  1840s  in  an  attempt 
to  salvage  at  law  a  position  which  in  terms  of  day  to  day 
business  was  becoming  increasingly  untenable. 
The  dispute  between  the  two  parties  was  in  part  purely 
legal  -  whether  or  not  the  Grand  Junction  company's  Act  empowered 
it  to  carry  goods  off  its  own  line  and  to  engage  in  collection 
and  delivery  services.  Baxendale  sought  to  restrict  the 
company  to  carrying  on  its  own  line  in  the  belief  that  wider 
power  would  preclude  any  effective  competition.  Freedom  of 
competition  wasg  for  Baxendale,  the  pre-condition  of  commercial 
prosperity  and  anything  which  inhibited  it  could  only  be 
damaging  to  the  country. 
83 
The  railway  companyreasonably 
enough,  sought  the  widest  interpretation  of  its  Act.  The 
particular  matters  over  which  the  court  action  was  raised  - 
Pickfords'  claim  to  send  small  parcels  packed  in  hampers  at  a 
tonnage  rate  instead  of  paying  per  parcell  and  for  a  rebate 
equal  to  that  allowed  to  Chaplin  &  Horne  for  collection  and 
delivery  in  London  -  although  substantialp  were  in  many  ways 
essentially  the  external  manifestation  of  a  more  basic  issue. 
Behind.  the  claimsv  counter-claims  and  special  pleadings  lay 
Pickfords'  desperate  struggle  for  survival  and  the  railway 
company's  determination  to  be  master  in  its  own  house. 
To  buttress  its  position  each  side  claimed  the  defence  of 
public  interests  in  that  it  offered  a  cheaper  and  more  efficient 
1, 
service  than  the  other.  The  arguments  of  both  sides  had  an 
element  of  persuasivenessq  without  being  easily  demonstrable 
83  S.  C.  on  Railways  PP  1844  (VOl-  XI)  Q-3191. 
244. in  cost  terms.  Probably  Pickfords'  weightiest  point  was 
that  the  private  carrier  could  offer  a  country-wide  service 
and  accepted  full  liability  for  goods  in  his  charge.  By 
contrast  the  railway  companies  were  limited  in  coverage, 
jealously  independent  of  each  other  and  unwilling  to  accept 
liability  for  goods  once  off  their  line.  For  each  railway 
company  to  attempt  to  match  the  carriers'  services  would 
occasion  undescribable  chaos  and  wasteful  and  expensive 
reduplication.  This  contention  was  in  part  falsely  based 
since  it  presumed,  somewhat  ineqnuously,  that  individual 
companies  could  not  carry  beyond  the  limits  of  their  own  lines 
or  even  devise  some  pooling  system  by  'which  to  share  traffic, 
receipts  and  responsibility, 
84 
In  part,  however,  it  was 
substantiated  by  the  practical  difficulties  experienced  in 
negotiating  pooling  agreements,  as  exemplified  by  the  early 
85 
history  of  the  Railway  Clearing  HoUse. 
The  issues  were  complex  and  the  official  attitudep  as 
expressed  in  the  reports  of  successive  select  committeesq  was 
only  slLowly  formulated.  Eventually  it  became  clear  that 
only  by  banning  railway  companies  from  carrying  goods  at  all, 
even  over  their  own  lines,  could  effective  protection  be 
assured  for  the  carriers..  This  was  a  radical  step,,  and  one 
which  Parliament  proved  unwilling  to  take. 
The  fullest  consideration  of  the  carrying  question, 
dominated  by  the  controversy  between  Pickfords  and  the  Grand 
Junction  company,  was  given  by  the  Seymour  committee  of  1840 
86 
84  Baxendalels  evidence,  second  report  S.  C.  on  Railways  PP  1839 
(Vol,  X)  Q,  25o6  ff. 
85  Bagwell  Railway  Clearing  Housep  Chap.  IV 
86  S.  C.  on  Railway  CommunIcation 
' 
PP.  1840  (Vol.  XIII).  The 
committee  issued  five  reportsl  the  last  of  which  followed 
extensive  evidence  from  representatives  of  Pickfords  and  the 
Grand  Junction  company.  The  committee  of  the  previous  year 
declined  to  pass  any  opinion  on  the  grounds  that  there  was 
inadequate  experience  available:  Second  report  S.  C.  onRailways 
PP.  1839  (Vol-X). 
245. In  its  third  report  the  committee  hedged,  It  apparently 
favoured  the  system  wherdby  as  on*the,  Liverpool  &  Manchester 
line,  the  railway  company  was  a  carrier  of  goods  but  subject 
to  maximum  charges.  The  committee's  only  recommendation  was 
for  the  appointment  of  an  authority  to  examine  the  various 
systems  in  use.  In  its  fifth  and  final  reportt  however,  the 
committee  had  seemingly  been  swayed  by  the  carriers'  claim  that 
only  they  accepted  full  liability  for  goods  in  transit.  The 
committee  conceded  that  a  railway  company  could  carry  more  ý 
cheaply  over  its  own  line  but  argued  that,  as  far  as  through- 
traffic  was  concerned#  the  carriers'  profit  would  be  a  smaller 
cost  to  the  public  than  the  confusion  and  disputed  claims  which 
would  follow  if  the  railway  companies  engaged  in  such  traffic. 
Even  so$  no  legislative  intervention  was  advised. 
By  1844,  when  the  question  was  again  discussed,  opinion 
was  less  favourable  to  the  carriers. 
87 
They  had  proposed  that 
a  schedule  of  clauses, 
88 
designed  to  ensure  them  conditions  of 
fair  competition  with  the  railway  companies,  should  be  attached 
to  all  railway  Acts  but  the  committee  regarded  them  as  a  major 
interference  in  a  company's  management  and  refused  to  endorse 
themv  in  the  absence  of  exceptional  and  compelling  reasons. 
Instead  the  committee  expressed  the  hope  that  the  decision  of 
the  Court  of  Chancery  in  the  case  of  Pickford  v  Grand  Junction 
87  Fifth  report  section  IV  part  2,  S.  C.  on  Railways,  PP.  1844  (vol. 
XI-) 
88  Reproduced  as  Appendix  5.  Baxendale's  cftse,  which  he  also 
argued  before  the  1841  committee,  was  that  railways,  as 
public  companiesq  possessed  such  large  resources  and  strong 
monopoly  powers  as  to  be  beyond  the  normal  competitive  power 
of  market  forces.  Only  by  legislative  intervention  would 
competition  from  private  sources  be  possible.  See  also 
Memorial  of,  P1ckford  &  Co.  to  the  Board  of  Trade  (Feb.  1844) 
Pic  4/25.  P  15. 
246. company  would  provide  further  Guidance,  Parliamont  effectively 
refused  to  take  any  decision  on  the  matter. 
The  general  question  of  relations  between  the  carriers  and 
the  railway  companies  continued  for  several  years  but  the 
particular  dispute  between  Pickfords  and  the  Grand  Junction 
company  was  brought  to  an  issue  by  ovents  quite  removed  from 
the  immediate  controversy.  In  1845  the  Liverpool  &  Manchester 
railway  company  was  merged  into  an  enlarged  Grand  Junction 
company  which  then  joined  with  the  London+  Birmingham  and 
Manchester  &  Birmingham  companies  to  form  the  London  &  North 
Western  railway  company.  The  Act  passed  in  July  1846t  and  by 
October  negotiations  were  already  underway  for  Pickfords  and 
Chaplin  &  Horne  to  become  agents  to  the  now  company. 
89 
The 
reversal  of  the  London  &  Birmingham,,  Company's  open  policy 
rendered  Pickfords'  dispute  with  the  Grand  Junction  company  quite 
meaningless. 
The  change  of  policy  was  the  most  important  single  factor 
which  destroyed  Pickfords'  position  but  there  were  other 
considerations  pressing  both  sides  to  seek  a  solution.  Legal 
costs  were  heavy  and  Pickfords'  vigorous  opposition  to  the  Grand 
junction  company  could  not  have  been  pursued  indefinitely  in 
the  face  of  its  failure  to  secure  results  from  court  or 
Parliament,  For  its  partt  toov  the  Grand  Junction  company  had 
reason  to  resolve  the  dispute.  *  By  the  mid-1840s  capital 
charges  were  bearing  heavily  on  railway  companies.  Track 
maintenance  costs  were  unexpectedly  high  and  running  expenses, 
including  the  introduction  of  more  powerful  locomotivest  mounted 
89  LNW  1/221  Minutes  general  locomotive  and  general  merchandise 
committee  14  Oct.  1846. 
247. with  increased  scale  of  operations. 
go  Large  capital  sums 
were  also  tied  up  in  terminal  buildings  and  costly  urban  entry 
schemes. 
91  The  need  to  maximise  revenue  forced  companies  to 
seek  all  possible  traffic,  not-just  the  passenger 
92 
and  high 
paying  merchandise  trade.  An  attack  was  made  on  the  remaining 
canal  traffic  when  it  was  appreciated  that  large  quantities  of 
low  value-traffic  could  be  profitable. 
93  The  Grand  Junction 
company  experienced  all  of  these  pressures  and  in  addition 
was  subject  to  strong  competition  on  all  sides. 
94 
with  more 
threatened  by  the  new  surge  of  railway  promotions.  In  this 
context  Pickfords  had  much  to  offer  the  new  amalgamated  company  - 
iixperienceq  substantial  capital  savings  and  above  all  traffic. 
The  basis  of  a  compromise  was  present,  if  at  some  cost  to  each 
side.  Pickfords  lost  much  of  its  independence;  the  railway 
company  had  to  seek  harmonious  working  with  its  recent  opponent. 
It  was  an  alliance  born  of  necessity  and  was  never  an  easy  one. 
In  Januaryt  18479  an  agency  contract  was  agreed"  with  effect 
from  1  July  and  in  September  the  same  year  Baxendale  sold  his 
depot  at  Camdent  to  the  London  &  North  Western  railway  companyo 
96 
90  Gourvish  British  railway  management  p  21. 
91  Kellett,  Impact  of  railways  on  Victorian  cities  pp  9-  14t 
Pp  79-86.  In  1867  it  was  estimated  that  approximately  20% 
of  the  LNWR's  capital  had  been  spent  in  this  way,  most  of  it 
before  1849. 
92  Until  the  requirement  of  'Parliamentary  trains',  1844,  this 
was  heavily  oriented  to  the  first  class  traffic. 
93  Huish's  evidenceg  S.  C.  on  railways,  PP  1844  (Vol.  XI)  Q.  6638 
ff;  also  Huish,  ';  s  report  on  merchai7dise  traffic  to  LNWR 
directors  Feb  1848,  HL  2/19  R  99B.  But  also  see  G.  R.  Hawke 
Railways_and  economic__p-rowth  in  England  and  Wales  1840-1870. 
Coxford  1970)  Chap  1119  P  55  ff, 
94  Gourvish  Op.  c:  L-t,.  chaps  3  and  4. 
95  LNW  3/3.  It  is  significant  that  the  contract  was  signed 
not  by  Baxendale  but  by  his  sons. 
96  Duplicate  conveyance  Pic  3/2. 
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(n  a  Tj  En  A  10  0 From  1847  Pickfords  became  increasingly  identified  with 
railway  business  in  general  and  with  the  London  &  North  Western 
railway  companyq  (LNWR)  in  particular.  The  agency  agreement 
commenced  in  that  year  continuedq  with  periodic  renewalsq 
until  1901.  The  increased  traffic  and  revenue  it  brought  to 
Pickfords  became  a  central  prop  of  the  firm's  business.  At 
first  the  agency  was  technically  conducted  as  a  separate 
enterprise  by  Baxendale's  three  sonst  although  in  practice  the 
agency  traffic  was  worked  in  with  Pickfords'  general  traffic. 
1 
Baxendale  himself  was  not  a  signatory  to  the  agreement  but  his 
unwillingness  to  become  formally  involved  did  not  lead  him  to 
stand  in  his  sons'  way.  In  the  light  of  his  experiences 
during  the  preceding  few  yearst  his  ejection  from  the  chairman- 
ship  of  the  South  Eastern  company  in  1844  and  his  frustrating 
legal  battle  with  the  Grand  Junction  railway  company,  his 
attitude  is  not  difficult  to  understand.  By  the  later  1840s, 
Baxendale  was  clearly  quite  disenchanted  of  railway  affairs. 
2 
Although  defeated,  outside  the  courts,  on  the  main  issue, 
Baxendale  did  not  concede  the  field.  He  was  a  formidable 
litigant  and  fought  stubbornly  for  his  rights  as  he  saw  them. 
More  than  one  company  must  have  rued  the  day  when  Baxendale 
filed  a  sui  tý  against  it,  for  he  had  the  habit  of  winning  his 
cases.  A  note  in  Pickfords'  records  relates  that  between 
1  January  1858  and  25  May  1863  thirty-four  actions  were  brought 
against  railway  companies.  Of  theseq  two  were  then  still 
proceeding;  only  one  had  been  lost,  and  that  on  a  technical:  Lty.  3 
1  Case  and_Opinion  of  Counsel  as  to  the  legality  of  Pickfords' 
using  City  Basin  for  Agency  work,  I/l/1851.  Pic  3/20. 
2  Thus  the  ten  r  of  his  evidence  to  the  Gauge  Commissioners  and 
the  R.  C.  on 
;? 
etropolltan  Termini. 
3  Even  in  this  case,  (v  Eastern  counties  railway  company),  the 
note  addsp  the  company,  on  the  Court's  intimation,  conceded 
for  the  future  the  substance  of  Pickfords'  claim.  In 
sixteen  of  these  cases,  the  Great  Western  railway  company  was 
the  defendant. 
249. Some  of  these  actions  marked  important  stages  in  the  definition 
of  railway  law.  The  judgments  in  the  Reading  case  and  the 
Bristol  case, 
4 
both  in  18589'established  the  law  concerning 
undue  preference  shown  to  itself  by  a  railway  company.  Hadley 
v  Baxendale  (1854)5  remains  the  precedent  for  remoteness  of 
contingency  in  the  law  of  contract. 
The  future,  however,  undoubtedly  lay  with  the  railways,  and 
for  Pickfords  close  association  with  the  LNWR.  Within  weeks 
of  the  amalgamation  being  formally  approved  Huish,  the  general 
manager  of  the  new  comPanyq  was  reporting  on  negotiations  then 
in  hand  for  Pickfords  and  Chaplin  &  Horne  to  become  cartage  and 
carrying  agents  of  the  company,  By  January  1847  sufficient 
common  ground  had  been  established  for  the  terms  of  a  draft 
contract  to  be  discussed  and  in  Mayp  all  details  finalised,  the 
contract  was  sealed. 
6 
It  was  estimated  that,  on  the  basis  Of 
existing  traffic  alone,  the  company  would  gain  a  revenue  of 
C309000  per  annum  as  a  result  of  the  agreement.  An  even  larger 
7 
income  would  accrue  from  the  increased  traffic  expected. 
The  agents'  duties  comprised  services  both  on  and  off  the 
railway.  For  performing  cartage  and  delivery  services  at  the 
railway  company's  stations,  up  to  a  distance  of  seven  miles, 
the  agents  were  paid  a  tonnage  allowance  according  to  an  agreed 
schedule.  As  this  part  of  the  contract  was,  not  meant  to  be  a 
source  of  profit  to  the  agents,  the  allowance  was  reduced  - 
Both  of  these  were  Great  Western  cases.  Undue  preference 
appears  as  the  most  common  cause  of  litigation.  For  the 
details  of  the  two  cases,  Collection  of  the  cases  decided 
under  the  second  section  of  the  Railway  and  Canal  Traffic 
Act  of  1854  and.  Register  of  cases  docided  by  the  Railway 
Commissioners  under  the  Regulation  of  Railways  Act,  1873 
ed.  Neville  &  MacNamara,  1874)  p  191,  p  202.  also  Railway 
Times  13  Nov.  1858  p  13559  22  Jan.  1859  p  80. 
.5E. 
B.  Ivatts  Carriers'  Law  p  274 
6  Minutes:  General  Locomotive  and  General  Merchandise  Committee 
LNW  1/221:  14  Oct.,  9,14  Nov.,  1846;  8  Jan,  5  March,  9  April, 
14  May  1847.  Contract,  LNW  3/3. 
7  LNW  1/2219  9  Nov.,  1846. 
250. as  costs,  especially  that  of  fodder,  fell.  In  return  for 
carrying  out  the  company's  duties  as  carrier,  exclusive  of 
actual  conveyancep  the.  agents  were  paid  on  a  commission  basis, 
according  to  the  total  tonnage  carried.  The  same  basic  format 
was  adopted  by  the  Midland  railway  companyq  for  which  Pickfords 
and  Chaplin  &  Horne  were  also  joint  agents.  The  LNWR,  however, 
took  the  further  step  of  guaranteeing  a  minimum  income  to  its 
agents.  The  company  contracted  to  make  up  any  deficiency 
below  E7500  p.  a.,  but  was  to  receive,,  half  of  any  excess  over 
C121,500.  The  agents'  joint  salary  was  distributed  in  the 
ratio  of  64:  36  in  favour  of  Pickfordsp  recognition  of  the  firm's 
position  as  the  larger  carrier.  However,  when  the  contract 
8 
was  renewed  in  1852,  there  were  significant  changes.  The 
guarantee  was  raised  to  C10,000  but  the  company  took  two  thirds 
of  the  commission  up  to  L111000  and  everything  beyond  that. 
The  allocation  of  commission  between  the  agents  was  also  altered. 
pickford5  had  failed  to  provide  the  volume  of  traffic  proportion- 
ate  to  its  share  of  commission  and  so,  reluctantly,  it  had  to 
concede  improved  termsq  60:  40,  in  favour  of  Chaplin  &  Horne. 
Memories  of  former  battles  were  revived  by  the  LNWRIs 
stipulation  that  small  parcels  were  to  be  forwarded  and  charged 
separatelyv  "it  being  hereby  admitted  that  it  is  part  of  this 
entire  contract  of  agency  that  payment  accordingly  shall  be  made.  " 
The  Midland  Company  made  the  same  condition.  Both  companies 
required  their  agents  not  to  compete  with  them  by  any  alternative 
form  of  transportationt  but  to  bring  all  their  present  traffic 
to  the  railway.  The  remnants  of  Pickfords'  canal  trade  was 
the  target  here. 
s  Pic  -3/3. 
251. Despite  the  speed  with  which  Pickfords  and  others  abandoned 
the  canals,  the  LNWR  remained  especially  sensitive  to  the  threat 
of  canal  competition.  With  hindsight  this  seems  rather 
surprising,  bearing  in  mind  the  ease  with  which  it  was  possible 
to  disrupt  whole  sections  of  the  canal  network  and  drive  traffic 
off99  but  Huish,  for  example,  certainly  took  the  threat  seriously. 
10 
The  situation  was  complicated  by  the  fact  that  the  Midland 
railway  was  not  complete  in  1847  and  that  company  was  willing  to 
lot  Pickfords  continue  its  canal  service  where  there  were  gaps 
in  the  system.  As  late  as  1849  Pickfords  advertised  water-borne 
services  on  the  Trent  and  Humber  "and  by  canal  to  the  iron 
districts  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Tipton  and  Wolverhampton.  "  11 
The  LNWR  complained  sharply  about  these  activities,  regarding 
them  as  a  breach  of  the  contract. 
12 
but  the  problem  tended  to 
solve  itself  as  the  gaps  in  the  Midland  line  were  filled  and  that 
company  too  required  Pickfords  to  abandon  the  canals.  By  1850 
the  number  of  Pickfords'  boat  horses  was  down  to  14,  from  107 
in  1848  and  even  these  had  gone  by  1853.13 
For  several  years  the  affairs  of  the  agency  did  not  progress 
smoothly.  One  reason  was  the  fierce  competition  between  Pickfords 
and  Chaplin  &  Horne.  The  monthly  conferences  with  the  LNwR 
goods  managers  were  marked  by  bitter  exchanges  between  the  agents. 
According  to  D.  Stevensonq  "their  implacable  competition  with  one 
anotherg  in  seeking  the  tradep  was  a  source  of  weakness  to  the 
9  Evidence  of  Mr.  J.  S.  Pixton,  second  report,  S.  C.  on  Railwa 
and  Canal  Bills,  PP  1852-3  (XXXI)  Q293  ff. 
10  Gourvish  Op.  cit.  p  185  ff. 
11  Glasgow  directory  1849-50  Appendix  p  149. 
12  LNW  1/2210  20  Nov.  1848;  12  Jan,  9  Feb.  1849. 
13  Pic  4/25  p  73;  Pickfords  agreed  to  take  off  the  remainder 
of  its  competing  boats  in  September  1849.  LNW  1/221  14  Sept. 
1849.  'However, 
' 
Pickfords  contiriued  to  operate  a  few  canal 
boats  which  conveyed  pig-Iron  and  coal,  on  the  Birmingham, 
Dudley  and  Staurbridee  canals  in  south  Staffordshire  as  part 
of  the  agency  agreement.  This  did  not  cease  until  19019  when 
the  agency  was  terminated  and  the  boats  sold  to  the  Shropshire 
Union  canal  company.  See  Cartage  and  Agency  committee  minutes 
15  Dec.  1887  LNW  1/573;  also  evidence  Mr  __B  lowell  R..  C.  on, 
C, Z_anal,  s  and  waterways  Vol  V  CC,  d'_.  4840jl90;  9  q:. 
141189.; 
252. company;  for  the  agents  would  expend  as  much  strength  in 
getting  customers  from  one  another  as  in  drawing  them  from 
railways  and  other  competitive  services...  Mr.  Horne  threw' 
all  his  excitable  and  inexhaustible  energy  into  the  combat; 
while  the  three  sons-of  Mr.  Baxendale  took  the  management  of 
Pickford  &  Co.  's  department  with  increased  personal  feeling 
and  angry  opposition.  "  14 
Pickfords  was  particularly  aggrieved  at  being  excluded  from 
the  parcels  traffic  sent  by  the  passenger  trains  and  seemed  to 
feel  that  the  terms  of  the  contract  were  generally  biased  in 
favour  of  Chaplin  &  Horne.  Despite  assurances  from  Chaplin  & 
Horne  that  parcels  traffic  was  neither  as  valuable  nor  important 
as  Pickfords  believed  it  to  be,  Pickfords  nonetheless  regarded 
this  as  the  major  reason  why,  between  1847  and  1850,  it  failed 
to  provide  the  volume  of  tonnage  proportionate  to  its  share  of 
the  agents'  remuneration  as  originally  set.  When  the  contract 
was  renegotiated  in  1ý51  Pickfords  pressed  hard  for  a  portion 
of  the  parcels  trqffict  but  was  unable  to  persuade  the  directors 
to  make  any  change.  Instead  Pickfords  had  to  accept  a  cut'in 
its  share  of  the  commission. 
15 
Pickfords  also  felt  that 
unfavourable  comparisons  made  with  Chaplin  &  Horne,  especially 
concerning  Pickfords'  higher  cartage  costs  in  London,  were 
unfairly.  -based. 
16  So  rivalry  deepened;  and  spilled  over  on  to 
London's  streets  where  disputes  over  the  right  of  way  between 
drivers  of  the  firmst  vehicles  added  to  the  existing  hazards  of 
the  City's  traffic  congestion. 
17, 
14  D,  Stevenson  Fifty  years  on  the  London  and  North  Western 
Railway  p  21. 
15  Correspondence  between  Pickfords  and  Huishq  and  Chaplin  & 
Hornet  May  to.  October  1851,  Pic,,  3M  .  See  also  the  revised 
agency  agreement  1  Jan.,  1852  Pic.  3/3- 
jL6  LNW  1/221  14  Feb.,  11  March,  14  April,  12,19,  May  1948. 
17  Chambers'  Journal,  20  Oct.  1866,  p  659. 
253. When  it  suited  them,  however,  tho  two  sides  could  show  a 
united  front.  The  renewal  in  1852  of  their  contract  with  the 
Midland  railway  company  had  provided  for  a  deduction  from  the 
agents'  commission  of  5%  rising  to  6%  during  its  term, 
18 
In  1855  Pickfords  and  Chaplin  &  Horne  applied  forxelief  from 
this  provision  on  the  grounds  that  fodder  prices,  the  fall  of 
which  in  1852  had  been  one  of  the  chief  justifications  for  the 
reductiong  had  now  risen  sharply.  Combined  with  a  20%  increase 
in  the  price  of  horses,  their  income  from  the  companyls  traffic 
was  claimed  to  no  longer  cover  working  costs.  Although  they 
sought  'strength  in  a  joint  communication  to  the  board  they  failed 
to  get  any  relief.  They  were  toldq  in  effect,  that  having  in 
the  past  enjoyed  good  profits  they  would  have  to  absorb  their 
losses,  A  further  attempt  later  in  the  year  to  renegotiate 
their  contract  on  mutually  agreed  terms  -  "as  it  will  be  US81055 
for  us  to  hold  out  for  one  amount  and  you  for  another"  -  seems 
to  have  been  equally  unsuccessful.  The  directors  presented 
their  terms  virtually  on  a  'take-it-or-leave-itt  basis. 
19 
In 
such  exchanges  the  railway  company  held  the  upper  hand,  and, 
provided  the  terms  offered  were  not  wholly  unreasonable,  the  two 
firms  had  little  option  but  to  accept. 
The  same  pattern  of  relationsbips  was  repeated  in  dealings 
with  the  LNWR,  a  second  cause  of  friction  in  the  early  years  of 
the  agencyq  especially  on  Pickfords'  side.  Chaplin  &  Horne  had 
its  complaints  to  make  but,  being  new  to  the  carrying  trade  20 
and  having  been  railway  agents  probably  from  the  outset,  was 
18  Pic.  3/18. 
19  Correspondence  between  Midland  railway  companyt  Pickfords, 
and  Chaplin  &  Horne  May-Dec.  1855,  Pic.  3/19. 
20  Stevenson  Op.  cit.  p  21. 
254. basically  content  with  its  position.  Pickfords,  by  contrastq 
seems  to  have  been  resentful  of  its  lost  independence  in 
railway  traffic  and  far  less  comfortable  in  the  role  of  willing 
agent.  In  addition  there  was  an  animus  against  a  major 
component  of  the  now  company  to  be  dispelled  and,  without 
imputing  blameq  the  presence  in  leading  positions  of  ex-Grand 
Junction  officers  like-Huish  and  Braithwaite  Poole  no  doubt 
ensured  that  old  rivalries  died  slowly. 
The  railway  company  firmly  controlled  all  aspects  of  the 
agency  work. 
21 
All  carriage  rates  were  set  down  by  the  company 
and  had  to  be  strictly  observed,  Collection  and  delivery 
services  were  to  be  charged  at  cost,  as  determined  by  an  audit 
of  the  agents'  bookd.  The  settlement  of  claims  for  all  amounts 
over  L5  was  reserved  to  the  company.  The  agents'  duties  and 
obligations  were  scheduled  in  detail,  thereby  virtually 
eliminating  any  scope  for  discretionary  action.  In  general  the 
agents  were  expected  to  devote  themselves  to  the  company's 
concerng  if  necessary  at  the  expense  of  their  own. 
The  agents'  dependent  status  was  heavily  emphasisedq  some- 
thing  which  rankled  with  Pickfords,  As  an  independent  concern 
Pickfords  was  accustomed  to  referring  non-actionable  disputes 
to  arbitration  proceduresq  but  this  the  LNWR  refused  to  concede. 
In  all  cases  the  companyts  decision  was  to  be  final.  In  1851 
Pickfords  raised  the  point  of  arbitration.  It  felt  that  the 
proposed  terms  for-the  renewal  of  the  agency  agreement  conferred 
on  the  company  wide  powers  to  dispense  with  Pickfords'  dervices, 
21  The  following  paragraphs  are  based  on  the  series  of  contract 
renewals  Pic-  3/3  to  Pic-  3/12. 
255. entirely  at  the  directors'  discretion.  Pickfords  sought  to 
define  the  company's  powers  more  closely  but  stnted  its  willing- 
ness  to  accept  them  unreservedly  if  the  company  would  agree  to 
an  arbitration  clause.  The  company  offered  a  vague  qualification 
that  the  powers  were  chiefly  cautionary  to  Pickfords'  good 
conduct  and  would  not  be  exercised  without  cause,  but  continued 
to  refuse  arbitration  as  not  "consistent  with  our  relative 
22 
positions.  "  There  Is  no  immediate  explanation  of  why  the  LNWR 
should  refuse  to  concede  something  which  the  Midland  railway 
company  had  provided  for  since  184  ý.  23 
The  LNWR  did  not  change 
its  attitude  until  1866. 
An  initial  sharp  discord  between  Pickfords  and  the  LNWR 
24, 
is  not  too  surprising.  Dispute  immediately  arose  over  the 
accounts  for  the  first  half  year's  working  of  the  agency,  to 
December  1847.  The  LNWR  regarded  Pickfords'  cartage  charges 
as  excessive  and  made  a  deduction  from  its  allowance.  A  matter 
of  LlrOOO  was  in  dispute.  Pickfords  believed.  its  accounts 
represented  true  cost,  felt  badly  treated  and  consequently 
refused  to  settle.  The  controversy  continued  until  October 
1848  when  strong  hints  that  the  company  would  consider  terminating 
the  contract  apparently  persuaded  Pickfords  that  it  was  time  to 
settle  in  full.  There  was  no  similar  recurrence.  In  November 
1848  satisfaction  was  expressed  at  the  figures  for  the  half-year 
to  Junet  and  Pickfords  was  urged  to  co-operate  fully  with  the 
company  for  the  future.  By  1850  the  agency  had  sAtled  down  and 
relations  improved.  The  most  serious  objection  the  LNWR  could 
2ý-  Pickfords  to  Huish,  16  July  1851,  Pic  3/13 
23  Pic.  3/16  clause  33:  howeverg  disputes  over  cartage  rates 
were  excluded. 
24  The  following  paragraph  is  based  on  LNW  1/221,  passim- 
256. raise  was  that  "the  names  of  the  agents  were  placed  on  the 
carts  and  waggons  in  larger  letters  and  in  a  far  more 
conspicuous  position  than  the  name  of  the  company.  "  At  the 
end  of  the  year,  when  the  question  of  renewing  the  contract 
came  up,  it  was  felt  that  the  interests  of  both  the  company 
and  the  agents  had  been  satisfactorily  met  and  so,  with  the 
modifications  already  noted,  the  contract  was  continued  for  a 
further  seven  years, 
In  subsequent  years  the  LNWR  became  a  little  more 
accommodating  in  its  conditions.  It  retained  tight  control 
of  the.  working  but  was  willing  to  accept  a  greater  share  of  the 
agents'  costs.  In  1858t  for  example,  in  addition  to  the  5% 
interest  already  allowed  on  the  agents'  stock  employed  for 
contract  workp  it  began  to  allow  as-deductable  expanses'the 
replacement  cost  of  vehicles  and  equipment.  It  also  accepted 
a  wider  share  of  risk.  Even  so  the  grounds  for  disharmony 
continued.  Under  the  agency  Pickfords  retained  the  working 
of  the  Camden  depot,  free  from  inspection  by  the  railway  company's 
officersp  even  after  the  premises  had  been  sold  to  the  LNWR. 
Iii  18580.  the  accusation  was  made  that  Pickfords  was  abusing  its 
position  at  Camden  by  diverting  traffic  away  from  the  company. 
Pickfords  has  been  allowed  to  send  goods  it  collected  In  London 
for  the  Midland  line  by  way  of  the  Great-Northern,  D.  Stevenson- 
an  officer  of  the  LNWR  goods'  department  reported  his  suspicion 
to  Richard  Iloon,  one  of  the  directors,  th-,  -:  It  Pickfords  was  advising 
ifiembers  of  the  public  to  take  traffic  which  had  been  brought  to 
Camden  and  should  have  gone  by  the  company's  route  to  its 
premises  at  King's  Cross. 
25 
He  suggested  that  the  removal  of-the 
25  Stevenson  to  Moon  4,8  Oct;,,  1858,  HL  2/19,  R427;  also 
Stevenson  Op.  cit.  P  33  ff. 
257. agents  from  their  control  of  the  London  goods  sheds  was  a 
necessary  step  in  the,  company's  interests,  a  proposal  which 
was  implemented  by  Moon:  when  he  took  over  as  chaiman  of  the 
LNWR.  B.  W.  Horne  opposed  the  move  by  seeking  an  injunction 
but  his  application  failed.  Pickfords'  only  known  reaction 
was  to  promptly  remove  its  best  men  from  the  Camden  depot. 
This  episodeq  which  probably  occurred  in  1864,26  seems  to 
have  marked  the  culmination  of  a  phase  of  deteriorating  relations 
between  Pickfords  and  the  LNWRý7  The  terms  of  the  renewed 
contract  in  1866  suggests  that  an  effort  was  being  made  to 
patch  up  differences.  Not  only  was  arbitration  written  into 
the  agreement  for  the  first  time  but  a  special  clause  was 
iniroduced  which  called  on  each  side  to  help  the  other  in 
speeding  up  the  dispatch  of  traffic.  As  an  inducement  Pickfords 
was  offered  increased  commission  of  4d.  per  ton  on  all  additional 
traffic  which  its.  exertions  brought  on  to  the  line.  28 
Throughout  this  period  the  LNWR  had  engaged.  in  cartage  work 
on  its  own  account 
. 
to  a  limited  extent,  chiefly  outside  of  London, 
but  in  1877  the  company  decided  to  deal  directly  with  parcels 
delivery  and  collection  in  London.  Chaplin  &  Horne's  agency 
work  was  absorbed  into  the  general  traffic  of  the  company  and 
many  of  the  firm's  receiving  offices  were  taken  over.  Chaplin 
&Horne's  loss  was  Pickfords'  gain  for  at  last  the  firm  received 
a  share  of  the  company's  parcels  traffic.  Pickfords  had  been 
developing  a  parcels  business  in  London  and  its  various  receiving 
offices  were  now  opened  to  the  reception  of  LNWR  parcels  traffic. 
26  In  his  diary  Joseph  Hornby  Baxendale  speaks  of  Pickfords 
"entirely  altering  the  terms  and  conditions"  on  which  it 
worked  for  the  LNWR.  Pic.  HH. 
27  In  November  1862  Pickfords  had  written  to  Moon  complaining 
about  increasing  delays  in  the  goods  traffic  and  the  difficulty 
in  getting  any  replies  from  the  company  to  complaints. 
28  Pic.  3/6. 
258. Pickfords'  salary  was  the  booking  fee  charged  on  all  parcels, 
which  the  LNWR  undertook  to  collect  daily  at  regular  intervals.  29 
Pickfords  became  sole  agent  to  the.  LNWR  and  shared  traffic  only 
with  the  company  itself,  After  this  the  agency  agreement 
continued  with  only  minor  modification  in  its  terms  until  the 
end  of  the  nineteenth  century. 
The  agency  agreement  with  the  LNWR,  the  largest  and  most 
influential  of  the  railway  companiesq  was  the  means  by  which 
Pickfords  escaped  thecbmise  of  the  canal  fly-trade  and  found 
security  in  the  new  order  of  railway  transportation.  The 
degree  of  success  with  which  Pickfords  made  the  transition  was 
really  quite  remarkable.  Within  a  short  space  of  time  and 
with  no  diminution  of  its  public  namet  Pickfords  shed  one 
personality  as  the  country's  premier  canal  carrier  and  acquired 
the  new  one  of  leading  railway  agent.  Soon  after  1850  Pickfords 
had  already  come  to  be  regarded  as  an  integral  part  of  the  railway 
machine. 
30  It  was  later  claimed  that  Pickfords'  name  was  "as 
much  identified  with  railways  as  the  name  of  Stephenson  or 
Brunel  ...  If  Pickfords  (was]  to  cease  to  be  tomorrowo  a  good 
quarter  of  the  business  of  London,  Manchester,  Liverpool  & 
Birminghamv  would  be  paralysed  for  a  week.,, 
31 
So  Pickfords  transferred  from  canals  to  railways  with 
considerable  successq  but  little  further  is  known  directly  about 
the  development  of  the  business  in  the  second  half  of  the 
nineteenth  century.  Virtually  no  primary  evidence  survives 
for  this  period  and  it  is  necessary  to  rely  very  heavily  on 
secondary  and  indirect  evidence. 
29  Stevenson  Op.  cit.  P  43;  Neele  Railway  Reminiscences  pp  220-221; 
supplementary  memorandum  of  aereement  Pic-  3/8. 
30  Household  Words  27  June  1857  p  606. 
31  Newspaper  buttingg  unidentified  daily  paper  (?  London)  1872 
(?  21  May)  CHP  /33. 
259. The,  general  impression  which  emerges  from  contemporary 
references  to  Pickfords  is  of  a  vigorous  and  healthy  concern. 
In  the  1860s  Dickensq  reporting  on  various  forms  of  horse 
transport  in  London,  visited  Pickfords'  depot  at  Camden  Town, 
where  he  was  "at  once  struck  with  an  air  of  substantiality 
which  is  different  to  anything  we  have  yet  seen  during  this 
tour.,, 
32  A  year  or  so  later  Henry  Mayhew  toured  Pickfords' 
main  business  premises  in  London.  He  was  forcibly  struck 
by  the  bustle  he  saw  and  the  scale  of  the  firm's  activities. 
Pickfordst  headquarters  at  the  Castle  was  "an  enormous  mercantile 
establishment  with  a  hugh  staff  of  busy  clerksg  messengers  and 
porters"  from  which  a,  close  supervision  was  maintained  of  all 
aspects  and  offices  of  the  business.  He  was  'amazed'  and 
'bewildered'  at  the  size  and  complexity  of  Pickfordst  railway 
warehouses  at  Haydon  Square  and  Camden  Townt  and  the  Great 
range  and  volume  of  traffic  handled  there.  Pickfords' 
establishment  at  City  Basin 
) 
then  chiefly  used  as  warehouse  and 
storage  spacep  had  "an  air  of  substantial  sedentary  wealth". 
33 
After  allowing  for  the  hyperbolet  Mayhew's  impression  of 
pickfords  reinforces  that  of  Dickens. 
The  indications  of  expanding  business  in  London  are  the 
acquisi,  tion  by  Pickfords  of  additional  premises  in  several 
parts  of  the  city  and  the  reconstruction  of  existing  premises 
in  Oxford  Street  and  also  of  the  Castle  in  Wood  Street. 
34 
32  All  the  Year  Round  25  July  1863  PP  522-4. 
33  H.,  Mayhew-The  9hops  and  offices  of  London  (1865)  pp  49-51, 
p  144.1  must  thank  Dr.  J.  R.  Kellett  for  this  reference, 
34  Building,  News  February  1876  a  cutting  in  Pic.  4/25  p  47. 
260. There  are  odd  hints  of  expansion  outside  of  London.  It 
appears  that  the  extension  of  services  into  Kentv  begun  in  the 
1840s,  was  continued.  '  Dickenst  'uncommercial  travellerIq  on 
his  return  after  a  lapse  of  years  to  his  native  Dullborough 
(Rochester),  lamented  the  disappearance  of  some  of  his  boyhood 
hauntsp  including  Timpson's  coach  office.  This,  together  with 
adjoining  buildings,  had  been  knocked  down  and  replaced  by  "one 
great  establishment  with  a  pair  of  big  gates,  in  and  out  of 
35 
which 
[Pickfords  g 
waggons  arep  in  these  days,  always  rattling 
Striking  further  afieldl  a'Paris  office  was  projected  in  1851, 
but  Pickfords  was  advised  it  would  be  able  to  penetrate  the 
existingýfir'msl  controlv  even  of  the  Anglo-French  traffic. 
Presumably  new  offices  were  opened  elsewhere,  but  there  is 
no  further  evidence*  It  is  also  difficult  to  assess  the  cost 
to  the  firm  of  capital  invested  in  depots  specific  to  the  canal 
trade  which  had  to  be  written-off  when  the  canals  were  abandoned. 
How  far  was  the  loss  of  canal  business  off-set  by  the  growth  of 
railway  traffic?  There  is  no  way  of  answering  this  question 
directly.  The  essential  task  is  to  estimate  net  expansion 
for  the  total  concerng  for  which  the  number  of  branch  offices 
is  only  one,  and  far  from  being  the  most  useful,  method  of 
approach.  The  desired  indicators  are  the  quantity  of  trans- 
actions  and  their  price  -  for  Pickfordsp  how  far  total  traffic 
increased  and  what  this  meant  in  terms  of  revenue  and  profits. 
35  C,,  Dickens,  The  Uncommercial  Traveller  (first  published  1861: 
Dickens'  Centenary  edition  1911)  PP  T38-9. 
261. There  is  every  reason  to  believe  that  the  volume  of  traffic 
handled  by  Pickfords  increased.  The  extension  of  steam  and 
associated  technologies  to  so  many  sections  of  the  British 
economy  after  1850,  the  supply  of  the  industrial  needs  of 
continental  Europe  and-North  America,  and  rising  demand  at 
home  brought  about  boom  conditions  which  lasted  for  twenty-odd 
years.  Rising  rates  of  growth  of  total  output  exerted  a  strong 
demand  on  transport  services  of  all  kinds  to  convey  raw  materialsp 
export  products  and  especially  commodities  for  domestic  consumption. 
The  railway  industry  felt  the  chief  effect  of  these  pressures. 
Total  freight  conveyed  by  rail  rose  rapidly,  almost  in  leaps 
and  bounds 
? 
from  64m.  tons  in  1856,  when  tonnage  figures  are 
first  availableg  to  122m.  in  1866  and  250m.  in  1882.  BGtween 
1843,  from  which  date  there  are  receipt  figuresq  and  1856  revenue 
from  goods  traffic  rose,  in  absolute  values,  by  a  factor  of 
36 
eight.  The  growth  curve  of  freight  receipts  in  this  period 
has  been  characterised,  as  that  of  the  'new  industry'  type. 
over  the  next  thirty  years,  during  which  average  receipts  per 
ton  of  goods  carried  was  fallingt  gross  receipts  tripled  in 
37 
absolute  value.  Although  the  greater  part  of  this  increase 
doubtless  came  from  freight  of  low  unit  value,  a  proportion  of 
the  traffic,  rising  in  absolute  termsq  would  be  the  parcels  and 
general  merchandise  handled  by  Pickfords  and  Chaplin  &  Horne. 
The  expansion  of  railway  traffic  alone  required  a 
38 
proportionate  increase  in  urban  cartage  and  delivery  services. 
36  Mitchell  and  Deane  British  historical  statistics  Table  5 
p  225. 
37  Hawke  Railways  and  economic  growth  p  56v  p  58  and  fig-III  -03 
38  Kellett  Impact  of  xqilwaXs  pp  287-8. 
262. Far  from  destroying  road  haulage,  railways  positively  promoted 
its  extension  )  as  adapted  to  the  new  needs  of  the  economy. 
Pickfordsv  for  example,  owned  some  850  horses  in  1846  of  which 
between  a  quarter  to  a  third  were  employed  in  London:  twenty 
years  later  the  total  was  1468,  with  well  over  half  working  in 
London*  In  1878  the  number  had  reached  almost  2000,  and  London 
retained  the  same  proportion. 
39 
The  number  of  persons  employed 
in  all  branches  of  road  transport  in  London  similarly  increased; 
the  number  of  carmen  and  carters  rose  from  14,700  in  1861  to 
43,800  in  1891.  By  1891  road  transport  work6rs,  with  their 
dependents9  were  one  of  the  largest  occupational  groups  in  the 
city. 
40  -  Not  all  of  this  expansion  was  a  function  of  railways. 
Even  in  the  1860s  road  haulage  was  genuinely  competitive  with 
railways  for  certain  sections  of  traffic  for  distances  within  a 
10  mile  radius  of  London. 
41 
The  sheer  weight  of  London  in  the 
total  economy  combined  with  the  size  of  its  associated  urban 
area  set  in  motion  trends  which  became  prominent  outside  of 
London  only  much  later  in  the  century. 
A  major  influence  on  the  development  of  urban  cartage  was 
the  expansion  of  small  parcels  traffic.  Small,  or  'coacht  parcels 
as  they  were  originally  called,  were  not  new  of  course.  They 
had  been  a  valuable  source  of  revenue  to  the  stage-coaches  and 
39  Pic.  4/25.  P  73.  The  figure  for  1878  is  from  information 
supplied  by  Mr.  Keith  Chivers  from  his  researches  for  the 
Shire  Horse  Society,  Pickfords  became  famous  for  its 
horses  in  this  period,  See  The  Bailie  22  Sept.  1886, 
portrait  of  Mr.  William  McCulloch,  pi7kfords'  horse-buyer, 
40  Kellett,  OP.  cit.  p  288  citing  Charles  Booth,  Vol,  VII  p  284. 
41  Ibid, 
263. Pickfords'  rivalry  with  the  Grand  Junction  railway  company 
was  expressed  In  the  issue  of  control  of  this  traffic. 
Developments  in  the  second  half  of  the  nineteenth  century 
gave  a  wider  meaning  and  Greater  importance  to  this  class  of 
traffic. 
The  penny  post,  the  telegraph,  and  later  on  the  telephone, 
revolutionised  internal  communications  both  in  terms  of 
efficiency  and  cost..  Thisp  together  with  railway  transportation, 
stimulated  major  changes  in  the  pattern  of  traffic. 
42 
Apart 
from  the  growth  of  trade  consequent  upon  the  greater  perfection 
of  the  marketp  retailers  and  other  traders 
P 
in  any  part  of  the 
countryg  were  enabled  to  order  goods  regularly,  even  dailyq  and 
in  small  quantities  instead  of  infrequently  and  in  bulk  as 
before.  Both  wholesalers  and  railway  companies  found  thatp 
as  a  resultv  the  number  of  individual  orders  and  consignments 
grew  out  of  all  proportion  to  the  absolute  growth  of  traffic. 
Speed  of  dispatch  became  a  priority,  and  the  flow  of  regular 
consignments  or  'shop-goodsto  as  they  were  known,  increased 
the  demand  for  cartage  and  delivery  services  to  and  from  the 
railway  stations  in  London  and  the  major  towns.  Over  short 
distances,  roads  could  out-compete  railways  for  such  traffic. 
43 
London  was  big  enough  to  generate  a  sufficiently  large 
volume  of  internal  parcels  traffic  to  support  firms  which 
specialised  in  this  line  of  business.  As  early  as  1838  the 
London  Parcels  Delivery  Company  had  been  formed  to  exploit  this 
42  The  following  is  based  on  E.  A.  Pratt  RailwaXs-and  their  rates 
(1906)  p  90  ff. 
43  Evidence  of  Mr.  J.  F.  S.  Goodayo  general  manager  of  the  Great 
Eastern  r  ilway  company,  R.  C.  on  London  Traffic  Vol.  II 
CCd-'-.  2751)  1905  Q.  18552  ff. 
3 
264. traffic  within  the  twopenny  post  limits  of  the  metropolitan 
area  but  the  main  expansion  seems  to  have  come  from  about  1860. 
Carter  Paterson  &  Co.  was  founded  in  that  year  specifically  to 
exploit  this  branch  of  business  and  by  the  1870S  the  traffic  was 
sufficiently  attractive  to  persuade  the  LNWR  to  take  Chaplin  & 
Horne's  agency  into  its  own  hands.  Despite  being  excluded 
by  the  LNWR  from  a  share  in  its  parcels  traffic  until  1877, 
pickfords  developed  an  interest  in  this  line  of  business  in 
London  on  its  own  account.  By  the  late  1870s  Pickfords  had 
adopted  the  title  of  'town  carrier'.  In  1880  six  firms, 
exclusive  of  railway  companies,  were  reported  as  dealing  with 
parcels  traffic,  of  which  Carter  Paterson  &  Co.,  with  14  receiving 
officesv  and  Pickfords,  with  16,  were  by  far  the  largest, 
45 
The  emphasis  was  on  efficiency  and  speed  of  service, 
46 
the  needs 
of  which  were  met  by  the  development  of  a  special  type  of  light- 
weight  delivery-van.  'Pickfords'  van  acquired  a  new  meaning  and 
a  new  notoriety.  Competition  from  the  Post  Office's  parcels 
. 
47 
service  only  began  in  1883  and  until  the  first  world  war  was 
confined  to  parcels.  which  wighed  eleven  pounds  or  less. 
Another  potential  source  of  traffic  lay  in  the  Ishopping 
revolutiont  of  the  later  nineteenth  century  associated  with  the 
growth  of  department  stores  and  multiple  trading.  Not  only 
road  passenger  transport  would  be  stimulated  by,  this  development. 
If  the  District  railway  company  found  it  worthwhilev  in  1892, 
45  C.  Dickens  Dictionary  of  London  (1880)  p  208. 
46  Ibid.  Two  of  the  firms  listed  were  called  'Parcels  Express'. 
47  Sherrington  Op.  cit,  p  228.  Prior  to  that  date  Rowland  Hill's 
proposals  for  a  parcels  post  had  been  opposed  by  the  railway 
companies.  R.  Hill  and  G..,  B.  Hill  The  Life  of  Sir  Rowland  Hill 
(1880)  Vol.  2P  3360  --  ' 
265. to  put  on  a  parcels  service  "chiefly  to  relieve  shoppers  on 
48 
their  homeward  Journey"  it  is  at  least  Possible  that  some  of 
this  traffic  came  into  the  hands  of  the  parcels  firms.  However 
the  more  direct  stimulus  is  likely  to  have  been  on  the  side  of 
heavy  cartagep  for  the  success  of  both  the  department  and  retail 
stores  depended  on  the  solution  of  supply  problems.  The 
provision  dealers  like  Liptong  Home  &  Colonial  and  Maypole 
imported  large  quantities  of  butter  and  bacon  for  which  cartage 
would  be  necessary  from  dock  or  railhead  to  a  central  store  for 
subsequent  reconsignment  to  branches.  As  their  trade  was  in 
fresh  foods 
I  efficient  transport  services  would  be  essential,  but 
this  aspect  of  such  firms'  activities  has  not  received  attention. 
49 
However  it  seems  that  Pickfords  managed  to  extract  advantage  from 
these  conditions. 
From  the  1860s, 
50 
Pickford5  was  contracting  to  supply  firms 
which  had  bulk  transport 
I 
needs  with  the  carts  and  horses  required 
or  to  perform  the  entire  job  itself.  The  customer  was  saved 
overhead  expenses  on  this  accountp  a  factor  of  some  appeal  to 
firms  like  Maypole  and  Lipton  which  sought  to  keep  their  capital 
liquid, 
51 
while  the  contractor  could  benefit  from  economies  of 
scale  on  his  existing  investment.  No  details  survive  of  the 
individual  firms  with  which  Pickfords  dealt  in  this  periodg  but 
a  contract  with  Peek  Frean  &  Co,  was  taken  over  from  McNamara 
&  Co.  in  1896,  and  contracts  with  Home  &  Colonial  and  Maypole 
48  T.  C.  Barker  and  M,  Robb'  sA  historX  of  London  Transport,,  Vol,  I, 
The  Nineteenth  Centur 
49  P,  Mathiasq  Retailing 
ýUlojobuijl-op  JU4 
19t7)  PP  173-4  comments 
that  a  highly  efficient  distribution  system  was  one  of  the 
great  achievements  of  the  multiple  provisions  dealers  but 
does  not  enter  into  the  detailed  mechanics  of  how  the  supply 
and  distribution  side  was  organised. 
50  An  article  in  Pickfords'  old  house  magazine  Driving  Mirror 
Winter  1946/79  Vol.  I,  No.  11  p  6,  stated  that  there  was  no 
record  of  when  contracts  became  a  separate  department  but 
that  several  accounts  still  handled  had  stood  in  the  books 
for  over  fifty  years  and  one  for  eighty  years. 
51  Mathias  Op.  cit.  P  1739  on  the  practice  of  the  Maypole  Dairy 
company  to  rent  rather  than  purchase  its  shop  premises  so  as 
to  keep  capital  turning  over  in  the  business*  The  same 
principle  was  applied  by  Lipton  and  others. 
266. in  London  and  Lewis's  in  Birmingham  were  well  Výstablished  by 
the  beginning  of  the  twentieth  century. 
The  growth  of  London's  suburbso  which  in  part  underlies 
the  preceding  discussionp  further  widened  the  already  extensive 
market  for  road  transport  servicesp  as  the  carman  followed  the 
horsebus  and  horse  tram  into  the  inner  suburbs.  Pickfords  made 
a  strong  bid  for  a  share  in  a  growing  volume  of  surburban  traffic. 
The  renewals  of  the  LNWR  contract  in  1881  and  1887  contained  a 
special  clause  by  which  the  railway  company  agreed  to  give  to 
Pickfords  all  the  goods  traffic  it  could  for  delivery  in  the 
suburban  districts  of  London  "beyond  the  limits  of  free  cartage 
and  delivery.  " 
52 
In  the  1880s  leases  were  held  or  acquired  of 
premises  in  Chalk  Parmv  Deptford,  Penge  and  Stratfordg  while  in 
the  1890s  premises  were  bought,  probably  often  the  freehold  of 
property  already  leasedt  in  Balhamo  Brentford,  Brixton, 
Edmontong  Finsbury  Park,  Fulhamv  Kingstont  Pimlico  and  Walthamstow, 
and  Croydon,  Caterham  and  Lee  (Kent)  further  afield. 
53 
Each 
depot  worked  a  number  of  collection  and  delivery  districts  and 
traffic  collected  for  dispatch  by  rail  or  for  delivery  in  other 
parts  of  London  was  tranferred  to  a  central  depot  overnight  and 
then  reconsigned  to  the  appropriate,  delivery  point.  It  was 
clearly  in  the  1880s  that  Pickfords  developed  its  'London  and 
Suburban  Town  Cartage'  service  of  the  early  twentieth  century. 
The  adoption  of  new  lines  of  business  widened  the  traffic 
base  on  which  Pickfords  could  draw.  One  such  development  was 
the  forwarding  of  goods  overseas.  Pickfords  had  become  Custom 
52  Pic.  3/10  and  Pic;.  3/12. 
53  Register  of  London  Premises  Pic.  4/13.  Compare  with  the 
list  of  Pickfords'  London  s  burban  agenciesq  Board  Minutp 
23  April  1909  Pic.  1/2. 
267. House  agents  in  London  by  the  later  18305,54  and  extended 
these  activities  to  Liverpool  and  Southampton,  Dublin, 
Edinburgh  and  Glasgow  by  the  mid  century, 
55 
The  clearance  of 
goods  for  shipping  and  payment  of  duty  on  bonded  goods  were 
included  among  Pickfords  advertised  services  in  1881.  By 
this  time  Pickfords  has  ceased  to  act  in  Scotland  but  operated 
in  Bristol,  Portsmouth  and  West  Hartlepool  instead.  Pickfords 
wast  by  then,  agent  to  the  East  and  West  India  Dock  companies 
and  also  forwarded  goods  daily  to  the  Continent.  Quotations 
would  be  given  for  through  rates  to  Paris  and  most  of  the  major 
European  cities, 
56 
Pickfords  had,  in  addition,  a  more  direct  interest  in 
shipping.  In  1897  the  firm  bought  the  lease,  and  some  of  the 
freeholdo  of  Phoenix  Wharf,  Clink  Street,  in  Southwark  and 
renamed  it  Pickfordst  Wharf. 
57 
How  long  Pickfords  had  hold  the 
lease  and  what  was  the  precise  nature  of  the  traffic  handled 
at  the  wharf,  and  in  what  capacity,  cannot  be  determined. 
Pickfords'  shipping  interests  also  included  a  service  of  sailing 
boats  -  carrying  general  cargoe  from  Portsmouth  and  Southampton 
to  the  Isle  of  Wight#  begun  about  the  mid-1870S. 
58 
A  fleet  of 
four  steam  vessels  was  introduced  in  the  1880s,  It  is  not 
known  why  this  service  was  started. 
54  Joseph  Hornby  Baxendale  records  in  his  Diary  that  he  joined 
this  branch  of  Pickfords'  business  when  he  started  with  the 
firm  that  year.  Pic.  HH. 
55  Glasgow-directory  1848-49,  appendix  p  152;  1853-49  appendix 
p  158;  1854-5g  appendix  p  219, 
56  London  Post  Office  directory  1881  (Traders  &  Court)  Conveyance 
directory  p  2478. 
57  Register  London  Promises  Pic.  4/13.  entry  for  Pickfords'  Wharf. 
58  Register  of  County  Promises  Pic.  4/14.  Pickford  leased 
several  premises  in  Portsmouth  in  the  later  1860s  and 
property  in  Southampton  in  1875.  One  of  the  original  sailing 
boats  was  still  in  use  in  1906. 
268. Household  removals  had  also  emerged  as  a  distinct  line  of 
business  by  1900.  Again  this  service  was  advertised  in  1881, 
but  how  much  earlier  it  had  existed  in  unknown. 
A  case,  thereforep  can  be  made  for  an  increase  in  the 
volume  of  traffic  from  all  sources  handled  by  Pickfords  in  the 
years  after  1850.  What  this  meant  in  terms  of  revenue  and 
profits  is  much  more  difficult  to  assess.  The  bulk  of  traffic 
receipts  accrued.  to  the  railway  companies.  As  an  independent 
carrierv  by  road,  canal  or  railt  Pickfords  had  determined  the 
price  of  conveyance  and  received  the  whole  of  the  sum  due.  But 
as  railway  agento  freight  rates  were  set  by  the  railway  company 
and  Pickfords'  share  of  the  receipts  was  reduced  to  its  cartage 
allowances,  tonnage  commission  and  other  bonuses.  59  The  rate 
of  return  to  Pickfords  per  ton  of  traffic  handled  probably 
dropped  sharply,  but  the  rapid  growth  of  traffic  would  have 
more  then  off-set  this  effect,  It  can  only  be  assumed  that 
pickfords'  total  revenue  increased. 
It  is  equally  difficult  to  assess  what  situation  Pickfords 
faced  on  the  side  of  costs.  Increased  traffic  would  presumably 
mean  a  proportionate  increase  in  operating  costs.  There  was, 
however,  some  benefit  in  this  respect  of  being  agent  to  a 
railway  company,  In  addition  to  supplying  the  means  of  convey- 
ancep  the  railway  companies  leased  warehouse,  stabling  and  office 
59  For  example  by  its  agreement  with  the  South  Eastern  railway 
company  in  1858  (ric  3/15)  Pickfords  received  a  10'iD'-  allowance 
on  its  account  in  exchange  for  waiving  its  claims  to  bulk 
small  parcels  and  to  be  charged  the  same  rate  for  the  same 
class  of  goods  as  customers  who  had  a  special  agreement  with 
the  company. 
269. 6o 
space  to  their  agents  at  low  rents.  Pickfords  also  received 
an  allowance  from  the  LNWR  for  its  working  stock  employed  on 
agency  contract  business. 
One  of  the  major  componentsof  costs  for  a  firm  employing 
a  14rge  number  of  horsesq  and  Pickfords  owned  about  2000  horses 
in  the  later  1870s,  was  that  of  provender.  The  relationship 
between  rising  fodder  costs  and  increased  road  haulage  charges 
in  the  eighteenth  century  has  already  been  noted.  For  the 
later  nineteenth  century  T.  C.  Barker  and  11.  Robbins:  have 
remarked  on  the  contribution  of  cheap  imported  fodder  to  the 
61 
profits  of  the  London  horse  bus  companies.  For  the  years  under 
discussion  here  the  role  of  fodder  prices  in  governing  Pickfords' 
operating  costs  is  most  clearly  seen  in  the  fluctuations  of 
cartage  rates  allowed  to  Pickfords  by  the  LNWR  and  the  Midland 
railway-company.  The  contract  terms  of  both  companies  required 
that  their  agents'  cartage  services  should  be  performed  at  cost. 
A  reduction  in  the  rate  allowedg  wouldq  therefore,  imply  a  fall 
in  costs.  The  fact  that  the  cost  of  provender  was  a,  if  not 
the,  prime  factor  in  the  calculation  is  demonstrated  by  the 
reduction  made  by  the  Midland  company  in  1852  explicitly  on  the 
grounds  that  fodder  prices  had  fallen  since  1847  when  the 
originalp  higherv  rate  had  been  set.  Pickfords'  application 
in  1855  for  a  revision  of  this  rate  because  feed  costs  had 
60  This  might  not  have  been  effective  until  the  1880s.  The 
LNWR  contract  of  1887  (Pic  3/12)  contained  a  schedule  of 
promises  leased  from  the  company  by  Pickfords  in  London, 
Birminghamv  Manchosterg  Liverpool  and  elsewhere,  for  which 
Pickfords  paid  a  rent  of  Z2750  p.  a.,  free  of  rates  and 
taxes.  Provision  was  also  made  for  the  use  of  additional 
premises  should  they  be  necessary  for  the  working  of  the 
contract.  There  is  no  evidence  as  to  whether  such  provision 
was  made  earlier.  In  1858  the  railway  company  had  already 
agreed  to  meet  the  replacement  cost  of  Pickfords'  waggonsg 
vans  and  sheets  used  in  the  agency  work. 
61  Barker  and  Robbins  History  of  London  transport  p  243  ff- 
270. sharply  risen  reinforces  the  point. 
62 
On  the  basis  of  changes 
in  the  cartage  rates  allowed  by  the  LNWR  to  Pickfords,  fodder 
prices  did  not  fall  substantially  until  the  beginning  of  the 
1880s,  by  which  time  the  impact  of  cheap  imported  fodder  might  be 
expecte.  d  to  have  b,  een  effectivebut  then  remained  stable  for  a 
decade. 
63 
Although  a  lowering  of  provender  costs  would  not 
result  in  any  benefit  in  Pickfords'  railway  agency  worko  gains 
should  have  accrued,  in  the  form  of  increased  profits,  6n  the 
rest  of  the  firm's  business. 
any  more  specific* 
It  is  impossibleg  however  to  be 
Table  10.1  gives  an  estimate  of  Pickfordst  profits  for  the 
years  1848  to  1870.  The  figures  show  higher  average  profitsl  in 
absolute  money  valuesq  for  the  years  1848  to  1862  than  in  the 
preceding  thirty  years. 
64 
The  previous  best  was  an  average  of 
C24,500  during  1838  to  1842.  Between  1848  and  1857  this 
performance  was'maintained  and  slightly  improved  upon,  while 
the  years  1858  to  1862,  at  an  average  of  C34-359000,  show  the 
best-returns  up  to  1870.  This  higher  average  contained  three 
particularly  good  years  1859-1061;  at  Z43,800,1859  was  the 
best  single  year  after  1838.  Economic  recovery  after  the  severe 
depression  of  1858  is  the  most  likely  explanation  of  this 
6.5 
performance,  Railway  freight  receipts  rose  by  L2.8m  during 
the  same  three  years.  Another  high  spot  was  in  1870  with  profits 
62  The  estimates  of  Pickfordst  profits,  Table  10.19  for  1848-56 
show  a  significant  statistical  correlation  with  hay  prices  for 
the  same  years  as  recorded  by  T.  Tooke  and  W.  Newmarch  A  history 
of  prices  and  the  state  of  the  circulation  durinp,,  the'nine  vears 
1848-18  Y01-  VI  (1857)  p  454  ft. 
63  in  1866  the  allowance  fell  from  7/-  to  616  per  ton  but  rose 
again  to  7/-  in  1873.  By  1879  the  rate  had  drifted  to  619  and 
fell  to  6/3  in  1881.  It  remained  at  this  figure  until  1892 
whenit'  by  a  special  agreement,  it  was  increased  by  4d  per  ton. 
For  this  last  pointf  see  the  endorsement  to  the  Pic,  HH,  copy 
of  the  1887  agreement. 
64  See  appendix  2  for  further  comment. 
65  J.  R.  T.  Hughes  Fluctuations  in  tradeq  industry  and  finance.  A 
study  of  British  economic  development  1850-1860  TO--xford  1960) 
pp.  27-33. 
271. TABLE  10.1.  Pickfords'  estimated  p  rofits  1848-1870 
Credit  of  stock  account  Computed  distributed  profits 
Total  profits 
Year  Total  per  Baxen-  Total  per 
ended  five  year  Annual  dale's  per  Annual  five',.  year 
31  Mar-  period  6verago.  share  annum  Average  326riod 
1848  6985  (2)  13970 
1849  14o66  28132 
1850  18868  37736 
1851  16856  33712 
1852  127517  25503  11086  22172  27144  135722 
1853  11979  23958 
1854  8476  16952 
1855-  -  11090  22180 
1856  8102  162o4 
1857  126004  25200  15238  3o476  21954  109770 
1858  9346  18692 
1859  21924  43848 
1860  15008  30016 
1861  17500  35000 
1862  178599  35719  12170  2434o  34379  171896 
(Total  per 
Annum) 
1863  20011  5003  (4)  20012 
1864  25023  4506  18024 
1865  18624  4656  18624 
1866  20245  2411  9644 
1867  .  16908  20182  4237  16948  16628 
1868  25310 
1869  28216 
1870  41809  31775 of  r.  41,800.  In  contrast  to  these  figures  the  returns  for 
1863-67  'emerge  as  distinctly  poorg  especially  when  viewed  against 
an  increase  of  E4.7m,  in  railway  freight  receipts  over  the  same 
period. 
With  the  available  data  it  is  impossible  to  assess  whether 
these  profits  would  be  considered  a  good  Or  poor  response  to 
trading  opportunities.  It  is  clear,  however,  that  Joseph 
Baxendale  was  disatisfied  with  Pickfordst  performance  in  the  mid- 
1860s.  He  made  his  feelings  known  in  several  letterst  chiefly 
to  his  eldest  son  Joseph  Hornby  Baxendale.  In  July  1866  he 
expressed  concern  at  the  level  of  earnings  and  expenses  and  later 
his  "serious  discomfort  and.  alarm"  at  the  way  the  business  was 
left  to  take  care  of  itself.  In  August  1868  he  again  voiced  his 
anxiety.  Baxendale  was  clearly  disappointed  with  his  sons  and 
implied  that  they  lacked  application  to  business  and  enterprising 
management. 
66 
Joseph  Hornby  believed  his  father  exaggerated. 
He  conceded  that  he  and  his  brothers  did  not  possess  their  father's 
dedication  but  "we,  have  hardly  the  same  stimulusg  yet  the  concern 
is  sound  and  there  is  no  fear  for  the  property.  " 
67 
The  brothers' 
proposals,  in  18709,,  to  sell  Pickfords  to  the  LNIM9  although  not 
implementedt  must  have  come  as  a  further  disappointment  to  him. 
Baxendale  was  then  in  his  eighty-second  year,  but  the  memories  of 
past  exertions  were  still  vividly  before  his  mind,  He  wrote,  to 
his-second  son,  Lloyd,  how  the  years  since.  1816  up  to  the  present 
had  been  a  cause"of  much  anxiety  both  mental  and  bodily.  " 
68 
He 
66  Joseph  Baxendale  to  Joseph  Hornby  Baxendale  12  July,  4  Oct.  1866pp. 
67  Joseph  Hornby  Baxendale  to  Joseph  Baxendale.  18  April,  1868  F.  P. 
68  Joseph'Baxendale  to  Lloyd  Baxendale  11  May  1870  F.  P. 
272. concluded, 
"in  closing,  the  accounts  for  the  year  that  has 
now  passed,  I  will  look  'with  great  attention. 
If  those  for-whom  the  business  has  been  kept 
together  will  not  think  it  worth-while  to  give 
the  necessary  attention  to  the  affairs,  this 
will  be  an  important  question  in  looking  for 
an  arrangement  with  the  London  &  North  Western 
Railway  whilst  I  am  still  with  you.  " 
After  1870  no  figtwes  are  available  until  the  later  1890s 
when  for  the  years  1896  and  1897  net  profits  averaged  C59,200 
falling  to  932,900  over  the  next  two  years.  The  rate  of  return 
to  capital  fell  over  the  four  years  from  13.41ý-  to  6-37%. 
69 
Nothing  can  be  said  directly  of  the  intervening  years.  Carter 
Paterson  &  Co.,  which  specialised  and  rivalled  Pickfords  in  the 
London  parcels  tradev  experienced  mixed  success  between  1888  and 
1892, 
-but 
then  profits  rose  strongly  to  a  peak  in  1897.  During 
1898-9  Carter  Paterson"s  profits  fell  back,  although  not  so 
sharply  as  Pickfords',  Perhaps  Pickfords  broadly  shared(ILrter 
70 
Paterson's  earlier  experience.  Pickfords'  finances  were  felt 
to  be  sufficiently  healthy  for  a  considerable  sum  of  money  to  be 
sunk  in  land  and  premises.  In  the  London  area  alonev  almost 
L120,000  was  invested  in  freehold  property  and  land  purchases, 
during  the  1890s,  together  with  a  further  Z8000  for  the  assignment 
of  several  long  leases.  Between  March  1896  and  March,  1901  the 
value  of  Pickfords'  premises  as  entered  on  the  balance  sheet  rose 
from  L250tOOO  to-L470tOOO,  an  increase  of  over  85%. 
********  **** 
69  All  of  the  figures  for  Pickfords  used  in'this  paragraph  are 
from  materials  in  the  Carter  Paterson  records  CP  4/27.  The 
fall  in  the  percentage  rate  of  return  overstates  the  position 
a  bit  because,  tho  capital  figure  on  the  basis  of  which  the 
calculation  was  made  rose  from  L440,00o  to  .  E510,000,  an  increase 
of  some  15%. 
70  Minutes  of  meetings  of  proprietors  and  B6ard  of  directors 
1-&87-1900  CP  1/1. 
273. In  1900  Pickfords'  fortunes  were-5till  under  the  guidance 
of  the  Baxendale  family  but  by  then  new  faces  had  made  their 
appearance  in  the  board  room.  Pickfords  had  belonged  entirely 
to  the  Baxendales  since  1850  when  Elizabeth  Pickfordq  Thomas 
Pickford's  widowq  sold  the  family's  remaining  interest.  Joseph 
Baxendale  was  then  no  longer  active  in  the  daily  management  of 
the  firm  but  as  a  partner  kept  a  sharp  watch  over  his  interests. 
Scarcely  any  detail  has  survived  of  Baxendalets  later  life. 
In  the  1850s  he  spent  a  'lot  of  time  in  France  presumably  in 
connection  with  his  railway  activities  there.  In  1845  he  had 
joined  the  board  of  the  East  India  railway  company  and  continued 
to  be  concerned  with  its  affairs  fifteen  years  later,  For  the 
rest  he  seems  to  have  withdrawn  into  the  private  life  of  his 
family. 
71 
Joseph  Baxendale  died  in  1872,  at  the  age  of  84, 
leaving  a  personal  estate  of  some  9700,000. 
He  also  left  as  an  example  to  his  successors  a  concern  for 
the  welfare  of  Pickfords'  employees.  In  his  will  he  directed 
that  a  sufficient  portion  of  his  3'p"  Consols  be  set  aside  to 
provide  an  income  of  9300  p.  a.,  out  of  which  annuities  were  to  be 
paid  to  the  men  who  had  worked  for  him  over  so  many  years. 
72 
Pickfords'  grant  of  a  retirement  pension  to  employees  with  many 
years  service  to  the  company,  carmen  as  well  as  clerks,  was  a 
well  established  practice  by  1900  and  continued  the  spirit  of 
Baxendale's  gesture.  Pickfords'  encouragement  of  the  clerical 
staff's  Provident  Fund  followed  Baxendale's  belief  in  the  virtues 
71  Baxendale's  diary  for  those  years  contains  only  personal 
entries, 
72  1  must  thank  Mr,  Thomas  Baxendale  for  lending  me  his  copy 
of  the  will* 
274. of  self-help.  The  fund  was  started  in  March  1878  to  provide 
against  "severe  sicknessp  accident  or  misfortune  of  any  kind"; 
it  was  open  to  all  Pickfordst  clerks  on  payment  of  a  penny  per 
week, 
73 
It  was  the  partners'  practice  to  donate  to  the  fund  a 
sum  equal  to  the  members'  annual  subscription, 
Joseph  Baxendale  was  not  long  survived  by  his  sons.  Richard 
Birley,  the  yo#ngest  of  the  three  brothers  who  became  partners  , 
74 
died  in  1878.  Lloyd  died  in  1882,  and  Joseph  Hornby  in  1886. 
However  a  third  generation  of  Baxendaleswas  on  the  way.  Joseph 
Hornbyls  son,  Joseph  William,  joined  Pickfords  in  1871  and  had 
become  a  partner  by  1879.  Ile  was  followed  by  Lloyd's  two  sonsq 
Lloyd  Harry  and  Francis  Hught  in  1879  and  1884. 
, 
In  1894  when 
the  partnership  was  reformed,  Joseph  William  had  succeeded  his 
father  as  senior  partnor  and  had  eight  shares;  Lloyd  Harry  had 
-19 
six,  and  Francis  Hughl7nd  three.  So  things  remained  until  1901, 
when  it  was  decided  to  convert  the  partnership  into  a  private 
'76 
limited  company. 
Pickfords  entered  the  twentieth  century  toncerned  with  four 
main  categories  of  business  -  parcels  and  general  railway  cartage, 
foreign  trafficp  contracts  and  household  removals. 
77  It  had 
also  become  firmly  rooted  in  London.  Much  of  the  preceding 
discussion  has  been  centred  on  London  in  Part  because  virtually 
all  the  surviving  evidence  relates  to  Pickfords'  activities  in 
London  but  also  because  the  forces  which  shaped  Pickfordst 
73  Pic  4/3  p  27. 
74  Baxendalets'forth  sonv  Salisburyq  became  a  barrister. 
75  Articles  of  partnership  31  Aug.  1894.  Pic  3/28. 
76  Notice  of  Pickfords'  conversion  to  a  private  limited  company 
Pic.  4/3,  p  24. 
77  A  bond  of  1894  designated  Pickfords  as  "Carriers  Warehousemen 
Furniture  Removers  and  Custom  House  Clearers". 
275. development  in  the  later  nineteenth  century  were  most  strongly 
felt  in  the  London  market.  Pickfords  did  not  lose  touch  with 
its  origins  in  the  north;  the  needs  of  the  LNWR  agency  alone 
saw  to  that.  But  undoubtedly  by  1900  the  major  part  of  Pickfords' 
business  was  transacted  in  London  and  the  surrounding  area. 
v 
276. PICKFORDS  IN  THE  TWENTIETH  CENTURY PreliminaEZ 
By  the  beginning  of  the  twentieth  century  Pickfords  was 
predominantly  a  London.  firmpchiefly  concerned  with  urban  cartaCe 
business.  Urban  traffic  was  of  two  main  kinds,  parcels  which 
were  both  collected  and  delivered  within  the  London  suburban 
areat  and  provincial  trafficq  consigned  by  railway,  which  was 
carted  to  and  from  the  railway  stations.  The  London  parcels 
trade  was  contested  by  a  group  of  firms  which  includedt  apart 
from  Pickfords,  the  London  Parcels  Delivery  Company,  Sutton'sq  Atlas 
Express  and  severallothers,  Competition  between  them  was  keen. 
However  Pickfords  and  Carter  Patersonp  the  two  biggest  companies 
engaged  in  the  trade,  had  achieved  a  position  of  leadership. 
Most  of  these  firms  specialised  in  parcels  traffic  and 
were  restricted  in  their  activities  to  the  London  area.  The 
London  Parcels  Delivery  Company  was  founded  in  1838  "to  carry 
goods,  package  s  and  parcels  from  and  to  all  parts  of  the  metropolis 
within  the  limits  of  the  Two  Penny  Post.  " 
1 
Bean's  Express 
commenced  in  the  1860s  and  specialised  in  the  rapid  delivery  of 
drapery  parcels. 
2  Although  their  activities  widened,  both 
remained  small,  specialist  firms.  Carter  Paterson,  with  which 
Pickfords  was  soon  to  amaigamatet  grew  from  very  small  beginnings 
in  1860  to  become  by  1900  a  firm  of  considerable  size.  It  was 
founded  to  exploit  the  opportunities  for  collection  andcblivery 
services  for  railway  traffic  in  the  metropolitan  suburban  area. 
It  thus  had  few  if  any  depots  outside  the  London  area  and 
1, 
_Articles 
of  Association,  1912  CP  2/19; 
2.  T_he  Window  Card  Vol-  3  No  5  September  1933  p  253- 
277. consigned  provincial  traffic  to  local  firms,  including  some 
commission  agentsq  for  delivery. 
Pickfords  differed  from  other  firms  in  the  trade  in  two 
major  ways.  Although  Pickfords  carried  on  a  large  cartage 
businessq  in  London,  which  still  included  substantial  agency 
work  for  the  LNIMt  this  was  far  from  being  an  exclusive  interest, 
Contract  workq  household  removals,  shipping  and  forwarding  all 
continued  to  have  their  place,  and  distinctly  new  lines  were 
developed.  In  addition  Pickfordslactivities  were  not  confined 
to  the  London  area.  Pickfords  still  owned  a  large  number  of 
provincial  depotsv  now  chiefly  in  the  southern  half  of  England, 
Unlike  its  competit6rs,  Pickfords  could  offer  collection  and 
delivery  services  in  the  major  provincial  centres  as  well  as  in 
London.  Pickfords  thus  maintained  a  central  position  in  the 
London  carrying  trade  without  losing  the  features  of  a  comprehensive 
and  national  transport  company  which  had  long  characterisod  it, 
278. CHAPTER  11 
PICKFORDS  IN  THE  EARLY  TWENTIETH  CENTURYp  1901-1912 The  new  century  brought  wide  ranging  changes  for  Pickfords. 
In  1901  the  partnership  was  converted  into  a  private  limited 
company,  In  the  same  Year  the  long  association  with  the  LNIM 
which  had  continued  unbroken  for  over  fifty  yearsl  was  ended. 
Since  more  than  half  of  Pickfords'  railway  traffic,  which  itself 
was  a  major  part  of  the  firm's  business,  had  been,  up  to  then,. 
on  account  of  the  LNWR  agency,  the  termination  of  the  contract' 
made  substantial  adjustment  unavoidable.  In  addition  a  new 
mode  of  transPortationg,  that  Of  motor  transporto  soon  began  to 
make  its  challenge.  Purther  re-organisation  to  accommodate 
I- 
motors  was  necessaryp.  since  the  evolution  of  the  existing  road 
transport  network  had  been  controlled  by  the  needs  and  limitations 
'6f  horseso  The  first  decade  of  the  present  century  was  a 
testing  time  for  Pickfords,  another  transitional  phase  in  some 
way  comparable  to  the  critical  years  earlier  following  the  advent 
of  railways* 
Through  all.  its  vicissitudes  during  these  years  Pickfords 
enjoyed  a  reputation  for  enterprise  and  initiative. 
2 
But  if  this 
were  taken  to,  imply  a  firm  well  placed  to  meet  the  future  from  a 
position  of  strength  then  external  appearances  tended  to  de  C64ee 
Not  that  Pickfords'  Public  reputation  was  undeserved;  quite  the 
contrary.  Pickfords  adopted  motors  without  hesitation  and 
showed  imagination  in  building  up  an  interest  in  travel  and 
tourism.  A  number  of  'firsts'  were  also  achieved.  Pickfords  was 
1  See  chapters  6  and  89  and  my  article  in  Trans_port  History 
Vol  11,1969.  There  is  unfortunately  a  gap  in  Pickfords' 
records  from  March  1909  to  June  1910. 
2  The  WorldIs  Carriers  and  Contractors  Review  Vol.  1  (1905) 
p  77  quoting  'The  Railway  and  Shipping  Journal',  Ibid  Vol.  2 
Jan  1906  p  96;  Vol.  8  Jan  1912,  p  98;  The  Motor  World  and 
Industrial  Vehicle  Review  Vol  2,26  May  1906,  p  483;  Motor 
Traction  Vol.  2,30  May  1906  p  484. 
279. the  first  firm  to  make  commercial  use  of  motor  barges  for  coastal 
traffic,  on  the  Solent  s6rvice. 
3 
and  was  the  first  of  the  parcels 
firmsýto  capitalise  on  the  value  of  its  delivery  vans  as  saleable 
advertising  spacee 
4 
Although  such  efforts  illustrate  Pickfords' 
enterprise  they  are  not  equally  successful,  apart  from  the  case, 
of  advertising,  in  providing  new  sources  of  profit,  Profits  were 
-what  Pickfords  particularly  needed  to  meet  a  deteriorating 
financial  position.  Higher  outgoings  were  being  incurred  but 
Pickfords'  ability  to  meet  them  declined.  The  break  with  the 
LNWR  reduced  annual  income  and  then  the  later  withdrawal  of  J.  W. 
Baxendale  left  Pickfords  seriously  undercapitalised.  Inadequate 
resources  undermined  efforts  to  restore  Pickfords'  position  and 
this  was  probably  the  chief  reason  why  the  decision  was  ultimately 
made  to  amaleamate  with  Pickfords'  main  competitors,  including  the 
chief  rival  Carter  Paterson. 
Some  of  these  pointswill  be  examined  at  greater  length 
below  and  then  four  main  themes  treated  more  extensively,  the 
management  of  Pickfordsq  the  decision  to  break  with  the  LNUR  and 
its  effects,  the  adoption  of  motors,  and  the  circumstances  leading 
up  to  the  amalgamation. 
In  March  1901  Pickfords  was  registered  as  a  private  limited 
company  with  an  authorised  capital  of  E500,000.5  The  share 
capital  actually  issued 
)  as  paid-ilpt  was  L4579000p  composed  of 
C287,000  in  L10  preference  shares  and  the  balance  of  C1709000 
in  Ll  ordinary  shares,  J.  W.  Baxendalet  previously  senior  partner, 
3  The  World's  Carriers  Vol  2(1906)  p  223-  Motor  Traction  Vol,  2 
30  RaY  1906t  pp  44  7;  Vol-3  8  Aug.  19;  6  p  117t  p  122. 
4  The  WorldIs  Carriers  Vol.  8  (1912)  p  98. 
5  Pic  lt/-25  Various  notes  on  the  conversion. 
280. and  now  the  major  shareholder  with  l5t200  preference  and  70,000 
ordinary  shares,  became  chairman  of  the  company.  L.  H.  Baxendale 
held  7,800  preference  and  60,000  ordinary  shares,  and  F,  H*Býxendale 
held  59700  preference  and  40,000  ordinary  shares.  The  number 
of  directors  was  set  at  a  minimum  of  three  and  a  maximum  of  five, 
each  of  whom  was  required  to  have  a  qualifying  holding  of  E10,000 
preference  or  ordinary  share  capital.  Both  types  of  shares 
carried  voting  rights  but  preference  shareholders  could  only  bote 
on  matters  which  directly  related  to  their  interest,  Decisions 
on  matters  of  general  policy  therefore  lay  with  the  ordinary 
share  holders. 
The  distribution  of  ordinary  shares  was  such  that  J.  W. 
Baxendaleg  despite  his  position  and  the  size  of  his  capital 
holdingg  could  be  outvoted  by  his  fellow  directors.  This  was 
not  50  unreaýonabie  as  at  first  sight  might  appear.  Given  the 
much  higher  ratio  of  preference  to  ordinary  sharesp  Baxendale 
carried  significantly  less  risk  than  his  two  cousins.  Moreover 
the  work  of  active  management  lay  chiefly  with  the  latter,  who 
received  a  salary  of  91,000  per  annum  as  director  managers, 
6 
pickfords  continued  in  its  new  form  under  the  sole  ownership 
and  control  of  the  Baxendale  family,  until  1902  when  Nigel  0. 
7 
Walker  was  admitted  to  the  Board.  The  only  other  director  to 
be  appointed  before  the  amalgamation  of  1912  was  Guy  Vernon 
Baxendale,  the  son  of  F.  H.  Baxendale. 
8 
In  the  early  yearsof  the  present  century  Pickfords'  total 
staffq  exclusive  of  casual  labourp  numbered  8  to  lOjOOO  persons. 
9 
London  was  the  main  centre  of  activities;  there  the  majority  of 
6  Board  Minutes  8  Jan  1902  Pic  1/2. 
7  Ibid  19  Feb.  1902 
8  Board  Minutes  21  Aug  1912  Pic  1/9. 
9  The  size  of  the  workforce  expanded  within  this  range.  Pearsonts 
R22111-Y  7  Dec-1905,  at  Pic  4/2;  The  Molassine  World  Dec-19FO-6 
p  430;  The  Times  23  April  1909;  The  World's  Carriers,  Vol.  5 
(1909)  p--378-6. 
281. the  workforce  and  the  bulk  of  Pickfords'  stock  of  horses  and 
road  vehicles  was  deployed.  Urban  cartage  traffic  was  the 
chief  business  but  Pickfordst  lesser  interests,  like  shipping 
and  household  removals,  continued  to  have  their  place.  On 
the  wholep  howevert  little  of  real  substance  can  be  said 
about  them.  Presumably  Pickfords  judged  that  conditions 
justified  the  L2,750  expended  on  two  motor  barges  for  the  Isle 
of  Ifight  trade  but  little  further  can  be  gleaned  from  the  record, 
10 
The  profitability  or  otherwise  of  Pickfords'  wharf  broadly 
accords  with  general  economic  fluctuations  as  profits  of  9600 
per  annum  during  1901  to  1906  deteriorated  in  1907  and  declined 
into  deficits  with  the  depression  of  1908.  Revival  came  with 
the  recovery  of  trade. 
11 
. 
Scope  for  expansion  was  felt  to  exist 
in  the  forwarding  of  goods  overseas.  Extra  staff  were  taken 
on  and  efforts  made  to  increase  the  volume  of  business  handled, 
especially  to  France,  but  also  to  Germany  and  Belgium. 
12 
opportunity  was  also  seen  in  trade  with  South  Africa  and  it  was 
to  develop  this  interest  thLit  a  subsidiary  company  Pickfords 
Colonial  was  formed. 
13 
Pickfords'  shipping  interests  were  said 
to  be  substantial 
14 
but  no  details  survive. 
Important  changes  took  place  in  the  way  in  which  various 
needs  of  the  business  were  met.  Much  that  had  previously  been 
contracted  out  was  now  brought  under  Pickfords'  direct  provision. 
10  The  first  boat  'Wasp'  cost  L745:  it  was  ordered  in  August 
1905  and  in  service  for  July  1905,  Board  Minutes  16  Aug.  1905, 
4  July  1906.  'Bat'  cost  92000  being  introduced  to  the  services 
in  May  1912.  Directors'  committee  24  May  1911,15  May  1912. 
11  Profits  on  the  wbarf  were  recorded  half  yearly  for  1901  to 
1906,  then  monthly  1907-8,  and  in  1910  when  the  records  are 
again  available. 
12  Board  Minut2s  1904,1906  passim. 
13  For  the  foundation  of  Pickfords  Colonial,  Board  Minutes  9, 
30  March  1904,  Pic  1/4;  27  April,  6  May  19  ic  1/5. 
14  Evidence  of  E.  H.  Beckwith,  Pickfords  Ltd.,  v.  LNWR,  Jan  1907 
Pic  4/15. 
282. Horses  had  long  been  chosen  by  Pickfords'  own  specialist  buyers. 
Stock  was  obtained  chiefly  in  Britainp  but  supplies  were  also 
sought  in  Irelandt  Belgium,  Denmark  and  America  in  an  effort  to 
find  horses  of  the  right  quality  and  price.  Previously  the 
stock  had  been  cared  for  by  contract  farriers  and  vets  but  in 
1901  Pickfords  employed  its  own  vet  and  began  to  do  part  of  its 
shoeingg  a  step  which  was  sufficiently  successful  to  be  progress- 
ively  extended.  As  to  fodderg  Pickfords  had  for  years  seen  to 
its  own  needs  but  one  of  the  consequences  of  terminating  the 
LNWR  contract  was  that  premises  at  Camden  and  Ilaydon  Square 
containing  the  firm's  processing  plant  had  to  be  given  up.  For 
a  few  years  Pickfords  made  arrangements  to  draw  its  requirements 
from  Carter  Paterson  but  in  1909  acquired  fresh  premises  and 
resumed  its  previous  practice  of  supplying  its  own  needs. 
15 
The  main  consideration  behind  the  moves  seems  to  have  been 
the  belief  that  Pickfords  could  do  the  work  itself  more  cheaply. 
The  cost  of  shoeing  was  reduced,  within  a  few  weeks,  by  an  annual 
saving  of  9450.16  Similar  possibilities  applied  to  the  construct- 
ion  and  maintenance  of  Pickfords'  fleet  of  road  vehicles,  work 
that  hitherto  had  been  contracted  out  to  two  specialist  firms  of 
-vehicle  buildersý  Hazeldine  and  McDougall.  Pickfords  was 
dissatisfied  both  with  the  quality  of  their  work,  and  the  price 
charged.  Failing  to  get  satisfactory  improvement,  Pickfords 
started  its  own  van  works  at  Glasshouse  Yard,  Aldersgate  Street 
whetel,  from  Februaryq  1904,17  all  new  work  and  repairs  were 
progressively  concentrated.  Again  the  venture  was  successful. 
15  Carter  Patersonts  records,  Board  Minutes  30  Jan  1902  CP  1/1; 
14  Oct  1ý099  also  26  Oct  1911  cp 
172. 
16  Board  Minutes  8  Jan  1902  Pic  1/2 
17  The  Window  Card  Vol.  2  No  5  1931  p  244. 
283. The  balance  sheet  for  Glasshouse  Yard  showed  a  profit  of  C39800 
18 
in  the  first  full  financial  year.  For  the  three  years  1909-11 
Pickfords'  profit  and  loss  account  credited  an  average  93,000 
profit  to  the  yard;,  Work  was  also  done  at  the  yard  for  other 
f  Irnis  . 
Another  of  Pickfords'  needs  was  for  waterproof  sheets  to 
cover  parcels  while  on  board  the  vans.  The  point  of  interest 
here  is  that  the  device  of  expanding  an  internal  supply  section 
into  a  commercial  enterprise  was  repeated.  The  mak-ing  and 
dressing  of  waterproof  sheets  was  carried  on  at  Terrace  House, 
North  Finchley.  In  March  1906  it  was  decided  to  convert  this 
department  into  a  separate  business  called  -The  North  Finchle): 
Waterproofing  Company.  Although  its  main  business  continued  to 
be  the  supply  of  Pickfords'  needs,  and  the  small  profit  made  paid 
into  Pickfords'  general  fund,  under  its  new  guise  it  took  on  the 
additional  function  of  general  carrier.  In  the  summer  of  1911- 
it  was  converted  into  a  small  limited  company. 
19 
In  addition 
to  creating  a  new  companyq  Pickfords  bought  several  small 
companies  in  London  and  elsewhere.  One  of  these  was  Camp's,  a 
small  West  End  carrying  businessq  which  was  bought  in  1903  and 
run  under  its  own  name  until  it  was  absorbed  into  the  general 
20 
business  at  th6  end'of  June  1912.  Not  only  did  it  show  a 
21 
small  profit  but  it  served  as  the  agency  for  two  further  purchases. 
To  discuss  Pickfords'  overall  financial  position  from  1896 
to  1912  is  to  enter  upon  particularly  difficult  terrain.  This 
is  chiefly  because  of  the  partial  nature  of  the  surviving  financial 
18  Board  Minutes  Aug  1905,19  July,  9,16  Aug.  1905  Pic  116. 
19  Ibid  7  March  1906  Pic  1/7;  Directorsicommittee  3,10  May, 
T4-june,  2  Aug.  1911  Pic 
20  Board  Minutes  27  May,  15  JulY  1903  Pic  1/4;  Directors'  committee 
26  June  1912  Pic  1/17. 
21  Saunders  of  Mortlake,  and  I.  W.  Sealby  of  Berwick  Street 
Board  Minutes  21  June,  2,16  Aug.,  1905  Pic  1/6, 
284. records.  The  annual  balance  sheets  and  profit  and  loss  accounts 
are  available  only  from  the  financial  year  ending  30  June  1909.22 
Before  that  half  yearly  and  yearly  accounts  were  presented  to  the 
annual  general  meeting.  butp  except  for  June,  1905 
23 
the  details  were 
not  recorded.  Accounting  principles  are  not  explained  and  it 
has  been  impossible  to  discover  how,  for  examplet  the  recorded 
not  profit  figures  were  arrived  at.  Similarly  it  has  not  proved 
possible  to  estimate  Pickfords'  basic  trading  position,  before  - 
interestp  depreciation  and  other  charges,  by  reconstructing  gross 
trading  profit.  With  regard  to  the  overall  financial  position 
little  can  be  said  about  the  nature  and  value  of  Pickfords' 
reserves.  No  schedule  of  reserves,  cash  deposits  or  investmentsq 
survives  for  the  period,  while  the  figure  placed  upon  the  value 
of  the  reserves  varies  markedly  over  the  years,  It  cannot  be 
said  whether  the  latter  represent  genuine  alterations  or  different 
principles  of  valuation.  Thus  the  data  is  slight  and  difficult 
to  interpret:  per  contra  the  dangers  of  misconstruction  are 
serious.  What  follows  therefore  is  rather  by  way  of  general 
impression  than  confident  assertion. 
Taking  all  the  evidence  together  the  vasic  impression  is 
that  Pickfords  was  experiencing  a  period  of 
'financial 
stringency, 
with  current  earnings  far  from  adequate  to  meet  current  require- 
ments.  The  available  data  of  most  use  is  summarised  in  Table  11,1. 
The  figures  for  1896-1899  are  included  because  they  point  the 
contrast  with  the  next  decade  and  also  indicate  that  some 
deterioration  was  alrbady  occuring. 
22  Pic  4/22  for  the  years  1909-1911;  Pic  4/289  for  1912-1919 
23  Minutes  of  General  Meetings,  15  Nov  1905  Pic  1/1. 
285. Table  11,1  Pickfordst  financial  Position  1896to  1913 
Profit  as  Profit  as 
Net  a  percentage  a  percentage 
Capital:  Receipts  brofit  of  capital  of  receipts  Reservcs 
ic  ZL  9 
1896  430,637  59p265  13.41  36,2o4 
1897  (4789000)  2  590225  12-39 
1898  (509t7OO)  2  32,  '622  6.4o 
1899  (5199200)  2  339159  6.37 
1906  (4579000)  2  4729243  59073  1111  1.07 
1901  4579000  113,968 
1905  457,000  89602 
1909  1719800  442,559  -  279  56j618 
1910  1749500  4629349  16,278  9.33  3.52  569813 
1911  174,5oo  488,402  15,435  8.85  3.16  639359 
1912  2089600'  6,9563  137tlOO 
1913  2089600  524p946  15,116  7.24  2.88  137olOO 
Source:  The  figures  for  1896-1901  are  from 
a  draft  scheme  for  amalgamation  in  1901 
CP  4/27;  that  for  1905  from  Minutes  of  Annual 
General  Meeting  Pic  1/1;  those  for  1909-1913 
from  the  relevant  balance  sheets  and  profit  and 
loss  accounts  Pic  4/22  and  Pic  4/28 
Notes  I.  For  1896  and  19019  as  at  CP  4/27;  1897-1900 
estimatedt  as  note  2;  1908-1913,  nominal  share 
and  loan  capital 
2,  The  figures  in  brackets  are  calculated  from 
columns  3  and  4. 
3.  On  a  financial  year  of  January  to  December  1912, 
from  a  statement  of  net  profits  declared  to  Hays 
Wharf  Cartage  Company  Ltd.,  6  May  1919(?  ),  Pic  HH, 
Accountant's  office. The  total  collapse  of  profits  between  1899  and  1900  is 
inexplicable.  The  directors  of  Carter  Paterson  reported  to 
their  shareholders  in  the  latter  year  that  there  had  been  marked 
increases  in  the  cost,  of  both  materials  and  labour,  but  not 
apparently  of  such  proportions  as  to  explain  a  fall  of  this 
scale. 
24 
As  prices  continued  to  rise  strongly  the  following 
year 
2.5 
it  is  not  likely  that  profits  recovered  in  1901  and  quite 
possibly  fell  even  further.  The  only  profit  figure  for  the 
succeeding  years  is  that  for  1905,  which  suggests  a  small  rally, 
The  underlying  trend,  howeverv  is  perhaps  indicated  by  the  fact 
that  the  payment  of  dividends  due  in  1900  was  not  completed  until 
June  1906.26  After  a  small  loss  in  1909  profits  recovered  to  a 
more  hopeful  level.  In  March  1910  an  interim  dividend  of  2-1%  in 
27 
ordinary  shares  was  declared,  the  first  payment  recorded  since 
igo6. 
Even  in  1909,  when  the  accounts  show  a  losst  Pickfords  no 
doubt  made  a  crude  trading  profit  for  the  year;  provision  for 
other  charges  pushed  the  account  into  deficit.  In  general 
Pickfords'  current  earnings  seem  to  have  been  basically  inadequate 
to  meet  recurrent  costs  and  still  show  a  profit.  Depreciation 
charges  presented  a  particular  problem.  It  was  noted  that  the 
profit  declared  for  1905  was  considerably  understated  because  of 
the  amount  which  had  been  written  off  vehicles. 
28 
During  1901 
almost  150  bf  Pickfords'  vans  were  moth-balled,  and  a  fair 
number  of  these  were  not  brought  back  into  active  service.  In 
addition  the  hopes  of  converting  horse  vehicles  for  use  as 
24  Directors'  rePort  to  AGM,  9  Aug,  1900  Cp  1/1. 
25  Directorst  rePoEt  to  AGM,  4  Oct,  1901  CP  1/2. 
26  Minutes,  General  Meetings  14  Nov  1906  Pic  I/l.  - 
27  board  Minutes  9  March  1910  Pic  1/9. 
28  Minutes,  General  Meetings  15  Nov.  1905  Pic  1/1. 
286. trailers  with  motors  were  disappointed  so  there  was  an  element 
of  obsolescence  as  well.  It  is  impossible  to  be  procisol  but 
it  is  likely  that  the  increasing  use  of  motors  raised  the  rate 
of  obsolescence  in  Pickfords'  existing  stock.  Motors  themselves, 
especially  in  the  early  yearsq  had  a  high  rate  of  technical 
obsolescence. 
29  Thus  the  factor  of  high  depreciation  charges 
is  likely  to  have  been  a  general  trend  rather  than  peculiar 
to  one  year. 
A  final  point  which'suggests  a  difficult  financial  position 
is  the  extent  to  which  Pickfords  had  recourse  to  borrowing,  by 
necessity  ratber  than  choice.  Pickfords  main  bank  account#  with 
Glyn-Mills,  was  at  times  substantially  over-drawn  for  several 
months-.  At  E159000  the  bank  asked  for  the  directors'  personal 
guarantee  of  repayment. 
30 
However  the  chief  means  of  borrowing 
was  by  mortgage.  From  1901  until  the  middle  Of  1905  a  steady 
flow  of  loans  was  arranged  by  Pickfords'  solicitors,  on  the 
security  of  various  properties.  The  pressure  then  eased  somewhat 
only  to  build  up  again  in  1911  and  1912.  Loans  called  in  were 
replaced  by  new  borrowingsq  and  also  two  very  large  loans  were 
negotiatedv'one  for  C100,000  from  the  Legal  and  General  Assurance 
Society  Ltd,,  the  other  for  L195vOOO  from  the  Commercial  Union 
Assurance  Company  Ltd. 
31 
In  1912  Pickfords  various  mortgages 
totalled  over  L400,000.32 
The  two  large  loans  just  mentioned  followed  upon  a  further 
change  in  the  composition  of  Pickfords.  In  1908  J.  W.  Baxendale 
29  See  the  discussion  on  methods  of  depreciating  motors  in  a  firm's 
accounts,  Commercial  Motor  Vol.  4  (1907)  P  587;  Ibid  Vol.  10 
(1909)  P  P.  00 
30  For  example  the  account  remained  in  overdraft  of  915,000  on, 
these  terms  from  Aug.  1910  to  Nov.  1911, 
31  For  the  two  major  loans  see  Boa:  rd  Minutes  1912  passim  Pic  1/9. 
32  As  recorded  in  Schedule  2  to  the  Agreement  of  amalgamation 
28  Aug.  1912p  CP  3/10. 
287. left  Pickfords:  he  was  opposed  to  the  policies  bej 
-ng  pursued  by 
his  two  cousins. 
33  In  place  of  his  original  subscription  of 
C220,000  preferred  and  ordinary  shares  lie  now  received  L166,  ooo 
4%  Debenture  Stock  to  terminate  his  interest  in  the  firm.  34 
Pickfords  was  then  converted  to  Baxendales  Ltd.,  and  immediately 
went  into  voluntary  liquidationo  to  be  reconstructed  as  Pickfords 
Ltd.  It  was  to  finance  the  liquidation  and  reconstruction  that 
Pickfords  needed  to  borrow  so  heavily.  35  'At 
the  same  time 
Pickfords  share  capital  was  heavily  written  down  from  the  issued 
capital  of  E457,000  in  March  1901  to  91059900.  The  net  effect, 
'therdforptof  J.  W.  Baxendale's  departure  was  to  reduce  Pickfords' 
capital  resources  and  at  the  same  time  increase  the  burden  of 
debt. 
Constraints  such  as  these,  which  are  taken  to  underlie 
subsequent  discussion 
)  meant  that  the  quality  and  character  of  the 
management  capabilities  of  those  responsible  for  Pickfords  were 
put  to  the  test.  As  their  titlo  indicates  it  was  the  task  of 
L.  H.  Baxendale  and  F.  H.  Baxendale,  the  director  manag 
36 
-ers, 
to 
provide  the  supervisory  management  of  the  business.  N.  O.  Walker 
and  G.  V.  Baxendale  took  the  same  role  when  they  joined  the  board. 
The  formal  vehicle  of  management  was  a  weekly  meeting  of  the 
directors.  Until  February  1907  the  directors  met  weekly  as  a 
33  Information  from  the  late  G.  V.  Baxendalev  J.  W.  Baxendale  ceased 
to  attend  board  meetings  after  26  June,  1907  and  made  only 
rAte  appearances  at  Directors'  meetings.  During  1908  he  did 
not  attend  at  all. 
34  Board  Minutes  14  Oct  1908  Pic  1/9;  J.  W.  Baxendale  opposed  the 
terms  of  Pickfords'  reconstruction  as  contrary  to  his  interests. 
-Minutes  of  General  Meetings,  25  March,  1,89  15t  24  April  and 
especially  13  May  1908  Pic  1/1. 
35  For  the  purpose  and  cost  of  reconstruction,  Board  Minutes 
16  Dec  1908  24  March,  28  Aprilq  1909,  Pic  1/94Minutes  General 
Meetinag  29  Dec.  1908  31  March,  15,21p  22  April  1909  Pic  1/1 
Minutes  Directors,  '  committee  7  June  1911  Pic  1116, 
36  They  were  actually  referred  to  as  managing  directors  but  the 
title  has  been  changed  to  avoid  confusion  with  modern  usage. 
258'. board  but  then  reconstituted  themselves  as  a  managine  committee 
and  reserved  board  meetings,  held  irreaularly  as  required,  to 
purely  formal  business.  37  At  each  meeting  a  report  was  made  on 
the  current  state  of  each  aspect  of  the  business  together  with  the 
comparative  position  in  earlier  years.  Week  by  week  the  same 
methodical  survey  was  the  main  business  of  the  meeting, 
Consequently  the  record  of  their  meetings  reflects  the  directors, 
primary  concern  with  the  mundane  matters  of  everyday  working; 
neat  formulations  of  policy  are  absent.  At  times  discussion 
descended  into  considerable  detail.  Discussion  of  advertising 
mattersp  for  example,  a  subject  of  regular  consideration, 
invariably  extended  beyond  budgetary  and  general  policy  consider- 
ations  to  include  the  particular  formatq  cost,  location  and 
length  of  placement  of  individual  items.  Pickfords'  directors 
spent  a  considerable  proportion  of  the  time  given  over  to  the 
formal  exercise  of  management  on  matters  which.  appear  of  limited 
importancep  matters  which  might  advantageously  have  been  dealt 
with  by  a  managing  director  or  by  senior  clerks  invested  with  the 
necessary  discretionary  authority. 
_ 
Except  possibly  for  certain  vague  areas  of  responsibility, 
e.  g,  Walker  for  financep  the  two  Baxendales  for  supervision  of 
the  provincial  agenciesq  there  is  no  evidence  that  the  directors' 
contributed  any  specialist  knowledge  to  Pickfords  or  even 
concentrated  in  any  particular  aspect  of  the  firmts  business. 
As  individuals  the  directors'  management  role  appears  as  a 
general  attention  to  businessin  line  with  the  customary  terms  of 
partnership.  Indeed  in  many  ways  the  transition  from  partnership 
37  Board  Minutes  13-Feb.  1907  Pic  1/8* 
289. to  limited  company  appears  asa  change  of  form  only.  At  no 
point  did  Pickfords'  directors  observe  any  conventions  which 
suggest  they  accepted  the  principle  of  collective  responsibility 
to  a  superior  body  of  shareholders  or  that  their  authority 
derived  from  anyone  but  themselves.  There  were  no  ex-directorate 
shareholdings? 
8 
so  there  was  no  separation  betweon  ownership  and 
control;  the  managers  were  responsible  only  to  themselves, 
An  informative  comparison  can  be  obtained  by  examining 
Pickfords'  board-room  procedures  against  those  of  Carter  Paterson, 
the  great  rival. 
39 
Although,  like  Pickfordst  the  family  element 
was  still  strong,  Carter  Paterson  preserved  a  formal  structure  of 
management.  A  chairman  and  vice-chairman  were  elected  annually. 
The  chairman  was  also  managing  director  and  in  this  capacity  he 
sought  the  authority  of  his  board  for  proposed  actions  and 
reported  back  on  the  results.  Special  committees  were  appointed 
whose  recommendations  were  presented  to  the  board  for  discussion. 
Authority  was  taken  to  subsist  in  the  board  as  a  group,  from 
which  individual  directors  drew  their  powers.  Supreme  authority 
lay  with  the  shareholders  to  whom  the  director  presented  an 
annual  account  of  their  stewardship.  No  doubt  the  existence  of 
significant  ex-directorate  shareholdings 
4o 
underlies  the' 
preservation  of  these  formal  conventions,  but  by  observing  the 
principle  of  accountability  to  the  shareholdersq  however  nominal 
in  practicep  Carter  Paterson's  directors  both  followed  the  forms 
of  a  limited  company  more  strictly  than  Pickfords  and  left  a  far 
more  informatiye  historical  record.  By  contrast  Pickfordst 
38  Except  for'seven  shares  held  by  seven  members  of  the  family- 
and  firm,  Board  Minutes  26  March  1901  Pic  1/2. 
39  The  following  is  based  on  a  general  reading  of  the  Carter 
Paterson  records. 
40  See  the  distribution  of  preference  stock  in  the  re-formed 
Carter  Patersong  Schedule  2  to_  Application  and  nomination 
by  Pickfords  Limited,  3  Dec  1ý12  CP  2/19.  This  distribution 
was  based  on  previous  holdings  in  the  two  companies. 
290. directors  proceeded  in  a  much  more  informal  manner.  Shareholders 
meetings  were  perfunctory  and  the  boardroom  procedures  of  Carter 
Paterson  totally  absent.  The  reported  actions  of  individual 
directorsp  an  agency  closed  or  a  small  business  bought,  suggest 
the  exercise  of  autonomous  authority  more  consistent  with  the  form 
of  partnership.  This  might  well  be  a  false  impression,  due  to 
the  nature  of  the  record.  If  such  actions  represent  decisions 
reached  outside  of  the  directors'  meeting  then  the  informality 
of  Pickfords  would  only  be  heightened. 
Only  on  rare  occasions  does  the  record  contain  an  explanation, 
even  an  observationg,  from  the  directors  on  their  purposes  and 
actions.  The  essential  taskv  therefore,  is  to  make  explicit  what 
in  the  record  is  only  implicit.  This  is  particularly  so  when 
searching  to  discover  the  criteria  of  efficiency  adopted  by  the 
directors.  Each  week  Pickfords'  statistics  office  served  up  to 
the  directors  a  whole  battery  of  cost  and  revenue  figures  for  each 
part  of  the  business,  broken  down  per  I-iorse  or  per  man  according 
to  the  appropriate  unit. 
-Over 
a  run  of  weeks  and  years  these 
provided  a  useful  comparative  framework  for  reference.  Marked 
deviations  from  past  trends  could  be  quickly  picked  out  and,  in 
the  absence  of  known,  price  changesq  an  explanation  sought. 
The  operating  ratio  to  which  Pickfords'  directors  were 
particularly  sensitive  (both  for  the  total  concern  and  its 
41 
constituent  parts)  was  the  ratio  of  salaries  and  wages  to  earningse 
In  Pickford5l  Position  this  was  an  informative  ratio  to  use. 
Wages  and  salaries  were  the  heaviest  single  charge  on  revenue 
averaging  about  40ýper  cent  of  total  expenditure.  The  size 
41  Minutes  Directorst  committeep  Junet  JulY  1907  Pic  1113; 
Ibidj-  21  Feb,  1912  Pic  1/17. 
291. of  the  wages  bill  wast  therefore,  a  major  determinant  of  the 
level  of  profit.  This  explains  the  directors'  alarm  when  on 
one  occasiont  expenditure  on  this  account  at  Pickfords'  wharf 
reached  48  per  cent  of  revenue.  The  manager  was  urgently 
summoned  for  an  explanation  and  left  in  no  doubt  that  savings 
might  well  start  with  his  salary, 
42 
Provender  was  the  other 
major  variable,  accounting  for  a  further  20  per  cent  of  total 
costs. 
When  the  wages/earnings  ratio  carie  under  strain,  efforts  were 
made  to  meet  it  from  both  sides.  A  special  canvass  for  traffic 
would  be  held  in  an  attempt  to  increase  revenue,  but  as  the  main 
pressure  invariably  came  from  the  side  of  costs  it  was  there  that 
the  main  corrective  measures  were  applied.  The  level  of  provender 
costs  was  largely  determined  by  market  conditions  but  the  level 
of  labour  costs  was  subject  to  a  certain  degree  of  control.  By 
a  crude  form  of  labour  managementv  replacing  men  with  boyst 
cheaper  labour  could  be  substituted  for  more  expensive  labour  and 
thus  total  costs  cut.  In  the  circumstances  this  was  an 
economically  soundq  if  socially  damaging,  way  of  meeting  rising 
costs. 
Although  the  directors  alone  made  decisions,  at  times  the 
opinion  of  senior  staff  was  sought  in  matters  where  their  exper- 
43 
ience  was  felt  to  be  particularly  relevant,  The  lines  of 
communication  between  the  directors  and  the  staff  were  clearly 
laid  down,  All  depot  managers  were  answerable  to  the  board. 
Administrative  work  at  Gresham  Street,  the  head  office,  was  broken 
down  into  a  defined  "departmental  structure. 
44 
A  senior  clerk 
42  Minutes  Directors'  committee  14  Aug,  1907  Pic  1/3. 
43  Board  Minutes 
,9 
27  Nov.,  11  Doe,  1901  Pic  1/2.  Minutes 
Directors'  committee  8,15,  May  1912  Pic  1/17. 
44  Recorded  on  two  occasions,  Board  Minutes  23  April  1902 
Pic  1/2;  Minutes  Directors'  committee  26  Aug,  1908  Pic  1/14. 
292. headed  each  department  arid  was  responsible  to  the  board  for  the 
management  of  his  section.  He  was  expected  to  be  on  top  of  his 
work  and  show  an  example  to  the  office  staff.  by  his  prompt  arrival 
for  work  and  his  assiduity  in  carrying  it  out.  Slackness  could 
bring  stinging  rebukes  from  which  the  most  senior  stnff  were 
not  immune. 
45 
There  wa 
-sa  danger  of  slipping  into  peremptory 
reprimands  which  might  be  resented.  9  especially  when  they  were 
felt  to  be  unjustlY  administered.  Efficiency  and  smartness  were 
insisted  on  from  all  the  staff.  Emphasis  was  placed  on  polite 
and  prompt  attention  to  customersq  especially  where  claims  and 
46 
complaints  were  concerned.  For  certain  offences,  including 
intoxication,  disobedience  or  negligencet  Pickfords  reserved  the 
right  of  instant  dismissal  -  the  sentence  handed  out  to  the  firm's 
vet  Ilowine  to  the  state  in  which  appeared  in  a  horse  case  at  the 
Highgate  Police  Court.  " 
47 
In  return  for  loyal  service  Pickfords  offered  favourable 
48 
conditions  of  employment.  Wages  were  possibly  higher  than  in 
comparable  firms  and  increases  were  not  begrudgedg  even  when 
money  was  tightq  when  it  was  felt  they  had  been  genuinely  earned. 
Manual  as  well  as  clerical  staff  were  employed  on  a  regular  basis, 
and  perhaps  enjoyed  greater  security  than  in  comparable  branches 
of  the  transport  industry.  Downgrading  to  the  toddl  or  casual 
basis  wasq  howeverg  used  as  a  disciplinary  measure  or  as  a  means 
of  laying-off  staff  during  a  strike,  Both  the  manual  and 
clerical  staff  received  a  week's  paid  holiday  after  twelve  months 
45  Board  Minutes,  8  Feb.  1905  Pic  116, 
46  Memo  Book,  1906-1913,  containing  notices  addressed  to  staff 
Pic  4/10;  alsof  General  rules  and  rePulations  to  be  observed 
bX  all  persons  in  the  service  Of  Pickfords  Ltd.  P-3-c  191  1- 
47  Minutes  Directors'  committee,  9  Dec  1908  Pic  1/14 
48  The  following  is  based  on  the  records  generally. 
293,. 'With  the  firm.  Self-help  was  encouraged  by  the  continuation 
of  the  old  practice  whereby  the  firm  contributed  to  the  Clerks, 
Provident  Fund  a'sum,  equal  to  the  annual  subscriptions  and 
allowed  the  balance  to  be  invested  in  the  firm.  The  welfare 
of  elderly  and  former  employees  also  received  attention.  The 
cost  of  medical  care  was  often  paidq  or  half-wages  allowed,  and 
convalescence  might  be  arranged  at  St.  Andrew's  Houset  Greenhamp 
near-Newburyl  which  was  maintained  by  the  Baxendales. 
49 
Senior 
clerical  staff  received  pensions  in  proportion  to  their  salary 
and  length  of  service.  Ex-gratia  pensions  were  also  paid  to 
carmen  who  had  been  with  Pickfords  for  25  years  or  more.  A 
pension  of  7/6d  per  week  was  the  maximum  allowed;  more  generally 
it  was  5/-  per  week,  the  level  set  by  the  National  Insurance  Act 
of  1908. 
A  hint  of  paternalismo  tinged  with  autocracy,  -suggested  by 
the  foregoing  is  given  more  substance  by  the  attitude  displayed 
towards  the  activities  of  organised  labour.  As  part  of  the 
transport  industry  in  general,  and  associated  with  the  railways 
and  docks,  in  particularg  Pickfords  could  not  avoid  being  affected 
by  the  industrial  strife  of  the  pre-war  years. 
50  Pickfords 
apparently  escaped  trouble  in  1908  when  conditions  first  seriously 
deteriorated  -a  situation  which  drew  from  one  of  the  trade 
journals  the  plaintive  cry  that  it  was  "high  time  that  businessmen 
found  a  permanent  solution  to  the  difficulties  constantly  arising 
between  capital  and  labour.  1151  Unfortunately  the  conflict  was 
to  rise  to  a  higher  level  of  intensity  in  1911  and  1912,  which 
embroiled  the  transport  workers  in  particular.  Pickfords  had 
49  A  feature  on  the  Home  in  The  Window  Cardt  No.  1  Oct.  1927 
said  that  It  was  then  equipped  and  maintained  by  L.  H.  Baxendale 
personally. 
50  E.  H.  Phelps  Brown  The  growth  of  British  indu-strial  ralat16ns 
(1950)  esp.  Chap.  VI;  H.  Pelling,  A  history  of  British  Trade 
UnionAsm  (1963)  P  133  ff;  H.  A.  Clegg,.  A.  Fox  and  A.  F.  Thompson 
A  history  of  British  trade  unions  since_1889  Vol,  1  1889-1910 
ý0_xford  1964)  esp.  Chapll,  A*Bullock  The  life  and  times  of 
Ernest  Bevin  Vol.  1  (1960)  pp  16  ff. 
51  Iforld's  Carriers  15  Dec  1908  p  49. 
294. to  deal  with  strikes  in  both  of  these  years  in  support  of  the 
two  common  demands,  higher  wages  and  the  employment  of  men 
instead  of  boys. 
52 
The  directorst  attitude  to  unions  and  strikes  was  equivocal. 
They  did  not  take  an  extreme  view  and  refuse  to  negotiate  with 
the  men's  representatives.  The  indications  are  that  not  many  of 
Pickfords'  men  belonged  to  the  local  carmen's  unions.  The 
decision  of  the  London  men  to  form  a  separate  uniont  parallelled 
elsewherev  the  Amalgamated  Society  of  Pickfords'  Employees,  seems 
to  have  been  welcomed  by  the  directors. 
53 
But  their  reaction  to 
strike  actiong  or  the  threat  thereofq  was  a  complex  mixture  of 
benevolencep  repression  and  plain  vindictiveness.  In  June  1912 
Pickfords  became  involved  in  the  dock  strike  at  Bristol,  Plymouth 
and  elsewhere.  At  Bristol  Pickfords  joined  with  the  other  master 
carmen  in  issuing  a  summons  against  the  strikers  but  decided  to 
recompense  its  own  men  for  Part  of  their  lost  wages  because  they 
54 
had  remained  at  work  for  as  long  as  they  possibly  could,  Almost 
in  the  same  breathq  howevert  action  was  taken  against  packer  Woods 
of  Plymouthq  44  years  in  the  company's  service  and  67  years  of 
ago*  He  was  to  be  informed  that  heccould  no  longer  be  permanently 
employed,  thus'losing  his  weekly  wage  of-,  26/-dl  far  above  his 
potential  earnings  elsewhereq  because  he  had  Gone  on  strike  with 
the  other  men  "when  there  was  not  the  least  occasion  for  him  to 
do  so.,  155  It  is  difficult  to  imagine  a  man  of  advanced  age 
putting  such  a  wage  at  risk  unless  subject  to  some  form  of 
pressure  but  such  consideration  was  not  raised.  Other  steps 
52  Minutes-Directorst  committee  26 
F 
July  1911  Pic  1/16. 
53  Ibid  12  Junet  3  July  1912  Pic  1M 
54  Ibid  19  June  1912  Pic  1/17 
55  Ibid  19  June  1912  Pic 
, 
1/17 
295. taken  in  the  face  of  strike-action  included  the  immediate  with- 
drawal  of  bonus  payments,  the  withdrawal  of  paid  holidays,  and 
the  attempted  black-listing  of  men  who  left. 
56 
On  the  whole 
Pickfords'  management  was  less  then  progressive  in  its  attitude 
to  organised  labour  but.  shows  up  well  in  the,  more  traditional 
form  of  staff  welfare. 
In  -the  case  of  labour  troubles  the  soundness  of  the  directors 
response  is  not  a  factorýof  major  importance.  In  the  given 
situation  the  position  adopted  by  an  individual  firm  was  not 
likely  to  affect  the  outcome  to  any  significant  extent,  There 
were  situations,  howeverg  where  the  opportunen6ss  of  judgement 
displayed-by  the  directors  would  materially  influence  the  whole 
phape  of  Pickfords'  future.  Chief  among  these  was  Pickfordst 
associationg  as  cartage  agentq  with  the  LNWR,  and  especially  the 
decision  to  terminate,  the-contract.  There  can  be  no  doubt'that 
Pickfords-derived  substantial  revenue  from  this  connection, 
although  no  precise  valuation  can  be  placed  on  it.  On  the  basis 
of  tonnage,  payments  made  to  the-various  railway  companieso  the 
only  indicator  avallablep,  Pickfords  agency  traffic  represented 
about  two-thirds  of  its  total  railway  traffic  at  the  turn  of  the 
century,  As  sole  agents  to  the  LNWR  Pickfords  had  access  to 
a  large  volume  of  business  on  which  the  profit  realised  was 
possibly  in  the  region  of  Z20,000  per  annum. 
58 
A  secure  income 
of  this  size  must  have  been  a  valuable  asset  in  the  face  of 
rising  competition. 
56  Ibidv  26  Julyq  18  Oct.  1911  Pic  1/16. 
57  See  the  accompanying  graph.  The  figures  are  extracted  from 
the  London.  Office  Journal  Pic  4/5 
" 
58  Letter  from  E.  G.  C.  Beckwith,  the  son  of  E.  H.  Beckwith  who  was 
head  of  Pickfords'  rail  traffic  departmentt  dated  21  May  1961: 
this  letter  quo.  tes  from  a  letter  written  to  him  some  twonty 
years  previously  by  his  father's  brother  which  included 
comments  on  the  LNWR  affair  and  cites  this  profit  figure. 
Pic  HH,  Baxendale:  Personal  and  General.  In  Pickfords'  court 
action  against  the  LNWR#  Z20vOOO  was  g3-ven  as  the  total  loss  to 
the  firm  if  the  LNIM  continued  the  policies  of  which  Pickfords 
was  complaining. 
296. The  value  to  Pickfords  of  its  tic  with  the'LNWR  is  obvious. 
However  the  benefit  was  not  solely  one  way.  Even  at  the  end  of 
the  nineteenth  century  many  firms  still  regarded  Pickfords  as  their 
carrier  and  consigned  'by  Pickford'  rather  than  'by  railway'  or  a 
particular  railway  companys 
59 
Pickfords  not  only  brought  traffic 
to  the  LNWR  but  it  also  absorbed  the  bulk  of  the  clerical  cost 
of  processing  traffic  which  had  grown  out  of  all  proportion  to 
the  absolute  growth  of  traffic  because  of  the  changed  composition 
60 
of  railway  freight,  Pickfords  services,  therefore,  remained 
of  value  to  the  LN'WR  and  although  the  railway  company  was 
expanding  its  own  cartage  facilities  by  the  1890s,  it  showed  no 
desire  to  end  Pickfordst  favoured  position. 
61 
However  by  1901  there  were  feelings  of  dissension  on  Pickfords, 
side. 
62 
Restrictions  on  the  firm's  activities,  e.  g.  the 
obligation  to  bring  all  traffic  to  the  railway  company  and  refrain 
from-any  form  of  competitiong  which  force  of  circumstance  had 
previously  made  necessary  were  evidently  no  longer  regarded  as 
acceptable.  In  addition  the  cartage  rate  allowed  by  the  LNWR 
was  felt-to  be  unsufficiently  remunerative.  In  January  1901 
pickfords  informed  the  directors  of  the  LNWR  of  its  intention  to 
terminate  the  agency  agreement  at  the  end  of  the  following  June. 
63 
Although  they  believed  Pickfords'  main  aim  was  to  break  its  tie 
with  the  company  rather  than  bargain  for  better  terms,  the 
directors  tried  to  negotiate  a  compromise.  However,  no  agreement 
could-be  reached  and  the  break  accordingly  went  ahead.  The 
LNWR  promptly  acquired  500  horses  and  some  200  waggonsg.  canvessed 
59  Railway  Magazine  Vol.  1  (1897)  p  194,  interview  with  Mr.  F.. 
Harrisont  General  manager  of  the  LNUR. 
60  Pratt  Railways  and  their  rabas  p  90  ff. 
61  Minutes  cartage  and  agency  committee  1885-1891,  LNW  1/573 
62  Cuttings  from  various  journals,  Pic  4/25  PP  31-33t  Board 
Minutes,  27  Nov,  1901  Pic  1/2. 
63  Minutes,  goods  traffic  committee 
' 
16  Jan,  13  March,  17  April, 
1901t  LNW  1/201;  15  May,  19  June,  17  July#  7  Aug  1901 
LNW  1/202. 
297. Pickfords'  customers,  and  successfully  hold  the  bulk  of  its 
traffic  when  the  now  terms  of  working  came  into  effect. 
The  termination  of  the  agency  agreement  was  the  personal 
decision  of  either  or  both  of  the  two  director  managers,  L.  11. 
Baxendale  and  F.  H.  Baxendalop  against  the  views  Of  their  senior 
staffq  and  probably  their  chairman  and  major  shareholder,  J.  W. 
Baxendale. 
64 
The  fact  of  the  staff's  opposition  is  important 
since  it  means  that  an  assessment  of  this  decision  as  fundament- 
ally  misconceived  it  not  based  solely  on  ex-post  considerations, 
The  evidence  of  the  resultant  effects  allows  of  no  other 
conclusion.  The  effect  on  Pickfords'  business  with  the  LNWR  is 
shown,  in  terms  of  tonnage  payments,  by  the  accompanying  graph. 
The  contract  ended  on  30th  June  1901;  business  for  the  quarter 
ending  that  day  totalled  L78tOOO  of  which  a  little  over  half, 
937,320  was  paid  to  the  LNWR,  By  the  end  of  the  next  quarter 
the  total  had  fallen  by  about  an  eighth  but  the  LNWR's  share  had 
fallen  to  about  a  third.  In  July  alone  the  agencies  whose  main 
work  was  LNWR  traffic  made  a  loss  of  UP155,  an  annual  rate  of 
C25tOOOo 
65 
By  the  autumn  Pickfords'  railway  earnings  were 
reported  to  be  down  by  a  third. 
Pickfords  thus  experienced  an  immediate  sharp  reduction  in 
traffic  with  the  LNWRj  followed  by  a  steady  downward  slide. 
Table  11.2  illustrates  this  in  terms  of  tonnage  weight  conveyed* 
Pickfords'  tonnage  payments  to  the  LNWR,  as  shown  in  the  graph 
64  According  to  the  letter  of  E.  G.  C.  Beckwithv  cited  above,  L.  H. 
Baxendale  was  responsiblev  and  E.  H.  Backwith  and  other  staff 
opposed  the  move.  The  late  Guy  Baxendale  stated  that  the  change 
was  advocated  chiefly  by  his  fatherg  F.  H.  Baxendale'and  that 
the  disastrous  results  lay  behind  the  quarrel  with  J,  W. 
Baxendale. 
65  Board  Minutes  2  Oct.  1901  Pic  1/2. 
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lia Table  11.2.  Pickfords  traffic  on  the  LýIWR  1901-1905.  (tons) 
London  CountrX,  Total 
1901 
June  I  year  estimated 
1 
166,6oo 
December  year  16,699  639614  80013 
Es,  timated  whole  year  246,  goo 
1902  259253  88,393  113,646 
1903  19,439  61t6lq  81t058 
lgo4  169709  54P877  71,586 
1905  14t582  53029  679911 
Source  Evidence  of  E.  H.  Beckwith,  Pickfords  Ltd.  v. 
LNWR  Jan.  1907  Pic  4/15.. 
Note  1.  The  tonnage  figure  for  June  half  year  1901  has 
been  estimated  by  calcula  ting  the  ratio  between 
the-known  tonnage  figure  and  tonnage  payment  for 
the  December  half  year'an  d  applying  this  to  the 
known  tonnage  payment  for  the  June  half  year. contracted  in  similar  proportion  over  the  same  period.  Both 
series  show  that  by  1905  Pickfords'  business  with  the  LNWR 
had  fallen  to  about  25  per  cent  of  its  level  in  June  1901,  It 
then  temporarily  stablised  at  that  level.  Table  11.2  also 
shows  how  much  the  flow  of  traffic  was  from  the  provinces  to 
London  and  explains  why  agencies  in  the  north  and  midlands  dealing 
almost  exclusively  with  LNWR  traffic  quickly  ran  into  difficulties. 
Several  of  them  were  already  marginal  and  now  had  to  be  closed. 
The  loss  of  LNWR  traffic  could  not  have  been  unexpected, 
possibly  even  some  net  reduction  anticipated.  In  general  the 
hope  would  have  been  that  rickfords  would  hold  the  bulk  of  its 
traffic  and  transfer  it  to  the  Great  Central  railway  company 
(GCR)  with  which  an  agency  agreement  had  been  concluded. 
67 
The  link  with  the  GCR  undoubtedly  throws  light  on  the  timing  of 
Pickfords'  action,  Only  in  1899  was  St.  Pancras  station  opened, 
the  step  by  which  the  GCR  achieved  its  long  standing  ambition 
of  having  a  London  terminus,  and  thus  broke  the  LNWR's  monopoly 
of  traffic  between  London,  the  midlands,  and  the  north.  An 
agency  contract  was  also  signed  with  the  Lancashire  &  Yorkshire 
railway  company  (LYR) 
68 
but  the  main  hopes  rested  on  the  new 
association  with  the  GCR.  Unfortunately  for  Pickfords  the  GCR 
failed  to  mount  seri 
ý: 
ous  competition  to  the  LNWRfs  position.  Its 
line  was  poorly  located  to  generate  much  independent  traffic  and 
it  wa's  largely  unsuccessful  in  attracting  traffic  off  other  lines. 
In  addition  to  this 
) 
the  LN1TR  canvassed  for  Pickfordst  traffic  and 
also  as  the  premier  railway  company  was  in  a  pos-ILtion  to  exert 
an  influence  on  other  railway  companies.  In  the  first  tWelVe 
67  Ibid 
, 
24  Junb  1901 
68  lbid  14  Aug.  igol 
299. months  of  the  new  arrangements'Pickfords  creatod  'new'  business 
with  the  GCR  and  the  LYR  to  the  extent  of  927,500,  but  flost, 
E97,000  worth  of  business  with'the  LNWR9  a  new  reduction  of 
C709000-  The  effects  of  breaking  with  the  LNITR  had  not  been 
off-set.  In  fact  despite  the  break  Pickfords  continued,  for 
most-of  the  succeeding  periodt  to  conduct  more  business  with  the 
LNWR  than  with  the  GCR.  Only  for  one  quarter,  December  1907, 
did  Pickfords  account  with  the  GCR  exceed  that  with  the  LNWR,  and 
then  only  by  the  barest  margin.  Similarly,  use  of  the  LYR  was 
by  way  of  a  temporary  boost  only  and  had  already  fallen  back 
before  the  railway  company  terminated  the  contract  in  1906.69 
All  in  all  Pickfords  had  not  come  out  of  the  changes  very  well. 
Tn  an  effort  to  halt  the  slide  Pickfords  took  to  the  courts 
once  rýore., 
70  The  techni6alities  of  the  case,  which  came  to 
a  decisive  issue  in  January  1907,  centred  on  the  controversial 
question  of  whether  a  railway  company  should  be  compelled  to 
quote  as  separate  components  of  its  charge  the  cost  of  conveyance 
station  to  station  nnd  the  cost  of  collection  and  delivery. 
71 
The  general  practice  was  for  the  company  to  make  a,  comprehensive 
charge  and  then  allow  a  rebate  to  any  customer  performing  his  own 
collection  and  delivery.  In  previous  actions  before  the  Railway 
and  Canal  Commission72  the  LNWR  had  been  ordered  to  supply 
pickfords  with  a  breakdown  of  its  charges  and,  after  losing  its 
appeal,  the  company  had  complied.  Pickfordst  case  now  was  to 
argue  that  the  rebate  allowed  was  less  than  the  cost  of  collection 
and  delivery  when  performed'by  the  railway  company  i.  e.  the  company 
IA 
69  Board  Minutes  7  March,  18,25  April  1906,  Pic  1/7. 
70  Pickford  Ltd.  v.  LNWR  in  the  court  of  the  Railway  and  Canal 
Commissioners,  Jan.  to  May  1907  Pic  4/15. 
71  Ibid  evidence  Mr.  Maxwell  Stevens;  evidence  of  Mr.  B.  Howell, 
R.  C.  on  canals  and  waterways  (1906-1909)  Vol  V  part  2 
TC--d484oj  1909  QQ  41119-41152;  for  the  general  background  see 
Dyos  and  Aldcroft  British  transport  pp  165-172, 
72  World's  Carriers, 
q  Vol  1  (1  905)  P  137t  p  191  ff. 
300. allowed  itself  more  than  it  allowed  its  competitors  and  thereby 
unduly  )  and  illegallyq  preferred  itself,  The  further  details  of 
the  case  are  not  important.  Pickfords'  basic  purpose  was  to 
try  to  show  that  it  had  been  discriminated  against  by  the  LNWR 
to  the  extent  of  seriously  depressing  its  revenue.  The  aim  was 
to  secure  a  higher  rate  of  rebate.  Pickfords'  action  was  taken 
up  vigorously  by  the  motor  press73  but  enthusiastic  cheering 
from  the  side  lines,  even  disgust  at  the  outcome,  was  no 
compensation  for  losing  the  case.  The  decline  in  Pickfords' 
earnings  was  not  denied  but  the  judges  maintained  that  it  had  not 
been  proved  to  be  the  direct  result  of  the  railway  companyls 
action,  -exclusive  of  other  possible  influences.  Pickfords 
appealed  but  again  lost  the  verdict.  As  a  direct  consequence  the 
agencies  at  Leedsq-  Huddersfield  and  Bradford  were  closed  in 
addition  to  those  already  shut  at  Dudley,  Derby  and  Smethwick. 
74 
Pickfords'  use  of  the'LNWR  declined  even  further  and  total  tonnage 
payments  showed  a  similar  slide.  Eventually,  however,  old 
differences  were  patched  up.  In  the  autumn  of  1910  terms  were 
arranged  for  a  new  agency  agreement  which  was  commenced  the 
following  January  and  resulted  in  a  modest  recovery  of  Pickfordst 
railway  business. 
75 
Almost  from  the  time  Pickfords  broke  with  the  LNITR  efforts 
were  made  to  find  new  sources  of  revenue.  Rail  traffic  in  the 
south  east  and  from  London  to  the  south  coast  generally  was  one 
area  where  expansion  was  hoped  for.  76 
The  evidence  of  tonnage 
7ý  Commercial  Motor#  Vol.  5  (1907)  p  286  ff;  Vol.  6  (1907-8) 
pp  449-50,;  World's  Carriers,,  Vol.  3  (1907)  Feb.,  Julyq  Aug., 
Sept.,  Oct.  9  Dec.,  issues 
74  Minutes  Directors'  committee  4,11  Dec.  1907  Pic  1/14. 
75  Ibid  39  10,  Aug.,  30  Nov.,  1910,4  Jan.  1911  Pic  1/16. 
76  Board  Minutes  18  Dec.  1901  Pic  1/2, 
301. payments  does  not  indicate  any  noticeable  expansion  on  this 
. 
account  I 
although  between  1902  and  1906  Pickfords  openod  a  number 
of  new  agencies  in  the  area,  including  ones  at  ReigategRedhill, 
Staines,  Epsom  and  Worthing. 
The  cartage  of  passengers?  advance-luggaee  to  Victoria  and 
other  London  stations  was  a  new  outlet. 
77 
Pickfords  received 
commission  on  this  businessp  as  indeed  it  did  on  the  sale  of 
tickets  for  railway  and  steamship  companies,  a  quite  new 
departure  for  Pickfords 
P 
which  was  built  up  with  considerable 
vigour, 
78 
Agreements  were  made  with  the  major  shipping  companies 
and  with  both  overseas  and  domestic  railway  companies,  From 
this  position  it  was  a  small  step  to  a  direct  interest  in 
holiday  travel.  By  the  beginning  of  1908  the  development  of 
pickfords'  tourist  interests  was  an  important  object  of  policy. 
79 
Indeed  by  then  Pickfords  already  had  several  ventures  to  its 
credit,  including  tours  to  Norway 
I 
Hungary  and  the  lands  of  the 
Nile  river. 
80 
One  Particularly  intriguing  project  was  that  of 
voyages  by  balloon  at  a  charge  of  C25  for  four  persons  -  and  at 
the  customerts  entire  risk. 
81 
From  such  beginnings  Pickfords 
travel  department,  now  Pickfords  Travel  Limited, 
q  emerged. 
Finally  Pickfords  initiated  the  sale  of  poster  space  on  its 
delivery  vansv  a  lead  which  other  firms  quickly  followed, 
82 
All  of  these  points  have  their  interest  but  the  main 
consideration  lies  in  whether  they  contributed  additional  revenue. 
The  sale  of  advertising  space  was  certainly  successful.  Net 
income  rose  from  about  C2,000  per  annum  in  1907  to  949250  ýn 
1911,  and  was  a  considerable  value.  It  is  difficult'to  assess 
77  Ibid,  14  Jan.  25  Feb.  9  18  March  1903  Pic  1/3;  26  Aug  1903 
Pic  1/4. 
78  Especially  1904-1905 
79  Minutes  Directors'  committee,  22  June  1908  Pic  1/14. 
80  Board  Minutes,  21  March,  27  June,  29  Sept.  1906  Pic  1/7*9 
79  14  Nov.  1906  Pic  1/8;  Minutes  Directors'  committee  5  Junc 
1907  Pic  1/13;  5  Feb  1908  Pic  1/14;  -The  Times,  30  May  1907 
81  Minutes  Directors  committee  29  May  1907  Pic  1/13. 
82  Ibid  11  March  1908  Pic  1/14. 
302.. 
- the  contribution  of  the  ticket  and  tourist  side  in  the  absence 
of  proper  figures.  Pickfords'  stock  of  tickets  had  to  be 
guaranteed  by  its  deposit  with  the  various  companies  of 
Investment  security  to  the  value  of  the  stock  held.  It  is 
Indicativethat  the  premises  at  37  Sloane  Streetq  which  Pickfords 
took  especially  for  its,  ticket  sales,  were  abandoned  after  a 
few  years.  Running  expenses  were  found  to  be  heavyp  and 
83 
generally  in  excess  of  earnings. 
Pickfords'  interests  in  tourism  and  travel  were  developments 
whose  main  significance  still  lay  in  the  future.  Among 
innovations  of  immediate  consequencev  the  introduction  of  motor 
transport  was  of  primary  importance.  The  potential  contribution 
of  steam  power  to  road  transport  was  held  back  for  most  of  the 
nineteenth  century  by  the  repressive  attitude  displayed  in  the 
1820s  and  1830s. 
84 
By  the  later  years  of  the  centuryq  however, 
number  of  firmsq  like  Burrells  and  Taskerv  specialised  in  the 
manufactuieof  'road  locomotives.  '  Technical  advance  was  not 
absent*  F.  J.  Burrell  patented  a  system  of  spring  mountings  which 
allowed  the  wheels  to  rise  and  fall  with  the  contours  of  the  road 
surface  without  the  boiler  rolling  at  all. 
85 
In  general  however, 
the  commerc  ial  application  of  motors  to  road  haulage  was 
impossible  until  the  existing  legal  constraints  were  removed, 
Things  began  to  change  with  the  Locomotives  and  Highways 
Acts  of  1.896.86  The  raising  of  the  speed  limit  for  light 
locomotives  from  4  to  12  mph  provided  the  conditions  within  which 
the  private  motor  industry  could  develop.  The  Daimler  and 
83  Ibid 
, 
19  Feb  1908  Pic  1/14. 
84  W.  T.  Jackman  Transportation  in  modern  England  PP  328-335 
85  World's  Carriers,  Vol.  2  (1906)  P  90;  also  C.  Singer  et  al  ý-eds)  A  history-of  technology  Vol.  V  (Oxford  1958)  pp  425-6. 
86  C.  I.  Savagep  An  economic  history  of  transport  (1959)  P  93  ff; 
Dyos  and  Aldcroft,  British  transport  chap.  12. 
1 
303. Lanchester  companies  both  began  production  in  Britain  in  that 
year  and  speculative  finance  was  also  attracted. 
87 
The  private 
motor  industry  was  given  a  secure  basis  by  the  Motor  Car  Act  of 
1903  which  recognised  the  'motor  car'  as  being  distinct  from  the 
slight  locomotivelq  raised  its  speed  limit  to  20  mph  and 
established  the  conditions  for  its  general  use.  The  application 
of  motors  for  commercial  purposes  was,  however,  still  difficult. 
A  flight  locomotives  was  defined  as  having  a  tare  or  unladen 
weight  of  less  than  three  tons,  which  proved  to  be  too  low  a 
limit  within  which  a  reliable  vehicle  could  be  produced.  The 
practice  of  putting  a  van  body  on  a  motor  car  chassis  proved 
highly  unsatisfactory. 
88 
Not  until  the  Heavy  Motor  Car  Order, 
1904  which  raised  the  tare  limit  to  five  tons,  did  the  commercial 
jj3otor  industryq  with  purpose  built  vehicles  begin  to  emerge. 
In  Decemberv  1902  Pickfords'  directors  discussed  the 
possibility  of  using  steam  traction  over  long  distances,  say 
between  London  and  Birmingham.  Estimates  were  made,  in  consult- 
ation  with  Thorneycrofts,  of  costs  per  ton  mile  and  the  likely 
availability  of  traffic,  but  it  was  eventually  decided  that  the 
existing  speed  limit  rendered  any  such  scheme  impracticable. 
89 
The  following  Septembert  however,  two  light  traction  engines  were 
ordered  from  Wallis  &  Stevens  of  basingstoke,  followed  by  an 
order  for  twenty  more  two  months  later. 
90 
These  vehiclesq 
capable  of  hauling  a  trailer  with  a  five  to  eight  ton  loadwere 
as  aled-down  version  of  the  bigger  model,  specially  devel.  oped 
by  Wallis  &  Stevens  to  meet  the  specifications  for  'light 
87  S.  B.  Saul  'The  motor  industry  in  Britain  to  19141,  Business 
History,  Vol.  5  (1962-3)  p  22;  also  E.  L.  Cornwell  Commorcia'l 
Vehicles,  (N.  D.  ?  1963) 
88  Commercial  Motor  Vol.  1  (1905)  P  306 
89  Board  Minutes,  3,109  17  Dec.  1902  Pic  1/3. 
90  Board  Minutes,  2  Sept,  11  Nov.,  1903  Pic  1/4 
304. locomotives.  '  From  this  first  purchase  Pickfords  steadily 
extended  its  use  of  motors.  Steam  lorries  were  soon  preferred 
to  traction  enginesp  largely  because  they  could  carry  a  load  on 
their  platform  as  well  as  haul  a  trailer,  but  petrol  vehicles 
, were  initially  regarded  with  some  distrust,  in  part  because  of 
high  fire  risk* 
91 
By  1906  motor  transport  was  firmly  established  with  Pickfords. 
The  directors  decided  that  year  to  form  a  small  limited  company 
with  the  registered  business  name  'The  Motor  Cartage  and  Carrying 
92 
Company'.  in  order  to  provide  for  anticipated  future  trade. 
A  more  decisive  step  came  in  1908  when  Pickfords  bought  up  a  firm 
which  had  gone  into  liquidation,  'The  Motor  Delivery  Companyt, 
presumably  one  of  the  many  short-lived  concerns  which  tried  to 
find  a  place  in  the  contract  hire  business. 
93 
Pickfords 
retained  it  as  a  separate  contract  company  but  two  years  later 
all  Pickfords'  motor  business,  including  that  of  the  subsidiary 
company  I  was  merged  into  a  single  moto.  r  department. 
94 
At  the 
same  time  a  garage  was  opened  at  Hackford  Road,  Brixton,  for 
servicing  the  motor  fleet. 
95 
1910  was  thus  a  decisive  year 
in  Pickfords'  adoption  of  motors,  as  it  was  for  the  adoption 
of  commercial  goods  vehicles  in  general. 
91  Commercial  Motor  Vol.  1  (1905)  supplement  to  issue  number  1, 
p  10. 
92  Board  Minutesp  25  April,  2.16  May  1906  Pic  1/7. 
93  Minutes  Directors'  committee,  29  July  1908  Pic  1/14; 
Commercial  Motor  Vol.  8  (l  8-9)  p  log. 
94  Minutes  Directors'  committee  31  Aug.  1910  Pic  1/16;  Comniorcial 
Motorg  Vol.  12  (1910-1911)  P  56,  p  94. 
95  Minutes  Directors'  committee,  22  June,  l9lo  Pic  1116; 
The  Driving  MirroE,  Winter  1946/7,  p  4. 
305. Table  11-3.  Goods  Vehicles  in  use  1204-to  1914 
Vehicles  in  use 
Marcli  1904  4,000 
1905  99000 
igo6  120000 
1907  14,  ooo 
1908  18,000 
1909  22,000 
1910  309000 
1911  4o,,  ooo 
1912  52,6oo 
1913  639000 
1914  829000 
Increase 
5tOOO 
3,000 
2tOOO 
4,  ooo 
49000 
81000 
100000 
12,6oo 
11,000 
18,4oo 
Source:  British  Road  Federation 
Basic  Road  Statistics  1969  (1969)  P  3. 
No  historical  study  has  yet  been  made  of  the  commercial 
motor  industry,  so  a  discussion  of  Pickfords'  adoption  of  motor 
transport  has  to  proceed  without  the  benefit  of  comparative 
experience. 
96 
However  some  comment  can  be  made  on  the  basis  of 
Pickfords'  recordso  on  the  state  of  the 
The  general  impression  conveyed  is  very 
in  its  primitive  and  uncertain  stages. 
order  to  Wallis  &  Stevens  for  twenty  smý 
accompanied  by  the  provision,  agreed  by 
industry  in  these  years. 
much  that  of  an  industry 
For  example  Pickfords' 
all  traction  engines  was 
the  manufacturers,  that 
similar  vehicles  would  not  be  supplied  to  anY  of  Pickfords' 
competitors  for  eighteen  months. 
97 
The  size  of  the  order  was 
doubtless  a  chief  reason  why  Wallis  &  Stevens  was  willing  to 
accept  such  a  condition.  Since  the  total  output  of  all  manufact- 
urers  of  steam  vehicles  was  only  twenty-five  per  week  in  1907,98 
such  an  order  four  years  previously  probably  represented  several 
months  work  to  a  single  firm.  In  addition  this  was  an  unduly 
large  order  for  Pickfords  to  place;  purchases  were  usually  made 
96  General  comments  on  the  industry  are  based  on  a  limited 
reading  of  some  of  the  motor  Journals,  especially  Commercial 
Motor  and  World's  Carriers 
97  Board  Minutes,  11  Nov.  1902  Pic  1/3. 
98  Commercial  Motor,  Vol.  5  (1907)  p  455 
3o6. in  lots  of  half  a  dozen  or  less,  Since  orders  were  placed  with 
several  firmsy  Pickfords  were  presumably  obliged  to  carry  a 
large  stock  of  spare  parts,  Although  uneconomic  in  an  accounting 
senser  operational  experience  of  competing  versions  of  a  now  and 
still  developing  technology  no  doubt  had  its  value.  The 
acceptance  by  a  manufacturer  of  obsolete  vehicles  in  part  exchanae 
was  one  factor  taken  account  of  when  now  orders  were  being  placed. 
99 
Not  that  Pickfords  necessarily  sought  the  cheapest  money  cost. 
previous  good  experience 
0 
for  example,  clInched  a  new  order  for 
Hindleys  even  though  that  firmts  quotation  was  the  second  most 
expensive  of  six  and  exceeded  the  cheapest  by  almost  E90  per 
vehicleo 
100 
Although  vehicles  were  fairly  soon  built  in  a  standard  range 
of  tare-weightsq  a  completely  standard  product  built  for  and 
sold  from  stock  did  not  appear  for  sorqe  time.  Market  conditions 
do  not  seem  to  have  supporýed  such  a  position  much  before  about 
1910.  Not  all  firms  made  purchases  in  such  small  lots  as 
pickfords  but  it  is  likely  that  for  some  years  at  least  the 
procurement  of  a  steady  flow  of  orders.  was  one  of  the  manufacturers' 
main  tasks.  As  the  manufacturer  probably  held  the  weaker  position 
in  the  producer-customer  relationshipp  the  end  product  was  likely 
to  incorporate  a  certain  degree  of  individual  customer  preference. 
The  manufacturer's  role  did  not  end  with  the  completion  of  a  sale. 
Apart  from  the  provision  of  finance  in  the  form 
* 
of  hire-purchase 
agreementso 
101 
manufacturers  offered  customers  post-sales  services 
in  the  form  of  traini  ng  facilities  for  their  drivers 
102 
or 
99  Minutes  Directors'  committee  8  April,  6  Nov.  1908  Pic  1/14; 
13  July  1910  Pic  1/16. 
100  Ibid  23  Octp  1907  Pic  1/13 
101  Commercial  Motor  Vol.,  6  (1;  07-8)  P  398. 
102  Ibid  Vol  4-F1906-7)  p  29. 
307. contracts  of  three  to  five  years  to  maintain  the  purchased  vehicle 
in  running  or  er. 
103 
A  simple  model  of  the  innovation  of  a  new  mode  of  transport- 
ationt  proposes  a  limited  initial  lreakthrough  in  defined  areast 
by  virtue  of  superior  operating  costs,  followed  by  a  period  of 
, general  diffusion  as  its  competitive  power  against  existing  modes 
steadily  increases.  104  Finally,  the  cost  reduction  of  the  new 
modeq  after  further  technical  advance,  business  convenience  and 
possibly  the  superior  power  of  a  new  interest  group  all  combined 
to  promote  its  adoption  for  the  majority  of  purposes  and  the 
reduction  of  its  predecessor  to  the  role  of  ancilliary.  The 
phasing  of  Pickfords'  adoption  of  motors  broadly  fits  this 
formulationg  although  less  neatly  than  in  the  case  of  the 
transition  from  canal  to  rail  transport.  The  advance  of  motors 
was  less  strikingly  decisive  than  that  of  railways.  For  the 
large  volume  of  traffic  incorporated  in  town  delivery  work,  horse 
transport  reigned  supreme  for  many  years  to  come.  Although 
motor  transport  soon  attracted  its  own  interest  group,  its 
adoption  was  determined  chiefly  by  proved  technical  capacity. 
Motor  transport  had  to  make  its  way  in  the  face  of  a  g.  ood  deal  of 
oppositiont  especially  from  local  authorities.  Threatened  or 
actual  prosecutions  for  damage  to  roads  and  bridges,  or  creation 
105 
of  smoke  nuisances  were  some  of  the  early  hazards  to  be  overcome. 
As  late  as  1911  Pickfords  were  threatened  with  a  perpetual 
injunction  by  the  town  clerk  of  Kensington  because  of  the  annoyancc 
103  Minutes  Directors'  committee  15  July  19089  Pic  1/14; 
Commercial  Motor.  L  Vol.  6  T-1907-8)  p  258 
104  As  posed  by  L.  Girard  in  M.  M.  Postan  and  C-Wilson  (eds) 
Cambridge  economic  history  of  Europe  Vol.  VI  (OX.  P.  1965) 
pt.  1  pp  212-214,  and  systematised  by  S.  G.  Checkland  'The 
economic  evaluation  of  the  modern  world:  a  review  article' 
Business  History_Reviewv  Vol.  XL  (1966)  PP  355-68. 
105  Board  Minutes  19  April  1905  noted  the  fifth  summons  for 
smoke  nuisance;  10  May  1905  Pic  l/  6;  Minutes  Directors' 
committea  6,13  Jan,  1909  Pic  1/14. 
308o and  damage  caused  by  heavy  traction  engines  passing  through  the 
borough.  Similar  action  had  been  taken  successfully  against  two 
other  firms.  Pickfords  chose  the  path  of  compromise  and  diverted 
the  offending  vehicles. 
106 
For  motors  to  be  of  practical  value  to  Pickfords  they  had  to 
be  able  to  work  more  cheaply  and  at  least  as  efficiently  as 
horses-  A  motor  vehicle  could  cover  a  much  greater  mileage 
than  a  horse  and  could  convey  larger  loads.  Because  of  its 
higher  work  rate  the  motor  had  a  higher  earnings  rate.  But  both 
its  capital  cost  and  working  costs  were  considerably  higher.  So 
for  a  motor  vehicle  to  be  used  profitably  it  had  to  be  employed 
to  its  full  potential.  Only  where  the  work  of  several  horses 
could  be  transferred  could  the  necessary  volume  and  regularity  of 
-work  be  made  available  to  secure  the  maximum  exPloitation  of  the 
vehicle's  potential,  In  Pickfords  case  some  contract  cartage 
work  met  these  conditionsl07  but  for  general  purposes  the  main 
scope  for  their  use  was  found  in  depot  transfer  work.  Parcels 
were  dispatched  in  bulk  between  the  depots  at  regular  intervals 
during  the  dayl  and  then  were  sorted  for  subsequent  delivery. 
Since  a  motor  could  do  two  round  trips  a  day,  two  teams  of  horses, 
six  or  seven  in  all,  could  be  taken  off.  By  the  end  of  1904 
motors  were  being  used  between  City  Basin,  Pickfor'ds'  central 
parcels  depotp  and  Brentfordo  Pulliam  and  Kingston-upon-Thames. 
After  the  initial  teething  troubles  of  breakdowns  and  delayed 
schedules  had  been  overcome,  motors  were  brought  into  General  use 
for  this  sort  of  work. 
108 
106  Ibid,  18t  25  Oct. 
107  Board  Minutes,  28 
Pic  1/7- 
108  Board  Minutes  17 
ý-1904-5)  pp  8-12; 
to  issue  number  1 
1  Nov.  1911  Pic  1116. 
Oct.  1903  Pic  1/4;  Ibid  21  Febq  1906 
uc,  1904  Pic  115;  World's  Carriers  Vol.  1 
Commercial  Motor  Vol.  1(1905)  supplement 
P  10. 
309. Individually  motors  could  handle  more  traffic  than  horses 
but  the  basic  issue  was  whetherv  over  a  comparable  volume  of 
traffic,  the  motor  vehicle  could  show  a  significantly  higher 
margin  of  profit  "per  unit  of  traffic  conveyed.  It  is  unlikely 
that  charges  could  be  increased  on  the  strength  of  a  speedier 
service.  Indeed  the  force  of  competition  exerted  a  persistent 
downward  pressure  on  rates:  no  single  firm  was  ina  position 
to  influence  the  market  except  in  a  downward  direction  by 
log 
initiating  a  round  of  price-cutting.  A  speedy  motor  service 
was  a  promotinnal  advantage  but  within  the  existing  rates  structure. 
thus  average  revenue  per  unit  of  traffic  was  probably  declining 
and  could  be  off-set  only  by  increasing  total  volume.  Sop  whether 
to  meet  competition  or  to  maintain  profit  margins,  it  was  on  the 
side  of  costs  that  efforts  had  to  be  concentrated.  Evidently 
depot  transfer  work  provided  the  sort  of  conditions  where  the 
motor  vehicle's  cost  effectiveness  could  be  exploited.  A 
quantitative  assessment  of  the  margin  of  the  motor  vehicle's 
economic  advantage  over  horses  in  this  work  generally  is 
impossible  since  the  necessary  figures  do  not  exist.  The  only 
comparative  cost  figures  which  do  exist  are  for  July,  1908,110 
some  time  after  the  transitional  phase,  and  probably  refer  to  one 
service  only.  The  figures  are 
Horses  -  L2.15.8ýd  per  day 
Petrol  motor  -  Z2.11.11d  per  day 
Steam  motor  -  C2.0.51d  per  day  V 
The  important  figures  are  those  for  horses  and  steam  motors  since 
109  Board  Minutes,  22-June-1904  Pic-1/5  dispute  with  Sutton5; 
Minutes  Directors'  committee,  March-April  1908,  dispute 
with  Globe  Parcels  Express  Pic  1/14;  Ibid  Oct.  19080  Carter 
Paterson  and  Beans  Express  undercutting  Pickfords;  Ibid 
6  Jan.  1909  dispute  with  London  Parcels  Delivery  Company. 
110  Between  Edmonton  and  City  Basing  Ibid  24  June,  1  July  1908 
Pic  1/14. 
310. Pickfords  did  not  use  petrol  vehicles  for  this  purpose.  On 
the  basis  of  these  figures  steam  motors,  over  a  six  day  working 
week,  carried  a  saving  at  a  rate  of  L270  per  annum.  Once 
introduced  there  was  never  any  suggestion  of  reverting  to  horses 
so  perhaps  these  figures  indicate  the  general  trend., 
Motors  do  riot  seem  to  have  enjoyed  a  comparable  economic 
advantage  over  Tiorses  in  town  delivery  work,  the  other  major  area 
of  their  potential  innovation.  The  above  figures  indicate  that 
even  in  the  favourable  conditions  of  transfer  work  petrol  vehicles, 
the  type  used  for  town  deliveries,  showed  a  relatively  small 
., 
e  over  horses.  comparative  advantag  Since  town  delivery  work  was 
characterised  by  fluctuating  tonnages  and  periods  of  slack,  under- 
utilisation  of  capacity  was  likely  to  erode  this  small  margin. 
in  addition  delivery  rounds  were  designed  to  meet  the  working 
limits  of--.  a  horse  so  that  only  where  several  existing  rounds 
could  be  combined  could  the  necessary  displacement  ratio  be 
achieved  to  allow  the  deployment  of  a  motor.  Even  where  tech- 
nically  these  conditions  were  metv  motors  could  not  always  perform 
the  work  as  efficiently  or  cheaply  as  the  horses  they  displaced. 
For  examplet  in  1907,  Pickfords  experimented  with  a  petrol  motor 
in  Brighton  to  cater  for  holiday  luggage  traffic  but  its  running 
costs  for  the  first  six  months  worked  out  nt  twice  the  level 
of  earnings  it  brought  in.  It  probably  never  made  very  much 
profit  the  whole  time  it  was  there.  When  eventually  horses  were 
restored  -  and  for  prestige  purposes  this  was  delayed  for  some 
timeq  despite  the  loss,  because  Carter  Paterson  was  making  a 
similarg  unsuccessful  experiment  -  costs  were  so  reduced  that 
despite  a  drop  in  the  volume  of  traffic  a  higher  rate  of  profit 
was  achieved. 
ill 
In  the  London  suburban  area,  where  the  bulk  of 
JLlj  Minutes  Directors'  committee  31  July,  14  Aug..  1907  Pic  1/13; 
1-8  Dec.  1907  Pic  1/14;  139  20t  27  July  1910,19  July  1911 
Pic  1/16. 
311. town  delivery  work  was  centredp  Pickfords  made  some  use  of  petrol, 
-vehicles,  chiefly  in  the  outer  areas.  The  distance  of  a  delivery 
round  from  the  depot  and  the  area  to  be  covered  were  probably 
the  features  which  led  to  the  consideration  of  motors.  A  note 
in  May  1912  showed  that  of  five  districts  in  which  motors  were 
being'tried,  the  smallest  was  21  square  miles  in  area  and  the 
largest  91  square  miles.  The  rounds  worked  by  horses  selected 
for  comparison  were  each  less  than  one  square  mile  in  area. 
112 
The  latter  are  likely  to  have  been  more  typical  of  Pickfords' 
delivery  districts  for  which  horses  continued  in  general  use. 
It  is  possible  to  analyse  in  a  little  detail  Pickfords' 
innovation  of  petrol  motors  in  two  districts,  at  least  in  the 
form  in  which  Pickfords  assessed  the  difference  in  working. 
113 
In  February  1912  Pickfords  introduced  a  motor,  worked  from  Poplarp 
in  the  Woolwich  and  Plumstead  districts  and  two  months  later 
another  motorý  worked  from  Walthamst0wo  to  cover  the  Loughton, 
Woodford  and  Chigwell  districts.  Over  the  next  nine  months  a 
weekly  report  was  made  of  the  number  of  parcels  handled  each  dayt 
the  cost  per  package  and  the  comparative  figures  for  the  proceeding 
yeare  It  is  difficultp  for  reasons  explained  below,  to  determine 
the  value  of  these  figures  but  since  they  were  clearly  intended 
to  provide  a  meaningful  comparison  between  the  new  and  old  system 
of  working  it  seems  legitimate  to  make  use  of  them. 
It  is  worth  notingp  as  a  preliminary,  that  although  tho  work 
of  seven  horses  was  taken  over  in  both  cases,  in  the  Walthamstow 
area  it  proved  impossible  to  work  the  whole  district  with  a  single 
motor.  Within  a  fortnight  a  horse  van  was  put  back  on  to  cover 
112  Ibid  29  May  1912  Pic  1/17. 
113  The  following  is  based  on  data  recorded  in  Minutes  Directors, 
cominittee  3  April  1912  -  22  Jan  1913  Pic  1/17- 
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Chigwell  and  the  motor  did  the  rest  .  There  was  no  such 
problem  with  the  other  motor.  'I  The  substantive  point,  howovert 
is  bow  far  the  introduction  of  motors  reduced  costs.  From  the 
data  contained  in  the  weekly  reports,  the  curve  of  average  cost 
per  parcel  has  been  drawn  for  both  districts  and  for  both  systems 
of  working.  (See  the  accompanying  graphs).  In  Woolwicb  and 
plumstead  the  substitution  of  motor  for  horses  resulted  in  a 
modera  to  reduction  of  costs  but  without  any  significant  increase 
in'the  volume  of  traffic  handled.  In  the  Walthamstow  caseq 
howevert,  although,  the  average  number  of  parcels  conveyed  rose 
significantly)the  average  cost  per  parcel  of  motor  with  horse  was 
higher  than  for  horses  alone. 
However  it  is  difficult  to  attach  more  than  a  superficial 
meaning,  to  these  resultso  since  further  analysis  suggests  that  the 
recorded  unit  cost  figures  are  artificial.  Firsto  tabulation 
of  the  data  shows  an  unlikely  fineness  of  gradation.  Secondly 
calculation  Of  total  cost,  from  cost  per  unit  times  quantity, 
produceý  virtually  the  same  result  except  at  the  very  lowest 
volume.  In  other  words  total  cost  is  held  constant  over  several 
months  and  irrespective  of  the  volume  of  traffic.  This  seems 
rather  unlikely.  It  is  not  known  how  the  figures  were 
calculated  or  what  elements  they  compri'se  but  they  appear  to  be 
a  form  of  internal  accounting,  a  fixed  charge  taken  as  a  working 
basis.  Averaged  over  the  daily  volume  'of  traffic  this  would 
show  fluctuations  in  the  rate  of  profit  on  the  calculated  cost; 
it  would  not  necessarily  show  either  true  profit  or  true  cost. 
The  conclusiong  therefore,  is  disappointingly  negativOg  but  has 
l14.  Ibid  39  109  17  April  1912  Pic  1/17. 
313. some  value  in  illustrating  the  method  of  comparison  Pickfords 
actually  used. 
The  main  consideration  bore  is  the  replacement  of  horses 
by  motorsp  butp  at  a  time  when  the  claims  of  steam-powered 
vehicles  are  being  raised  againp  it  is  worth  noting  the  rivalry 
between  steam  and  petrol. 
115  Steam  had  much  in  its  favourt 
especially  in  the  form  of  the  steam  lorry.  It  was  cheaper  to 
buy  and  run,  easier  to  drive  and  maintain.  Engineers  drew  on 
their  stock  of  skilled  knowledge  of  steam  power  and  quickly 
produced  a  simple,  reliable  and  technologically  mature  road 
-vehicle.  The  petrol  vehicle  was  more  expensive  and  did  not 
reach  technical  maturity  until  much  later,  as  Pickfords'  ample 
experience  of  mechani6al  failures,  especially  of  the  brakes  and 
gearingp  illustrates  only  too  well.  But  it  did  have  the 
advantage  of  speed  and  on  this  factor  was  develpped  a  certain 
specialisation  of  function  between  the  two  forms  of  motors  - 
or  as  Pickfords  advertised  'Petrol  for  speed:  steam  for  heavy 
I 
haulage.  1116  Only  in  exceptional  circumstances,  could  petrol 
compete  with  steam  for  heavy  loads,  as  for  example  the  5  ton 
Commer  lorry  that  Pickfords  used  in  Sheffield  because  of  its 
superior  ability  to  cope  with  the  hills. 
117  The  speed  advantage 
of  petrol  vehicles  was  reduced  when  rubber  tyres  were  fitted  to 
steam  lorries  tbereby  lowering,  in  terms  of  loading  weights,  the 
competitive  threshold  between  the  two.  The  balance  was  given  a 
further  tilt  towards  steam  when  tax  on  petrol  was  discovered  to  be 
a  fruitful  form  of  revenue,  In  1911  one  of  the  leading  motor 
11.5  Minutes-Directors'  committee,  8.15  May  1913  Pic  1/17; 
Commercial  Motor  passim. 
116  Minutes  Directors,  committee,  25  Oct.  1911  Pic  1116. 
117  Commercial  Motoj:,  Vol.  10  (1909-10)  p  121. 
314. journals,  The  Commercial  Motor,  t  ran  a  long  series  of  articles 
showing  how  even  at  the  31  ton  level  the  rubber-tyred  steamer 
could  hold  itSagainst  petrol  vehicles.  Twelve  months  later  the 
1% 
exercise  was  to  show  how,  despite  increased  fuel  pricesq  petrol 
could  still  compete  with  steam. 
Pickfords  found  scope  for  both  steam  and  petrol  vehicles. 
It  did  not  follow  Carter  Paterson's  action  in  1911  of  switching 
over  to  petrol  entirelyq  even  for  depot  transfer  work. 
118 
Pickfords  continued  to  believe  that  "with  regard  to  motors  for 
depot  services  at  present  there  is  apparently  no  useful  alter- 
119 
native  to  steam.  "  Carter  Paterson's  decision  was  no  doubt 
prompted  by  the  commencement  in  that  year  of  a  new  service  to  tile 
outer  London  suburbs  like  Watfordq  Romfordt  Woking  and  Staines, 
the  beginning  of  that  firmls'Home  Counties  Express" 
120 
Pickfords 
followed  some  time  later  with  its  own  version  of  what  was 
essentially  the  same'service,  but  less  well  named,  the  'Outer 
Area  Service.  1121  Here  petrol  vehicles  made  a  unique  contribution 
to  road  transport  for  their  speed  was  an  essential  precondition 
to  covering  such  relatively  long  distances.  By  then  Pickfords 
was  increasingly  looking  to  petrol  vehicles  for  its  future 
services.  In  May  1912  tenders  were  received  from  six  firms  for 
the  supply  of  a  hundred  such  vehicles  1 
122 
but  even  at  the  end  of 
that  year  more  than  fifty  per  cent  of  a  considerably  expanded  motor 
fleet  were  steam,  vehicles, 
123 
One  effect  of  the  introduction  of  motors  was  to  increase 
the  existing  competition  between  the  leading  London  carriers. 
118  Minutes  Directors'  committee  3  May  1911  Pic  1/16. 
119  Ibid  27  March  1912  Pic  1/17. 
120  Board  Minutes,  15  Feb..  1911;  Directorst  report  to  AGM 
7  sept  -  1911  'CP  1/2'.,,  -  e 
121  Begun  1  Feb.  1'  912  Minutes  Directorst  Committee  24  Jan., 
7  Feb  1912  Pic  1/17. 
122  Ibid  27  March,  8  May  1912 
123  Ibidq  15  Nov.  1911  Pic  1/17.  -  39  motors  (a  net  increase  of 
9  since  the  end  of  1907)(of  which  26  were  steam  vehicles; 
World's  Carriers  Vol.  9  1912-1913)  P7-  62  motors  of  which 
Wt  least  32  were  steam  vehicles,, 
315. Motors  implied  speedier  services,  a  useful  advertising  feature 
with  which  to  appeal  to  the  public  for  their  custom.  In  19o6 
Pickfords  and  Carter  Paterson  were  seen  to  be  "running  a  neck 
and  neck  race  ...  for,  while  we  see  the  Express  Motor  delivery  vans 
of  the  one  company  running  in  all  directions,  we  see  displayed  on 
every  van  belonging  to  the  other  company  particulars  of  the  large 
124 
number  of  motors  they  are  now  using.  "  That  same  year  the 
directors  of  Carter  Paterson  drew  their  shareholders  attention, 
for  the  second  successive  yeart  to  the  depressive  effect  on 
average  revenue  and  carriages  rates  of  the  keen  competition  being 
experienced.  Earlier  in  the  year  they  had  taken  the  step  of 
registering  two  small  subsidiary  companies,  'The  London  & 
Provincial  Motor  Despatch  Company  Ltd.  1  and  'The  London  Motor 
Parcel  Express  Ltd.  '  in  the  hope  of  checking,  if  possible,  "the 
enterprising  spirit  displayed  by  the  promotion  of  Motor  traction 
in  the  early  Part  of  the  year"* 
125 
Pickfords  was  always  alert  to  the  activities  of  its 
competit6rs,  those  of  Carter  Paterson  in  Particular.  The  apening 
of  a  new  agencyg  signs  of  superior  results  for  similar  trafficq 
the  introduction  of'6  new  service,  all  such  were  carefully  noted 
and  their  implications  for  Pickfords  assessed.  Indeed  the  whole 
range  of  business  was  sharply  contested  but  none  more  so  than 
the  collection  and  delivery  of  parcels.  Some  parcels  were  brought 
to  Pickfords  depots  and  receiving  offices  but  the  major  part 
were  collected  by  the  carmen  on  their  daily  rounds,  Wholesale 
and  retail  houses  received.  routine  calls,  shops  and  householders 
when  a  1w:  1ndow  card'  , was  displayed.  A  'window  card'  was  a  notice 
124  World's  Carriers,,  Vol,  2  (1905-6)  p  149. 
12.5  Divectors'  repoEts  to  AGM  15  Aug.  1906  CP  1/2. 
316. in  the  name  of  Pickfordst  Carter  Paterson  or  any  of  the  othor 
firms,  which  was  placed  in  a  window  to  advise  the  passing  carmon 
that  there  was  a  parcel  to  be  collected.  Since  several-firms 
covered  the  same  district  carmen  were  tempted  to  poach  traffic 
by  answering  anotherts  card.  Rivalry  between  tho  carmen  was 
tke. 
keen,  since  bonuses  were  offered  according  to 
A  volume  of  traffic 
brought  ing  and  such  episodes  at  times  resulted  in  roadside 
scuffles  and  even  serious  physical  injury,  One  of  Pickfords' 
men  lost  the  sight  of  o'neeye  in  this  way. 
126 
The  competition  for  traffic  also  involved  strains  of 
another  kind  for  the  carmen.  For  both  collection  and  delivery 
services  the  variOU5  firms  competed  to  got  their  vans  onto  the 
round  first  each  morning  in  order  to  secure  the  best  of  the 
traffic.  Pickfords  watched  Carter  Paterson  very  closely  in 
this  respect.  The  timing  of  Carter  Patersonts  vans  was  carefully 
noted  and  efforts  made  to  ensure  that  Pickfords'  own  vans  reached 
their  rounds  just  a  few  minutes  earlier.  In  January  1906  the 
addition  of  a  motor  van  for  depot  work  Cave  Pickfords  an  edge 
over  other  firms  in  the  Acton  district.  Pickfords  started 
deliveries  at  8.30  a.  m.  9  Carter  Paterson  at  8.40  and  the  London 
Parcels  Delivery  Company  at  9.20.127  Similar  pressure  to 
stretch  the  working  day  existed  in  the  evenings  also  since  there 
was  traffic  to  be  picked  up  by  the  firm  offering  the  latest 
collection.  The  inevitable  result  for  the  carmen  was  a  very 
long  working  day.  At  the  turn  of  the  century  a  fifteen  or 
sixteen  hour  working  day  was  not  uncommon,  and  conditions  are 
not  likely  to  have  improved  in  subsequent  years. 
126  Minutes  Directors'  committee  12  Aug.  1908  Pic  1/14. 
127  Board  Minutes,  31  January  1506  Pic  1/7. 
317. A  state  Of  'cat  and  mouse  equilibrium' 
128 
would  seem  an  apt 
summary  of  the  conditions  existing  in  the  London  parcels  trade 
at  the  time.  Vigorous  competition  with  moderate  profit-taking 
is  generally  regarded  as  being  'healthy'  for  the  public  but 
excessive  competition  as  'unhealthy'  since  it  is  always  likely  to 
result  in  some  arrangement  between  the  interested  parties  to 
reduce  the  damage  being  caused,  Efforts  of  this  kind  were  made.  ' 
In  May  1905  Pickfords  was  in  touch  with  the  directors  of  Globe 
Parcels  Express  about  the  possibility  of  a  working  arrangement 
but  apparently  nothing  came  of  it. 
129 
By  the  beginning  of 
1907  the  force  of  competition  was  clearly  being  felt  more  keenly 
as  Pickfords  took  steps  to  fif;  ht  off  Beans  Express  and  Carter 
Paterson  at  various  places. 
130 
In  addition  trade  began  to 
weaken  later  in  the  year.  Again  the  possibility  of  a  working 
arrangement  arose  and  this  time  agreement  was  reached  between 
PickPords,  Carter  Paterson  and  Bean  Express,  "for  the  improvement 
of  the  service  to  the  public,  economy  in  administration  and  their 
mutual  convenience.  " 
131 
The  scheme  originally  promoted  envisaged 
the  pooling  of  future  profits  on  an  agreed  basis132  but  the 
final  scheme  was  much  looser,  designed  primarily  to  prevent  price- 
cutting  and  thus  further  erosion  of  profit  margins. 
The  provisions  of  the  agreement  were  administered  by  a 
councilq  composed  of  one  member  from  each  board,  whose  unanimous 
decisions  were  binding  on  each  party.  An  agreed  schedule  of 
rates  was  drawn  up  which  no  Party  was  to  underquote.  The  council 
128  E.  A.  G.  Robinson  Monopoly  (C.  U.  p.  1941)  p  27. 
129  Board  Minutes,  31  May  1905  Pic  1/6. 
130  bbidq  61  13  Feb-1907  Pic  1/8;  Minutes  Directors,  committee 
12  June  1907  Pic  1/13. 
131  Working  agreement  dated  24  Oct-1907  CP  2/19;  see  Minutes 
Directors'  committee,  16  Oct-1907  Pic  1/13;  Board  Minutes. 
30  Oct  -  1907  Pic  1/8.  -'- 
132  Carter  Paterson  Board  Minutes  18  JulYp  7  Nov.  1907  CP  1/2. 
318. had  the  power  to  revise  the  agreed  rates  or  to  add  now  services 
not  then  included.  If  a  customer  of  one  party  approached  either 
of  the  other  two,  he  was  to  be  quoted  the  same  rate  and  the  same 
trading  terms  re  creditg  discount  and  so  on.  The  penalty  for 
contravening  these  terms  and  securing  a  contract  thereby  was  a 
fine  equivalent  to  its  total  value  to  the  aggrieved  party  over 
the  preceeding  three  years  org  for  a  contract  of  lesser  past 
durationg  thirty-six  times  the  value  of  the  monthly  account. 
The  signatories  pledged  themselves  to  assist  each  other  "in  the 
event  of  fire,  strikep  lock-out  or  labour  combination"  but 
otherwise  the  agreement  was  limited  to  the  stated  matters,  For 
the  rest  each  firm  acted  quite  independently  and  mne  had  any 
rights  over  the  others.  "It  is  not  a  partnership.  "  133 
The'scheme  as  negotiated  was  a  relatively  weak  device  by 
which  to  counter  the  force'of  alle,  gedly  excessive  competition. 
It  did  nothing  to  promote  positive  economies  of  workingg  but, 
by  securing  a  degree  of  co-operation  in  the  form  of  non-competitive 
ratesp  would  serve  to  hold  the  existing  position.  Much  would 
depend  on  the  spirit  in  which  the  agreement  was  interpreted,  in 
respect  of  which  the  requirement  that  decisions  of  the  council  be 
unanimous  to  be  binding  was  a  source  of  weakness.  Clearly  none 
of  the  firms  concerned  was  willing  to  subject  itself  to  a 
controlling  influence  on  the  part  of  the  others,  even  within  the 
given  limits  of  the  agreement.  There  wereq  however,  efforts 
to  promote  each  other's  interests  beyond  the  limite,  of  agreed 
rates.  Pickfords,  Carter  Paterson  and  Beans  began  a  mutual 
exchange  of  traffic  for  places  outside  of  London  whereby  Pickfords 
consigned  its  own-traffic  to  the  other  two  at  places  where  it  had 
133  Working  a,  -reement  24  Oct.  1907  CP  2/19. 
319. no  local  office  but  they  did  and  in  turn  received  their  traffic 
134 
at  other  places, 
The  attempt  to  stabilise  rates  was  subject  to  considerable 
pressure*  The  three  firms  might  settle  agreed  rates  between 
themselves  but  they  lacked  the  means  to  impose  their  terms  on 
firms  which  were  not  party  to  the  working  agreement.  These  did 
not  hesitate  to  go  in  for  further  price-cuttina.  Carter  Paterson 
fel 
It 
the  effects  of  Sutton's  competitionl35  and  Pickfords 
retaliated  vehemently  when  Globe  Parcels  Express  got  hold  of  one 
136 
of  its  cartage  contracts,  Indeed  pressure  of  this  kind  is 
likely  to  have  increased,  against  which  the  1907  agreement  was  no 
shield.  In  1909  a  call  was  made  for  combined  action  by  the 
carrying  trade  to  prevent  further  rate  cutting,  so  as  to  improve 
the  efficiency  of  service  to  the  public  as  well  as  restoring  the 
trade  to  more  prosperous  conditions. 
137 
In  addition  there  were 
signs  of  strain  between  the  firms  as  Pickfords  complained  of 
others'  actions  which  were  alleged  to  infringe  the  agreement. 
138 
By  1911  the  strain  had  become  so  great  that  the  agreement  broke 
down  completely.  From  April  1911  the  council  ceased  to  meet. 
139 
Despite  its  breakdown,  however,  the  1907  scheme  was  not  without 
result.  It  showed  that  in  the  circumstances  the  pressure  to 
promote  individual  interests  was  too  great  to  be  easily  resisted. 
This  pitfall  would  be  avoided  only  if  the  interests  of  all  the 
parties  were  identical.  The  full  amalgamation  of  the  various 
firms  waýs  the  logical  and  ultimately  only  certain  way  of  solving 
their  problem. 
134  Minutes  Directorst'committee  14,28  Aug-t  4  SOPt-1907  Pic  1/13 
135  Ibid,  14  Dec.  1910  Pic  1716. 
136  Ibid,  28,  March,  8,22  April  1908  Pic  1/14, 
137  World's  Carriers  Vol.  6  (19lo-11)  p  1. 
138  Minutes  Directorst  committee  18  March,  28  Oct.  1908,6p  13 
Jan.  1909  Pic  1/14;  4  Jan  Tq-ll  Pic  1/16. 
139  Ibid-19  April  1911  Pic  1/16. 
320. The  merging  of  Pickfords  and  Carter  Paterson,  the  two  major 
componentsv  into  a  larger  combine  was  by  no  means  a  novel  idea. 
The  Idea  of  a  working  arrangement  between  the  two  had  been 
broached  in  1899  14o 
and  two  years  later  details  were  worked  out 
how  the  two  companies  might,  with  the  London  Parcels  Delivery 
Companyp  form  a  newp  amalgamated  enterprise, 
141  Although  explor- 
atory  work  continued  into  1902  nothing  came  of  these  proposalst  nor 
of  a  further  consideration  a  few  years  later,  142 
Howevert  just  at 
the  time  the  1907  agreement  was  breaking  upt  rumours  began  to 
appear  in  the  press  of  an  impending  amalgamation  between  the 
leading  firmsq  and  fears  expressed  that  this  might  be  a  preliminary 
step  to  an  increase  in  rates.  Profits  were  accepted  to  have 
fallen  to  a  low  level,  confirmation  of  the  belief  "that  the 
competition  between  the  existing  companies  is  of  the  keenest 
character.  "  143 
Although  denials  were  put  out,  It  seems  that 
steps  were  already  being  taken  towards  an  eventual  amalgamation. 
In  May  1911  Carter  Paterson  decided  to  increase  its  shareholding 
in  the  London  Parcels  Delivery  Company  up  to  E2,000  by  buying 
up  whatever  shares  came  on  the  market. 
144 
The  following  January 
the  firm's  managing  director  was  authorised  to  attend  a 
conference  of  other  carriers  for  the  purpose  of  arranging  an 
amalgamation. 
145 
By  the  September  terms  had  been  agreed  between 
the  four  leading  companiesl  Pickfordst  Carter  Patersong  Beans 
Express,  and  the  London  Parcels  Delivery  Compan'. 
146 
Speculation  y 
had  continued  through  the  year  but  definite  news  leaked  out  only 
in  that  month  when  the  directors  of  the  London  Parcels  Delivery 
140  Board  Minutes  17  Aug  1899  CP  1/1. 
141  Ibid  29  March,  10  July  1901;  Directors'  report  to  AGM 
4  Oct  1901  CP  1/2;  the  details  of  the  proposed  scheme  are 
at  CP  4/27- 
142  Board  Minutest  23  Oct.  1908  CP  1/2. 
143  The  Times,  20  April,  also  22  June  1911;  World's  Carriers 
Vol.  7  (1910-11)  p  235. 
144  Board  Minutes 
'4 
May  1911  CP  1/1 
14.5  Ibid  23  Jan  1912  CP  1/2. 
146  The  correspondence  drafts,  etc.  associated  with  theemalgamation 
are  at  Pic  4/18;  CP  2/19;  CP  3/10;  and  Pic  HH. 
321. Company,  a  public  company,  annot,  inced  a  deferment  on  the 
distribution  of  the  previous  halfyear's  profit  on  the  anticipation 
of  amalgamating  with  other  companies. 
147 
It  is  impossible  to  tell  from  the  record  from  which  side 
the  main  impetus  to  secure  an  amalgamation  came  or  the  motives 
behind  it.  Equally  it  is  difficult  to  assess  the  move  in  terms 
of  Pickfords'  overall  developmentv  in  particular  whether  Pickfords 
entered  the  combine  from  a  position  of  strength  or  weakness. 
There  are  certain  grounds  for  believing  that  over  the  years  from 
1901,  when  the  proposal  was  previously  made,  Pickfords'  position 
relative  to  the  other  companies  concerned  had  declined. 
The  figures  in  Table  11.4  show  that,  had  the  proposed 
amalgamation  gone  through  in  1901p  Pickfords  would  have  dominated 
the  joint  company  by  contributing  almost  60  per  cent  of  the 
total  capital  against  35  per  cent  from  Carter  Paterson.  In  1912 
their  positions  were  very  largely  reversed,  Again  in  1901  the 
form  of  amalgamation  would  have  been  by  the  creation  of  a  new 
company  to  which  the  three  component  companies  would  have  been 
eventually  sold.  The  actual  amalgamation  in  1912  was  carried 
through  by  the  absorption  of  Pickfords  and  the  London  Parcels 
Delivery  Company  into  an  expanded  Carter  Paterson. 
It  is  possible  that  these  changes  owed  something  to 
technical  -difficulties  and  reflect  the  legal  form  by  which  the 
amalgamation  was  made.  It  was  noted  in  1901  that  because 
certain  Carter  Paterson  shares  were  held  in  trust  a  form  of 
amalgamation  which  involved  the  sale  of  Carter  Paterson  to 
Pickfords  would  entail  legal  problems  on  that  score,  These 
147  World's  Carriers.  Vol.  8  (1911-12)  P  338. 
322. Table  11.4.  Allocation  of  new  capital  between  component  firms 
1901  and  1912 
1901 
Total 
Pickfords 
Carter  Paterson 
London  Parcels 
Delivery  Company 
1912 
Percentage  Percentage 
Capital  (9)  share  capital  (C)  share 
667,  oi6  720t7OO 
3899661  58.4  2729950  37.9 
223Y110  33.5  354t750  49.2 
'54  245  -ý)  9  8.1  93tOOO  12.9 
source:  1901  Figures  CP  4/27;  1912  figures  - 
Agreement  and  Amalgamation,  28  Aug.  1912 
Pic  3/10;  memorandum  to  the  Amalgamation, 
Pic  HH. 
Note  1:  This  figure  is  issued  share  and  loan 
capital;  nominal  capital  was  9775,000; 
Plus  9350POOO  Debenture  Stock. could  largely  be  avoided  if  the  transaction  -were  arranged  the 
other  wayo 
148 
To  some  extentf  thereforep  the  changes  indicatod 
by  Table  11.4  possibly  reflect  precautions  to  avoid  the  problem. 
However  it  would  seem  that  thealteration  was  a  matter  of 
substance.  Although  L.  H.  Baxendale  became  chairman  of  the  now 
companyp  Pickfords  not  only  took  on  a  subordinate  position  but 
came  under  the  control  of  the  shareholders  of  the  pre-existinF. 
Carter  Paterson  company.  All  voting  rights  ill  the  new  company 
were  vested  in  the  ordinary  sharesq,  which  werep  distributed, 
76,630  to  Pickfordso  33,000  to  the  London  Parcels  Delivery 
Company  and  145070  to  Carter  Paterson.  In  other  words  the 
existing  owners  of  Pickfords  prior  to  the  amalgamation,  could 
be  outvoted  in  the  new  company,  even  when  joined  by  the  London 
Parcels  Delivery  Companyt  by  the  existing  owners  of  Carter 
Paterson, 
149ý 
-Not  only  had  the  Baxendales  given  up  ownership  of 
the  family  firmg  they  had  also  lost  control.  Thus  the 
amalgamation  of  1912  marks  anothor  major  stage  in  Pickfords' 
history. 
148  Opinion  of  F.  B.  Palmer  19  June  1901  CP  4/27- 
149  Memorandum  to  the  -anialgamation  Pic  HH 
323. CHAPTER  12 
AMALGAMATION  AND  AFTER:  PICKFORDS  1912-1920 The  amalgamation  was  carried  through  by  a  reconstruction 
of  Carter  Patersong  to  which  the  other  three  companies  became 
subsidiaries.  Carter  Patersonts  nominal  share  capital  was 
increased  from  L25OvOOO  to  C775,000  and  powers  were  taken  to 
issu6  5%  Debenture  Stock  up  to  the  value  of  9135POOO.  The 
amalgamation  was  effected  as  of  I  July  1912  but  the  first  board 
meeting  of  the  newly  expanded  Carter  Paterson  company,  which 
now  became  the  governing  body  of  the  associated  companiest  was 
not  held  until  the  end  of  October. 
1 
The  formal  arrangement  adopted  between  Carter  Paterson  and 
each  of  the  other  three  companies  differed  in  several  important 
ways.  Beans  Express  Ltd  was  bought  for  06060  cash  and  passed 
into  the  direct  ownership  and  management  of  the  joint-board. 
The  existing  owner-managers,  Mr.  W.  W.  Allen  and  his  son  Percy, 
both  withdrew  from  the  business  and  were  replaced  by  Carter 
Paterson  nominees.  Beans  Express  continued  to  trade  under  its 
own  nameq  but  it  became  a  parcels  collecting  agency  only:  all 
deliveries  were  made  through  the  parcels  service  of  one  of  the 
other  companies. 
2 
The  London  Parcels  Delivery  company  was  also  bought  up  ins 
a  going  concern'.  The  purchase  price  was  039000  against  the 
L.  P.  D.  company's  Z60,000  ordinary  share  capital  and  thus  included 
L33,000  as  payment  for  the  company's  assets  and  goodwill,  By 
buying  up  the  equity  Carter  Paterson  acquired  overall  control  of 
of  the  L.  F.  D.  company  but  the  transaction  was  settled  by  the 
1  Doard  Minutes  28  Oct.  1912,  CP  1/3.  The  terms  of  agreement 
were  before  Pickfords'  directors  during  September  and  October, 
and  were  approved  by  a  special  general  meeting  16  October  1912, 
Pic  1/9. 
2.  Board  Minutes  4  Sept.  1912  CP  1/2,2  Nov  1912  CP  1/3; 
,  reement,  AmaIC,  o-mation  af-  CP  3110.  Allen  had  formerly  been 
traffic  manager  of  Carter  Paterson  but  after  a  dispute  had 
joined  Beans  and  built  it  up  in  opposition.  The  associate 
company  he  had  founded,  Allens'  Motor  Express  Ltd,  was  included 
in  the,  agreement.  The  Window  Card  Vol.  3  No.  5  Sept.  1933 
p  253  ff;  Summer  1946,  P  3. 
324. issue  of  ordinary  and  preferred  shares  in  Carter  Paterson  to  the 
full  value  of  the  purchase  price.  Unlike  Beans,  therefore, 
the  L.  P.  D.  company  with  339000  ordinary  sharest  received  voting 
rights  and  representation  on  the  joint-board.  Three  L.  P.  D. 
directors  joined  the  Carter-Paterson  board  and,  as  nominees  of 
the  boardq  continued  in  the  day-to-day  management  of  their 
company. 
3 
Beans  Express  and  the  London  Parcels  Delivery  company  were 
small  concernsq  the  junior  partners  in  the  merger.  They  were 
essentially  bought  up  and  taken  over.  By  contrast  the  terms 
arranged  between  Pickfords  and  Carter  Paterson  were  rather  more 
complex. 
4 
Pickfords  was  not  bought  up  in  the  sense  that  both 
Beans  and  the  L.  P.  D.  company  were  but  rather  it  was  merged  with 
Carter  Paterson  by  the  limited  financial  arrangement  sufficient 
to  ensure  effective  control  to  Carter  Paterson  and  efficient 
combined  working.  Carter  Paterson  bought  out  Pickfords'  share 
capital  but  no  payment  was  made  for  Pickfordsl  trading  assets. 
By  owning  the  equity,  the  joint-board  possessed  ultimate  control 
while  leavinj  Pickfordso  in  practice,  with  much  of  its  independence. 
Any  suggestion  of  undue  domination  by  Carter  Patersong  given 
the  essential  nature  of  the  arrangement  as  a  combination  between 
partnersq  was  avoided,  as  well  as  the  burden  of  the  considerable 
extra  capital  that  would  have  been  required  to  finance  the 
purchase  of  Pickfords'  assets.  Since  Pickfords'  intention  could 
not  have  been  other  than  to  co-operate  positively  with  its 
partnersq  the  outright-purchase  of  Pickfords  was  not  necessary 
for  effective  joint  working. 
Amalgamation  aFreement  CP  3/10. 
4  Ibid;  also  Memorandum  as  to  the  amalgamat_ionp  Pic  HH. 
325 Carter  Paterson  paid  z433P700  to  acquire  control  of 
PIckfords.  -5  91009000  was  paid  in  5%  Debentures  and  the  balance 
in  cash  but  the  whole  of  this  sum  was  committed  to  the  purchase 
of  Carter  Paterson  shares.  Pickfords  bought  74,630  ordinary 
shares  of  Ll  each,  which  carried  voting  rights  and  representation 
by  three  directors  on  the  joint  board.  The  remaining  money 
purchased  259,070  Zl  preference  shares,  of  which  Pickfords 
. retained  only  about  two  fifths.  The  major  portion,  163,450 
shares  in  all,  were  distributed,  at  Pickfords'  expense,  between 
the  shareholders  of  the  told'  Carter  Paterson  company  "in 
consideration  of  their  consenting  to  the  amalgamation  agreement.  " 
This  was  worth  roughly  LlOtOOO  in  any  year  that  a  dividend  was 
declared.  Pickfords'  shareholdersq  too,  received  their 
inducement  -a  guaranteed  Z59000  p.  a.  from  interest  on  their 
debenture  holdings  together  with  a  further  Z59750  as  a  preferred 
charge  on  profits. 
The  character  and  composition  of  capital  holdings  in  the 
joint  enterprise  is  revealing.  The  shareholders  of  the  told' 
Carter  Paterson  company  put  up  the  bulk  of  the  risk  capital  of 
the  joint  enterprise  -  145070  of  the  2539000  ordinary  shares 
issued.  Pickfords  and  the  London  Parcels  Delivery  company 
together  contributed  less  than  that.  Indeed  Pickfords'  share- 
holders  were  primarily  investors  in  the  amalgamated  company. 
A  comparison  (Table  12.1)  of  the  shareholding  of  Pickfords' 
directors  in  their  own  company  with  that  in  the  'new'  Carter 
Paterson  shows  thato  although  each  increased  his  total  capital 
holdingg  the  share  of  ordinary  capital  'was  significantly  reduced 
The  following  is  based  on  Amalgamation  ap 
-  reement  CP  3/10 
and  Memorandum  as  to  the  amalgamation,  Pic  HHv  together  with 
the  source  material  for  Table  12.1. 
326. Table  12.1,  The  capital  holdings  of  Pickfords'  directors 
in  Pickfords  Ltd.  and  subsequently  Carter 
Paterson  &  Co,  Ltd. 
1.  Pickfords  Ltd.  30  June  1912, 
L.  H.  F.  H.  N.  O.  G.  V. 
Baxendale  Baxendale  Walker  Baxendale 
1.  Preference  'shares  25tOOO  16,200  109000  500 
2.  Total  privile  ged 
capital  259000  16,200  109000  500 
3.  Ordinary  shares  78,541 
1 
42059  2.59000  lotooo 
4.  Total  capital  1039541  58,559  35POOO  1OP500 
Ordinary  as  a 
percentage  of  total 
capital  ge  75,76  72.3%  71.4%  95.2% 
11.  Carter  Paterson  &  Co.  Ltd. 
jL.  Debentures  49,19o  29t585  18,018  39207 
2.  Preference  shares  48,172  25t981  159333  6,139 
3-  Total  privile'ged 
capi-tal  97,362  5.5,566  33,351  9,346 
4.  Ordinary-shares  37,597  200277  llj968  4,782 
5,  Total  capital  134,959  75,843  45019  149128 
6,  Ordinary  as  a 
percentage  of  total 
capital  27.9%  26.7%  26.4%  33.8% 
Source:  Section  Ip  allocation  of  shares 
as  of  30  Junef  1912p  Board  Minutes,  passim 
Pic  119;  Section  II  Application(Yor  shares) 
and  nomination  by  Pickfords  Ltd,  3  Dec,  1912 
CP  2/19, both  relatively  and  absolutely.  It  is  iMpossible  to  say  whother 
this  was  the  price  Pickfords'  directors  demanded  or  the  inducement 
the  Patersons  were  willing  to  offer  for  the  amalgamation  to  go 
ahead. 
The  logical  comPlement  of  this  arrangoment  was  that  the 
Carter  Paterson  side',  having  taken  the  greater  share  of  tho  risk, 
should  have  the  major  management  role  in  the  new  company.  So 
although  L.  11.  Baxendale  became  chairman  of  the  joint-boardq  aft-er 
some  wrangling  over  the  terms  of  his  position,  he  was  largely  a 
: figure-head  and  apparently  took  little  or  no  Part  in  routine 
rnanagement.  Effective  power  rested  with  the  Patersons.  J.  J. 
Paterson  became  vice-chairman  and  managing-director;  H.  R.  Paterson 
became  senior  director-manager  and  deputised  in  the  managing- 
director's  absence.  When  J.  J.  Paterson  retired  from  the  position 
in  19150  II.  R.  Paterson  succeeded  him. 
6 
All  the  other  directors, 
With  the  apparent  exception  of  F.  H.  Baxendale  who  was  in  any  case 
soon  succeeded  by  his  son  Guy  Vernon, 
7 
were  expected  to  take  their 
share  of  management  duties. 
How  was  Pickfords  affectedv  in  a  formal  sense,  by  the 
amalgamation?  The  company  was,  of  coursev  fully  owned  by 
Carter  Patersong  by  its  purchase  of  the  equity,  and  all  the 
directors'  qualifying  shares  were  held  in  trust.  Pickfords' 
board  was  expanded  to  accommodate  three  representatives  from 
Carter  Patersong  J.  J.  Patersong  H.  R.  Paterson  and  J.  Paterson. 
L.  H.  Baxendale  continued  as  chairman. 
8 
None  of  the  Patersons 
joined  the  directors'  committee  which  continued  the  day-to-day 
management  of  Pickfords  as  before.  At  this  level,  thereforep  the 
6  Board  Minutes  28  Oct.  1912  CP  113;  3P  7  Nov.  1  Dec.  (AGM)  1915 
CP  1/5- 
7  Ibid  12  Feb.  9  July  1913  CP  1/3. 
8  Board_Minutes  16  Oct  1  19  Nov.  1912  Pic  1/9. 
327. amalgamationg  although  facilitating  joint  workirigo  resulted 
in  no  formalp  structural  change.  This  was  delayed  until  the 
beginning  of  1915.  At  board  levelt  howevert  there  was  one 
fundamental  change  in  that  all  mntters  which  involved  capital 
spendirrg,  whether  the  purchase  of  a  small  business  or  orders 
for  motor  vehicles,  required  the  joint  board's  sanction  and 
therefore  had  to  be  referred. 
9 
This  was  the  necessary 
consequence  of  the  arrangement  by  which  the  amalgamation  of 
pickfords  and  Carter  Paterson  had  been  settled.  The  joint- 
board's  authority  and  its  effective  power  over  the  four  associated 
companies  rested  on  its  control  of  the  finances. 
On  the  whole  the  two  boards  co-operated  amicably,  although 
there  was  the  odd  occasion  when  votes  of  the  joint-board  divided 
along  Party  lines. 
10 
When  dissension  between  the  boards  did 
Occurv  it  invariably  involved  finance.  Since  Carter  Paterson, 
as  the  vehicle  of  the  amalgamation,  was  obliged  to  supply  the 
financial  requirements  of  the  joint  enterprise  it  receivod  all 
the  profits  earned  by  the  component  companies.  Thus  in  1913  and 
1914,  as  Table  1.2.2  showsv  Pickfords  distributed  virtually  the 
whole  of  the  available  not  balancev  and  only  a  little  less  in 
1915.  Pickfordsq  howeverv  soon  found  difficulty  in  meeting  some 
of  its  larger  items  of  expenditureý  especially  annual  insurance 
premiums  of  approximately  C75vOOO9  and  turned  to  the  joint-board 
for  assistance.  Carter  Paterson's  finances  were  also  severely 
stretched  by  this  time  and  J.  J.  Paterson  strongly  objected  to 
pickfords'  request,  He  apparently  believed  that  these  payments 
-were  in  some  way  internal  to  Pickfords  and  should  not  be 
9  M:  LnutesjL  Directoý:  s  comm4tteep  27  Nov  1912,14  May  1913P  Pic  1/17; 
Board  M-inutes,  19  May,  30  Sept-  1913;  5  May,  23  June  1914  Pic  1/9. 
10  Board  Minutes  11  Marchq  25  March,  8  Aprilq  22  April  1914  CP  1/4. 
328. Table  12.2.  Pickfords  Profits  and  ordinary  dividends 
1912-1919 
Net  jprofit  Distributed  Ordinary  Balance  carried 
W-  'profit  (Z)  -dividend  forward  (Z)_ 
1912  6P956  1 
1913  15,116  149226  8%  890 
igi4  15,944  15,694  9%  1,14o 
1915  lo.  167  (9630)  89774  4%  1P576 
igi6  79214  49194  1%  4,596 
1917  8958.5  4Y974  '1%  89207 
JL918  239802  219648  5%  10,36o 
1919  47072  59215 
. 
52971.7 
Note  1.  On  an  accounting  year  ending  31  December; 
all  other  years  end  30  June.  All  figures  are  rounded  to* 
the  nearest  Pound. 
Source:  These  figures  are  based  on  the  summary  accounts 
presented  to  the  annual  general  meeting.  In  1915  the 
net  Profit  figure  was  later  revised  to  the  smaller  sum 
given  in  brackets.  From  1916  there  is  a  marked 
divergence  between  these  figures  and  the  net  profit 
figures  entered  in  the  Profit  and  Loss  Account  (Pic  4/28) 
from  which  certain  interest  payments  were  no  longer 
deducted.  The  figures  in  the  above  table  tally  with 
thosev  for  1912-1918p  supplied  to  Hay's  Wharf  Cartage 
Co.  in  1919  (Pic  HH). subsldised  from  the  Joint  finances.  It  was  shown,  however, 
that  Pickfords  I  basic  problem  was  not  a  lack  of  earning  power 
but  that,  by  paying  over  virtually  the  whole  of  its  distributable 
p.  rofit  to  the  joint  board,  the  firm  was  being  drained  of  adequate 
cash  resources.  It  was  recommended  that  as  these  were  annually 
vecurring  charges,  proper  provision  should  be  made  for  them  either 
by  transferring  an  equal  sum  to  a  special  reserve  account  or 
simply  carry  forward  a  much  larger  balance  than  hitherto.  This 
question  came  to  a  head  in  the  spring  of  1916  and  it  is  clear  from 
the  accounts  of  that  year  (Table.  12.2)  that  the  latter  solution 
was  adopted. 
11 
It  was  no  doubt  the  financial  difficulties  of  the  parent 
company  which  brought  a  touch  of  acerbity  to  the  disagreement. 
Before  the  amalgamation  Carter  Paterson  had  enjoyed  a  secure 
financial  positionv  with  good  profits  and  healthy  accumulated 
xeservest,  but  this  soon  weakened  under  the  strain  of  financing 
the  member  companies.  In  each  of  the  first  two  years  of  the 
amalgamation  the  group  made  a  combined  profit  in  excess  of 
Z24,000  but  in  1915t  after  the  first  few  months  of  warp  this 
slipped  to  Zl3pOOO.  The  ordinary  dividend  was  passed  over.  Net 
receiptsp  i.  e.  trading  and  investment  income,  fell  from  L54,800 
in  1913  to  L29,550  in  1915,  and  this  at  a  time  when  the  company's 
12 
need  was  for  increa5ed  revenue,  From  early  in  1913  Carter 
Paterson  had  to  meet  the  sharp  competition  of  a  newcomer  to  the 
parcels  trade  W.  &.  G.  Express  Carriers  Ltd.  13 
and  was  itself  planning 
a  major  programme  of  capital  spending.  Consideration  was  being 
11  Ibid  2f  9#  June  1915  CP  1/4.  -;  also  Board  Minutes  I  June  1915, 
29  Feb.  24  March,  14  April  1916  Pic  1/9. 
12  These  figures  are  taken  from  the  Board  Minutes,  1,8t  15  Oct. 
1913  CP  1/3;  13,14  Oct  1914  CP  1/4.1  c.  1915  CP  115.  The 
fLnancial  year  ran  from  1  July  to  30  June. 
13  See  below  p.  33? 
329. given  to  the  purchase  of  100  vehicles  for  the  extension  of  its 
motor  delivery  service  to  include  towns  up  to  eighty  miles  from 
London. 
14 
In  March  1913  the  joint-board  decided  to  sc_,  ek  a  loan; 
91209000  was  originally  discussed  but  the  board  finally  settled 
for  950POOO  from  the  Phoenix  Assurance  Company.  This  must  have 
given  only  temporary  respite  since  by  the  begirining  of  1914  the 
financial  situation  was  again  acute.  All  current  income  was 
absorbed  by  various  interest  payments  and  insurance  premiums; 
Carter  Paterson  had  nearly  reached  the  bank's  limit  on  its  over- 
draftv  but  still  needed  a  further  923,000  to  cover  capital 
expenditure  already  incurred.  The  reaction  to  this  situation 
demonstrated  a  marked  difference  of  opinion  between  J.  J.  Paterson 
and  L.  H.  Baxendale  as  to  the  proper  form  of  business  finance. 
Cartor  Paterson  had  been  built  up,  dautiously  but  steadilyt  on 
the  well-tried  principles  of  self-finance;  past  profits,  not 
loansg  secured  the  next  phase  of  development.  Pickfords,  by 
contrast  I 
had  made  fairly  extensý*Ive  use  of  the  mortgage  and  loan 
rnarket. 
15  The  Phoenix  loan  was  opposed  by  both  J.  J.  Paterson  and 
J.  Paterson  on  the  grounds  that  it  damaged  the  effort  to  build 
up  the  business  out  of  revenue.  J.  J.  Paterson  deplored  the 
burden  of  interest  which  excessive  borrowing  imposed  on  the 
shareholders  and  forcibly  re-iterated  his  views  on  the  occasion 
of  this  latest  crisis..  L.  H.  Daxendale,  on  the  other  handp  implied 
that  the  group  was,  and  had  been  from  the  startj  under-capitalised 
14  Commercial  Motor  Vol.  17  (1913)  PP  339-340. 
15  Chapter  11  P.  287.  ' 
330. to  the  extent,  of  L100,000  and  was  clearly  unconvinced  that 
self-finance  would  provide  the  scale  of  funds  required.  When 
asked,  twicet  for  C5,000  from  Pickfords  to  help  reduce  Carter 
Paterson's  overdraft  he  refused.  The  merits  of  going  public 
were  advocated  by  H.  R.  Paterson  but  not  pursued,. 
16 
Problems  of  finance  gave  added  urgency  to  pressing  on  with  a 
programme  of  rationalisation  so  as  to  release  the  cost  reductions 
and  economies  of  scale  of  a  large-scale  enterpriset  the  essential 
economic  logic  of  the  amalgamation.  This  would  involve,  apart 
from  the  elimination  of  wasteful  competition,  the  centralisation 
of  common  servicesp  such  as  vehicle  and  horse  maintenance,  and 
the  concentration  of  customer  services  on  that  section  of  the 
group  best  placed  or  best  able  to  perform  them.  S-ince  prior  to 
.4 
the  amalgamation  there  was  a  relatively  low  degree  of  complement- 
aritY  of  product  between  the  four  firmsq  only  by  a  major  rational- 
Isation  scheme  could  economies  be  effected. 
There  is  little  doubt  that  a  rigorous  rationalisation 
programme  was  intended  by  the  joint-board  from  the  start  and 
remained  a'long-run  objective.  Howeverl  factors  other  than  the 
nar-rowlY  economic  tended  to  weigh  in  favour  of  a  slowp  rather 
cautiOus,  and  low-key  approach.  In  the  first  place  there  was  no 
-wish  to  draw  public  attention,  by  a  sudden  flurry  of  changes  and 
closureso  to  the  fact  that  a  strongg  monopolistic-combine  had  been 
created  in  the  London  parcels  trade.  Indeed  no  public  announce- 
ment  of  the  amalgamation  was  made;  instead  "it  was  agreed  the 
policy  should  be  to  keep  the  new  arrangement  as  reasonably  quiet 
as  possible.,, 
17  Even  the  re-naming  of  the  group's  vans  once 
16  Board  ýinutesv  26  March,  28,30  May  1913,28  Jan,  1914,  CP  1/3; 
lit  25  March  193-4  CP  1/4. 
17  Ibid  28  Oct,  1912  CP  1/3;  The  World's  Carrierso  which  had 
previously  twice  denied  the  truth  of  rumours  tKat  an  amalgam- 
ation  was  pending,  made  no  comment  at  all,  No  mention  was  made 
in  the  Commercial  Motor  until  September  1913  (Vol.  18  p  99) 
when  the  move  was  welcomed-as  promoting  improved  carrying 
facilitiest  greater  efficiency  and  economy. 
331. once  brought  into  a  common  poolp  was  to  be  hold  back  for  some 
t:  Lme  .  "and  then  be  very  gradual  0  It  18 
The  other  major  obstacle  to  an  immediate  re-structuring  of 
the  associated  companies  lay  in  the  possible  effect  on  the  staff. 
The  directors  realised  the  importance  of  retainine  the  confidence 
of  their  experienced  staff  and  having  their  support  in  promoting 
the  rearrangement  of  business. 
19 
Efficient  joint  working  required 
:  Vormer  rivals  to  work  harmoniously  and  flexibly  with  each  other 
as  colleagues.  Competition  for  traffic  had  been  keen  and  company 
JLoyalty  strongg  and  the  jealousies  and  strains  which  this  bred 
could  not  be  expected  to  disappear  overnight.  In  addition  the 
pooling  of  traffic  and  men  disclosed  various  anomalies  in  the 
structure  of  wa6esq  especially  between  Pickfords  and  Carter 
]Paterson.  Pickfords'  wages  for  comparable  jobs  tend  ed  to  be 
111gher  than  those  of  Carter  Paterson  and  it  took  some  time  and 
trouble  for  them  to  be  harmonised  on  a  common  basis, 
20 
Clearly 
the  joint-board  had  a  much  better  chance  of  carrying  the  men  with 
them  in  a  stable  employment  situation  than  if,  due  to  cuts  in 
sex-vices  and  staffq  jobs  were  felt  to  be  at  risk. 
For  reasons  such  as  these  the  Joint-board's  management 
policy  was  for  limited  objectives  in  the  immediate  Post-amalgam- 
21 
ation  phase.  The  construction  of  a  coherent  business  concern 
Dut  of  several  disparate  parts  without  undue  disturbance  to  staff 
or  dislocation  of  business  was  felt  to  be  difficult  enough.  Much 
standardisation  of  business  practices  had  to  be  carried  throught 
methods  of  accounting,  invoicing  of  traffic,  before  proceeding 
further,  A  start  was  made  by  bringing  Beans  Express  and  the 
IS  Ibid  6Novl9l2  CP  1/3 
19  lbid  28  Oct.  6  Nov  1912,  CP  1/3 
20  '15-eebelow  p  337 
21  Board  Minutes  Report  of  management  committee,  6  Nov  1912  CP  1113- 
332. London  Parcels  Delivery  company  into  line  with  Carter  Patersont 
on  the  basis  of  best  practice  I  and  leaving  Pickfords  to  be  worked' 
In  later.  Other  than  that,  the  objective  was  as  close  working 
as  possible  between  the  associated  companies  without  any  structural 
change. 
The  first  stage  of  tcloser  workingt  was  essentially  no  more 
than  a  straight-forward  working  agreement  between  a  number  of 
concerns  which  otherwise  remained  independent.  The  four  firms 
continued  their  individual  parcels'  collection  services  for  the 
time  being,  but  deliveries  could  be  effected  through  either 
pickfordsp  Carter  Paterson  or  the  London  Parcels  Delivery  company 
±rrespective  of  which  firm  had  collected  the  goods  in  the  first 
place.  From  December  1912  arrangements  were  made  for  Pickfords 
to  deliver  for  Carter  Paterson  and  the  L.  P.  D.  company  in  an 
increasing  number  of  places,  and  vice  versa. 
22 
These  arrangements 
however  incorporated  a  degree  of  rationalisation  in  that  Pickfords 
largelyp  but  not  entirely  v  withdrew  from  parcels  delivery  in 
London  and  became  the  vehicle  through  which  the  group's  entire 
provincial  deliveries  were  effected.  Deliveries  in  the  London 
area  were,  handled  chiefly  by  Carter  Paterson  and  the  L.  P.  D. 
company.  Carter  Paterson  had  a  few  depots  outside  of  Londong 
the  L.  P.  D.  company,  none  at  all;  Pickfords  alone  of  the  associated 
companies  POSS05sed  a  substantial  number  of  provincial  outletq; 
Thus  the  branches  co-operatedt  on  the  basis  of  their  relative 
strengthsv. 
-but 
remained  formally  distinct. 
The  same  principle  applied  when  Pickfords  began  to  handle 
Carter  Paterson's  foreign  traffic.  Carter  Paterson  lacked  a 
22  Minutes,  Directorstcommittee  20  Nov.  11  Doe  1912;  81  29  jant 
12  Feb,  5  March,  2,9  Aprilq  14-May,  9  JulY  1913  Pic  1/17p  1/18. 
333. foreign  service  such  as  Pickfords  had  long  had  and  so  passed  on 
to  Pickfords  all  the  traffic  it  collected  in  London  for  delivery 
overseas*  However  Pickfords  was  charged  for  cartage  from  the 
suburbs  and  commission  on  each  item  handed  over, 
23 
The  only 
sign  of  a  joint  service  properly  so-called  was  the  introduction 
±n  June  19139  of  a  new,  hourly  collection  and  delivery  service, 
24 
using  motorsq  to  the  City  and  West  End, 
In  time,  Carter  Paterson  took  over  all  parcels  delivery  work, 
including  that  to  the  outer  suburbs.  It  is  likely  that  Carter 
Paterson's  Home  Counties  Express  service  had  always  had  an  edge 
on  Pickfords'  equivalentp  its  Outer  Area  Service,  but  in  any  case 
the  latter  was  steadily  absorbed  into  the  former  service.  it 
was  estimated  that  by  the  end  of  1913,  after  twelve  months  or  so 
of  combined  workingg  Pickfords  was  handing  over  to  Carter  Paterson 
traffic  to  the  total  value  of  Zl2vOOOp.  a. 
2.5 
What  mattered,  of 
courset  was  how  the  group  as  a  whole  fared  but  it  is  possible 
that  from  Pickfords'  own  immediate  point  of  view  this  arrangement 
worked  to  its  disadvantage  in  terms  of  revenue.  Pickfords' 
traffic  receipts  on  its  'Town'  (i.  e.  London)  business  declined 
from  Z179,430  in  the  December  half-year  1912  to  Z15lpOOO  in  the 
June  half-year  1914.  Against  this  fall  of  C30,000  revenue  from 
fCountryl  traffic  remained  fairly  steadyt  fluctuating  between 
974,270  and  L79t675- 
26 
The  specialisation  of  function  'with  respect  to  parcels  traffic 
between,  Pickfords  and  Carter  Paterson  undoubtedly  owed  much  to 
the  relative  distribution  of  their  depots  but  it  is  also  possible 
23  Ibid  17  June  1914  Pic  1/18. 
24  Ibid  25  June  1913  Pic  1/17. 
25  Ibid  3  Doc  1913  Pic  1/17. 
26  Profit  and  loss  accounts,  Pic  4/28. 
334y that  Carter  Paterson  performed  parcels  delivery  work  moro 
offeciently  than  Pickfords.  It  was  stated  in  1919p  at  the  time 
I 
of  the  sale  of  Pickfords  to  Hays  Wharf  Cartage  companyt  that 
Pickfords  had  never  found  its  parcel  work  to  be  Profitable. 
27 
There  is  nothing  in  the  record  by  which  this  could  be  directly 
I 
confirmed  or  denied,  but  there  is  some  evidence  which  suggests 
that  in  terms  of  cost  per  unit  of  revenue  Carter  Paterson  performed 
Its  business  more  efficiently  than  Pickfords.  FiGures  for  the 
December  half-year  1912  show  that  Pickfordst  on  a  turnover  of 
1:  258,000,  paid  E2.6.4id  on  claims  for  losses  and  breakagesp  for 
every  C100  revenue:  Carter  Paterson  paid  18/7d  per  C100  on  a 
turnover  of  9207,400.  The  London  Parcels  Delivery  company, 
specialising  in  parcels  trafficq  paid  out  14/5id  per  Z100  revenue 
on  a  turnover  less  than  a  third  that  of  Carter  Paterson.  28 
Again  these  figures  cannot  be  pressed  too  far  becauset  for  example, 
Pickfords  engaged  in  a  much  wider  range  of  traffic  than  either 
of  the  other  two,  Parcels  traffic  was  a  mossy  sort  of  business 
involving  much  invoicingt  checking  and  handling,  and  was 
especially  liable  to  claims  for  damage  or  loss  and  thus  rapidly 
rising  costs  unless  carefully  watched.  It  would  seem  reasonable 
to  conclude  that  on  the  whole  Carter  Paterson  controlled  its 
costs  rather  more  successfully  than  Pickfords, 
The  concentration  of  parcels  services  on  Carter  Paterson, 
and  -the  L.  P.  D.  company  to  a  lesser  extentp  resulted  in  certain 
positive  economies  as  a  proportion  of  the  ment  horsesp  vans  and 
premises  used  in  the  business  became  superfluous  to  current  needs. 
When  Pickfords  town  cartage  depot  at  Edmonton  was  merged  with 
'27  Letter  to  the  directors  of  Hay's  Wharf  Cartage  company  re  the 
urchase  of  Pickfordst  6  May  (?  1919)  Pic  HII. 
28 
Noard 
Minutes  26  Febo  25  June  1913  CP  1/3. 
335. the  other  branches,  21  horses  and  13  vans  were  withdrawn;  at 
Walthamstow  1  motor,  17  horses  and  9  vans. 
29 
In  the  case  of 
surplus  premises,  some  wore  sold  and  others  were  converted  to 
other  uses;  Pickfordst  town  cartage  depot  in  Poplar  High  Street 
became 
-a 
motor  repair  shop  for  the  group. 
30 
The  closure  of 
pickford5l  parcels  premises  at  Edmontont  Kingston  and  Walthamstow 
-were  reported  to  have  reduced  operating  costs  by  some  L39500  p.  a; 
by  the  autumn  of  1916-,  when  the  programme  had  been  much  extended, 
this  figure  had  been  revised  to  L1209000  p.  a. 
31 
Further  economies 
-were  added  by  the  centralisation  of  common  services.  Vetinary 
arrangements  were  brought  under  central  c6ntrol. 
32 
In  September 
IL914  Pickfords'  van  repair  shop  at  Glasshouse  Yard  was  sold  and 
all  future  work  concentrated  on  Carter  Paterson's  premises  at 
Stoke  Newington. 
33 
By  a  variety  of  small  steps  like  these  some 
economies  of  scale  began  to  accrue  to  the  joint  enterprise, 
ireinforcing  the  policy  of  closer  working  but  without  initiating 
any  major  structural  change. 
This  rather  hesitant  programme  of  change  continued  for  over 
-two  years  from  the  date  of  amalgamation.  The  Joint  board  had 
Intended  to  move  on  to  much  closer  integration  at  an  earlier 
date  but  had  been  frustrated  for  two  main  reasons  -  intermitent 
labour  troubles  through  1913  and  the  early  part  of  1914  and  the 
appearance  of  a  new  and  vigorous  competitor  in  the  London  parcels 
tradee 
34 
There  were  tirodistinct  strands  to  the  labour  unrest  in  which 
the  group  was  concerned  during  these  months.  In  one  respect 
29  Minutes  Directorst  committee 
, 
28  Jan,  12  Nov  1914  Pic  1/18. 
30  Board  Minutes  13  Aug,  1913,  CP  1/3;  The  Kingston  depot  was 
transferred  to  household  removalst  Minutes,  Directorst 
committee  17  Sept.  1913  Pic  1/13. 
31  Doard  M-  inutes  10  Dec.  1913,11  Feb  1914,  CP  1/13;  6  Sept.  1916 
CP  1/5., 
11  32  Minutes  Directors'  committee  9  JulY  1913-  T"11 
33  Board  Minutes  20  May,  4  Nov  1914  CP  1/4. 
34  Ibid  Directors'  report  to  AGM  14  oct.  1914  CP  1/4. 
336. the  friction  was  purely  internal  as  the  increasing  intergration 
of  the  four  associated  companies  revealed  certain  disparities 
between  them  in  the  rates  of  pay  for  similar  jobs.  The  L.  P.  D. 
company's  men  objected  to  a  proposal  to  extend  to  them  the  scale 
of  wages  and  commission  applied  at  Carter  Paterson's  main  depot 
at  Goswell  road.  The  directors  made  certain  concessions  in 
their  favour  but  addod  a  rider  that  they  would  have  to  come  into 
line  before  very  long.  In  September  1913  the  horse-keepers  at 
Goswell  road  asked  for  an  extra  2/-  per  week  to  give  them  Parity 
with  Pickfords?  men  doing  the  same  work  and  a  few  weeks  later 
there  was  trouble  with  some  of  the  Beans  Express  men  over  similar 
complaints, 
35 
These  episodes  were  minor  nuisances  more  than 
anything  else  but  they  expressed  real  anomalies  that  had  to  be 
ironed  out  before  full  integration  could  properly  proceed.  Other 
than  the  episode  mentioned  there  is  no  sign  of  strikes  to 
maintain  differentials  and  probably  the  problem  was  tackldd  by  a 
vf  w&,  %,  L 
general  /ý 
levelling  of  wages. 
The  most  serious  unrest  derived  from  issues  and  events  which 
were  essentially  rational  in  character.  Although  the  strikes 
and  militancy  of  1912  did  not  recur  on  the  same  scale  in  1913, 
tension  and  disturbances  continued. 
36 
In  September  1913  Pickfordst 
directors  recorded  labour  troubles  in  Dublin,  Liverpool, 
Birmingham  and  Manchester.  37 
Within  a  few  days,  the  joint-board 
had  its  own  strike  to  deal  with. 
38 
On  September  25various 
groups  of  men  employed  at  Goswell  road,  Carter  Paterson's  main 
depot  I  went  6n  strike  for  improved  wages  and  hours  and  recognition 
of  the  Transport  Workers  Federation.  The  leaders  of  the 
Amalgamated  Society  of  Carter  Paterson  Employees  urged  the  board 
35  Ibid  9  July,  26  Sept.  8  Oct  1913  CP  1/3 
36  Polling  History  of  British  tradeunionism  p  138. 
37  Minutes  Directors'  co-,.  -,  mittee  17  Sept.  157-1  ?,:  L  I/  13 
38  The  following  is  based  on  Board  Minutes  26  Sept,  1,15  oct.  lp--_, 
CP  1/3;  also  Commercial  Motor  Vol,  JLý71913-14)  P  107. 
337. to  refuse  recognition  to  the  T.  W.  F.  -but  instead  to  publish  the 
irates  it  would  offer  and  then  open  the  gates.  This  was  donep 
but  to  no  avail.  '  To  get  a  return  to  work  the  board  was  obliged 
to  give  way;  they  conceded 
demands  on  wages  and  hours. 
almost  abject  forp  to  avoid 
dismissed  and  complained  of 
instated  and  two  others  who 
:  full  day's-wages  had  their 
recognition  and  most  of  the  men's 
Indeed  the  board's  surrender  was 
further  trouble,  two  men  who  had  been 
victimisation  were  hurriedly  re- 
worked  only  two  hours  and  claimed  a 
claim  met. 
So  the  directors  lost  that  round,  perhaps  being  taken 
unawaresp  and  no  doubt  it  rankled  because  they  made  sure  they  won 
the  next  conte  st. 
39 
Part  of  the  settlement  of  the  SePtembe.  r 
strike  was  the  concession  of  a  56  hour  week,  instead  of  the  54 
hours  demandedv  with  the  promise  that  a  further  reduction  would 
be  considered  in  six  months  time.  When  this  time  camep  however, 
the  directors  decided  that  it  should  be  left  to  the  meA  to 
raise  the  matter  and  that  in  any  case  no  further  reduction  could 
be  considered.  It  was  realised  that  a  strike  at  Goswell  road 
would  be  the  result  and  the  directors  accordingly  made  their 
]preparations.  , 
Arrangements  were  made  that  in  the  event  of  a 
strike  150  men  would  be  drafted  in  from 
office  clerical  staff  be  called  up,  A 
Jr.  L. 
- 
except  the  senior  supervisors  were  A 
down 
The  strike  was  delayed  until  late  April 
other  depots  and  the  head 
11  the  weekly  employees 
, graded  to  the  daily  staff. 
but  when  it  came  the 
management  moved  decisively.  Men  Ifere  immediately  brought  in  from 
other  depots  as  well  as  all  grades  of  head  office  staff  ) 
together 
with  "imported'  free  labour".  Traffic  was  diverted  to  other 
39  Ibid  25  Feb.  25,27  March,  31  22  April  1914  CP  1/3,1/4. 
338. depots  and  successfully  cleared.  None  of  the  men  who  left  their 
jobs  were  re-instated  but  were  permanently  replaced  by  the 
imported  labour.  The  new  men  lacked  the  experience  of  those 
they  replaced  and  had  to  be  trained  up,  but  this  was  the  price 
which  had  to  be  paid.  Two  points  are  of  general  interest  in 
this  episodep  the  lack  of  solidarity  among  the  men  and  the 
marked  contrast  in  the  directors'  action  compared  with  that  of 
six  months  previously,  There  is  no  obvious  explanation  for  this 
turn-round  6n  their  part.  It  seems,  however,  that  the  pressure 
of  labour  unrest  eased  from  that  time. 
Apart  from  labour  troubles 
) 
the  slow  progress  towards  full 
amalgamation  was  attributed  to  opposition  in  the  parcels  carrying 
trade.  Although  the  source  of  this  opposition  was  not  specified, 
it  almost  certainly  referred  to  the  activities  of  a  firm  new  to 
the  parcels  tradev  W.  &.  G.  Express  Carriers.  This  firm  was  a  new 
-venture  of  W.  &.  G.  du  Cros  who  are  perhaps  better  Imown  for  the 
fleet  of  Napier  built  taxi-cabs  they  operated  in  London. 
4o 
In 
the  couple  or  so  years  prior  to  1913  the  motor-cab  trade  in 
London  had  been  frequently  disrupted  by  labour  disputes  and  a 
motorised  delivery  service  of  light  poxcels  seemed  to  offer  "a 
second  line  of  defence.  "  The  now  service  was  announced  in 
Februaryq  1913,41  commenced  within  a  few  weeks  and  built  up 
very  rapidly.  By  the  September  of  1913  W.  &.  G.  Express  had  100 
vans  on  t1re  road  and  was  soon  taking  additional  premises  and 
planning  a  further  250  vehicles* 
42 
Such  rapid  expansion-suggests 
that  entry  to  the  trade  must  he.  Ve  been  relatively  easy  when 
40  C.  H.  Wilson-and  W. J.  Reader  Men  and  machines,  a  history  of 
D.  Napier  &  Son  (1958)  P  719  p  97;  for  the  background  to 
the  formation  of  the  parcels  business  Conmercial  Motor  Vol.  17 
(1913)  p  152;  also  World's  Carriers  Vol.  10  (1913-14)  P  27- 
41  Board  Minutes  26  Feb.  1913  CP  1/39 
42  Ibid  10  Dec.  1913  CP  1/3;  Commercial  Motor  Vol.  18  (1913-14) 
p  lp  74. 
339* considerable  capital  resources  were  available,  In  no  sense  was 
the  appearance  of  lf.  &.  G.  Express  a  direct  or  indirect  response  to 
an  attempted  monopoly  but  the  firm's  forceful  competition  under- 
mined  what  had  been  one  of  the  prime  hopes  of  the  amalgamated 
concerns,  that  of  eliminating  rate  cutting  and  ensuring  full  rates 
on  all  classes  of  traffic. 
Immediately  the  joint-board  heard  of  the  now  company,  H.  R. 
Paterson  was  deputed  to  see  its  promoters  to  try  and  come  to  an 
understanding  concerning  rates.  The  du  Cros  denied  both  any 
wish  to  cut  rates  and  allegations  that  such  occurences  were  taking 
place.  Satisfactory  terms  could  not  be  agreed  and  the  joint- 
board  decided  that  traffic  must  be  hold  at  any  cost. 
43 
The 
associated  companies  thus  found  themselves  back  in  the  vicious 
circle  of  lengthening  hours  of  work  and  rate-cutting  from  which 
they  had  so  recently  sought  to  release  themselves  by  amalgamation, 
-Indeed 
the  position  was  probably  considerably  worse  for  W.  &.  G. 
Express  mounted  a  formidable  and  very  successful  campaign, 
44 
which  prov6d  very  costly  to  meet.  At.  a  time  when  the  financial 
position  was  already  strainedv  the  board  had  to  authorise  capital 
spending  on  additional  motorsp  which  it  had  hoped  to  avoid. 
4.5 
Also  when  W,  &.  G.  extended  its  services  to  include  Home  Counties 
deliveries  but  at  the  rate  for  suburban  deliveriesq  Carter 
Paterson  had  no  option  but  to  follow  suite  by  lowering  its  own 
chargeso 
46 
The  Joint-board  clearly  lacked  the  resources  to  dki-ve  off 
the  new  competition  but  turned  to  the  other  option  of  buying  off  its 
43  Board  Minutes  26  Feb,  12  March  1913  CP  1/3. 
44  There  were  many  instances  of  W.  &.  G.  taking  business  from  Carter 
PateFsonv  Pickfords  and  Beans.  Board  Minutes  March  1913  to 
March  1914  passim  CP  1/39  1/4;  Minutes  Directorst  committee 
Pic  1/17,1/18. 
4.5  Board  Minutes  23  April,  25  June,  13  Aug.  1913  CP  1/3. 
46  Ibid  28  Jang  11  Feb  1913  CP  1/3;  Commercial  Motor  Vol.  18 
(1913-14)  p  454. 
340. competitor. 
47 
Consideration  of  this  possibility  was  taken  up 
as  early  as  July  1913  and  discussions  continued  spasmodically 
. 
for  several  months:  but  W.  &.  G.  was  not  to  be  bought  off  cheaply, 
-while  J.  J.  Paterson  was  not  convinced  of  the  firm's  viability. 
In  time  the  subject  of  discussion  shifted  from  take-over  to 
amalgamation  and  the  terms  of  an  arrangement  on  the  latter  basis 
had  been  more  or  less  agreed  by  early  August  1914  when  the  outbreak 
of  war  intervened.  With  the  consent  of  both  sides  the  proposal 
-was  dropped.  To  some  extent  the  group's  problems  on  this  score 
largely  solved  themselves  as  the  W.  &.  G.  company  increasingly 
turned  to  war  work  for  the  government  and  reduced  its  drive  for 
parcels  traffic. 
By  the  autumn  of  1914,  therefore,  the  way  was  at  last  clear 
for  a  full  re-organisation  of  the  joint-business  to  be  implemented. 
Details  were  worked  out  for  a  new  structure  of  management  and 
working  and  the  revised  scheme  was  introduced  from  1  January  1915, 
The  group's  various  activitiest  itemised  as  21  in  all, 
48 
were 
ordered  into  major  categories  and  reduced  to  eight  main  sections. 
Each  section  was  supervised  by  a  committee  of  three  directors  who, 
together  with  the  managing  directorl  were  responsible  to  the  board 
for  its  routine  management.  The  directors  served  on  each 
committee  for  three  yearsq  on  a  rotational  basis,  so  that  over  a 
period  of  years  all  would  acquire  a  detailed  knowledge  of  the 
business* 
49 
L.  H.  Baxendale  did  not  Join  any  of  them.  At  the  same 
time  the  distribution  of  services  within  the  groupq  essentially 
between  Carter  Paterson  and  Pickfordsp  was  also  finalised, 
50 
47  The  following  is  based  on  Board  Minutes  30  July  13  Aug  1913 
CP  1/3;  69  20  May,  I  JulY9  7t  12  Aug  1914  CP  1/4. 
48  Ibid  11  Feb.  1914  CP  1/3 
49  Ibid,  4  Nov.  2,9,30  Dec:  1914  CP  1/4.  The  eight  management 
committees  were,  1.  Finance;  2y  London  traffiep  which  included 
the  Home  Counties  Express;  3.  Heavy  haulage  and  hire  contracts;  4.  Country  traffic;  5.  Property;  6,  Horse  and  provender;  7  Van 
and  motor  works;  8.  Audit. 
50  Committee  2  essentially  supervised  the  Carter  Paterson  side  and 
committees  3  and  4  the  Pickford  side.  The  other  five  committees 
acted  for  the  whole  joint  business. 
41. The  implications  for  Pickfords  were  two-fold,  firstp  all  parcels 
business  was  finally  given  up  and  for  the  future  Pickfords 
specialised  in  two  main  areas  -  heavy  haulage  and  contract  hirep 
and  country  traffic,  which  was  taken  to  include  foreign  traffic, 
shipping,  household  removals  and  warehousingp  ticket  sales  and 
van  adverts.  Essentiallyt  therefore,  Pickfords  shed  one  of  its 
past  activities  and  continued  the  rest  on  behalf  of  the  group  as 
a  whole.  On  the  management  side,  secondlyt  there  was  rather 
rnore  fundamental  change.  Each  of  these  two  sections  was  managed 
by  a  committee  drawn  from  the  whole  of  the  Joint-board:  Pickfords' 
directors'  c'ommitteet*  which  had  continued  in  the  daily  management 
of  the  business  since  the  amalaamationt  was  now  wound  up,  The 
position  of  Pic'kfords'  board  of  directors  remained  unchanged, 
L.  H.  Baxendale  recorded  his  hopes  that  the  disappointingly  slow 
progress  towards  amalgamation  over  the  proceeding  two  years'would 
now  be  replaced  by  speedy  advance. 
51 
Baxendale's  hopes  however,  were  only  Partially  fulfilled  for 
although  the  pa  rcels  business  was  reduced  to  a  single  sorvice, 
relatively  little  progress  was  made  in  other  respects.  The  reason 
was  that  war  had  broken  out  a  few  monthiý  before  the  re-organis- 
ation  had  been  put  into  effect.  It  is  significant  that  the 
Inevitable  dislocation  of  war  was  not  considered  sufficient  reason 
to  abandon  a  programme  of  reform  which  of  itself  necessarily 
Involved  further  upsets.  It  is  not  that  the  disruption  of  war 
was  likely  to,  have  been  ignored  or  over-looked:  the  trade 
depression  and  strong  inflation  of  horse  and  fodder  Prices  during 
the  Boer  War  was  too  recent  an  experience  for  that.  52 
51  Roprd  Minuten  19  Jan  1915  Pic  1/9 
52  Directors'  report  to  AG14  9  Au,  9  1900  CP  1/1;  4  Oct.  Igol 
CP  1/2, 
342. But  these  influences  had  previously  been  relatively  short-lived 
and  absorbed  without  critical  effeats.  What  was  not,  and  could 
not  beg  appreciated  in  1914  was  the  intensity  of  the  strain  which 
total  war  was  to  bring,  for  an  individual  business  as  for  the 
whole  economy. 
For  years  past  both  Carter  Paterson  and  Pickfords  had 
participated  in  the  liar  Office  Scheme  whereby  in  return  for  a 
small  annual  subsidy  firms  contracted  to  releaso  a  given  number 
of  horses  in  the  event  of  war.  Certain  classes  of  motor  vehicles 
had  recently  been  brought  into  a  similar  scheme.  Immediately 
upon  mobilizationg  thereforeq  the  group  was  obliged  to  surrender 
a  large  number  of  horses  and  vehicles;  fifty-seven  motors  were 
taken  in  London  alone. 
53  By  the  end  of  the  War  the  group  had  been 
drained  of  2,500  men,  1800  horses  and  85  motors,  . 
54  No  business 
could-withstand  such  losses  without  serious  effect  and  it  is  not 
surprising  that  the  push  to  full  integration  lost  momentum. 
Indeed  at  times  6heer  survival  seemed  difficult  enough, 
The  outbreak  of  war  was  soon  followed  by  a  whole  range  of 
shortages,  of  labourv  motorsq  petrolt  horse-fodderv  which  together 
-with  rising  prices  brought  the  joint  business  under  severe  strain. 
The  loss  of  labour  was  especially  serious  on  the  parcels  side 
since  the  carments  detailed  knowledge  of  their  cartage  and 
delivery  rounds  was  an  essential  prop  of  the  whole  business. 
Large  numbers  of  women  and  army  rejects  were  taken  on  but  the  loss 
was  primarily  qualitativev  and  not  easily  made  up.  After  the 
: Lnitial  losses  from  voluntary  enlistment,  strenuous  efforts  were 
53  Commercial  Motor  Vol.  19  (1914)  p  596.  See  also  WorldIs 
Carriers.  Vol,  15  (1918-19)  p  278  where  it  is  sta  ed  that 
over  80  motors  and  hoarly  2000  horses  were  mobilised  with 
the  original  expeditionary  force. 
54  Memorandum  on  Carter  Paterson  &  Co.  's  business  dated  11.4.1919 
cP  4/33* 
343. made-to  hold  on  to  the  most  experienced  and  thus  the  most 
valuable  staff.  In  May  1916  the  Finsbury  Recruitment 
A  proposed 
to  take  670  men  under  thirty  years  of  aget  including  nearly  350 
of  the  best  carmen.  The  board  believed  that  such  an  outflow 
Ifould  push  the  company  into  liquidation  and  intervened  directly 
with  the  Tribunal.  On  this  occasion  a  reasonably  satisfactory 
bargain  was  struck  whereby,  although  670  men  had  to  be  given  up, 
the  board  was-allowed  to  list  and  retain  those  carmen  who  were 
considered  vital  for  the  continuation  of  business. 
55 
However  the 
outcome  of  subsequent  approaches  was  not  always  so  helpful.  As 
the  pressure  for  more  and  more  front  line  troops  mountedv  it 
became  increasingly  impossi  ble  to  resist,  the  Tribunalts  demands. 
From  July  1917  reserved  status  was  withdrawn  from  all  the  companyls 
single  men  and  married  men  aged  thirty-one  or  less,  thus  opening 
. 
56 
the  way  to  further  recruitment.  In  January  1918  the  board 
offered  to  release  all  men  aged  between  eighteen  and  twenty-four, 
57 
If  the  supply  of  qualified  labour  was  the  most  critical 
shortage2  other  scarcities  raised  acute  problems.  It  proved 
impossiblev  for  example,  at  least  in  the  short-run,  to  find 
replacements  for  the  motors  handed  over  to  the  War  Office.  Neither 
Leyland  or  Daimler  could  quote  a  delivery  date  and  of  28  Vehicles 
ordered  from  Tilling-Stevens,  25  were  impressed  by  the  Government 
before  they  left  the  factory. 
58 
The  price  of  a  Tilling-Stevens 
two-ton  petro,  1  motor  went  up  by  ten  per  cent  within  two  weeks  of 
-war  being  declared, 
59 
Even  if  the  situation  later  eased  a  little, 
the  introduction  of  petrol  rationing  from  1  August  1916  together 
with  a  sharp  rise  in  price  -  in  November  1916  the  contract  price 
55  Board  Minutes  10  May  1916p  21  March,  4  April  1917  CP  1/5- 
56  Ibid  25  July  1917  CP  1/5- 
57  Tbid  9  jan  1918  cp  116. 
58  Ibid  129  19  Aug,  2  Sept.  21  Dct,  2  Dec.  1914  CP  1/4. 
59  Ibid  19  Aug* 
344. of  petrol  supplied  to  the  group  rose  from  I/-  to  I/111d  a  Callon  - 
brought  new  difficulties. 
60 
Coal-gas  was  advocated  in  the  trade 
jou  rnals  as  an  alternative  fuel 
61 
and  steam  made  a  strong  revival 
62 
but  the  board's  main  response  was  to  replace  motors  with  horses. 
63 
Apparently  enough  horses  were  available  to  do  this,  but  the  supply 
of  hay  and  straw  became  a  nightmare.  Both  of  these  crops  came 
under  War  Office  control  and  at  timesp  especially  through  1918, 
the  board  had  to  fight  hard,  on  one  occasion  threatening  a  question 
In  the  House  of  Gommonsp  in  order  to  get  even  the  minimum  require- 
ments.. 
64 
The  condition  of  the  stud  deteriorated  badly  on  account 
of  the  shortage  of  fodder  and  the  directors  began  to  turn  to  steam 
-vehicles  to  relieve  the  pressure. 
65 
The  wide  range  of  scarcities  inevitably  resulted  in  a  marked 
rise  in  unit  costs.  InýFebruary  191.5  the  out-door  staff  claimed 
a  specia 
II 
war  bonus  to  meet  the  incrqased  cost  of  living,  a  pattern 
followed  in  subsequent  wage  claims  through  the  war  years. 
presumably  these  payments,  as  bonuses  to  meet  exceptional 
circumstancesp  were  technically  temporary,  but  in  time  they  were 
absorbed  into  the  basic  scale  and  so  pushed  wages  permanently 
upwards.  The  rising  trend  of  costs  for  all  commodities  during 
the  war  years  is  well  known:  one  particul;  ar  example  will  suffice 
to-illustrate  what  this  meant  in  the  case  of  motor  transport, 
60  Commercial  Motor,  Vol.  23  (1916)  p  420,424;  Board  Minutes 
29  Nov.  1916  CP  1/.  5,,  ,  61  Commercial.  Motor  Vol.  23  (1916)  p,  441,  Vol.  24  (1916-17)  P_77 
151;  Vol,  25  (1917)  Passim.  World's  Carriers,  Vol.  13  (1916  1fl 
p  2859  2969  313. 
62  Commercial  Motor  Vol.  23  (1916)  p  462,  Vol.  25  (1917)  P  3859 
p  430  fT  ,  Vol.  28  (1918-19)  p  23. 
63  Board  Minutes 
'9 
Aug  1916,12  June  1917  CP  115-  Immediately 
following  the  introduction  of  petrol  rationing  25  motors  were 
taken  off  and  100  horses  put  on. 
64  Ibid  5t  19  April,  10,31  May,  26  July  1916  CP  115.  The  position 
became  critical  from  the  spring  of  1918.  Ibid  27  Marchl  17,24 
Aprilo  29  May,  23  Oct.  1918  CP  116. 
65  Ibidq  109  17  Oct.  -19  Dec,  1917;  27  March,  24  April,  1918  CP  115. 
34.5. in  1907  the'quoted  price  of  a  new  Foden  steam  waggon  was  L550.66 
13y  the  spring  of  1917  a  new  vehicle  was  still  available  at  C600  but 
then  the  price  soared  as  petrol  and  fodder  shortages  enhanced  the 
competitive  position  of  steam.  The  price  had  leapt  to  L928  by 
Februa'ry-1918  and  L1200  before  the  end  of  the  year.  By  this  time 
the  Iýoard  was  willing  to  spend  over  ElOOO  on  a  second-hand  model. 
67 
3:  t  is'quite  possible  that  an  important  consideration  behind  the 
purchase  of  a  small  furniture  business  that  year  was  the  inclusion 
of  a  steam-waggon  in  the  sale* 
68 
Rising  unit  costs  werep  howeverg  accompanied  by,  a  fall  in 
aggregate-costs  as  the  volume  of  business  declined.  Behind  this 
overall  trend  the  two  major  components  of  total  costs,  wages  and 
provendert'  moved  in  opposite  directions.  Despite  a  big  reduction 
in  the  number  of  horses  employed,  there  was  a  marked  rise,  both 
relatively  and  absolutely,  in  the  level  of  provender  costs:  so 
soon  as  the  Ma  y  of  1915,  when  the  stud  had  been  reduced  by  950 
6 
horseso  feed  costs  had  already  risen  at  a  rate  of  E45,000  per  annug. 
ilowever  the  outflow  of  labour  to  the  Army  was  sufficiently  large 
to  reduce  the  wages  bill,  in  spite  of  war  bonuses,  by  an  amount 
which  more  than  off-set  the  rise  in  feed  costs.  But  inevitably 
revenue  was  also  reduced  and  unfortunately  led  the  downward  spiral. 
J)uring  the  December  half-year  1915  aggregate  expenses  of  the 
combined  business-fell  by  E4152  compared  with  twelve  months 
70 
previouslyp  but  revenue  fell  even  more  by  L8521.  The  gap 
continued  to  widen  in  1916  -  95000  in  March,  E7000  in  April,  71 
66.  Minutes  Directors'  committee  23  Oct  1907  Picl/13 
67  Minutes,  Heavy  haulage  committee  7  March,  4  April  1917;  20  Feb. 
30  Oct,  14  Nov  1918  Pic  1/20.  Board  Minutes  24  April  1918  CP  116. 
68  Board  Minutes  29  May  1918  CP  17-i-Ifinutes,  -Country  Traffic 
committee  28  June  1918  Pic  1/19.  The  board  offered  C1150  for 
the  business*  the  steam  waggon  was  valued  at  L97ý--  P 
69  Board  Minutes  14  July  1915  CP  1/4'.  The  stated  reduction  of  the 
studv  by  950  horses  is  markedly  less  than  the  claimed  losses 
consequent  upon  mobilisation  noted  above.  .  (N6tes  53  and  54). 
presumably  the  balance  had  been  made  up  by  fresh  purchases. 
70  Ibid 
,9 
Feb.  1916  CP  115. 
71  Ibid  10  May  14  June  1916  CP  ý/,  5* 
346. Inevitably  profit  margins  collapsed  under  the  pressure.  Although 
the  year's  accounts  for  1915  did  not  allow  an  ordinary  dividend 
to  be  paid,  there  was  still  a  favourable  balance  of  C139000  after 
depreciation  and  interest  charges.  But  in  1916  a  loss  of  E9000 
was  incurredq  wh  ich  rose  to  920,000  in  1917.72  Morale  slumped. 
By  November  1916  J.  J.  Paterson  had  despaired  of  any  improvement 
In  conditionst  especially  the  shortage  of  labour,  and  intimated 
his  willingness  to  sell  off  his  capital  holding  in  the  business 
at  much  legs  then  its  nominal  value  if  a  purchaser  could  be 
found. 
73 
Although  the  effects  of  shortages  and  rising  prices  were  felt 
by  all  sections  of  the  combined  business,  the  force  of  their  impact 
-varied  considerably.  Pickfordsq  having  opportunely  shed  its 
interests  in  parcels  trafficq  managed  to  escape  the  worst  of  the 
damage.  The  main  brunt  of  the  impact  was  borne  by  the  Carter 
Paterson  side  of  the  group.  From  1  January  1915  all  parcels  traffic 
was  brought  into  a  singlev  bombined  service  worked  from  Goswell 
roadt  Carter  Paterson's  headquarters,  and  it  was  on  the  parcels 
traffic  that  all  the  disruptive  effects  of  the  war  were  most 
acutely  concentrated.  The  loss  of  many  experienced  carmen  was 
critical  and  together  with  all  the  other  difficulties  of  supply 
and  rising  costs9  seriously  undermined  the  business.  But  the 
basic  fact  was  that  the  parcels  traffic  simply  disintegrated.  The 
following  figures  indicate  the  rate  and  extent  of  the  collapse. 
]3y  May  1916  the  total  volume  of  traffic  handled  by  the  joint 
service  was  somewhat  less  than  that  dealt  with  by  Goswell  road 
72  Ibid 
'1 
Dec,  1915.25  Octt  1  Nov.  1916  Cp  l/.  5;  21,28  Nov, 
1917  CP  116  The  loss  reported  to  the  1917  AGM  was  L25pOO09 
but  that  did  not  allow  for  a  profit  of  C5,000  forthcoming  from 
Pickfords  and  Beans  Express.. 
73  Jbid  29  Nov.  1916  CP  1/5. 
347. alone  only  twelve  months  previous  ly, 
74 
I 
Number  of  parcels  passing  through  the  combined  business(OOO) 
I  June  -T  year  December  -ý  year  Whole  year 
1914  approx  14m.  13p  548  27,548 
. 
1915  12,163  109759  22,922 
jL916  8,6o6  7ý631  16t237 
IL917  6031  69117  12,448 
1918  lOt293 
1919  129584 
Source:  the  figures  for  1914  to  1917  are  from 
Board  Minutes 
,5 
June  1918;  the  figures  for  1918 
and  1919  are  from  CP  4/16  Stntistics  (1887-1927) 
relating  to  Carter  Paterson  &  Co. 
The  range  of  responses  to  this  situation  was  necessarily 
JLimited.  One  was  simply  to  adapt  to  the  new  circumstances  by 
reducing  the  frequency  of  services  to  all  areas  and  eliminating 
them  in  marginal  areas.  By  the  spring  of  1918  the  parcels  service 
liad  been  withdrawn  in  120  London  and  suburban  areas,  chiefly  the 
outer  districtsv  and  80  Home  Counties  plac  I es. 
75 
All  parcels  work 
in  Birmingham  was  also  abandoned. 
76 
There  were,  however,  two 
further  potential  lines  of  action;  to  increase,  if  at  all 
possiblet  the,  company's  share  of  the  declining  market  and  to  secure 
the  maximum  revenue  from  whatever  portion  was  retained. 
Carter  Paterson  clearly  failed  to  increase  its  parcels  traffic 
but  the  fall  would  have  been  immediately  more  pronounced  had  the 
74  Ibid  10  May  1916  CP  115. 
'75  Ibid  17  April-1918  CP  1/6.  jhis  seems  to  have  been  the  lowest 
ebb  on  the  parcels  side  3  ince  a  few  months  later  the  number 
of  delivery'areas  was  increased  in  a  successful  effort  to 
increase  revenue.  Ibid  21  Aug,  11  Sept.  1918  CP  1/6. 
76  Minutes  Country  Traffic  co!  Bmittee  8  Oct,  1915  pic  1 
348. company's  position  not  been  boosted  by  the  purchase  of  W.  &.  G, 
Express  in  the  summer  of  19,577  The  W.  &.  G.  was,  by  thong  anxious 
to  concentrate  on  its  war  work  for  the  Government  dnd  initiated 
a  new  round  of  the  negotiations  which  had  been  abandoned  when  war 
was  declared.  Previously  the  terms  demanded  by  the  W.  &.  G.  would 
have  obliged  Carter  Paterson  to  take  over  that  company's  entire 
premises  plant  and  staff  but  the  deal  now  proposed  withdrew  most 
of  these  stipulations  and  virtually  offered  the  business  without 
conditions.  Carter  Paterson  had  spare  capacity  of  its  own  and 
could  have  had  no  interest  in  acquiring  moreg  but  cast  in  these 
terms  the  deal  promised  a  substantial  increase  in  traffict 
estimated  at  50,000  parcels  a  week  and  worth  LIOOO  in  revenue,  at 
little  additional  cost.  So  the  deal  went  through;  W.  &.  G.  was 
bought  and  closed  down  in  a  matter  of  weeks  and  the  extra  traffic 
and'revenue  absorbed  into  the  existing  system.  The  acquisition 
of  W.  &.  G.  no  doubt  slowed  the  rate  of  loss  of  traffic  for  a  time 
but  it  evidently  did  not  halt  it.  However  perhaps  the  main  value 
of  the  deal  to  Carter  Paterson  was  the  additional  influence  in 
the  market  which  it  brought.  Although  a  rates  aereement, 
78 
similar  to  that  of  1907  existed  between  Carter  Paterson  and  W.  &.  G. 
Express,  the  latter  had  remained  a  potentially  major  competitor. 
This  threat  was  now  removed. 
The  fall-off  in  traffic  was  due  to  a  number  of  causes*  In 
part  there  was  an  absolute  reduction  in  the  volume  of  traffic  as 
the  civilian  sector  of  the  war  economy  shrank.  In  addition  to 
this  some  customers  economised  by  bulking  several  small  parcels 
77  The  following  is  based  on  Board  Minutes  1,9  Dec.  19149  2016, 
24  June,  16  July,  29  Sept,  1915  cp  1/4. 
78  jbid  139  27  Jan,  24  Feb.  10  March  1915  CP  1/4. 
349. into  a  larger  single  one  (shades  of  former  battles!  )  and  so 
avoided  paying  per  item.  The  practice  explained  a  reduction  of 
20,000  parcels  a  month  from  a  sýingle  firm. 
79 
On  the  other  hand 
I 
the  fall-off  owed  something  to  the  switching  of  traffic  to  competing 
servicesq  to  the  Post  Office  in  the  case  of  light  parcels  and  the 
railways  for  heavy  parcels.  It  is  evident  that  at  these  upper  and 
lower  thresholdsp  which  themselves  would  vary  according  to  price 
movementsp-demand  was  significantly  price  elastic.  For  example  in 
1915  a  penny  increase  in  the  parcels  post  was  immediately  followed 
b3r  the  return  to  Carter  Paterson  of  129000  parcels  a  day  which  had 
earlier  been  lost'on  account  of  a  rates  increase.  Some  of  these, 
however,  soon  return  to  the  Post  Office  when  Carter  Paterson  added 
80 
to  its  own  rates.  Similarly  when  the  company,  later  on  in  the 
war`9  raised  its  rates  by  a  substantial  margin,  it  promptly  lost  to 
tlLi.  e'railways  some  of  its  heavy  traffic  to  the  London  suburbs.  The 
company's  position,  vis-a-vis  the  railways  was  not  helped  by  the 
60-vernment  policy-of  subsidising  freight  rates  by  goods  trains  and 
thus  maintaining  them  at  an  artifically  low  level.  Indeed  it  found 
81 
that  the  railway's  competition  extended  to  even  light  parcels. 
The  board  was  therefore  faced  with  something  of  a  dilemma  in 
formulating  its  pricing  policy  and  displayed  a  sense  of  insecurity 
b3r  consciously  chosing  to  avoid  increases  which  might  cause  offence 
to  customerst 
82 
and  thus  lose  traffic.  Consequently  rate  increases 
tended  to  be  delayed  until  they  were  absolutely  necessaryg  were 
d:  Lsguised  as  a  war  levy,  and  were  usually  no  more  than  the  minimum. 
79,  Ibid  8  March  1916,  CP  115*  The  tactic  was  to  divert  such  traffic 
from  the  parcels  service  to  Pickfords  heavy  cartage  service. 
Accordingly  the  Heavy  Haulage  committee  was  asked  to  keep  watch 
for  such  cases  and  when  any  were  detected  the  higher  parcels  rateg 
not  the  tonnage  ratet  was  to  be  charged.  (Minutes  17  Nov  1915 
Pic  1/20).  The  parallel  with  Pickfords  &  Co  V.  Grand  Junction 
railway  compaqy  is  singularly  ±ronic. 
80  Board  Minutes  13  Oct.  1915  CP  1/4;  Minutes  Heavy  Haulage  committee 
12  Jan  Fq-ý-16Pic  1/20. 
81  Board  Minutes  16t  23  Jan,  17  July  1918  CP  1/6;  Minutes  Heav3r 
Haulagr  committeet  6  Feb  1918  Pic  1/20. 
82-  Directors'-report  to  AGM  1  Nov'.  1916  CP  1/5. 
350. necessary  to  cover  commitments  at  current  costs  and  levels  of 
tiraffice  As  a  result  such  increases  were  invariably  eroded  within 
ti-iree  or  four  months  by  a  further  rise  in  costs  and  fall  in  tr*affic. 
83 
Not  until  the  end'of  1917,  when  the  companyle  financial  position 
-WeLs  getting  desperateg  did  the  board  break  out  of  the  vicious  circle 
by  raising  its  rates  sufficiently  to  put  the  business  on  its  feet 
again.  Even  then  it  only  acted  with  the  advice  and  support  of  the 
Board  of  Trade. 
8:  4 
Inevitably  some  traffic  was  lost  to  the  railways 
but  not  enough  to  prevent  the  small  profit  of  C3194  for  the  December 
ha1f-year  1917,,  itself  the  first  profit  on  the  parcels  business  for 
t-wo  yearsq  from  being  boosted  to  E30,304  in  the  June  half-year  1918ý5 
Concern  about  the  future  was  at  last  allayed,  Not  all  companies  were 
so  fortunate;  Globe  Parcels  Expressl  for  example,  went  to  the  wall.. 
86 
Pickfords  withdrew  from  parcels  work  but  continued  its  other 
vairled  activitiesq  'on  which  the  impact  of  the  war  differed  in  effect. 
ThO  ticket  and  travel  business,  not  surprisingly,  was  badly  hit. 
ThO  outbreak  of  war  immediately  put  an  end  to  the  autumn  travel 
programme  for  1914  and  all  plans  lapsed  for  the  duration  of  the  war. 
lJoine  trave  I  similarly  fell  and  ticket  sales  slumped. 
87 
Pickfords' 
pjrovincial  traffic  also  came  under  heavy  pressure  as  the  whole  range 
O:  f  shortages  and  rising  costs  took  their  toll.  An  estimate  made  at 
the  beginning  of  1916  suggested  that  less  than  half  the  provincial 
Agencies  a's  measured  by  the  total  capital  employed,  wouldyield  the 
desired  return  On  capital  of  15%  while  almost  a  quarter  would  show 
no  or  very  little  profit. 
88 
Sinae  the  estimate  did  not  allow  for  the 
8-1  For  examplet  rates  were  increased  in  March,  Augo  and  Nov.  in  1915 
and  on  each  occasion  the  potential  net  addition  to  revenue  failed 
to  materialise  because  of  further  traffic  falls  and  increased 
expenditure. 
84  Board  Minutes  21,28  Nov.  1917  CP  1/6. 
85  Y-bid,  28P  30  Aug.  1918  CP  1/6. 
86  jbid  10  April,  1918  CP  1/6;  the  Liverpool 
' 
Parcels  Delivery  Co., 
founded  in  1866,  was  also  obliged  to  close  down  at  least  for  the 
duration  of  the  war.  World's  Carriers  Vol.  15  (1918-19)  p  14 
(Oct.  1918).  . 
87  ,  Traffic  committee  8  Oct.  1915,11  Feb,  7  April, 
1916.  Pic  1/19. 
88  :  [bid  14  Jan  1916  Pic  1/19. 
351. f1lirther  deterioration  in  labour  supply,  it  is  unlikely  that  even 
these  results  were  achieved.  Some  of  the  marginal  agencies  had 
aiLveady  been  closed,  at  least  temporarily,  and  others  were  subsequently 
added  to  the  list. 
However  other  sections  of  the  business  were  stimulated  by  the 
WaIr.  Household  removals  and  storage,  whichInd  previously  existed 
Orl  a  rather  ad  hoc  basis,  developed  a  now  importance  in  both  London 
arid  the  provinceso  Extra  warehouse  space  was  acquired  and  a  couple 
small  firms  were  bought;  the  basis  was  laid  for  a  major  expansion 
:  Lr,  Lto  this  category  of  business  in  the  post7war  years. 
89 
Traffic  at 
p:  Lckfords'  wharf  boomed.  Profits  rose  from  C700  for  the  December 
1.1alf-year  1914  to  almost  L39500  for  the  same  period  in  1917,  a 
substantial  real  increase  even  allowing  for  the  decline  in  the  value 
c):  C,  money. 
go  The  goods  handled  were  mainly  foodstuffs 
.- 
flourv  cheese 
and  especially  canned  goods.  Pickfords  acted  as  distribution  agent 
: fOx-  Libby's  and  other  firms.  Bulk  consignments  were  received  at  the 
Wliarf  and  then  broken  down  into  delivery  lots,  This  class  of  business 
,,,.  s  especially  valuable  because  Pickfords  received  commission  from 
X-e-labelling  and  re-packaging  the  goodsp  revenue  from  warehousing 
dtiesp  and  employment  for  its  hea  . vy  cartage  teams.  91 
The  motor  departmento  now  under  the  immediate  management  of 
Mjr.  W.  Elliot,  who  became  Pickfords'  general  manager  a  few  years 
jLaterv  also  benefitted  from  war  demand.  It  is  not  clear  exactly 
. When  Pickfords  began  doing  contract  work  for  the  government, 
92 
but 
t1le  connection  was.  valuable  in  both  a  strategic  and  economic  sense. 
89  Ibid  passiml;  also  The  Driving  Mirror  Vol.  No.  4  Christmas  1947 
p  6,  History  of  Pickfords'  removal  deparlment. 
90  Ibid  -14  Jan  1916,25  Jan  1918  Pic  1/19. 
91  jbid  7  Sept,  19  Oct.  1917  12  July,  1918  Pic  1/19., 
92  The  first  clear  indic  ation  comes  in  December.  1915  but  it  might 
have  started  earlier  than  that.  This-section  i's  based  on 
Minutes,  Heavy  Haulag  e  committee  passim  (1915-1918  inclusive) 
352. The  transportation  of  aircraft  frames  qualified  Pickfords  for  the 
assIstance  of  the  Ministry  of  Munitions.  Exemption  badges  were 
received  for  fitters  and  drivers  directly  employed  in  this  way, 
and  certificates  for  the  purchase  of  motors  and  extra  supplies  of 
petrol  when  it  was  rationed.  Overall  Pickfords  would  seem  to  have 
dorne  out  of  the  war  quite  well,  In  1916  and  1917,  when  the  joint 
business  as  a  whole  was  sliding  further  and  further  into  deficit, 
pIckfords  managed  to  show  a  small  profit  (Table  12.2) 
The  fortunes  of  the  group  as  a  whole  had  begun  to  pick  up 
before  the  war  ended,  while  the  armistice  was  followed  by  even 
: f:  L:  rmer  recovery.  Profits  revived  steadily,  so  that  in  September  1919 
t1le  directors  co.  uld  Inform  the  shareholders  that  the  back-log  of 
deficitso  preferred  charges  and  interest  had  been  el4minated  and 
t1tiato  for  the  first  time  since  1914,  a  dividend,  four  per  cent, 
Cotild  be  paid  on  the  ordinary  shares, 
93  The  successful  rates  increase 
,t  the  beginnine  of  1918  had  restored  the  board's  self-confidence 
and 
immediately  upon  the  armistice  plans  were  laid  to  return  the 
business  to  its  pre-war  position.  A  major  expansion  of  motor 
transport  was  seen  as  the  key  element  in  the  recovery  programmefbr 
ajLjL  sides  of  the  businessq  parcelsp  provincial  traffict  removals 
,  cnd  heavy  haulage  alike. 
94  Daily  motor  delivery  servibes  would  be 
, extended 
to  places  far  beyond  the  pre-war  limits  Df  the  Home 
C;  Ounties  districts;  the  possibility  of  trunking  direct  to  the 
provinces 
by  road  instead  of  rail  was  also  raised, 
95 
Consequently 
Old'stock  was  cleared  out  and  large  orders  placed  with  Napiers, 
93  Directors'  report  to  AGM  30  Sept.  1919  CP  1/7- 
94  Board  Minutes  27  Nov,  4  Dec.  1918  CP  1/6;  Minutes'Counlýr  Traffic 
committee  179  31  Jant  28  Feb.  28  March  1919;  Minutes  heavy 
Haulage  committee  16  Jan  1919, 
9_5  Board  Minutes  30  July,  13  Aug.  3  Dec.  1919  CP  1/7. 
353. Leylands  and  Tilling-Stevens  for  new  petrol  motors,  Pickfords' 
travel  interests  were  also  immediately  revived  and  one  or  two 
novel  features  introduced  -  weekend  or  week-long  char-a-banc  tours 
of  the  West  Countryv  South  Wales  and  the  Lakes,  and  a  ticket-agency 
:f  or  "Mr.  Handley  Page  Is  air  trips  .  ,  96 
All  of  th15  required  a  heavy  capital  outlay  but  the  group'5 
,  recovered  prosperity  gave  every  hope  that  the  finance  would  be 
:  forthcoming  without  too  much  strain.  Nonetheless  the  board's 
decision  to  proceed  with  caution  was  wise, 
97 
since  the  future 
structure  of  the  transport  industry  was  very  uncertain  in  the 
:  Lnirnediate  post-war  years* 
98 
The  government's  declared  aim  was'.  to 
.  promote  cheap  transport  and  although  to  some  this  meant  national- 
:  Lsation  of  the  railways  what  mattered  to  Carter  Paterson  was  whether 
or  not  the  government's  war-time  subsidy  of  freight  rates  was  to  be 
r_ontinued.  The  directors  therefore  approached  the  Board  of  Trade 
for  clarificationt"  on  the  grounds  that  considerable  capital 
spending  was  liable  to  be  put  at  risk;  no  private  firm  could  match 
the  force  of  state-aided  competition.  However  to  cover  such  an 
emergency  the  board  put  forward  a  scheme,  in  the  time  honoured 
method  of  dealing  with  undefeatable  opponents,  by  which  Carter 
paterson's  facilities  would  be  merged  with  those  of  the  railway 
companiest  and  the  Post  Office  so  as  to  provide  the  public  with  a 
cheap 
/ 
and  comprehensive  parcels  delivery  service.  Although  this 
episode  was  not  co-uched  exactly  in  the  terms  of  the  'road  versus 
x-aill  debate  of  the  inter-war  yearso  the  basic  issue  was  already  on 
tile  agenda. 
96  Minutes,  CountrX  Traffi  C  committee  29  Novq1918;  March  14,  May 
19,1919  Pic  1/19, 
97  Board  Minutes  13  Aug.  1919  C?  '1-7 
98  Dyos  &  Aldcroft 
' 
British  transport  p  290  ff 
99  the  following  is  based  on  a  ýIemorandum  presented  to  Sir  William 
Marwood,  Board  of  Trade  20,1.1919.  CP  "  4/33.  Discussions  were  also 
held  with  Sir  H.  Walker,  chairman  of  the  Railway  Execu 
* 
tive,  and 
also  with  Sir  P.  Nash  and  Sir  Eric  Geddes  to  discover  the 
intentions  of  the  forthcoming  Ministry  of  Transport. 
3.54 From  Pickfords'  point  of  viewq  however,  more  important 
discussions  were  taking  place  elsewhereq  for  by  the  spring  of  1.919 
negotiations  were  under  way  which  resulted  in  the  firm  being  sold 
to  the  Hays  Wharf  Cartage  company,  a  subsidiary  of  the  Proprietors 
of  Hays  Wharf. 
100 
Hays  Wharf's  main  point  of  contact  was  on  the 
ileavy  cartage  side  but  its  bid  was  for  the  whole  of  Pickfords' 
:  Lnterests  which  had  not  yet  been  absorbed  into  Carter  Paterson. 
The  fact  that  Pickfords  could  be  detached  without  disrupting  the 
X-est  of  the  group  demonstrates  how  limited,  on  account  of  the  war, 
the  degree  of  integration  other  than  for  parcels  had  been. 
The  negotiations  ran  through  the  whole  range  of  possibilities 
as  the  joint-board  tried  to  interest  Hays  Wharf  in  a  merger 
embracing  the  whole  group  or  the  joint  flotation  of  a  public  company. 
j3ut  Hays  Wharf  was  interested  only  in  a  cash  and  shares  offer  for 
pIckfords  and  on  these  terms  the  deal  was  finally  settled  at  a 
purchase  price  of  L371,881.6.10d.  L.  H.  Baxendale,  N.  O.  Walker,  and 
J.  Paterson,  inFreference  to  the  protesting  G.  V.  Baxendaleý  joined 
-the  board  of  Hays  Wharf  Cartage  Company. 
101 
Walker  resigned  from 
Carter  Paterson  and  J.  J.  Paterson  and  H.  R.  Paterson  resigned  from 
pickfords.  L.  H.  Baxendalet  G.  V.  Baxendale,  J.  Paterson  and  O.  Day 
continued-as  directors  of  Pickfords  but  L.  H.  Baxendale  resigned  as 
chairman  in  favour  of  Major  O.  C.  Magniac  of  Hays  Wharf. 
102 
Baxendale 
continued  as  chairman  of  Carter  Pat.  erson  and  for  the  future 
JLOO  A.  Ellis  Three  hundred  years  on  London  =iver.  The  Hay's  Wharf 
story 
' 
1651-1951  (1952)  p  109.  The  discussion 
' 
of  the  negotiations 
is  based  on  Board  Minutes  9  April,  4,18  Junev  20  16  July, 
24  Sept-  5.  Nov,  10  Dec.  1919  CP  1/7;  also  correspondence  and 
papers  concerning  the  sale  Pic  HH;  Board  Minutes  9  Jan  1920, 
Pic  1/9. 
101  Board  Minutes  5  Nov-  1919  CP  1/7. 
102 
_ibid 
14  Jan,  1920  CP  1/7;  Board  Minutes  14,20  Jan,  4  Aug  1920 
Pic  1/9. 
355. concentrated  his  business  activities  on  that  concern. 
So  the  links  between  the  Baxendale  family  and  Pickfords, 
:  Ln:  Lti6tbd  in  1817,  weakened  further.  Pickfords  had  already  passed 
out  of  the  family's  control  in  1912  and  now  it  was  no  longer  even 
headed  by  a  member  of  the  family.  Thus  the  position  remained 
until  1933  when  Pickfords  passed  into  new  ownership,  that  of  the 
:  rour  main  line  railway  companies,.  Baxendale's  resignation  from 
the  board  finalised  the  end  of  an  era  in  PickfordIs  history. 
356. CHAPTER  1,3 
CONCLUSION During  the  170  years  of  Pickfords'  history  examined-'here, 
there  were  three  radical  breaks  in  the  technology  of  transportation, 
The  construction  of  canals  from  the  mid-eighteenth  centuryt  the 
advent  of  the  steam  locomotive  in  the  1820sp  and  the  introduction 
of  motor  transport  in  the  twentieth  centuryq  all  three  developments 
had  a  fundamental  impact  on  the  structure  of  transport  services. 
This  effect  was  most  forcibly  felt  in  the  case  of  railways  and 
rnotors.  Canal  conveyance  essentially  added  a  new  dimension  and 
scale  to  the  pre-existing  transport  systemp  whereas  ihe  innovation 
of  both  railways  and  motors  resulted  in  a  clash  of  interests  between 
rival  transport  forms.  For  a  firm  to  survive  over  a  lengthy 
period  of  years  and,  in  the  meantimep  absorb  the  innovation  of 
successive  new  technologiest  suggests  a  high  degree  of  sustained 
enterprise.  To  be  the  sole  survivor  of  a  cluster  of  firms  in 
the  mid-eighteenth  century  suggests  that  its-experience  was  in 
some  ways  exceptional.  Yet  this  was  Pickfords'  achievement.  What 
reasons  and  conditions  lay  behind  it? 
(1756-1817)  The  payments'  and  financial  crisis  If  1815-18179 
. resulting  in  the  introduction  of  new  partners  to  the  business 
from  outside  of  the  family  and  the  early  loss  of  control  to  them, 
inarks  a  major  break  in  Pickfords'  development.  During  the 
preceeding  years  since  James  Pickfords'  first  known  activities 
as  a  Manchester  to  London  waggoner,  the  conditions  within  which 
pickfords  operated  had  been  transformed. 
From  about  the  middle  of  the  eighteenth  century  the  British 
economy  began  to  undergo  that  process  of  change  which,  with  the 
357. Innovation  of  new  technologies  and  methods  of  productionp  has 
since  been  characterised  as  the  Industrial  Revolution.  The  growth 
I 
of  modern  industryq  involving  much  bigger  units  of  production  and 
rapidly  rising  levels  of  aggregate  outputp  inevitably  resulted  in 
a  vastly  increased  demand  for  transport  services.  Greatly  increased 
quantities,  of  raw  materials  had  to  be  conveyed  to  the  centres  of 
production  and  manufactured  goods  to  domestic  and  export  markets. 
pressureýfrom  this  source  stimulated  the  improvement  of  existing 
ineans  of  conveyance  and  the  innovation  of  an  entirely  new  form  of 
transportation. 
The  application  of  new  methods  of  organisation  and  technique 
significantly  raised  the  efficiency  of  road  transport.  The  supply 
of  road  transport  services  grew  in  volume  and  regularity  and  by 
the  early  years  of  the  nineteenth  century  the  condition  of  the 
roads  has  been  so  far  improved  that  goods  could  be  conveyed  in 
special  light-weight  vehicles  and  at  faster  speeds  than  had  ever 
been  known  before.  The  demand  for  transport  services  was,  however, 
so  strong  that  an  altogether  new  technology,  that  of  canal 
conveyance,  was  required  to  meet  it.  Canals  in  their  turn  promoted 
further  growth  iri  the  economy. 
The  industrialisation  and  growth  of  the  British  economyq  and 
the  consequent  increased  volume  of  traffic  to  be  transported, 
provided  the  conditions  for  the  development  of  firms  whose  business 
was  the  suppl  y  of  transport  services.  By  1750  the  structure  of  the 
inland  carrying  trade,  including  that  of  the  long-distance  trade, 
was  already  well  formed  and  from  about  1770  the  number  of  carrying 
concerns  rapidly  increased.  Expansion  in  the  carrying  trade  was 
accompanied  by  specialisation,  as  the  carrier  ceased  to  convey 
passengers  and  concentrated  his  attentions  solely  on  the  business 
of  goods  traffic.  The  construction  of  canals  positively  promoted 
the  carrierls  businessp  that  of  the.  long  distance  carrier  in 
358. particular.  Because  of  a  fear  of  monopoly,  the  companies  who 
owned  and  built  the  canals  were  prohibited  from  engaging  in  the 
carrying  of  goods  over  them.  Canal  conveyance,  thereforet  offered 
a  major  opportunity  to  those  with  the  enterprise  to  exploit  it. 
Between  1756  and  1817  Pickfords  was  transformed  from  a  small 
iroad  haulage  concerng  operating  a  handful  of  waegons  between 
Manchester  and  London,  to  one  which  provided  road  and  canal  transport 
sex-vices  on  a  substantial  scale  over  a  considerable  part  of  the 
country.  Expansion  in  the  volume  and  range  of  Pickfords'  services 
was  accompanied  by  the  acquisition  of  permanent  premises  in  London 
and  Manchesterv  by  the  lease  of  wharfs  and  warehouses  from  several 
canal  companies-9  the  pur.  chase  of  a  sizeable  road  haulage  business 
:  Ln  Leicester  and  the  extensioqof  its  canal  services  to  Birmingham, 
For  the  first  twenty  years  there  was  no  significant  change  in 
the  scale  or  character  of  Pickfords'  business;  that  came  from  the 
later  1770s  when  Matthew  1ýickford  was  in  control  of  the  firm. 
3:  n  common  with  the  other  carriers  in  Manchester,  Pickfords'  road 
services,  to  and  from  London  were  increased  from  two  a  week  to  a 
daily  service  (excludinG  Sundays).  Services  were  introduced  on 
other  routes  and,  after  Matthew  Pickfords'  deathp  the  specialised 
: fly-van  service  added  a  significant  extension  to  the  firms  range 
of  road  haulage  facilities.  It  was  also  during  Matthew  Pickfords' 
life  time  that  Pickford5l  interests  were  extended  to  include 
canal  conveyancet  a  line  of  business  which  his  successors  in  the 
family,  concern  actively  promoted.  By  1817  Pickfords  operated 
over  most  of_the  major  canals  between  London  and  Lancashire  and 
][lad  emerged  as  one  of  the  leading  firms  of  canal  carriers  in 
ti-le  country. 
Although  this  phase  of  Pickfords'  development  ended  in  crisis, 
there  were  certain  features  which  marked  Pickfords  out  from  others 
in  the  trade,  Already  at  the  time  of  Matthew  Pickford'sl  death 
359. In  17999  Pickfords  was  one  of  only  two  carrying  firms  in  Manchester 
, which  traded  to  and  from  London  to  survive  from  James  Pickford's 
time.  Pickfords  thus  possessed  a  degree  of  durability  which  most 
other  firms  lacked.  Another  feature  which  differentiated  Pickfords 
: from  others  in  the  London  trade  was  its  use  of  canals.  Whereas 
other  road  carriers  did  not  adopt  canal  conveyance  until  after  1800p 
it  had-b6come  an  Integral  part  of  Pickfords'  services  for  several 
years  prior  to  Matthew  Pickford's  death. 
It  is  impossible  to.  define  to  any  significant  extent  Matthew 
pickfordst  personal  contribution  to  the  family  firm.  Continuity 
from  his  father  and  mother  and  a  life-long  concern  with  the  business 
arc  the  minimumv  and  of  importance  in  themselves.  His  interest 
in  the  coaching  trade.  and  the  timing  of  hisadoption  of  canal 
conveyance  suggest,  a  degree  of  energy  and  enterprise,  but  as  so 
little  is  known  about  Matthew  Pickford,  it  is  difficult  to  be 
any  more  specific.  Possibly  he  imparted  a  certain  momentum  to 
business  which.  survived  his  death  for  a  time,  but  which  his 
successors  were  unable  to  maintain. 
After  Matthew  PickfGrd's  deathq  Pickfords  continued  to  expand 
both  by-land  and  water.  The  purchase  of  Clarkets  waggons  in 
Leicester  added  a  new  dimension  to  the  road  haulage-side  of  the 
businesso  and  new  canal  services  were  started  from  Birmingham  and 
Derby  to  London,  and  between  Birmingham  and  Leicester.  Enterprise 
ifas  apparently  not  absentg  but  as  the  volume  of  traffic  and 
scale  of  organisation  increasedp  so  greater  demands  would  be  made 
of  those  who  controlled  the  business,  The  chief  requirements  would 
be  those  of  character  -  initiativev  but  also  energy,  close 
attention  to  business,  and  above  all,  the  abilit-ý  to  dominate  an 
extended  organisation..  The  relationship  between  the  success  or 
failure  of  an  enterprise  and  the  life  and  death  of-a  dominant 
: founder  or  personality  remained  a  Prominent  feature  of  business 
360. In  the  early  nineteenth  century.  Individuals  rather  than 
Institutions  determined  continuity,  but  a  business  temperament 
was  not  necessarily  handed  on  from  father  to  son.  It  is  impossible 
to  say  whether  the  third  generation  of  Pickfords  lacked  the  ability 
or  the  will  to  continue  the  business.  What  is  cloar  is  that 
pickfords'  revival  was  based  on  the  new  blood  taken  into  the 
partnership  in  1817  and  in  particular  on  the  energies  and  forceful 
personality  of  one  of  the  new  partners,  Joseph  Baxendale. 
(1817-1847)  The  economic  depression  which  followed  the 
conclusion  of  the  French  wars  and  the  accompanying  decline  in  the 
canal  trade  no  doubt  helps  to  explain  the  timing  of  Pickfords' 
crisis  in  1817.  Dull  conditions  still  prevailed  when  the 
partnership  was  reformed  by  the  inclusion  of  Langtonp  Inman  and 
]Baxendale#  and  general  economic  recovery  was  delayed  until  about 
1820.  There  then  followed  some  fifteen  years  of  strong,  if 
eraticp  economic  advance,  but  in  the  later  18308  trade  began  to 
weaken  and  severe  depression  returned  during  the  first  years  of  the 
jL840s.  Subsequent  recovery  was  interrupted  by  the  financial  crisis 
of  1846-7v  but  then  strengthened  into,,  a  long  period  of  sustained 
expansion. 
During  the  fifteen  or  so  years  after  18170  road  and  canal 
transpor 
It 
reached  their  peak  of  development,  Although  the  challenge 
of  steap-power  began  to  attract  attention  from  about  1825,  the 
steam  engine  was  not  then  seen  as  the  threat  it  ultimately  became. 
Efforts  to  adopt  the  new  technology  to  the  needs  of  canal  conveyance 
, Were  not  successful.  Instead  it  took  the  form  of  the  steam 
locomotivey  the  powerful  competition  of  which  had  by  1840  brought 
l  B.  Supple  'The  great  capitalist  man-hunt.  A  review  article,  ' 
Business  History  Vol.  VI  (1963-4)  esp,  P  55.  See  also  S.  G. 
Checkland's  review  of  D.  C.  Coleman  Courtauldsq  Economic  History 
Review  Vol.  XX111  (1970)  PP  556-560. 
361. severe  disruption  to  the  existing  pattern  of  transport  services. 
For  most  of  these  years  Pickfords  benefitted  from  the  stimulus 
of  continued  economic  growth  and  the  stability  of  transport 
-technology.  Joseph  Baxendale  brought  firm  guidance  and  leadership, 
and  with  the  improvement  Of  trade  Pickfords  recovered  and  prospored, 
The  waggon  service  between  London  and  Manchester  was  continued, 
I 
and  new  services  started  to  several  towns  from  Sheffield  and 
Manchester.  Additional  fly-vans  were  introduced,  to  give  a  network 
of  vans  between  London  and  Manchosterg  Liverpool  and  Sheffield. 
Canal  conveyance  similarly  advanced.  A  new  and  major  canal 
Ileadquarters  was  built  at  City  road  basin  when  the  Regents  canal 
was  opened  in  1820.  The  fleet  of  canal  boats  was  completely 
0-verhauled  and  increased  in  number.  By  the  mid-1830s  the  canal 
t:  fly-tradel  was  dominated  by  a  handful  Of  firms.  Bache,  Kenworthy, 
Crowley,  Robinsp  Shiptong  all  of  which  opprated  on  a  national 
-basisp  but  Pickfords  was  widely  recognised  as  the  biggest  and 
Inost  important  of  them. 
The  advent  of  railways  changed  this  position  entirely.  The 
canal  carriers'  control  of  the  inland  transpcýrtation  of  merchandise 
traffic  owed  much'to  the  prohibition  which  prevented  canal  companies 
: rrom  also  acting  as  carrying  concerns.  The  carriers'  position, 
thereforet  depended  as  much  on  legal  as  economic  considerations. 
The  original  intention  of  applying  the  same  terms  of  public  access 
to  the  railways  as  already  existed  in  respect  of  roads  and  canals 
turned  out  to  be  unworkable.  This  outcome  was  of  critical 
Importance  for  the  carriers.  The  protection  which  the  law  had 
previously  conferred  on  them  was  removed.  The  railway  companies 
emerged  as  direct  competitors  for  the  merchandise  trade  which  also 
controlled  the  necessary  means  of  conveyance.  Once  the  railway 
companies  added  to  their  other  functions  that  of  public  carrierg 
t1le  existing  carriers  had  of  necessity  to  give  way.  to  them. 
362. Pickfords'  experience  illu.,  §trates  the  point.  From  the 
late  1830s  railway  transportation  was  adopted  as  canal  conveyance 
had  been  previously.  A  large  railway  headquarters  was  built  at 
Camden  Town  and  traffic  was  conveyed  by  rail  over  a  wide  area  of 
the  country.  But  Pickfords  met  resistance  from  the  Grand  Junction 
railway  company  which  controlled  direct  access  to  Liverpool. 
The  Grand  Junction  company  was  determined  to  retain  control  of 
all  aspects  of  its  enterprise  and  showed  a  particular  hostility 
to  the  carriers.  Pickfords'  main  response,  while  maintaining  its 
competition  through  the  use  of  other  railway  routes  and  the  canals, 
was  to  seek  a  legal  remedy.  This  took  the  form  of  Pickfords' 
court  action  against  the  Grand  Junction  railway  company  and 
Baxendale's  attempt  to  persuade  the  1844  select  committee  of 
]Parliament  to  prohibit  railway  companies  from  acting  as  carriers 
beyond  the  limits  of  their  own  lines.  When  both  of  these  efforts 
: failedv  and  the  tondon  &  Birmingham  railway  company's  open  policy 
was  reversed  following  the  creation  of  the  London  &  North  Western 
railway  compaiýLy  in  1846  Pickfords  had  no  alternative  but  to 
:  recognise  that  its  days  as  an  independent  carrier  were  over. 
As  the  leading  canal  carrier,  and  with  extensive  custom  in 
Londonp  Liverpool  and  Manchesterv  Pickfords  had  much  to  offer  the 
LNIM  -  which  itself  was  the  largest  railway  company.  As  agents  to 
the  LNWRlPickfords  lost  its  former  independence  but  made 
Significant  gains*  Above  all  its  continued  existence  as  a 
transport  firm  was  ensured;  most  of  the  other  canal  carriers 
disappeared.  In  addition,  Pickfords  retained  its  national 
framework  of  operations  and  although  the  terms  on  which  its  agency 
work  was  carried  out  were  strictly  controlled  by  the  railway 
companypthe  firm  was  not  tdally  dominated.  Much  of  its  former 
identity  was  maintained,  so  that  even  at  the  end  of  the  nineteenth 
century  many  firms  still  consigned  'by  Pickfordt  rather  than  by 
the  LNWR. 
363. (1847-1,901)  In  the  long  termp  the  advent  of  railways  posed 
the  biggest  single  threat  to  Pickfords'  survival,  But  PickfordS 
turned  the  threat  by  becomingt  as  agent  to  the  LNWRp  an  integral 
part  of  the  railway  system..  Having  achieved  this  positiong  there 
was  no  reason  for  Pickfords  to  be  dislodged.  The  lone  boom  of 
the  third  quarter  of  the  nineteenth  century  further  stimulated  the 
demand  for  transport  services  and  since  it  was  railways  which 
primarily  met  the  demando  Pickfords  would'also  benefit,  By  the 
Inid-1870sp  when  the  boom  ended,  the  change  in  the  composition 
of  railway  traffict  i.  e.  the  frequent  dispatch  of  individually 
small  consignments  instead  of  occasional  and  large  consignments, 
together  with  the  expansion  of  urban  cartaget  especially-in  the 
London  areav  ensured  that  stock  was  not  left  idle.  As  transport 
technology  remained  stable  until  the  end  of  the  centurythe  structure 
of  the  transport  industry  was  undisturbed. 
In  these  conditions  Pickfords  was  more  likely  to  continue 
than  fail.  As  long  as  Pickfords  remained  agent  to  the  LNWR,  it 
was  effectively  beyond  the  threat  of  competition  in  a  substantial 
part  of  its  business.  Its  only  potential  competitor  was  its 
co-agent  Chaplin  &  Horne;  when  that  firm  was  wound  up  in  1877, 
Pickfords  was  left  unchallenged.  Pickfords  thus  became  part  of 
the  institutional  structure  of  the  railway  industry,  The  business 
could  be  left  to  take  care  of  itselft  as  Joseph  Baxendale  complained 
in  the  1860s,  without  coming  to  serious  harm,  Pickfords'  demise 
was  most  likely  to  occur  as  the  result  of  a  deliýerate  act: 
the  LNWR9  for  example,  might  decide  not  to  renew  the  agency  or 
decide  to  take  over  its  agent's  business,  as  it  did  that  of 
Chaplin  &  Horne.  Neither  of  these  conditions  would  have  immediately 
destroyed  Pickfords  as  it  had  other  interests  than  its  agency  w,  ork, 
but  it  would  have  been  seriously  embarrassedp  as  later  events 
showed.  On  Pickfords'  sidev  there  was  little  likelihood  at  this 
364Q stagep  that  the  agency  contract  would  be  delilverately  abandoned, 
The  sale  of  the  business,  which  was  actually  under  consideration 
In  18709  would  have  been  the  most  likely  end.  But  none  of  these 
possibilities  materialised. 
However,  if  there  was  no  threat  to  survival  there  were 
opportunities  to  be  exploited,  especially  in  the  London  area, 
The  growth  of  London's  suburbs  stimulated  an  extension  of  urban 
cartage  both  for  parcels  traffic  and  also  railway  work  beyond  the 
area  of  free  collection  and  delivery.  A  number  of  new  and 
-vigorous  concerns  appeared  to  exploit  the  trade,  such  as  Carter 
Patersont  and  competition  was  keen.  Pickfords  claimed  its 
portion  of  business,  and  by  1880  'Was  sharine  a  position  of  leader- 
ship  in  the  London  parcels  trade  with  Carter  Paterson.  During  the 
1870s  and  1880s  Pickfords  added  a  number  of  other  activities, 
including  household  removals  and  a  small  shipping  interest  to  and 
from  the  Isle  of  Wight.  By  the  end  of  the  nineteenth  century 
therefore,  Piclýfords  had  developed  into  a  firm  with  general 
transport  interests  among  which  agency  work  for  the  LNWR9  although 
by  far  the  most  valuableg  was  one  of  several  lines  of  business. 
(1901-1920)  Pickfordst  development  during  the  first  two  decades 
of  the  twentieth  century  was  affected  by  a  wide  range  of  influences. 
F,  conomic  conditions  were  generally  less  favourable  than  they  had 
been.  Periodic  trade  recessions  took  their  toll  in  reduced 
profits  and  increased  industrial  strife  and  the  severe  run  down 
. of  the  civilian  economy  following  the  outbreak  of  warias 
illustrated  by  the  collapse  of  the  parcels  trade,  added  further 
difficulties.  Conditions  were  rendered  even  more  unstable  by 
a  new  advance  in  technologyq  with  the  advent  of  motor  transport. 
36.5. A  major'effect  of  motor  transport  was  to  enable  road  haulage 
to  compete  with  railways  and  so  offered  transport  firms  the  long- 
-term  prospect  of  less  dependence  on  railways  and  railway  companies. 
I:  n  thisp  motor  transport  was  in  many  ways  adding  a  new  dimension 
to  an  existing  situation.  Horse  transport  in  the  urban  areas  was 
rnainly  complementary  to  railways  but  in  London  there  was  also  an 
element  of  competition.  Up  to  a  distance  of  about  ton  miles 
parcels  firms  could  deliver  tshop  goods' 
2 
and  other  parcels 
traffic  more  quickly  and  cheaply  by  horse  transport  than  if  the 
same  goods  were,  sent  part  way  by  rail.  By  progressively  extending 
the  distance  and  range  of  traffic  over  which  road  transport  could 
compete  with  rail,  motor  transport  widened*the  scope  for  this  kind 
of  business.  So  issues  of  'road  versus  rail'  reached  the  agenda 
for  disCU5siong  but  were  not  the  subject  of  a  full  debate  until 
after  1920. 
Motor  transport  was  destabilising  for  firms  like  Pickfords 
:  Ln  other  ways,  Steam  vehicles,  which  were  essentially  a  new 
-variant  of  an  old  technologyO  soon  reached  technical  maturity. 
13ut  petrol  motorsq  an  entirely  new  technology,  underwent  substantial 
technical  development  within  the  first  few  years  of  their  intro- 
duction;  the  rate  of  obsolescence  of  early  models  was  high.  A 
premature  conversion  to  motor  transport,  petrol  vehicles  in 
particulart  could  have  been  equally  as  damaging  as  the  failure 
to  innovate  quickly  enough.  In  so  far  as  motors,  irrespective  of 
type,  lowered  costs  and  so  made  possible  lower  rates  to  the  public, 
'Shop  goods'  were  the  orders  placed  by  suburban  retail  shop- 
keepers,  with  London  wholesale  firms,  and  which  were  delivered 
by  the  parcels  firms  in  preference  to  the  railways,  See 
evidence  of  Mr.  J.  P.  S.  Gooday,  general  manager  of  the  Great 
Eastern  railway  company,  R.  C.  on  London  Traffic  Vol,  II 
ýCd.  2751)  1905  q-18552  ff;  see  also  Pratt  Railways  and  their 
[tates  pp  98-9. 
366. the  pressure  on  other  firms  to  follow  suite  sharpened  the  edge 
of  competition. 
Pickfords'  adoption  of  motors  was  cautious,  the  guiding 
principle  being  that  of  comparative  cost.  Motors  were  introduced 
-where  they  could  perform  existing  work  more  cheaply  than  horses 
or  could  earn  additional  revenue  by  tapping  sources  of  traffic 
-which  were  closed  t,  o  horses.  Pickfords'  main  use  of  motors  up 
to  '19209  thereforej  was  for  the  haulage  of  heavy  loads,  for  example 
parcels  transfer  traffic  or  aircraff  frames,  or,  as  in  the  now 
service  to  the  outer  London  suburbs,  where  relatively  lone 
distances  were  involved. 
I  Both  economic  and  technical  factors  affected  the  pattern  of 
Pickfords'  development  from  the  beginning  of  the  present  century, 
but  probably  the  most  immediate  and  mott  important  single  influence 
was  the  disastrous  decision  to  abandon  the  agency  contract  with 
the  LNWR.  Two  main  results  followed.  Pickfords  lost  a  valuable 
income  which  it  could  ill  afford  to  let  go  and  J.  W.  Baxendale 
withdrew  from  the  partnership  and  took  most  of  his  capital  with  him* 
so  at  a  time  when  resources  were  needed  to  finance  the  purchase 
of  Motors  and  profit  margins  in  the  London  parcels  trade  were 
being  squeezed  by  sharp  rates  competitiong  Pickfords  was  under- 
capitalised  and  had  suffered  a  marked  reduction  in  its  earning 
power*  Efforts  to  discover  now  sources  of  rdvenue  met  with  only 
modest  success.  So  for  a  third  time  in  its  history,  Pickfords 
raced  a  crisis.  This  time  the  crisis  was  averted  by  an 
amalgamation,  in  1912v  with  its  leading  competitors  in  the  London 
parcels  trade.  Although  difficult  times  were  still  to  comev 
especially  during  the  war  yearsl  Pickford5  continued  existence 
had  once  again  been  ensured, 
367. Three  main  reasons  would  seem  to  account  for  Pickfords'  success 
and  continued  existence  in  1920,  Firstp  Pickfords  showed  a 
consistent  record  of  positive  and  enterprising  response  to  chanaes 
:  Ln  transportation  technology.  Canals,  railwaysq  motors  were  all 
adopted  readily  but  judiciously.  S.  econdly,  at  an  important  phase 
of  its  developmentg  Pickfords  had  the  good  fortune  to  come  under 
the  direction  of  Baxendale,  a  man  of  high  entreprenounial  ability, 
Finally,  on  three  separate  occasionst  successful  solutions  were 
: found  to  conditions  of  crisis. 
Because  of  its  unique  survivalv  Pickfords  is  necessarily  not 
typical  of  other  transport  concerns.  At  each  stage  of  its  history, 
Ilowever,  Pickfords'  experience  essentially  reflected  developments 
:  Ln  transportation  which  were  general  in  character.  The  expansion 
of  road  haulage  services  in  the  later  eighteenth  century,  the  growth 
of  the  canal  ?  fly-trade'  to  its  peak  in  the  1820s  and  1830s,  the 
development  of  the  London  parcels  trade  in  the  later  nineteenth 
centuryo  none  of  these  were  confined  to  Pickfords.  Pickfords 
participated  in  them  to  considerable  effect  but  their  explanation 
lies  in  the  general  condition  of  the  contemporary  economy  and 
technology.  The  particular  interest  of  Pickfords'  history  is 
that  it  illustrates  in  a  single,  continuous  experience  the  impact 
of  changing  modes  of  transportation  over  a  time  period  of  more 
than  150  years.  The  transition  from  one  mode  to  another 
invariably  raised  difficulties.  Pickfords  alone  found  a  satisfactory 
solution  to  all  of  them. 
368* APPENDIX  L. 
THE  ORIGINS  OF  PICKFORDS It  has  proved  impossible  to  find  concrete  support  from  the 
surviving  evidence  for  the  tradition  Of  seventeenth  century 
origins,  The  only  direct  reference  to  this  tradition  in  Pickfords' 
records  occurs  in  January  1908  when  the  directors  approved  "the 
Idea  of  stating  'Established  300  years'  on  all  our  Ticket 
advertisements.  "  There  is  nothing  in  the  Pickford  or  Baxendale 
family  papers-which  casts  any  light  on  this  matter, 
, 
There  is  no  doubt  that  the  directors  decision  was  based  on  a 
current  belief  that  Pickfordst  origins  reached  back  to  the  early 
seventeenth  century.  A  description  of  PIckfords  published  in 
a  new  trade  journal  in  October  1904  clearly  presumed  such  origins. 
2 
The  same  belief*would  seem  to  underpin  the  brief  account  of 
Pickfords  included  in  one  of  C.  G.  Harperts  books  published  at  the 
beginning  ofthe  present  century,  Harper  acknowledged  the 
assistance  of  J.  W.  Baxendalet  then  the  senior  member  of  the  firm, 
3 
and  presumably  derived  his  information  from  him.  In  Harperts 
account  the  Pickfords  entered  the  carrying  trade,  by  purchase  or 
otherwisep  about  1730t  having-acquired  a  pack-horse  business  which 
in  turn  was  said  to  date  from  the  early  seventeenth  century.  In 
view  of  the  following  discussion  it  is  noteworthy  that  on  this 
basis  the  Pickfords  direct,  participation  in  the  carrying  trade 
would  date  from  towards  the  mid-eighteenth  century.  Sherrington 
4 
followed  Harper's  accountt  but  neither  author  cites  any  supporting 
evidence. 
Minutes:  Directors  committee  8  Jan  1908  Pic  1/14. 
2  The  World's  Carriers  Vol,  1,15  Oct.,  1904  p  9. 
3  C.  G,  Harpert  Stage  ý7`oach  and  mail  in  days  of  yore  (1903):  Vol.  IIP 
Chapter  V-'A  great  carrying  firm:  the  story  of  Pickford  and  Co. 
pp  123-143.  In  the  preface  to  Vol.  1  Harper  acknowledges  the 
assistance  of  Mr.  Joseph  Baxendale  for  his  section  on  Pickfords; 
also  C.  G.  Harper  The  Manchester  and  Glasp_ow  road  (Manchester  and 
London  1907t  2nd  revised  edition  1924-T-pp  228-9. 
4  C.  E.  R.  Sherringtont  A  hundred_years  of  inland  transport,  (1934) 
p  37. 
369. The  official  statement  of  Pickfords'  traditional  origins  is 
to 
- 
be  found  in  the  brief  company  history  Trans2ort_Saaa  1646-1947- 
5 
There  the  starting  point  of  1646  is  adopted  basically  on  the 
I  grounds  that  the  State  Papers  at  that  date  contain  references  to 
a  Thomas  Pickford  of  Adlington,  Cheshire,  the  village  where  James 
P:  Lckford  himself  originally  lived.  This  Thomas  Pickfordt  yeoman, 
was  one  of  several  persons  in  that  area  whose  lands  were  sequestered 
on  account  of  Royalist  sympathies.  The  documents  concerned  have 
been  published  elsewhere  but  do  not  indicate  Pickford's  offence. 
6 
The  author's  suogestion  that  Pickford  has  perhaps  been  supplyine 
the  Royalistp  with  horses  and  thus  possibly  already  connected  with 
the  carrying  trade  is  thus  purely  fictional. 
The  Pickford  business  is  assumed  to  have  been,  some  years 
laterv  that  of  contracting  for  the  carriage  of  stone  for  road 
building  in  the  area  of  the  Cheshire-Derbyshire  border.  This 
supposedly  led  into  general  carrying  locally  in  the  Macclesfield 
areap  followed  first  by  extension  to  Manchestert  and  thenp  with 
James  to  London.  Again  this-is  supposition,  for  which  no 
supporting  evidence  can  be  found.  The  scale  of  activity  suggested 
could  only  be  explained  in  terms  of  turnpiking,  yet  no  roads  in 
Macclesfield  district  were  turnpiked  before  1756.7  Similarly 
there  is  no  evidence  of  any  carrying  activities  in  Manchester  prior 
to  this  same  date. 
Transport  saga  1646-1947  (printed  privately  1947).  The  first 
chapter  attempts  to  derive  the  firm's  history  before  1756. 
6  J.  P6Earwakerg  East  Cheshire  past  and  present  (1877)  Vol.  I 
pp  23-6,  Vol.  II  p  232. 
G.  Ormerodv  The  historX  of  thecounty  Palatine  and  city  of 
Chester  (1819)  Vol.  1  PP  38-9. 
F.  Renaudt  Contributions  towards  a  historyof  the  ancient  parish 
of  Prestburytin  Cheshirep  (Chetham.  Society  Publications,  1876 
Vol.  97)  P  105-ý 
7  R.  W.  Lloyd-Jones  An  economic  and  social  history  of  Macclesfield 
r  1700-1850  (Manchester  University  M.  A.  Thesis,  1954,  deposited  in 
ýjacclesfield  Public  Library),  Appendix,  Map  6;  also  W.  Harrison 
'The,  development  of  the  turnpike  system  in  Lancashire  and 
Cheshire'  Lancashire  and  Cheshire  Antiquarian  Society  Vol.  IV 
(1886)  pp  80-92,  esp.  the  accompanying  map,  The  only  turnpiking 
vaguely  in  that  area  was  the  Manchoster-Buxton  road,  under  an 
Act  of  1724. 
370. The  manorial  records  of  Manchester  mention  James'  son  Matthew 
In  1768 
8 
but  nothing  else.  Other  local  records  including 
turnpike  recordsp  poor  rates,  church  leys  and  other  assessed  taxes 
throughout  the  eighteenth  centuryo  contain  no  clear  reference  to 
p:  Lckfords'  carrying  business  before  1794.9  Much  the  same  is  true 
of  London.  Thomas  Le  Laune  10 
published  the  names  of  London 
carriers  in  the  late  seventeenth  century,  but  the  name  of  Pickford 
-was  not  among  them.  The-Pickfords  leased  property  in  London  in 
their  own  right  only  in  1794  and  so  do  not  appear  in  the  City  of 
London  records  until  then. 
11 
All  the  evidence  which  has  been 
examined  has  produced  either  negative  or  inconclusive  results. 
Although  the  traditional  picture  of  Pickfordst  first  beginnings 
way-well  have  some  truth  in  it,  no  positive  evidence  has  yet  been 
discovered  to  ident  ify  it. 
Had  James  Pickford  not  died  intestate  this  whole  difficulty 
would  not  have  arisen.  The  absence  of  a  'will  has  left  a  gap  which 
it  has  proved  very  difficult  to  fill.  It  is  not  known  'with  any 
certainty  who  Jamest  parents  were  and  especially  whether  or  not 
1-ie  inherited  his  stage-waggons.  Direct  evidence  is  absent#  but 
circumstantial  evidence  offers  some  hopes. 
In  JulY  1741  the  death  occurred  of  Matthew  Pickford.  the  Elder 
of  Adlinaton.  Since  his  will  is  registered  and  the  contents  known, 
it  would  become  valuable  evidence  if  it  could  be  demonstrated  that 
this  was  James  Pickford's  father.  Clearly  full  proof  is  impossible 
but  it  is  the  writer's  belief,  that  such  a  relationship  is  more 
8  J.,  P.  Earwaker  (ed)  The  constables'  accounts  of  the  manor  of 
Manchester  (1891-2T  Vol-  39  P  176;  also  J.  P.  Earwaker  (edj- 
Manchester  Court-Leet  records  (1888) 
9  Church  Leys  17o6,1709,1711t  17159  1714. 
Poor  Rates  1733-4,  -1736-9,1743v  17509  1752-31  1756,17709  1794 
Lamp  Tax  1765,  Police  Tax  1770-1.  Manchester  &  Wilmslow  Trust; 
Manchester  and  Rusholme  Trust  -  various  books  of  Deeds  and 
Accounts. 
10  Thomas  De  Laune  The  present  state  of  London  (1681)  Angliae 
Metro2olis  or  the  present  state  of  London  T1690) 
11  E,  Halfpenny  'Pickfordst;  expansion  and  crisis  in  the  early  nine- 
teenth  century.  '  Business  History  Vol.  1  No.  2  (1959)  P  117- 
37  1. IL:  Lkely  than  not.  The  following  discussion  is  based  on  the 
:  Lnternal  evidence  of  five  wills, 
12 
details  of  which  are  attached 
-together  with  the  likely  family  pedigree.  Internal  evidence  of 
three  willsp  those  of  Matthew  Pickford  the  Elder  of  Adlington, 
James  Pickford  of  Lostock  Within  Poyntong  and  John  Pickford  of 
Adlington  supports  the  relationship  plotted  above  the  line  of  the 
accompanying  pedigree.  The  Genealogy  of  the  Pickfordst  carriers, 
:  from  James  and  Martha  on  is  firmly  established.  The  task  is  to 
combine  the  two  sections. 
The  starting  pointq  and  strongest  evidence,  must  be  the  will 
of  James'  widowp  Martha  Pickford.  She  names  as  her  executors  her 
son  Matthew  and  'my  friend  Henry  Richardson  of  Norburyp  Cheshire.  ' 
This  is  almost  certainly  the  same  Henry  Richardson  who  appears  as 
executor  to  both  Matthew  Pickford  the  Elder  and  his  son  John, 
iFirmly  established  above  the  line,  he  may  therefore  be  a  means  of 
jLjnking  the  two  sides* 
What  was  Martha's  connection  with  Richardson?  There  are 
several  possibilities.  He  might  have  been  a  friend  of  Martha's 
own  familyv  of  whom  nothing  is  known  but  their  name,  Johnson. 
Ri  chardson  then  becomes  a  mutual  friend  of  the  Johnson  and  the 
pickford  family  of  Matthew  the  Elder.  Martha  married  a  Pickford 
called  James  -  the  son  of  this  family,  or  of  a  quite  different 
family  of  Pickfords  living  in  the  same  small  area? 
Alternatively,  Martha  might  have  known  Richardson  through  her 
husband.  In  this  case  there  are  two  chief  possibilities. 
Richardson  is  a  mutual  friend  of  two  families  of  Pickfordsq  whose,: 
relationship  to  each  other  cannot  be  determined.  Martha's 
12  This  following  is  based  on  the  transcription  of  wills  taken  by 
the  late  the  Hon.  Mary  Pickford.  These  are  at  K.  S.  /3/1- 
372. : fjriendship  with  Richardson  then  need  not  imply  any  connection 
with  Matthew  Pickford  the  Elder.  The  favourable  assumption  would 
Akso  be  that  Martha's  husband  through  whom  the  contact  was  made  was  the 
A 
son  of  Matthew  Pickford  the  Elder.  On  this  analysisp  Richardson's 
association  is  less  elusivev  and  in  the  circumstances  of  James, 
death,  quite  natural.  Martha  has  turned  to  a  friend  of  her 
husband's  family,  who  has  performed  a  like  service  for  her  father- 
In-law  and  brother-in-law.  This  explanation  would  involve  no 
stretching  of  the  evidence. 
What  other  support  can  be  found?  A  second  Possible  linkaCe 
derives  from  the  will  of  James'  son  Matthew.  Named  as  one  of  his 
executors  is  his  brother-in-law,  Matthew  Priostnall  of  Stockport, 
Liquor  Merchant.  Now  Priestnall  is  a  family  name  already  well 
established  by  marriage  with  the  Pickfords  above  the  line.  Although 
no  direct  evidence  links  Matthew  with  these  other  Priestnallsp 
It  can  be  shown  he  was  acquainted  with  another  family  of  Pickfords. 
A  notice  appeared  in  the  Manchester  Mercury,  13  June  1786,  stating 
that  a  John  Pickford  of  Stockport,  Innkeeper,  had  assigned  his 
estates  and  effects  to  Richard  Harrison,  of  Salford#  Timber 
Merchantt  Matthew  Priestnall  of  Stockport,  Liquor  Merchantt  and 
Matthew  Pickford  of  Stockporty  Innkeeper.  The  repetition  of 
exactly  the  same  designation  makes  it  highly  probable  that  the 
same  Matthew  Priestnall  is  involved.  Is  this  another  and  most 
interesting  coincidencet  and  the  two  sets  of  Pickfords  only  looselyt 
if  at  all  related?  If  the  John  and  Matthew  Pickford  referred  to 
here  can  be  identified  as  the  two  elder  sons  of  John  Pickford  of 
373. Adlingtong  a  favourable  interpretation  would  make  Priestnall  the 
husband  of  one  of  their  cousins.  He  would  thus  be  a  suitable 
person  to  act  in  what  was  probably  a  bankruptcy.  A'similar 
pattern  to  the  Richardson  connection  emerees,  and  a  simple 
interpretation  of  both  of  them  would  point  in  the  same  direction. 
The  background  evidence  to  the  foregoing  discussion  also 
suggests  a  further  consideration;  that  is  the  remarkable  number 
of  references  which  recur  to  the  timber  trade.  The  third 
executor  named  in  the  will  of  Matthew  Pickford  (carrier)  was  John 
Barber  of  Liverpool,  Timber  Merchant.  Matthew  Pickford  the  Elder 
-%as  a  timber  merchantq  and  in  fact  his  will  is  devoted  almost 
entirely  to  the  disposal  of  his  timber  yards  in  Manchester.  A 
notice  in  the  name  of  the  three  executors  of  his  will  in  the 
1,,  Ianchdster  Magazinep  27  July  17429  advertised  their  sale.  Some 
years  later,  one  of  the  assignees  of  John  Pickford  of  Stockport, 
innkeeperp  was  also  engaged  in  the  timber  trade,  and  it  is  possible 
-that  John  Pickford  of  Adlington  might  have  had  indirect  links  with 
the  same  trade.  The  Manchester  Mercury,  6  August  1776p  carried  a 
notice  of  the  sale  of  the  property  and  inheritance  of  a  John  Pickford 
th6  tenant  of  one  of  the  properties  in  Great  Turner  street. 
Reference  to  the  first  Manchester  Directorýof  1772  shows  that 
Thomas  Pickford  of  Great  Turner  S  treet  was  a  timber  merchant,  The 
sale  was  advertised  in  August  1776:  John  Pickford  of  Adlington 
had  died  in.  September  1774.  Were  they  the  same  person?  Possibly, 
The  reference  to  Thomas  Pickford  of  Great  Turner  street  contains 
a  further  interesting  feature.  In  the  next  Directory  of  1781  no 
374. Thomas  Pickford  appears  in  the  general  classification.  But  in 
that  same  issue,  under  the  heading  of  carriers  I 
services,  Matthew 
PIckford's  entry  includes  the  information  that  the  Book-keeper 
: for  the  waggons  in  London  is  Thomas  Pickford.  This  will  have 
been  Matthewls-younger  brother  who  is  known  from  other  sources 
to  have  been  in  London  by  1781.  He  joined  with  Matthewl  and 
looked  after  the  London  end  of  the  business.  Are  the  two  items 
connected,  suggesting  that  Thomas  dabbled  in  timber  before  going 
In  with  his  brother?  Over  a  number  of  years,  there  are  several 
hints  of  some  type  of  family  connection  with  the  timber  trade. 
There  would  be  immediate  points  of  contact  between  this  trade  and 
a  carrier's  business. 
There  are  two  other  possible  clues.  The  first  two  gener- 
ations  of  the  Pickfordsq  carriers)that  is  James  and  Marthaq  and 
their  son  Matthewp  are  buried  in  Prestbury  Churchyard  very  close 
to  the  graves  of  Matthew  Pickford  the  Elder,  and  his  son  John. 
Finallyp  of  the  five  wills  drawn  on  here,  four  are  made  within 
a  few  months  of  the  death  of  the  person  concerned.  The  exception 
is'John  Pickford  of  Adlington,  whose  will  is  dated  six  years 
before  his  death.  He  might  well  have  been  seriously  ill,  but  it 
Is  interesting  to  note  that  it  was  made  within  a  month  of  the 
death  of  James  Pickford  (  carrier)  intestate. 
No  item  of  evidence  presented  here  individually  carries  much 
weight;  taken  together,  however,  some  type  of  pattern  seems  to 
emerge.  At  worst,  they  remain  a  series  of  coincidences  which 
might  or  might  not  suggest  some  relationship.  Makine  a  number  of 
favourable  assumptionsq  however,  some  foundation  'can  be  found 
to  support  the  suggestion  that  Matthew  Pickford  the  Elder  was 
indeed  the  father  of  James  Pickfordp  carrier. 
375. There  ist  in  fact,  one  reference  to  James  Pickford  before 
1756,  but  not  as  a  carrier.  A  surviving  indenture 
13 
dated  25 
March,  17889  records  an  alteration  in  the  terms  on  which  James' 
son  Matthew  held  some  land  from  Sir  George  Warren  of  Poynton, 
lord  of  the  manor  and  chief  landowner  in  the  area.  Two  properties 
were  involvedq  one  which  Matthew  hold  in  his  own  right,  and  a 
second  which  he  had  inherited.  The  agreement  of  1788  referred 
back  to  the  terms  of  the  original  lease  of  this  latter  property, 
showing  that  it  has  been  drawn  in  January  1747.  The  property 
concerned  had  been  made  over  to  'ýTames  Pickford  of  Adlington, 
Farmer,  '  There  is  no  hint  that  the  land  so  leased  by  James  was 
to  be  used  for  any  purposes  other  than  farming,  If  he  was 
engaged  in  carrying  at  allp  at  that  timev  it  can  have  been  no 
more  than  a  subsidiary  interest. 
To  conclude,  no  evidence  has  been  found  to  substantiate 
Pickfordst  existence  before  the  mid-eighteenth  century.  It  is 
notinpossible  that  James  Pickford  acquired  an  existing  business  as 
a  going  concernp 
14 
but  the  argument  of  probability  would  be  that 
It  was  James  who  introduced  the  Pickford  family  to  the  carrying 
trade. 
15 
13  CHP/5.  A  check  on  the  Warren  estate  papers  with  the  Cheshire 
Record  Office  and  Stockport  Library  revealed  no  rent  books  or 
other  papers  which  might  have  thrown  further  light  on  this 
tenýancye 
14  See  Chapter  3. 
15  In  the  late  1920s,  O.  M.  Doyt  Secretary  of  Pickfordsq  promoted 
some  research  into  the  firm's  early  history  to  try  and  establish 
the  date  of  founding,  but  nothing  was  discovered  before  1756. 
The  Hon.  Mary  Pickford  was  working  at  the  same  time,  and 
exchanged  letters  with  Doy,  see  Pic.  4/16.  A  comment  among 
Miss  Pickfordts  extant  notes  indicated  that  she  had  concluded 
that  it  was  James  who  started  the  business. 
376. Digest  of  internal  evidence  Of  wills  in  the  name  of  Pickford 
in  the  Adlington  and  Poynton  area 
Pickford  the  Elder  of  Adlinaton  in  the  parish  of 
Prestbury,  yeoman  and  timber  merchnnt 
b.  1652  d.  3  JulY  1741  (buried  at  Prestbury) 
Will  dated:  4  December  1740  Probate:  29  October  1741 
Refers  to  sons:  John,  Georgev  Matthewp  James 
Daughter:  Prothesia  and  husband  George  Priestnall 
Elizabeth  and  husband  John  Worthington 
Executors  include:  sons  John  and  Matthew 
Henry  Richardson  of  Norburyq  in  Parish 
of  Stockport,  yeoman. 
2.  James  Pickford  of  Lostock  within  Poynton, 
_-Xeoman 
Will  dated:  14  June  1757  Probate:  2  November  1758 
Refers  to:  sister  Thomasin  Hulme 
brother-in-law  Thomas  Priestnall 
nPices  Prothesia,  wife  of  George  Priestnall, 
Elizabeth,  wife  of  John  Worthington 
nephews  George  and  James  Pickford,  sons  of  his 
late  brother  Matthew 
nephew  John  Pickford  of  Lostock 
Executors  include:  nephew  John  Pickford  of  Lostock 
Peter  Jamion  ,  of  Poyntong  Schoolmaster. 
John  Piclcford,  of  Adlington,  yeoman 
b.,  1697  d.  15  September  1774  (Buried  at  Prestbury) 
Will  dated:  18  June,  1768  Probate  11  May  1775 
Refers  to:  sons  Johng  Matthewp  James 
daughters  Alicep  Ann  (  who  Is  married) 
son  in  law  William  Richardson 
Executors  include:  Henry  Richardson,  farmer  of  Norbury 
Peter  Jammion,  Schoolmaster  of  Poynton 
Witnesses  include:  George  Priestnall 
377. 4.  Martha  Pickford  of  Poynton,  i,  ý-idow 
b  171f)  d.  15  May  1772  (buried  at  Prestbury) 
Will  dated:  15  February  1772  Probate  22  March  1773 
Refers  to:  husband  James  (b.  1709  d.  10  May  1768,  buried  at 
Prestbury) 
sons.  Matthew,  George,  Thomas, 
daughter  Mary  Vauxq  Elizabeth  Higginson, 
Martha  Pickford  (  later  1773,  m. 
Matthew  Priestnall) 
Executors:  son  Matthew 
My  friend  Henry  Richardson  of  Norbury,  Cheshire 
5.  Matthew  Pickford  of  Poynton,  aentleman 
b.  1741  d,  9  August  1799  (buried  at  Prestbury) 
Will  dated:  15  April  1799  Probate  27  June  1800 
Executors:  son  Thomas 
brother-in-law  Matthew  Priestnall  of  Stockport, 
Liquor  Merchant 
John  Barber  of  Liverpool,  Timber  Merchant. 
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dA APPENDIX  2. Baxendale  left  a  recordv  for  each  year  ondine  31  March  from 
1818  until  1867,  of  his  profit  cum  salary,  the  value  of  his 
property  including  investmentso  interest  and  dividendst  and 
household  and  other  expenses,  The  only  direct  information  to 
Pickfords  would  seem  to  be  a  document  entitled  'Summary  of  Stock 
Account  from  lst  April  1817  to  1  April  18679  with  memoranda 
relative  to  the  commencement  of  the  partnership.  '  The  figures 
entered  in  column  1  of  Table  6.1  follow  the  heading  'Credit  of 
Stock  AccountIq  to  which  is  added  a  note  "Interest  not  included, 
placed  to  the  credit  of  each  partner  half-yearly.  "  This  would  seem 
to  imply  that  the  figures  entered  as  'Credit  of  Stock  Account' 
are  meant  to  be  a  statement  of  distributable  profitsq  possibly 
on  a  crude  total  receipts  net  of  total  expenditure  basis  % 
made 
at  the  stock-taking  closing  the  financial  year.  Interest  on 
capital  was  apparently  written  in  as  a  costo  but  in  what  way 
capital  was  charged  is  not  known.  Since  partners  were  required 
to  re-invest  their  profitj  precision  would  not  be  paramountg  but 
some  notional  distribution  would  be  required  for  the  future 
charging  of  interest  on  the  accumulated  capital.  Columns  3 
and  4  attempt  to  compare  this  with  an  estimated  actual  profit 
distribution.  Taking  Baxendale's  personal  profit  figure  for  each 
year  and  multiplying  it  by  a  factor  determined  by  his  known 
share  in  the  partnership,  a  total  distributed  profit  figure  is 
obtained.  Totalling  these  annual  figures  into  five-year  periods  0 
Columns  5  and  6pthe  results  show  a  reasonable  match  with  those 
in  Columns  1  and  2,  Relatively  small  differences,  as  in  1822, 
18329  1842  and  1847,  could  be  explained  by  accumulated  error 
due  to  rounding,  etc;  -  larger  differences,  1827,1837,  cannot 
be  explained  on  the  basis  of  the  surviving  evidence.  In  Table  10.1 
there  is  a  similar  difference  of  match  and  the  contrary  between  the 
two  series.  On  the  wholev  however 
I  it  is  f0lt  that  the  two  sets 
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7D of  figures  show  a  sufficient  degree  of  coincidence  to  support 
the  tentative  statements  in  the  text. 
It  has  proved  impossibl,  e  to  discuss  these  figures  excePt 
in  their  absolute  terms.  Figures  2  and  3,  relating  to  table  6.1 
and  table  10.1  respectively,  suggest  that  there  is  no  obvious 
correspondence  between  the  profit  figures  and  one  of  the  standard 
price  series  for  the  period.  In  both  cases  the  movement  of  the 
profit  curve  is  quite  random  in  respect  of  the  index.  A  useful 
contrast  is  provided  by  Fig.  l.  In  this  caseq  fluctuations  in 
the  profits  on  Pickfords'  Manchester  to  London  van 
1 
1818-25P 
broadly  correspond  with  the  movements  of  the  price  index.  The 
contrast  is  interesting.  The  van  profits  probably  represented 
gross  receipts  less  gross  expenditurej  that  iso  there  was  no 
intervention  of  accounting  procedures.  In  this  case  the  index 
would  serve  as  a  deflator.  However  in  the  other  two  cases  the 
figures  represent  a  sort  of  net  profit  i.  e.  after  accounting 
procedures  -  which  were  evidently  such  as  to  prevent  even  the 
broadest  relationship  with  price  movements.  The  most  informative 
ratio  to  have  discovered  would  have  been  the  rate  of  profitt  but. 
_ 
that  is  obviously  impossible. 
I  would  like  to  thank  my  wife  and  my  colleague  Dr.  To 
Gourvish  for  discussion  of  these  points. 
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